Univ. of
Toronto
Library

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/journalofreligio02worcuoft

THE

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION

EDITED BY

G. STANLEY HALL

President of Clark University and Professor of Psychology and Education.

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF

GEORGE A. COE, Northwestern University; THÉODORE FLOURNOY, University of Geneva; JAMES H. LEUBA, Bryn Mawr College; EDWIN D. STARBUCK, Earlham College; R. M.WENLY, University of Michigan, JEAN DU BUY, and others

VOL. 2

MARCH, 1906—JUNE, 1907

89041
171108

LOUIS N. WILSON, PUBLISHER
Worcester, Mass.

COPYRIGHT, 1907, BY G. STANLEY HALL

THE COMMONWEALTH PRESS
O. B. WOOD, PROPRIETOR
WORCESTER, MASS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE.

BECK, FRANK ORMAN. Prayer; a Study in its History and Psychology 107

DIHDWO TWE. A Message from Africa 295

FRANCE, JOSEPH I. The Universal Belief and its Rationality 95

HILL, DAVID SPENCE. The Education and Problems of the Protestant Ministry 204

HUGHES, PERCY. The Types of Religious Attitude . . 272

KAPLAN, RABBI JACOB H. Psychology of Prophecy . . 168

LEUBA, JAMES H. Fear, Awe and the Sublime in Religion . 1

LEUBA, JAMES H. Religion as a Factor in the Struggle for Life 307

MORRIS, MARGARETTA. Magic and Morals in Borneo . . 282

OOSTERHEERDT, A. Religion as a Matter of Feeling—a Criticism 62

OOSTERHEERDT, A. Religion as Functional, Metaphysical and Normative 141

PRATT, JAMES BISSETT. Concerning the Origin of Religion . 257

PRATT, JAMES BISSETT. Types of Religious Belief . . 76

STRONG, ANNA LOUISE. The Relation of the Subconscious to Prayer 160

WATHAM, REV. ARTHUR E. The Origin of Human Sacrifice—including an Explanation of the Hebrew Asherah . . 24

BOOKS REVIEWED.

Aims of Religious Education. The Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the Religious Education Association 140
Andree, R. Votive und Weilgeben des katholischen Volks in Süddeutschland 133
Arnold, C. L. Cosmos, the Soul and God 350
Ayres, S. G. Jesus Christ, Our Lord; an English Bibliography of Christology 357
Baker, Ven. Father F. A. Holy Wisdom 352
Baldwin, D. P. Christ's Credentials 135
Bois, H. Le Reveil au Pays de Galles 353
Bousset, W. Jesus 344
Bresler, J. Religionshygiene 354
Breysig, K. Die Entstehung des Gottesgedankens und die Heilbringer . 135
Coe, G. A. Education in Religion and Morals 122
Coe, G. A. The Philosophy of the Movement for Religious Education . 126
Coe, G. A. The Relations of the Young Men's Christian Association Movement to the Boy 127
Coe, G. A. The Spiritual Life 128
Coe, G. A. The Work of a Boy's Department in a Young Men's Christian Association 127
Course of Study in Religious Education in the Höheren Töchterschule in München 348
Dietrichs, A. Mutter Erde; ein Versuch über Volksreligion . . . 137
Dorsey, G. A. The Cheyenne; 2. The Sun Dance 137
Driesen, O. Der Ursprung des Harlekin 134
Eucken, R. Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart . 356
Fischer, W. Der verbrecherische Aberglaube und die Satansmessen . 350
Fisen, L. Tales from Old Fiji 132
Floody, R. J. Scientific Basis of Sabbath and Sunday 350
Forbush, W. B. The Boy's Life of Christ 136
Henry, V. La Magie dans l'Inde Antique 133
Holtzmann, H. J. Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesus 357
Holtzmann, O. Christus 357
Hopf, L. Die Heilgötter und Heilstätten des Altertums 134
Jordan, L. H. Comparative Religion; Its Genesis and Growth . . 137
Kaltenbach, J. Étude psychologique des plus anciens reveils religieux aux Etats-Unis 138
Keedy, T. L. Teachers' Book of Old Testament Heroes 358
Life of Christ from Bethlehem to Olivet, by modern painters . . . 358
Nivedita, Sister. The Web of Iudian Life 130
Northcote, H. Christianity and Sex Problems 346
Parsons, Ellen C. Christus Liberator; an Outline Study of Africa . 353

PFLEIDERER, O. Christian Origins 344
PILLAY, C. T. T. The Solution of Religions 347
PLANGE, T. J. Christus, ein Inder? 349
PRATT, J. B. The Psychology of Religious Belief 349
PRITCHET, H. S. What is Religion? 138
PROST, J. Die Sage vom ewigen Judan in der neueren deutschen Literatur 134
RÁMANÁTHAN, P. The Culture of the Soul among Western Nations . . 353
RASMUSSEN, E. Jesus, ein vergleichende psychopathologische Studie . 354
Religion und Geisteskultur; Zeitschrift für religiose Vertiefung des modernes Geisteslebens 355
Beligious Education Association. Fourth General Convention . . . 351
Religious Education. The Journal of the Religious Education Association, April–June, 1906; February, 1907.
RIBOT, TH. Essay on the Creative Imagination 353
ROPES, J. H. Apostolic Age in the Light of Modern Criticism . . . 353
SEDGWICK, A. D. The Shadow of Life 140
SOLTAU, W. Das Fortleben des Heidentums in der altchristlichen Kirche 352
STUTTGART, E. G. O. Inneres Wachstum, sieben Aufsätze 350
TYRRELL, G. Lex Orandi; or, Prayer and Creed 352
WAGGETT, P. N. The Scientific Temper in Religion; and other Addresses 137
WILDEBOER, G. Die Literatur des Alten Testaments 352
WOOD, H. Life more Abundant 136
WORCESTER, W. L. On Holy Ground 353
Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie 354

THE AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY
AND EDUCATION.

VOLUME 2 MARCH, 1906. No. 1

FEAR, AWE AND THE SUBLIME IN RELIGION.

A CHAPTER IN THE STUDY OF INSTINCTS, IMPULSES, AND MOTIVES IN RELIGIOUS LIFE.

BY JAMES H. LEUBA,

Bryn Mawr College.

The deeper purport of this paper and its place in a psychological study of religion will not be fully understood unless the general view of religion held by the author be first indicated. I shall, therefore, prefix the following statement.

Objectively considered, religious life consists of a portion of the actions by which man strives to reach the ends of existence: protection and increase. Subjectively considered, it consists in the psychic correlates of these actions: impulses, desires, feelings, ideas. It is unnecessary to state fully here how and where is drawn the line of demarcation between the religious and the secular actions and experiences. It will suffice to say in general terms that the line of cleavage follows the distinction made very early by man between the anthropomorphic or the personal and the mechanical in his conception of the kinds of energy which act upon him and which he may use to secure his desires.

In this view, religious, no less than secular, life is an expression of the lust for life, of the passion for growth. In it the psycho-physiological organism performs the same functions as in the rest of life. Will, feeling and intellect have in religion the place which belongs to them in the general economy of animal and human existence and no other. It is a wrong conception of the nature of religion, or a faulty

psychology, or both, which lead to the belief that feelings and emotions play a peculiar rôle in religious life. They may be more obvious and more intense in some phases of it and in certain persons, but they bear to religious life no other relation than to industrial, to literary, to scientific activities. In religion, no less than in the other departments of life, the will is primal. Every instinct and impulse, the most ferociously egoistic as well as the most purely altruistic, and every desire may be a spring of religion. There are no specifically religious instincts or motives. Any and every throb of life may give rise to a religious moment. In order that it be so, it is only necessary that the realization of the will be thought to depend upon certain personal beings.

The more fundamental of the animal and human needs have, in the course of biological development, come to express themselves in instinctive emotional reactions. *Fear*, *Awe*, *the Sublime*,[1] to name only three related forms, are as many different ways of responding according to one's nature to different impressions made by the outside world. They are primarily conative manifestations, racial ways of realizing one's nature.

These reactions have played, and still play, a conspicuous part in religious life because they express what is oldest and fundamental in human nature. One may therefore appropriately begin the study of instincts and impulses in religion with the consideration of its relation to fear and to the emotions most nearly allied thereto.

I have made some use in this paper of about 300 letters sent me in answer to a set of questions on religious life. These answers have frequently been supplemented by a personal correspondence. The information thus secured on the subject of the present paper would be completely inadequate for statistical purposes. It is, however, of material value to one content to use it with caution for what it is worth, *i. e.*, as 'qualitative' information upon the religious condition of our contemporaries. It will be observed that the results of the *questionnaire* have been used here more to illustrate or to confirm statements based upon wider considerations, than to establish them.

[1] I shall use the word sublime to designate the emotion itself, as well as the objective cause of it.

I. Fear.

To keep alive in the face of ever recurring dangers is the prime concern of the wild man. One might therefore expect fear to play a leading rôle in the religiosity of primitive human societies. Encompassed by dangers, the wild man seeks the protection of, or assistance against, the agents surrounding him: men, animals, celestial bodies, storms, etc.

Every student of the lowest forms of religion has noticed in them the preponderance of fear; some have seen in it the very origin of religion. "Fear begets gods," said Lucretius.[1] Hume concluded that "the first ideas of religion arose . . . from a concern with regard to the events of life and fears which actuate the human mind." A similar opinion is maintained by many of our contemporaries. The distinguished historian of religion, Tiele, holds that "in the animistic religions fear is more powerful than any other feeling, such as gratitude or trust."[2] Among psychologists, Ribot, for instance, affirms that "the religious sentiment is composed first of all of the emotion of fear in its different degrees, from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to the faith in an unknown, mysterious, impalpable Power, able to render great services, and, more especially, to inflict great injuries; for historians have always remarked that, in early times, it is always malevolent and terrible genii who are adored; the good and merciful ones are neglected; in the following period this state of things will be reversed."[3]

That fear was the first of the well-organized emotional reactions to appear in religious life, follows from the fact, now generally admitted, that it is the first to have been established in the course of animal development. It is now chronologically the first emotional reaction in the young animal and in the infant, according to the observations of Preyer and of many others. If it were objected that the lust for life must necessarily have worked itself out into aggressive actions (those for securing food, for instance) before the protective fear-reactions could have been established and that, therefore, we should expect to find in religious life positive, aggressive desires antedating

[1] *Primus in orbe timor fecit deos.*

[2] *Outlines of the History of Religion*, p. 11.

[3] *The Psychology of the Emotions*, Th. Ribot, p. 309.

the protective fear-reaction, the sufficient answer would be that these desires, although they certainly preceded the formation of the fear-instinct, did not give rise to any emotional reaction possessing the constancy, definiteness and poignancy of fear. Therefore it is that the negative, protective, emotion affirms itself so conspicuously in early religions. But it need not be—it certainly is not—the only way in which man expresses himself religiously at the beginning.[1] For the rest, we are not concerned here with the *original* form of religiosity, but only with what is dominant in the primitive religions known to us.

Among the more significant observations to which one is led by a comparison of the earlier with the later forms of religion is the procession of their dominant emotional tones. The procession begins with the obscuration of fear which, at a certain level of human development, yields the place of greater prominence to its relatives, awe and the sublime. These emotions are, in their turn, displaced by others in which fear is not only held under control, as in awe, but completely overcome. They are admiration, thankfulness, joy and the tender emotions expressive of acceptance, agreement, union, instead of rejection, disagreement, separation.

This procession is, of course, not the result of religion. To take it so would be to put the cart before the horse. Religion is the instrument, not the creator, of human impulses and desires. Whatever be the development through which it passes, that which takes place in it is no more than the manifestation in one realm of life—the religious—of that which is taking place in life generally.

Before attempting to account for the conquest of fear by the tender emotions, it will be our task to point to a few of the facts by which it may be illustrated. The obviousness of these facts makes a lengthy demonstration unnecessary.

Neither Christ, nor Gautama, nor even Mohammed, were actuated by fear. They were, it seems, of all men, fearless. But they did not represent their times. They were precursors. After their death, the religions which they had founded upon a plane much above that of

[1] On fear in infancy and childhood see the extensive researches of President G. Stanley Hall and his pupils, the outcome of which is to be found in a chapter of *Adolesence.*

their contemporaries were speedily degraded to the general level of the period, a level low enough to make it unnecessary to go further than the Christian era to find fear entrenched as the dominant religious force.

For those acquainted with history, the mention of the Dark Ages and of several subsequent centuries when cruelty and dread gave the dominant notes in the tumultuous dramas in which the Church of Rome played frequently the chief part, will be a sufficient reminder of the potency of fear in those times.

After the great Protestant schism, fear remained for another long period, on the whole, a dominant emotion in religious life. Predestination in combination with the belief in hell was, in skillful hands, an unsurpassed instrument of terror. Nowhere was the awfulness of God more seriously realized than among the Jansenists of Port Royal. Le Maître, de Saci, Blaise Pascal, to name only three of their great leaders, were brought to God through experiences in which fear played an important, perhaps a leading, part.[1] What Fontaine reports of de Saci in the *Mémoires* quoted by Sainte-Beuve could have been asserted with equal truth, perhaps, of all the noble men who directed the movement. "Those who have said after his death that the fear of the Lord had filled him, have made a true portrait of him." "The *chaste* fear of God and respect for his infinite grandeur so possessed him that," according to the same reporter, "he was in His presence as in a continual tremor of fear."

The great movement started by John Wesley was also fed by fear, as is sufficiently attested by the frightful eloquence of most of its distinguished propagandists. Even the organization that gave itself the peaceful name of "Friends" was not at the beginning free from the incubus of fear.

The change that has come over the Christian world with regard to fear is strikingly, and it seems to me accurately, reflected in the altered emotional tone of the revivals. I do not know of any revival, older than the present generation, in which the chief, or at least one of the chief, instruments of conversion was not fear: fear of wretched-

[1] See *Port Royal* by Sainte-Beuve; on LeMaitre, I, pp. 378-380; on de Saci I, p. 339; II, p. 328; on Pascal II, pp. 502 ff.

ness in this life, fear of God's wrath visited upon the impenitent, and, most of all, fear of torments in the hereafter.

With regard to the point at issue, the Edwardian Revivals were typical of many. The conditions of life in New England at the beginning of the 18th century were favorable to the spread of the harsh Calvinistic beliefs. Frequent conflicts with an unsubdued nature and with savage Indians kept the fear-reaction uppermost. The tender emotions could hardly thrive in communities where one went to church with a gun on the shoulder and where attention was at times divided during the service between worship and the expectation of war whoops.

It was common in the revivals of that period for people "under conviction of sin" to be so frightened that they would "throw themselves on the ground and roar with anguish." The terrifying method went so far that a few ministers made an effort to soften the preaching. Edwards, however, thought that "speaking terror to them that are already under great terrors, instead of comforting them," is to be commended if done with the intention of bringing more light. He complains of the weakness of those who shrink from throwing children into ecstasies of fear with talk of hell fire and eternal damnation. "But if those who complain so loudly of this," he remarks, "really believe, what is the general profession of the country, viz., that all are by nature the children of wrath and heirs of hell; and that every one that has not been born again, whether he be young or old, is exposed, every moment, to eternal destruction, under the wrath of Almighty God; I say, if they really believe this, then such a complaint and cry as this, betrays a great deal of weakness and inconsideration. As innocent as children seem to be to us, yet, if they are out of Christ, they are not so in God's sight, but are young vipers and are infinitely more hateful than vipers and are in a most miserable condition, as well as grown persons."[1]

What was the rule a hundred years ago has become the exception. The great evangelist Moody had little to say about hell and the wrath of God and a great deal about heaven and the love of Christ. In the latest of the great revivals, the Welsh Revival, the meetings were pitched in the key of the tender emotions. The practices of the salva-

[1] *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion*, by Jonathan Edwards. Edition of 1832, p. 203.

tion army is also a conspicuous example of how far, even in the lower strata of society, fear has fallen into disuse as a religious tool.

If such is the condition of the more ignorant and rougher part of our populations, that of the well-to-do and instructed portions can be inferred. The countenance of God best known to our prosperous Church goers is that of the merciful, compassionate Son of Man healing the sick and comforting the wayward. To the hissing of threats and maledictions has succeeded the singing of the Son's redeeming love and of the delights of Beulah land.

One must, however, hasten to add two corrective touches to this picture. On the one hand, the spirit of Christ has, at all times, been represented here and there in all the strength of its gentleness. There have always been, in obscure or in high places, men like Francis of Assisi and Fénélon to bear witness to the great struggle between the spirit of fear and the spirit of love. On the other hand, the antiquated method is still met with on occasion, and, naturally, chiefly among the less instructed. Here is, for instance, an account of how a certain French Priest, Curate of Notre-Dame-du-Mont, lately managed part of the religious instruction by which children are prepared for the confirmation of the baptismal vows and for their first admission to the Eucharist. On the last day of a "retreat" he would lock the doors of the church in which the children were assembled and forbid even the sexton to walk about. The church was then darkened. A pall, stretched out before the sanctuary, bore a crucifix and two holy candles. In this artfully prepared place he would preach a sixty minutes' discourse on Christ's Passion, describing with minute realism every detail of the crucifixion, the thorns penetrating into the flesh, the blood trickling down the face, the moral anguish of the loving Saviour. Before he was half through the sermon, sobs would break out and spread among the terrified children. In this state they were sent to confession.

The returns from my *questionnaire* reflect convincingly the new temper. Except in two instances fear enters into the religious life of my informants only incidentally and fitfully. It is of so little significance that its removal would leave the religiosity of the class of people represented by these data practically unaltered. The exceptions are those of an elderly French clergyman and that of a young law student. The first wrote as follows. "I feel very much that my

letter will disappoint you. The feeling of Divine justice and of its exigencies has much weakened in pious persons. In me it has continually grown stronger. The principles are neglected, and sentimentality is put in their place. Moreover, I have suffered dreadfully, physically and morally; the history of Job is constantly present to my mind. I have seen the evil spirits at work trying to injure me. I have seen Satan displaying his utmost ingenuity to make me suffer the inexpressible. You will therefore readily understand that my usual mood is not one of superficial lightheartedness, that I cannot be an optimist in the common acceptation of the word. I believe that the just man will be saved,—without that certitude there can be but despair and death; but he is to be saved painfully, as by fire. . . . I am moved to religious practices by a feeling of duty and to appease the wrath of God which rises against sinful humanity. . . . For many people the most characteristic religious experience is the feeling of God's love, of His goodness, compassion and readiness to succor those who call upon Him. I would not say that this is false, but its onesidedness brings it near to being false. . . . My experience is that, man being sinful, he must suffer, suffer much, drink also of the bitter cup of Jesus Christ. In my religious exercises I always experience fear towards the Holy God, who must inexorably avenge His broken law and His majesty outraged by sin."[1]

The law student (age 23) admits that the circumstances which oftenest affects him religiously are those that frighten him or make him nervous. Fear is with him an emotion easily aroused. Several of his religious practices are kept up chiefly because of a vague fear that harm will befall him if he discontinues. This is true, for instance, of his attendance on the Y. M. C. A. meetings, although he "shrinks" from them. There is "little pleasure and some annoyance in them." He used to read the Bible morning and evening. Lately he persuaded himself to leave off the evening chapter because *it wearied* him *so*. "But," says he, "it was a great effort and I felt the fear for a day or two."

In these two cases of fear-ridden religiosity—the sole instances that have come to my notice through the *questionnaire*—fear is con-

[1] Reprinted from the *Monist*, "The contents of Religious Consciousness." XI (1901)pp. 563 and 564.

stitutional. Both men are mild phobiacs and their natural disposition makes what use it can of such obsolete Christian doctrines as are frightful. The young man knows that he is very nervous and he suspects that his fears may be abnormal. "It [the fear] makes me very unhappy even when I am anxious, or at least willing, to do the very thing it prompts me to do. It may be a disease; for I remember that as a mere child it led me into the most absurd habits or tricks. I would feel it my duty to pick up all the loose pieces of glass and china in our home-yard lest some poor barefoot be injured." He has passed through a storm and stress period during which his earlier beliefs have given place to others. He knows now, even at the moment it is felt, that his fear is "admittedly groundless, unreasonable and inconsistent."

In general, the attention of my correspondents is so strongly and so habitually turned in other directions that, when they write upon the impulses and motives of their religious life, they either forget fear or else have actually nothing at all to say about it. When they do mention fear it is, commonly, only in general terms as, for instance, "fear of danger." Others are more definite. One writes that she would not begin the day without prayer for fear things in general would go wrong. Another one would not dare undertake a railway journey without first securing God's protection. A few mention the fear of death itself without any reference to the Beyond, while still others seem not to dread the great crisis so much as the other world.[1] The "fear of God" appears more frequently than any other fear. Some describe it as a "reverential fear" or as a "feeling of dependence." In others it bears a more mercenary stamp. I find only five who seem to have been disturbed at any time by the thought of the Hereafter, and, of these five, four declare that they have outgrown that stage of their youth. In childhood and in adolescence it is not unusual for fear to be the principal instigator of religious life. St. Theresa confesses that it was more base fear than love which prompted her to enter the religious life. A Mrs. X, of whom I have written elsewhere, had "no use" for God in her childhood, except when frightened. "I do not think I bothered with God when I was a child, except when

[1] In his study of Conversion, Starbuck found that in 14 per cent. of his cases fear of Death and of Hell had played a considerable part. His were chiefly adolescent conversions.

frightened. Usually I did not care a button for him. I would say my prayers as directed, but automatically. Only if I got into a plight I would cling with the completest faith to what I had been taught about God's power and his readiness to answer our prayers." We have in this very common experience the ontogenetic correspondent of the philogenetic emotional procession to which we have called attention.

In the religiosity of my correspondents fear plays, on the whole, a rôle too insignificant to attract attention. Our contemporaries, it seems, aspire to the good rather than struggle against the bad. They have the positive, not the negative attitude. Their qualities and their defects are those of an aggressive, optimistic and democratic age.

I do not, however, offer my returns as an exact measure of the degree to which fear is still present in the Christian religious consciousness. Among Roman Catholics, for instance, fear is, I have no doubt, much more conspicuous than among my correspondents.

Turning now from the facts to their interpretation, we discern three causes for the decline of fear.

In civilized societies the occasions for fear have been greatly reduced in number. The pressing dangers to which man in a state of nature is frequently exposed have almost ceased to exist for us. Wild beasts, human enemies, hunger, thirst and the horrors of war are, for most of us, mere symbols of never realized experiences. As for those possible causes of fear not removed by civilization: the celestial bodies, the clouds, the thunder, the lightning, so prolific of terrors in early times, they have lost much of their power to frighten, for they are understood, forecasted and partially mastered. Eclipses, comets, tornadoes, electric storms, are all *physical* phenomena to us.

Not only is the fear-reaction falling into disuse because of a lack of occasion, but also because the intellectual and moral training which is given to all in civilized countries, through the schools and through the wider channels of education, is producing an increased capacity for converting would-be emotional stimuli into controlled, appropriate reactions. The power of reflection and attention are natural antagonists of emotional reactions. They engender a habit of self possession: the more reflective and attentive, the less emotional.

The fundamental cause of the decline of the fear-reaction, however,

is neither increased knowledge of the physical world, nor mental training; it is to be found in the recognition of the imperfection of the reaction itself, of the inadequacy with which it fulfills its task. Considered in the light of reason, animal fear is a most clumsy and wasteful way of meeting danger.

Without entering into a detailed examination of the defects of the hereditary fear-reaction, let us recall that it meets each and every danger in one and the same manner: it brings about a more or less accentuated paralysis of the whole voluntary apparatus; it interferes with respiration; it produces spasmodic constriction of the blood vessels, shiverings, violent spasms of the heart resulting in pallor and peripheral anæmia.[1] These physiological constituents of the reaction have undoubtedly their direct or indirect value: the immobility which they inforce would, for instance, often be the wisest behavior for the threatened man or animal. But, in the case of beings able, as man is, to observe, understand and foresee, a uniform reaction, the essence of which is a lowering of vitality, a paralysis of the mind as well as of the body, is far from meeting the situation in the best way conceivable to them.

The origin of the fear-reaction accounts for its inadequacy. It arose at a comparatively low level of animal development through the natural selection of those chance variations (assisted probably by adaptive habits) which gave the animal possessing them an advantage over its fellows. Now, the struggle for life does not create improvements; all it can do is to preserve the fittest among the variations blindly produced by nature. The "fittest" is anything, however wretched, provided it be superior, for the purpose of animal life, to that which existed previously. Natural selection can do no more than preserve the *less deficient*. It deals with minimal improvements. The selected minimal improvements are transmitted through generations upon generations of animals to man, in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. So that now man, with powers of observation and of foresight immeasurably superior to those of the animals in which this way of meeting danger was established, still finds within himself the instinct to act in this same primitive, inadequate fashion when he could meet the situation more efficaciously otherwise. The

[1] See the descriptions of Lange, of Mosso, of Mantegazza, of Ribot.

typical fear-reaction is a survival of a by-gone age. "The dominant impression left by such a study" [a study of fears in children and adolescents], writes President Stanley Hall, "is that of the degrading and belittling effects of excessive fears."[1]

It is because the insufficiency of the fear-reaction is felt that there is going on in civilized man an increasing warfare, not always conscious, against its manifestation. The deficiency of our legacy, in respect of fear and of the coarser emotions generally, is so evident that frequently when confronted with danger man struggles as much against fear as against its object. One of the most interesting phase of the powerful mind-cure movement is the war it wages against fear. It is to be placed "in the category of harmful, unnecessary and therefore not respectable things," says Horace Fletcher.[2] For these people fear is the Great Sin; it is Satan's new name.

As a matter of fact, slavery to the ancestral fear is no longer complete. In ordinary cases, it is partly inhibited or otherwise modified by the operation of new motives and of a higher intelligence. But in case of sudden and violent peril even the best among us relapse to the level of the animals in which the fear-reaction was first established.

The readjustment of our primitive instincts and impulses to the present altered internal and external circumstances is nothing else than the outcome of the struggle of the 'spiritual' 'against the 'natural' man, if one may use these conventional terms in a meaning wider than the usual.

That after which civilized man strives is, however, not the disappearance of fear, if this term is taken to mean no more than awareness of danger, eagerness to avoid it and preparation for the contingency. What is wanted is independence of the one inherited way of blindly meeting every threatening situation, it is to remain in possession of one's intellectual and muscular powers so as to make the most judicious use of them. In this sense, one might say that the goal towards which we are moving is a fearless alertness to physical and moral dangers.

It may be thought by some that we have uselessly complicated a simple problem. If the influence of fear in religion is waning, it is

[1] A Study of Fears, *Amer. Jour. of Psy.*

[2] Happiness as found in Forethought *minus* Fear-thought, Menticulture Series, ii.

because, they might say, we have ceased to believe in the terrifying doctrines. When the beliefs in the judgment, in hell, in the devil, in the wrathful God give way, fear is dethroned. That is the long and the short of it. This account would be satisfactory if the discredit into which these doctrines have fallen was not as much the outcome of the progressive changes we have mentioned as of the activity of reason exercised directly upon religious ideas. If we no longer believe in hell, for instance, it is as much because we are not easily frightened because tuned to another key, as because we have come to admit the insufficiency of the proofs for the existence of hell. Did we not notice a little while ago in the only two among my cases in which fear held its old sway, that the beliefs were supported by a temperament in accord with them? The fear-habit was for our ancestors a strong inducement to believe in terrifying doctrines. To-day our judgment is deflected towards the doctrines which exhibit the love of God and, with regard to these, we are as easily satisfied intellectually as others used to be regarding the fearful doctrines. Love agrees better than fear with the contemporary popular temper.

The foregoing considerations warrant, it seems, the conclusion that the recession of fear in religion is not to be ascribed primarily to religious influences, neither chiefly to critical, doctrinal studies. Its more profound causes have a much wider scope. They are, as we have said, increased knowledge of the physical universe, intellectual and moral training, and, chief of all, the realization of the defects of the fear inheritance. The nature of these causes indicates that the passing of fear observed in the Christian religion must take place in all religions professed by progressive peoples, despite theologies and creeds to which they may have been wedded. As human nature changes, so do gods and religions change, or, as some may prefer to put it so as to keep closer to traditional expressions, as God changes us, so do we see Him altered and worship Him differently.

When clearly apprehended, this truth is seen to contradict the traditional assumption that, in religion, progress is from above through revelations. A "revelation" is merely the first, clear, dramatic, appearance in a person of an adaptive change, a progress, slowly working itself out in human society at large. It is as a breaking of the shell that concealed the unexpected growth.

II. Awe and the Sublime.

Awe and its near relative, the sublime, have held in religion and still hold in some forms of it, a large and honored place. In the ancient Greek mysteries; in the old Druidic rites celebrated amid the sombre majesty of forests; in the modern, imposing ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as in the Society of Friends in which simplicity, nakedness and silence, take the place occupied elsewhere by elaborateness, ornamentation, and music, awe and the sublime constitute an important if not even an essential part of the total emotional impression.

To judge by the efforts made so generally to strike with awe the worshippers, this emotional reaction must be of the highest importance for the realization of the religious purpose. One of the services awe and the sublime render religion, but not the chief one, is to bestow upon it a dignity which it is not in the power of fear to confer. Fear is hardly ever an experience of which one may be proud; it is often obviously a narrowly utilitarian and unintelligent reaction. In as far as it expresses the essential egoism of living creatures, it can only discredit religion in the eyes of those who have awaken to the nobility of the disinterested.

Awe and the sublime differ from fear in that they do not openly refer to personal needs, neither are they blatant witnesses to weakness and incapacity. They have no apparent selfish purpose; not even any obvious purpose at all. The peculiar attenuated shudder which creeps over one at the sight of the leaping waters of a cataract is neither egoistic nor altruistic, it is disinterested. It is true, however, that the awe-producing aspects of nature have all lurking about them the covert threat of potential danger.

The disinterestedness of awe is not its only virtue in the eyes of religion,—a merely negative virtue, by the way—it has a direct, enlarging, ennobling effect. To be impressed by the great, the powerful, the mysterious, and not to be afraid, is to evince one's partial kinship with them. Fear manifests antagonism, enmity; it declares isolation. Awe, involving as it does the recognition of greatness and the dawn of admiration and reverence, without any actual fear, gives the first sense of a not unfriendly relation with the cosmos. To feel power while on the verge of admiration, as we do in awe, is not only

to begin to understand but also to be attracted. The sympathetic vibrations of awe are the first organic sign of a friendship with the cosmic forces, the first step towards that ultimate union with the Great All achieved in certain forms of practical mysticism. The thrills of awe are thus ennobling, enlarging, vitalizing.

It should be observed further that there is but one, and that an easily taken, step from awe and the sublime to reverence and admiration. Now, in passing from fear through awe to reverence and admiration, man, from being a trembling beggar for protection, becomes the bestower of praises! Bent as man is upon self-respect and self-exaltation shall we wonder that he should have, amidst the glaring egoistic utilitarianism of the religiosity dominated by fear, seized upon awe and the sublime as upon redeemers of his religious nature?

It will not be out of place in this study to indicate, a little more definitely than has been done so far, the relation of awe to fear on the one hand and to the higher emotions on the other. There is in the emotional life a natural hierarchy which I must now make clear because a knowledge of it is necessary to the understanding of the course followed by religious development.

Awe might be defined arrested fear in the presence of objects whose greatness is apprehended. When these objects are connected in our minds with immediate danger, or even with a definite future danger, fear is generated. But when, although no cause for alarm is recognized, we remain to some extent under the influence of the connotation which past experience has established between great power in others and danger to us, the state induced is awe, *i. e.*, a consciousness of power on a background of arrested fear. In awe, the instinctive fear-reaction is ready to break forth, but it is held in check because the danger indicated by instinct is denied by intelligence. In as far as awe involves control over fear, it is a higher form of reaction.

The sublime is still farther removed from fear, since in the sublime there is no awakened fear-activity to be held in check. It stands, however, close to awe in the emotional hierarchy because of a vague fear residuum and also because the objective causes of both awe and the sublime have in common the characteristics of either physical or moral greatness or of both.[1]

[1]See Hiram Stanley: *Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling*, pp. 119 and 120.

If we go a step farther, admiration is reached. In it fear is not only overcome but all relations to it have been broken. So that admiration does not dispose to fear as awe and even the sublime do.

In coming to admiration from fear through awe and the sublime one has already gone a long way towards the tender emotions at the other end of the scale. Sympathy, affection, love, are natural antagonists of fear; they betoken agreement, appreciation, acceptance, union.

The ennobling qualities of awe and the sublime — disinterestedness and the obscure, but unifying, sense of kinship with the greater — would not of themselves be sufficient to give to these emotions the place they have gained at certain levels of religious development. The primary service they render religion is to lead man's thought, almost as forcibly as does fear, to that which is the source of religious energy: superhuman agents, gods, God, for the apprehension of greatness, power, majesty, involved in the sense of awe and of the sublime, sets the question of origin under circumstances which greatly favor a religious, as against a scientific, a secular, solution of the problem. What are these circumstances favorable to religion? They are simply the presence of emotions. Awe, as well as fear and every other emotion, favors the traditional causal explanation, *i. e.*, the explanation by reference to powers that may be described as animistic or personal or anthropomorphic. In reflective, non-emotional moments, the contemplation of natural phenomena might be referred to physical energy, while at another time, under the influence of emotional, instinctive, reactions, the same events might cause a reversion to the naïve, traditional, anthropomorphic interpretation which is the one necessary to the more common forms of religion. Emotions absorb attention, arrest the stream of thought and thus, for the moment, usually lower the intellectual level.

Awe does not, of course, always lead to the idea of God. Among the many in the present generation who have formed in youth the habit of looking upon nature as a mechanism, there are not a few who never relapse into the discarded view. Whether awed or frightened, no ghost, no God, appear to them.

An interesting problem is suggested by the persons who call awe a religious feeling even on those occasions when it does not seem to

suggest to them the existence of God. No. 51, who is frequently moved to awe by nature and also by the works of man, writes, "The same [religious] feeling I experience when meditating upon the massiveness of the Brooklyn bridge and again as I beheld such steamships as the St. Paul, Tourraine, etc." Why should this person consider the emotion induced by gigantic creations of man a religious emotion? Is it not because, on account of its frequent association with God, awe always brings along with it in these persons the feeling of a religious power? To a lover, love, by whomsoever suggested, always leads back to the thought of the beloved.

The problem grows in interest when we pass to persons not sure that there is anything in them deserving the name religion, not certain at all that they know what religion is, persons who, nevertheless, single out awe as their religious, or their *most* religious, experience, if the term is to be applied to any of them. No. 37 writes, "I prefer a religious service of much formalism. I have no religious feelings in public except as I am surrounded by the noble in architecture, in colored glass, in the pageantry of the Church. I have knelt at some shrine in walking through the country abroad, with religious feelings and I have done likewise in some altar in a cathedral. I prefer the Romish worship to any other on this account, but I refrain from having anything to do with it because I think it dangerous to liberty." No. 29 had his nearest approach to what he would call a religious feeling "while in the synagogue in thinking of the long line of continuity of race, racial sentiments of the Jews and also of others."

In these persons there is no real belief in God, not even during awe. Why then should awe be called a religious emotion? The vague consciousness of a mysterious power behind the awe-striking phe. nomena is all that need be admitted to account for the disposition of these people to look upon awe as a religious emotion. Their religiosity is just as inarticulate and uncertain as their idea of superhuman power and no more. If they are inclined to look upon awe as their *only* religious emotion, it is because, on the one hand, they have passed the stage at which one looks with favor upon the association of fear with religion, and, on the other hand, they have not assumed the habit of conceiving of the universe, of God, under the form of love. Therefore awe is for them the most available of the emotions which can be prominently connected with religious life.

Certain of the above passages might lead to a misunderstanding. Let me therefore say that the thought of God, however suggested, is not sufficient to create a religious moment. To it must be added a movement of the will stirred into activity by the consciousness of one's need, of one's weakness, of one's dependence.

When questioned concerning the emotions most conducive to religion, our Protestant contemporaries rarely forget to mention awe and the sublime. For one who names fear, there are hundreds who single out awe, the sublime and the beautiful as potent instigators of religious moods and activities. The following selections will illustrate the religious influence of nature.

"Mid ocean, lightning and thunder, inspire me with awe and the sense of dependence and turn my feelings toward God." No. 8.

"I can never look up at the stars at night but adoring love and worship fills my soul. The same at early dawn when the beautiful new day comes straight from the hand of God." No. 39.

"Any part of nature is so wonderful that it makes us feel how small and yet how great we are and after studying nature we are filled with an overwhelming sense of our responsibility." No. 2.

"Formerly it was chiefly a sense of awe and adoration which accompanied religious worship." No. 51.

Grandiose natural scenery, majestic or beautiful nature, are mentioned by nearly all my correspondents.

If our returns show clearly that in Protestant communities men have set their faces away from the dreadful and towards the desirable in their religious struggles for the increase of life, they indicate further that the stage of culture at which awe can be the dominant religious emotion is also passed. I imagine the worshippers of Odin and of Thor were swayed more by awe than by any other emotion. The Christianity of the past centuries knew no better ally, after fear, than awe. But now the awful, as well as the fearful, is growing obsolete. To be sure, these emotions have retained much of their ancestral power in large portions of the Christian world. The Roman Church, for instance, is not ready to dismiss an ally still so efficient. Vast, sombre cathedrals, majestic music, mysterious rites, gorgeous pageantry still entrance the faithful, subjugate the thoughtless and draw to its specta-

cles even the contemners of religion. The terrible, they have for the most part outgrown; the awful, they have not passed; and of the sublime, they are making all the use they can. In Protestant worship, and especially in the United States, it is quite otherwise. Yahve who was wont to thunder on the summit of Mount Sinai, in the presence of whom the august Moses himself, could hardly live, is rapidly being displaced by the God of love before whom not even prodigal sons need tremble. The 'new' revelation is a gospel of love: "children, flowers, fruit-trees, everything is full of God's love."—No. 39. In church architecture, the comfortable is put before the majestic; in doctrine, the practical is preferred to the mysterious and in the conception of God, the amiable is not to be overshadowed by the awful.

There have, of course, been love waves before now, in Christian and even in other countries, but never has any had so wide a sweep. There is manifested in the most advanced communities, in and out of religious life, an irresistible tendency to banish awe as well as fear. The rod is proscribed in home and in school; the child is no longer to sit at the feet of the master, they are to work arm in arm as becomes good friends; sin is either disease or weakness, and should be met with sympathetic tenderness. Nothing is real or good except love, and the sentiments which do not antagonize it, friendship, trust, hope, courage, fortitude. The affirmative, agreeing, accepting reactions are being selected as the most efficient, while the withdrawing, rejecting, attitudes are falling into disrepute.

The desirability of this procession of emotional reactions is not to be disputed on the ground that excesses are already apparent in the form of sentimental extravagances. In many quarters, love has not only cast out fear, but also reverence, veneration and even respect. There are churches in which a mawkish Divinity is praised in giggling, rag-time, music. It may be that we are threatened with a recrudescence of the amourous piety of a St. Theresa. There is, at any rate, no indication of a return in our churches to that "most awful reverent frame of mind" which, says William Penn, was that of George Fox when in prayer.

I have given as the chief ground of the value of awe to religion its ability to direct the mind to sources of religious power. It is not without interest to observe that emotions lead to God along two different routes. They either awaken directly a *sense* of God's presence

or they lead indirectly, through reflection, to the *idea* of God. There are persons who in a forest, or in the tempest "feel the divine" within them; "something in the stars of the night reaches out" to them. In this way, the ever present animistic tendency crops out and bids dispense with rational proofs of the existence of God.[1] Frequently God is induced instead of being felt. The mind comes upon the idea of God through meditation upon the power, the richness, the orderliness, the goodness of nature. Expressions similar to the following are common in our returns. 'The impressive silence of the woods or of the prairies is favorable to deep meditations on the problems of life;' 'the orderliness of nature leads one to the belief in a principle that makes for righteousness;' "a sense of relation to the cosmos or the infinite is the basis of the reasoning which prompts me to religious practice."

Each particular aspect of nature reveals special attributes of the Divinity. When felt in mysterious might, God awes and excites the sense of the sublime; when seen in the beautiful, He delights and makes thankful; when conceived of in the orderliness of nature, He appears as intelligence and awakens admiration; when seen in goodness and kindness, He stands forth as the God of Love.

That the power of nature as a revealer of God should, in our scientific age, be as great as it appears in our returns may well excite surprise in those who have contracted in early youth the "naturalistic" vision. To them — a large and increasing number, surely — the startling noise of thunder, the waking hush of the forest, a beautiful sunset, no more announce a god than do the steam engine, an explosion in the laboratory, or the structural beauty of a bridge. They may be startled, or frightened, or delighted, but why should the thought of God arise in them from the contemplation of phenomena they can produce at will, or at least understand with the precision and definiteness possible in the mathematical sciences? Why should a person who has learned, in college or out of it, to perceive the action of mechanical forces in the dance of the fallen leaves, see God in the movement of the stars? This question should not be obscured by another one; that of the *possibility* of a spiritual agent modifying the course of nature. We

[1] Comp. Wm. James on the *Sense of Presence*, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 58, ff.

are considering at present the influence upon the mind of only the ordinary, commonplace, natural phenomena. Neither should this question be irrelevantly complicated by the introduction of the contentions of materialism and idealism. Whether matter or spirit be the ultimate reality, it remains agreed upon that no *personality* is manifested in the ordinary[1] natural phenomena. There is in them nothing anthropomorphic, no personal intention, no good will, no spite; it is all weighable and measurable. That is the one great conclusion which centuries of observation, experimentation and reflection have established without peradventure of a doubt. Even Christianity, in its advanced orthodox form, has practically, if not theoretically, surrendered the natural realm to physical forces. Not that God is no longer looked upon as the Creator and Sustainer of the physical order, but that this realm is admitted to be a physical one. It is well known that many of those whose thoughts and feelings are frequently called to God by nature, positively disbelieve in any cosmology which ascribes to a personal God any function in the physical universe except, possibly, that of originator and sustainer. Many of these persons admit this strange fact and wonder at their inconsistency.

In the Monist for 1901, Vol. XI, pp. 553-557, I have published a few illustrations of the illogism which makes it possible for men of trained intelligence to call upon God for assistance when they disbelieve either in His existence or in His ability to answer prayer. The case of the law student referred to in the section on Fear is also in point. He tells us that the reason he would assign in an argument for his praying habit is that one is "greatly benefitted internally by this exercise of the feelings and I hope that by strong effort I can also develop myself by the stretching up and out process. . . . When I am about to face an audience, I find myself praying very rapidly, asking forgiveness and help. I think the fact that I reiterate the prayer is fairly good evidence that I expect nothing in reply." And, after remarking that he attends the Y. M. C. A. meetings for fear that if he does not go, he may "lose all hope of God's favor," he adds "this, though I do not believe in that kind of God at all." Another University student writes, "But although the appeal is directly to Him when in sickness or trouble or in great need of sleep, I do not believe in

[1] I say "ordinary," in order not to prejudge extraordinary phenomena.

God as interested in anything save possibly the Cosmos. That is, I do not believe at all."

This discrepancy between the Godward tendency of our thoughts in certain emotional seizures, and their movement when under the guidance of experience and knowledge, measures, on the one hand, the progress made by the individual since he discarded animism, and, on the other, the tenacity of the mental habits rooted in that distant and obsolete past.

The first notion of power is given us by our own activity, by the feeling of our will in action. It is therefore, of necessity, and in that sense, an anthropomorphic notion. From the rustling of the leaves to the eclipse of the sun, every movement of natural objects is interpreted by the savage as the doing of some man-like agent. In order to come to the conception of a force regulated by law, free from the influence of desire and emotion, there is needed a capacity for observing and for generalizing much above the possibilities of the untutored mind. Thus it happened that the race began life with animistic[1] beliefs and that each individual, no doubt, begins it likewise and continues in that habit for a length of time regulated by his aptitudes and his circumstances.

In the case of most of us the conception of a non-anthropomorphic force never acquires the firm foothold which a fast connection with instinctive reactions would give it. So that any unusual circumstance, *i. e.*, any experience awakening emotion, is likely to throw us back upon ideas associated with the primitive instincts and again we see ghosts, spirits, gods, where we would otherwise see mere physical forces. Any jar shakes off the unstable accessions of rational intelligence and uncovers the older, stabler, mental structure.

To the preceding considerations must be added the following remarks in order to account fully for the frequency and prevalence of the atavistic phenomenon under consideration. Not very long ago the general theistic belief of those professing the Christian Religion was of the kind which sees the hand of God in every natural event, however trivial. God was daily besought and thanked for weather, shelter, food and raiment, not in the conventional, unmeaning way still in vogue in official worship but in the familiar and personal manner

[1] Fetichism is a form of Animism.

of the home. This form of theism might be called an Animistic Theism, for it is not so very far removed from animism. One God with a million different, conflicting, manifestations of Himself—the popular theism—is, in its essence, much nearer animism than several Gods and one Law, the concept under which some of the old Greeks understood the universe.

The return to God through the impression made upon us by nature, be it fear, awe, the sublime or another emotion, is then in no way praiseworthy, unless forgetting that which we have learned and do believe in our clearest moments is to be commended. The powerful support which traditional Christianity—and of course, other forms of religion also—receives from the emotional reactions in question is due to the fact that both are survivals of an earlier age. Neither of them have been properly reconstructed according to present knowledge and needs. On that account, they meet on a common ground : the lapse of intelligence induced by emotion brings man down to the level of antiquated religious beliefs. If the conceptions of traditional Christianity were in accord with the modern interpretation of life, that form of religion would not find an ally in antiquated organic adaptations.[1]

[1] The author would welcome any data on the subject of this paper.

THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN SACRIFICE -- INCLUDING AN EXPLANATION OF THE HEBREW ASHERAH.

By Rev. ARTHUR E. WHATHAM.

In a former article, "The Origin of Circumcision," I endeavored to show that the origin of sacrifice called for a human victim, and that lower animals were subsequently offered in substitution. W. R. Smith, however, seems to doubt the accuracy of the general view in the later ages of antiquity that "the oldest rituals demanded a human victim, and that animal sacrifices were substitutes for the life of man." He claims that "in the oldest times there could be no reason for thinking a man's life better than that of a camel or a sheep as a vehicle of sacramental communion." In conclusion he says, "indeed, if we may judge from modern examples of that primitive habit of thought which lies at the root of Semitic sacrifice, the animal life would probably be deemed purer and more perfect than that of man" (Rel. Sem., p. 361). Subsequently he tells us that "As time went on . . . . a camel's life was no longer as sacred as that of a man," though it was treated as a tribesman's life when "presented at the altar", for then it was "regarded as the substitute for a human victim (*ib.*, pp. 361, 362).

The above shows clearly that W. R. Smith regarded a lower animal, a camel or a sheep, as the original victim of sacrifice. Mr. Elford Higgins, in his "Hebrew Idolatry and Superstition," quotes him as showing that "in earliest times a fellow tribesman was offered, not an animal" (p. 19). No such statement as this, however, occurs in his second edition of his lectures on the Religion of the Semites. on the contrary, whatever he may have said elsewhere, here he undoubtedly viewed a camel or a sheep as the original sacrificial victims which later were offered as a substitute for human life. I am inclined, therefore, to think that Mr. Higgins has misunderstood, and so misrepresented W. R. Smith's opinion in this instance, which I must confess appears to me to be somewhat vaguely expressed (see pp. 361, 362, 2nd. Ed. Rel. Sem.), though it is explained by his subsequent state-

ment touching the substitution of a camel for a man. He doubts that it was a substitute, for "In that case the ritual of the camel sacrifice would have been copied from human sacrifice, but in reality this was not so. The camel was eaten but the human victim was burned, after the blood had been poured out as a libation, and there can be no question that the former is the more primitive rite. I apprehend, therefore, that human sacrifice is not more ancient than the sacrifice of sacred animals" (*ib.*, p. 364). He might have said plainly that human sacrifice is less ancient than animal sacrifice, for that is what he means. In the Ency. Brit., he defines sacrifice as "primarily a meal offered to the deity . . . the original principle on which a sacrificial meal is chosen is that men may not eat what cannot be offered to their god" (Sacrifice). Returning to his "Religion of the Semites," he says, "To make the sacrifice effective, it was only necessary that the victim should be perfect and without fault," and then, as I have shown, he adds that "the animal life would probably be deemed purer and more perfect than that of man" (360).

I have been compelled to undertake this examination of W. R. Smith's statements because nowhere does he say plainly that animal sacrifice was older than human sacrifice. He does this indirectly as I have shown, but so vaguely that Mr. Higgins was led to quote him as saying that in earliest times a fellow tribesman was offered, not an animal. Mr. Joseph Jacobs, however, has correctly given his meaning. He says, "Prof. Smith has to make the most ingenious hypotheses to explain the late origin of human sacrifice amongst the Semites, among whom it certainly existed. But if ever a practice bore on the face of it the marks of primitiveness, it is that of human sacrifice" (Biblical Archæology, p. 36).

Prof. Samuel Ives Curtiss, in his "Primitive Semitic Religion To-Day," rejects this idea of a commensal meal being the origin of sacrifice. After an exceedingly interesting review of facts bearing upon the point, he asks, — "In what does the sacrifice consist?" and he answers, "Primitive sacrifice consists wholly in the shedding of blood" (pp. 223, 230). He does not, however, enter into any complete examination as to the ideas underlying the act of sacrifice. "The original idea of sacrifice," he says, "seems to be one derived from experience in the East, if not in the West, that 'every man has his price,' Hence the gods have their price. If God has brought mis-

fortune upon man, he can be bought off; if he demands a human life, the price may be paid through a substitute; if the price is 'bursting forth of blood before the face of God,' then the blood of a sheep, goat, bullock, or camel, the best that a man has of animal life, may avert the misfortune and cover the sin" (p. 245).

Is it then originally the idea of sin that lies behind this attempt to buy off the wrath of God? No, for Prof. Curtiss rightly thinks that this idea of sin, *i. e.*, as transgression, was a much later development in Hebrew thought (*ib.*). Sin was not with the early Hebrews ordinarily conceived of as guilt, but rather as misfortune, and the dominant notion is that misfortune comes, not because man or woman is guilty of some sin, but because God is arbitrarily angry. Hence his favor must be bought (*ib.*, p. 220).

Now the idea that the gods jealously guarded their divine prerogatives as rulers and owners from mankind, must have been an early thought with primitive man, since not only do we find it underlying Greek mythology, but also early Israel's ideas of Yahwe were based upon the same conception (see the remarks on Gen. 3: 5, 22; 11: 6, by Dillmann, Driver, Bennett, and Marcus Dods in their respective commentaries on Genesis).

The acquisition of knowledge or property of any character by man was therefore viewed as something taken from the gods that must be paid for, *quid pro quo*, or misfortune would follow upon the possessor. Was it wisdom that was acquired, then, "man has become as one of us," and must pay for this possession by a hard life ending with death (Gen. 3: 17-24). Was it property that he became possessed of, towards the making of a great nation? then his ambition must be checked or his riches, and, consequently, his pretensions, might rival those of the gods. Thus he is driven from his home in divisions speaking different languages, and unable to understand each other, since otherwise he might gather together again and defy the gods (Gen. 11: 6-8).

Prof. Curtiss, even as Dr. Trumbull (Threshold Covenant), gives many illustrations of the sacrifices offered at the building of houses and other structures, but neither of these writers states why this sacrifice was thought necessary upon these occasions. It is true they note the belief of the builders that the structures would not be safe without the shedding of blood, but this does not explain why this should be so.

The answer is that the jealousy of the unseen powers must be appeased, consequently a valuable possession is offered to them in sacrifice.

Here I must not neglect to add that Trumbull as well as Curtiss rejects the idea of eating as essential to sacrifice (p. 14).

And now with all this evidence before us we can understand the ideas underlying Israel's sacrifices. All things were owned by Yahwe, therefore they must be paid for. Hebrew sacrifice therefore was based upon two motives, first the buying off of misfortune arbitrarily sent; and again, the paying for acquisition of knowledge, property, or offspring. We therefore understand why Yahwe is represented as saying that "All the earth is mine;" why he declared, "all the first born, whatsoever openeth the womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of beast, it is mine," and why they were to be redeemed (Ex. 19 : 5 ; 13 : 2, 12, 13). It was not on the basis of God's fatherly ownership and loving protection that these thoughts were founded. This was the work of later writers who declared that no sacrifice was required by God but that of a broken and contrite heart, since he desired mercy and not sacrifice (Psl. 51 : 16, 17 ; Hos. 6 : 6).

With the early Hebrews the conception of Yahwe's character was as simple and undeveloped as the age. They conceived of Chemosh of the Moabites just as they conceived of Yahwe, and no otherwise (Kent-His. Heb. Peo., p. 27).

The origin of sacrifice, therefore, according to Prof. Curtiss, consists wholly in the shedding of blood on the buying-off principle. This undoubtedly was the idea underlying early Hebrew sacrifice, but it was not the original idea underlying Semitic sacrifice, and it is with this that we are primarily dealing, It is true that even here bloodletting formed the principal feature of sacrifice, but there was here an earlier idea than that of buying off a jealous god by offering to him the most precious of human gifts. Prof. Curtiss agrees with Dr. Trumbull that the first blood was shed at the entrance of the tent, or cave of the earliest Semites ; and later, when they lived in houses, on the threshold ; and still later on a rock (p. 237), this latter signifying some temple shrine. He does not, however, explain this shedding of blood at the tent door or threshold, therefore we must turn to Dr. Trumbull who does.

In his "Threshold Covenant," this able writer informs us that the

threshold of the house dwelling place was the primitive altar, and the house father the earliest priest (1). The earliest temple consisted of a doorway above a threshold, this latter being the altar. Thus a doorway and sill was the earliest form of temple and altar (pp. 102, 103). This was copied from the simple doorway with its side posts and lintel, of the earlier household, the sacred entrance of the home, which, undoubtedly, as he claims, preceded the temple (p. 66). He gives many illustrations of the shedding of blood at the entrance of the home. Here animals were sacrificed, but "apparently the earlier sacrifices were of human beings" (p. 46).

The Hebrew Asherah.

And here, leaving the more immediate discussion of sacrifice, I come to a feature closely related to it, in fact, one that is bound up essentially with it, since it lies at its very foundation. I refer to the Hebrew Asherah. Strange light has within the last few years been thrown upon this much-discussed symbol by the discovery of very ancient and remarkable ruins in the Tripoli hill range by Mr. H. S. Cowper, F. R. S. The curious feature about these ruins, so numerous that Mr. Cowper thinks they indicate that at one time a dense population must have existed where now only a few bands of roving Arabs are to be met with, is the large number of upright structures resembling doorways made of stone, and consisting of two jambs and a lintel with a flat stone altar immediately in front of each of them lying flush with the ground. Each altar is grooved with a square or round channel, with one or more branches reaching to the side of the altar which meets the earth, thus carrying into the ground the blood of the victim evidently slaughtered on these altars. Mr. Cowper offers an explanation of these senams, an explanation in which there is but one thing to regret, viz., its brevity. However, his admirable suggestions and analogies afford indispensable material to the further working out of the Asherah problem.

"It is difficult not to see," he says, "that the point where the whole ritual was focussed was at the senam itself; and this brings us to the more difficult question of what the symbol was for" (Hill of the Graces, p. 178). Further on he views the Asherah symbol as possessing a similar form to that shown on certain Babylonian seals.

Here we have an altar, a pillar with a cone-shaped head or top, and an upright structure exactly similar to the senams, except that it has a cross piece about half way down. On all the senams, however, Mr. Cowper noticed that on one jamb there was a slot sunk, while on the other jamb there was a perforation right through it immediately opposite the same slot. He very naturally viewed these holes as made for the inserting of a beam which barred the entrance of the senam doorway in a similar manner to the cross piece of the doorlike structure on the Babylonian seals. Mr. Cowper, on p. 180, gives a cut of one of these seals in his own possession, and others may be seen in Perrot and Chipiez's "Chaldæa and Assyria," Vol. 1, p. 279; Inman's "Symbolism," pp. 80, 81, etc.

Before the British Association at Ipswich, Mr. Cowper suggested that in the "senams of Tripoli we see symbolic structures, if not identical, at any rate nearly akin to the mysterious Asherah of the Baal worshippers." Subsequent consideration, and a second visit to the country, led him to view the Asherah symbol as possessing "such a form as we see in the senams and in the Babylonian seals" (pp. 184, 184). In the opening between the senam jambs, he sees the passage through which victims were passed by the priests, indicative of their regeneration or new birth, which was to be followed by either sacrifice or the purifying rite of passage through fire (p. 184 ff).

This is practically all that Mr. Cowper tell us by way of explaining the form and character of the Asherah as gathered from a study of the senams, so I must now refer to another scholar, Dr. Trumbull, whose investigations explain in a marvellous manner Mr. Cowper's senams, although he does not appear to have heard of the latter's wonderful discovery.

"Two upright stone posts," he informs us, "with or without an overhanging stone across them, and with or without an altar stone between or before them, are amongst the most ancient remains of primitive man's handiwork, and a similar design is to be recognized all the way along in the course of history, down to the elaborate doorway standing by itself as a memorial to the revered dead" (TC, p. 102).

"In China, Japan, Korea, Siam, and India, a gate or doorway usually stands before Confucian and Buddhist and Shinto temples, but

apart from the temple, and always recognized as of peculiar sacredness. . . . They stand in front of shrines" (*ib.*, p. 104). References to the sacred gate or doorway are numerous in ancient Babylonian literature. Here, also, we are informed that the crossing of a threshold marks the change from the present to the future world; while it is needful for another life to be given for one to be reborn into this life having crossed the threshold of the region beyond (*ib.*, 110–113). "The oldest temple discovered in Egypt is little more than a doorway with an altar at its threshold;" while "the same hieroglyph represented house or temple,—a simple quadrangular enclosure, with its one doorway." "An altar stood at the doorway, or before the door, at temples of later date in Phœnicia and Phrygia, as shown on contemporary medals and coins. And so in temples in other lands (*ib.*, p. 126, 100, 121).

Dr. Trumbull intimated that two upright stone posts with or without an overhanging stone across them, signify a threshold shrine similar to the completed doorway shrine. Mr. Cowper (p. 179) refers to the images mentioned in 2 K. 10 : 26, as brought out of the house of Baal by order of Jehu, and burned, as parallel structures to the senams. He points out that, as we know, they were pillars, and he sees in them a likeness to the dual pillars which stood before various temples, to Jachin and Boaz that stood in Solomon's temple. Prof. Lumby, however, sees in these pillars mentioned in Kings, a mere reduplication of the Baal pillars (Cam. Bib.). He is mistaken, since the special emphasis laid on the Baal pillar which was destroyed equally with these other pillars, shows that the latter must have represented an additional feature in the Baal worship. This could have been nothing else than the female principle, Astarte, his well-known companion, as he himself represented the male principle. Singular confirmation of this conclusion is found in a Carthage votive stele dedicated to the goddess Tanith-Artemis (the heavenly virgin, a form of Astarte), with two pillars in front of a temple (Eze. Polychrome Ed., p. 186). The two pillars which Ezekiel saw in the second temple stood one in front of either jamb of the threshold entrance, signifying by their position their original character (40 : 49), which I conceive to have been that of the senams, the Asherim, and the structures on the Babylonian seals.

Blood Letting and the Asherah Symbol.

With all this evidence before us, let us now see what connection existed between blood letting, and the threshold of a home, later a temple shrine. Let us endeavor to ascertain when, and under what circumstances, the first blood was supposed to have been shed as the commencement of sacrifice.

It would seem that in the union of the sexes was seen the first threshold sacrifice, at the doorway of physical life. This was followed by the shedding of blood at the threshold of the home, and later, at a temple doorway. It was thus that primitive man came to believe that there was no covenant binding without the shedding of blood; no continuance of life without animal sacrifice, be it of man or beast. This is why woman was viewed as the first altar, the shape of which was originally patterned after her form, broad at the ends, contracted in the middle. This is why as far back as the Vedas themselves the term yoni, or doorway of physical life, is used as synonymous with altar (TC, pp. 197, 198).

Now while all this is very wonderful, it is, after all, very natural, and at once explains the significance of the senams discovered by Mr. Cowper. They are simply representations of the physical doorway of life, which later became temple shrines, and before which sacrifices were offered, both of man and beast. Thus the senam is an emblem of life, physical and mystical; it is the symbol of woman, and the emblem of divine fertility. It is, as Mr. Cowper rightly conjectured, the Asherah symbol, and we now know for the first time what this symbol was like as originally used by the Semitic Baal worshippers who had borrowed from their fellow Semites of Babylonia this emblem of their Ishtar nature cult. If I am correct, then both senams and Asherim were phallic emblems, the latter representing the goddess Asherah, while the former, which there is reason to believe were of Phœnician origin (see Cowper, p. 188; *cf.* Her. B. 2. c. 54), represented Astarte, otherwise Asherah. In other words, they were one and the same symbol.

I am aware, however, that W. H. Smith, in his "Religion of the Semites," states that "the opinion that there was a Canaanite goddess called Ashera and that the trees or poles of the same name were her symbols, is not tenable (p. 188, 2nd ed.). Prof. Allen (Asherah-

HDB), doubts both the existence of a goddess Asherah, and that the Asherah was a phallic symbol. Prof. Moore (Asherah-Ency. Bib.) says simply, "the shape of an Asherah is unknown. . . . The assertion still often made that in the religion of Canaan the massebas (*i. e.*, pillars) were sacred to male, the asheras (*i. e.*, posts), to female deities, is supported by no proof whatever." Finally, the view that these pillars and posts were phallic emblems, he describes as the opinion of "amateurs in the history of religion" (Massebah-Ency. Bib.).

On the other hand, Professors Barton (Sem. Orig., pp. 106, 248; 102, 137) and Sayce (Pat. Pal., p. 255) both believe in the existence of a goddess Asherah, and that a tree or post was her symbol, while a pillar was the symbol of Baal. Prof. Hommel also accepts the existence of a goddess Asherah, whom he identifies with Astarte (Anct. Heb. Trad., pp. 220, 224). But perhaps the strangest difference amongst these scholars is that W. R. Smith himself had previously stated in the Ency. Brit. (Baal), that the pillar and post in the Canaanitish worship were phallic symbols, indicative respectively of the male and female reproductive powers; while the name Asherah sometimes denoted the goddess and sometimes her symbol. All this I have shown he repudiated in his subsequent lectures, without, however, a single reference to his former opinion. Thus, as he gave no reason for discrediting this opinion, which still stands in all the new editions of the Ency. Brit., we are at liberty to adopt it, especially in view of the evidence already produced, which I am about to amplify.

In a note on Eze. 6 : 4, in the Polychrome Bible, we read, "The khammanim or sun-pillars were posts, pillars, or obelisks connected with the worship of a Baal of the sun, as the Asherahs were with that of Astarte." Here we have an acknowledgment that both Baal and Astarte had their respective symbols erected alongside an altar.

I believe that the idols mentioned in conjunction with the sun-pillars in Eze. 6 : 4, called images in the AV, and simply idols in the RV, are the Asherim, since I conceive that the altars, sun-images, and idols of this passage, correspond to the altars, Asherim, and sun-images of Isa. 17 : 8 (RV). In Ex. 34 : 13, and Deu. 12 : 3, the order is altars, pillars, and Asherim. The word translated idols in Eze. 6 : 4, signifies merely a round log or post of no definite shape in themselves, but which, when standing as dual pillars or stakes, would re-

semble the senams of the Tripoli hill range. I referred, a little while back, to the pillars brought out of the house of Baal by Jehu, and I agreed with Mr. Cowper in seeing in them, when placed in a dual position, a parallel structure to the senams. In the idols mentioned by Ezekiel, and alluded to in Lev. 26 : 30, in conjunction with high places and sun-images, I believe we have similar pillars to those burned by Jehu. In other words, they were the jambs of the Asherah symbol, which, shapeless and meaningless in themselves when separate, were of deep significance when in position.

From numerous passages of Scripture (see above) it is seen that the three customary sacred things at a high place were an altar, a sun-image, and an Asherah. Moore himself admits that the Israelite high-place had its altar, stone pillar, and wooden post, all of which had been taken over from the Canaanites. He further refers to the worship at these centres as pictured by Hosea in the eighth century, noting the licentious intercourse of men and women, in which the priests and consecrated women set the example (High-Place-Ency. Bib., Baal-HDB). Now how came this immorality into the worship of the Israelites? Was it original, or a new development based upon a foreign importation? A correct answer to these questions will materially aid us to the understanding of the Asherah symbol.

Israel's Early Religion.

When the Israelites entered Canaan the religion of the country "was the worship of the male and female divinities, Baal and Ashtoreth ; it was accompanied by the most degrading and licentious rites." It was a civilization of this character into which the Israelites entered under Joshua, "and which they in part adopted" (Kent-His. Heb. Peop., pp. 28, 92). Budde, in his "Religion of Israel to the Exile," infers that the Baal-worship of Canaan was readily taken up by the Israelites after their entrance into their new home (p. 70). Other scholars express the same opinion. "In religion, also, the Canaanite-Israelite was a new production. He held his monotheism somewhat loosely, and was ready to worship at Canaanite shrines. . . . New to the land, he was introduced to the old sanctuaries by the old inhabitants, and thus learned to worship the local Baal, the native god of

corn and wine. Of Israel's morals during this period, little need be said" (Israel; Judges HDB).

We need not wonder, however, that Israel from the first adopted the local religion of the country they were invading, since their own god, Yahwe, while accompanying his people on their journeys, going with them where they went, nevertheless, had his permanent home in Sinai or Horeb (*ib.*). The gods of Canaan had indeed been conquered by Yahwe, but not driven out of the country, since Yahwe had not yet come to reside with his own people, remaining still enthroned on Mount Sinai (Budde, p. 54). In view of this latter fact, we can readily understand why from the first Israel adopted the religion of the Canaanites.

I have said that when Israel entered Canaan the religion of the country consisted in the worship of both male and female divinities. These for the most part were not called by their proper names, but designated as "Lord" or "Lady" of the place where they were worshipped, which had an altar, a sacred pillar, and a sacred tree or post (Israel-Ency. Bib.). It was in simple language a nature worship based upon the idea of fertility, and in which, consequently, both male and female divinities would necessarily be associated. This is the reason why mention is made of both sun-pillars and Asherah images standing together at the one altar, for sacrifice there offered included homage to both principles of nature.

W. R. Smith admits that "If a god and a goddess were worshipped together at the same sanctuary . . . and if the two sacred symbols at the sanctuary were a pole and a pillar of stone, it might naturally enough come about that the pole was identified with the goddess and the pillar with the god. . . . It is not therefore very surprising that in one or two later passages written at a time when all the worship of the high places was regarded as entirely foreign to the religion of Jehovah, the Asherim seem to be regarded as the female partners of the Baalim. . . . There is no evidence of a divine pair amongst the older Hebrews" (Rel. Sem., p. 189).

That the religion of the Canaanites taken over by the Iraelites was a nature religion, based upon the ideas of fertility and reproduction, including consequently homage to both male and female divinity, I think I have produced sufficient evidence to show. Thus, in opposition to W. R. Smith, I cannot but think there is ample evidence of

the worship of a divine pair amongst the older Hebrews, so that it follows, according to his own argument, that as a pillar, and another separate object, stood at a sanctuary where both a male and female deity were worshipped together, the pillar was identified with the god, and the other object with the goddess.

It further seems to me that we have entirely disposed of Prof. Moore's contention that there is no proof that the massebas were sacred to male, and the asheras to female deities.

"*The Original Shape of an Asherah.*"

We are told that the Asherah was a wooden post or mast (Asherah-Ency. Bib.), a tree, post, or stump of a tree (Asherah-HDB) ; a tree or post (Rel. Sem., 188) ; a tree or pole (Thresh. Cov., pp. 214, 232). These four writers base their opinion upon Ex. 34 : 13 ; and Deut. 16 : 21. In the former passage there is a direction to "cut down their Asherim," and in the latter, "not to plant thee an Asherah of any kind of tree beside the altar of Jehovah." This is all, or nearly all the foundation upon which these scholars build their idea as to the nature of the Asherah. These two passages, however, afford no ground for any such opinion, while many others show that it is utterly untenable.

Manasseh is recorded as having set up a graven image of Asherah in the house of the Lord (2 K. 21 : 7), which was brought out and burned by the reforming king, Josiah (2 K. 23 : 6). Ahab also is recorded as making an Asherah and apparently setting it up in the house of Baal (1 K. 16 : 32, 33). Thus the Asherah was something that could be made, and by man's fingers, as Isaiah records (17 : 8). Now what can be made, set up in, and then brought out of an enclosure, is neither a living, nor a dead tree stump, nor pole. Besides, the women of the temple wove drapery for it (2 K. 23 : 7), or in other words, garments or tunics (Dress-Ency. Bib.), for this is what the word rendered hangings in the A and RVs signifies. To this, however, I shall refer later.

Prof. Moore (Asherah-Ency. Bib.) tells us that *perhaps* the Asherah was "sometimes carved, but the drapery especially is doubtful" Other scholars, however, think that the Asherah *was* sometimes carved. In fact, that the term Asherah probably means the wooden image of a goddess worshipped with similar rites to those of the god Baal (Asherah-HDB ; Eze. Cam. Bib.).

The above difference amongst scholars has arisen from their misunderstanding of the original and subsequent development of the Asherah; together with their failure to grasp the significance of the covering woven for the Asherah by the temple women. Originally I believe that the Asherah was merely a threshold or doorway, such as the senams, and as seen on Babylonian seals, while sometimes it consisted merely of two uprights, or pillar jambs. Later, both in Babylonia and with the Hebrews, I believe it underwent a development, which will appear later.

When Israel entered Canaan, the high places which they took over from the Canaanites included, as we have seen, an altar, a Baal or sun-pillar, and what I believe to have been a threshold or doorway of wood, formed by two jambs and a lintel, called an Asherah. That the Asherah represented the feminine element in Baal worship, I think I have fully shown. If I am correct, then, when we bear in mind what Trumbull has abundantly proved, viz., that the female element was from the first represented by a threshold or doorway; when we see this symbol carried by the Phœnicians who had obtained it from Babylonia, to the people of the Tripoli hill region, are we not justified in claiming that the image depicting the female element as worshipped by the Canaanite-Israelite was similarly a threshold or doorway, represented by an actual enclosure with side posts and lintel, or merely by two upright beams or posts? As time went on, however, a change was made in the form of this symbol both in Babylonia and with the Hebrews, whereby from a mere symbol of the goddess it was made into an actual life-like image.

The New Form of the Asherah.

In 1 K. 15 : 13, AV., we read, "Maachah his mother, even her he removed from being queen, because she had made an idol in a grove; and Asa destroyed her idol, and burned it by the brook Kidron." This is not the literal rendering, so the RV gives it, "made an abominable image for an Asherah." But neither is this a literal translation, so they struck out the *an*, and put simply *for* Asherah, in the margin. The meaning of the passage seems to be that Maachah not contented with the usual simple, but suggestive Asherah symbol, made one more fully depicting the rites of the goddess symbolized by the threshold

emblem. Is it possible to ascertain this new form given to the Asherah? I think so, and will endeavor to describe it.

First, the word for idol in 1 K. 15 : 13, signifies a horrible image. It was, I apprehend, a representation of nature worship which by its gross literalism, shocked or disgusted its beholders. The original Asherah represented an opening indicative of the Kteis or doorway of physical life. Now, this was fully depicted in an actual likeness of a woman showing in grossly exaggerated realism her reproductive character. Figurines of Ishtar have been discovered at Nippur and elsewhere, depicting the goddess clasping her breasts with one hand, and her womb with the other (Jastrow-BAR, p. 674; Ashtoreth-Ency. Bib., HDB). Perrot and Chipiez, in their "Art in Phrygia," p. 293, give a drawing of an ancient mould, found at Thyatira, which depicts a nude figure of "the goddess-mother, Istar, or Anahith, of the religions of Anterior Asia." They draw attention to the gross realism referred to, which was a common feature of such figures throughout Semitic regions 2000 B. C. (Ellis-Psy. Sex., Vol. 11, p. 28). Maachah's horrible image seems to have been a similarly emphasized life-like representation of Asherah, otherwise, Astarte, otherwise, Ishtar. If I am correct, then the idol made by Maachah was a phallic image, and it is so accepted by Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible (Maachah). This was the opinion also of Movers, but W. R. Smith does not accept this idea, while he is emphatic in asserting that Eze. 16 : 17, does not refer to phallic worship (Rel. Sem., p. 456). I think, however, that Movers was justified in seeing in both passages phallic reference.

Were the Hebrews Phallic Worshippers?

Prof. T. Witton Davies, in his "Magic, Divination, and Demonnology" (p. 99), does not hesitate to refer to Hosea 2 : 2, as showing that the women who wore the ornaments there indicated, acknowledged the heathen religion. This, however, is but another way of saying that they practiced the same rites. Now what were these ornaments to which Hosea alluded as whoredoms to be put away from the face and breast? What were these images of men with which the Hebrew women played the harlot, and for which they made coverings (Eze. 16 : 17, 18)? Necklaces of phalli, and similar ornaments for the face, were common in ancient Egypt and countries surrounding

Israel (Westropp-Primitive Symbolism, p. 41). In Dyer's "Pompeii," is figured a necklace of amulets with two phalli, found on a female skeleton. Worship with an abominable use of ithyphallic images was similarly widespread (Pausanias, Bk. 6. c. 26; Her. Bk. 11, c. 102; Arnobius, Bk. 5, 132; Augustine-De Civ. Dei., Bk. 6, c. 9). Amsu, or Min, was a very ancient Egyptian god of the generative and reproductive powers of nature, and was usually depicted ithyphallic.

In a former article, "The Origin of Circumcision," I showed that Abraham himself viewed the Phallus as especially sacred to deity, and so also did Jacob (Gen. 47 : 29). This being so, with the perversion of an originally pure idea which saw in reverence paid to the phallus devotion offered to the Creator, we can well understand Israel's acceptance of, and participation in, the sexual grossness of the age. As part of a people always prone to sexual excess (Sem. Orig., p. 42), that the Hebrew women should have adopted obscene ornaments as exhibited in their use of phallic amulets, and ithyphallic images, for no other construction can be placed upon the statements of the prophets touching whoredoms committed by the wearing of ornaments, and the making of male images, does not surprise us in the least. Indeed, Dr. Peters (EHS, p. 28) does not hesitate to refer to the worship of the Canaanites as taken over by the Israelites as "phallic and lascivious."

We now come to the drapery woven for the Asherah. It is recorded that Asa removed and destroyed the shocking image which his mother had made. That was in 951 B. C., yet in 785 B. C., the Hebrew women were wearing phallic ornaments; in 624 B. C., an Asherah, for which women of the temple were weaving drapery, was still in the house of the Lord, (2 K. 23 : 7); while in 595 B. C., women of the same character, if not of the same profession, were making ithyphallic images of men and supplying them with garments. From all this I apprehend that the making of phallic images with pronounced sexual parts such as I conceive to have been introduced by Maachah, was continued all through this period together with other phallic practices. As for the garments woven for these images, it was a common custom amongst the ancients, down even to a late period, to weave garments for statues of both gods and goddesses. Matrons wove a shawl for Hera; the goddesses Ilithyia and Athene were

draped; while women wove a coat for Apollo at Amyclæ every year (Pausanias, Bk. 5, 15; 1, 18, 24; 111, 16).

It must be noticed that 2 K. 23 : 7, records that the drapery was woven, not for the Asherim, but for the Asherah, which I take to be the Asherah made for the temple. We have here, consequently, the weaving, not of tent-shrines, as certain scholars have assumed (Eze.-Cam. Bib.; High-Place Ency. Bib.), but of corresponding clothing to that made for the Greek gods and goddesses referred to, which, we are informed, was a custom borrowed from the East (Dress-Ency. Bib.). As for the garments referred to in Eze. 16 : 16, these evidently were made into tent-shrines, in which whoredom seems to have been committed, for this is the sense of the passage (Eze.-SBOT). This was a new and appalling departure in depravity, since hitherto, as was the case usually at heathen sex-rites (Rel. Sem., p. 454; Her. 1, 199), the Hebrews had always abstained, even among the married, from sexual intercourse at the approach to sacred enclosures (Ex. 19 : 15).

I have claimed that Maachah's "shocking" Asherah was a new form given to the usual threshold-doorway Asherah. What, then, was the shape of this graven Asherah which Manasseh made? In Deu. 4 : 16, the word used for image, in the sentence, "an image in the form of male or female," is semel, and in 2 Ch. 33 : 7, which records the making of the graven image by Manasseh, first mentioned in 2 K. 21 : 7, this word takes the place of Asherah in the last passage, showing that, in the mind of the writer, Manasseh's Ashera, like Maachah's, was also made in human form. We have here also a confirmation of my contention that Maachah's "shocking" Asherah was an anthropomorphic image of Baal's partner.

There was, however, another form of the Asherah to which I must also refer, as it is vitally connected with our subject.

The Babylonian Asherah.

On Babylonian-Assyrian monuments, there is frequently found a conventionalized tree receiving divine homage. A cut of such a tree is given in Ezekiel in the SBOT.[1] Here two winged beings stand, one on either side, with their right hand upraised, a sign of worship.

[1] Polychrome Bible.

The tree stands within a frame, conventionalized as part of the tree, being made of branches and foliage. The frame, however, while thus forming part of one symbol, is distinctly shown as separate from the tree. It is, in fact, a threshold or doorway in which the tree stands distinct from its framework. Other illustrations of this conventionalized tree are given in Inman's "Symbolism;" Layard's "Nineveh," where the framework is even more distinctly shown as separate from the tree. Here we have an instance of the association of tree worship with Asherah worship, since I take this frame or doorway to represent the usual Hebrew Asherah, and its centre piece a tree.

I have so far described the Hebrew Asherah as possessing two forms, the original simple doorway, or threshold, and, later, a human image. Prof. Barton, however, for whose opinion I have profound respect, sees nothing more in the Hebrew Asherah than a wooden post or pole, for he says it is a well-known fact that the Asherah in the OT period was a post or pole (Sem. Orig., p. 248). This opinion seems at first sight to be supported by the discovery of a clay tree-trunk enclosing a goddess (Phœnicia-Ency. Bib.); by the representation of a sacred tree in terra-cotta found in Cyprus, and an illustration of a Greek vase showing a tree standing by an altar (Eze. SBOT). That trees at one time were regarded as associated with or embodying divinity, we have evidence in the OT itself, in Abraham being represented as planting a tree and there calling upon the name of Yahwe (Gen. 21 : 33). Also in the representation of Deborah sitting under a palm-tree with the significance that from the tree she drew her inspiration (Jud. 4 : 5; Sem. Orig., p. 89). This association lasted down to a late period, since not only did Hebrews continue worshipping under trees, erecting there the usual furniture of a high-place, an altar, a pillar and an Asherah, but on the arch of Constantine there is a representation of Apollo enshrined in laurel trees (Smith's Dic. GR. Antiq.-Ara.); while Frazer gives instances of reverence paid to trees even in our own day (Golden Bough, Vol. 1, p. 187).

That the Asherah symbol was associated with tree worship, I fully admit, but I also believe that the reverse is equally true, viz., that tree worship was associated with the Asherah. It seems to me that what were origiually two separate ideas, each possessing its own symbol, the one a threshold, and the other a tree, were subsequently united, although separate representations of each continued to be made and

used to a late period. Thus, if I am correct, the terra-cotta tree found at Cyprus, depicts, not an Asherah, as claimed by Prof. Haupt, but the representation of a sacred tree, under which, in conjunction with an altar and a pillar, the Asherah was accustomed to stand. In like manner I would explain the tree on the Greek vase. They are representations, not of an Asherah, but of a sacred tree. Of the clay-trunk with the enclosed goddess, I shall speak later.

In the representation of tree worship engraved on Babylonian-Assyrian monuments, to which I have referred, while the trees depicted include several species, the date-palm is much more frequently represented, and of this tree it is the female which is always represented as receiving divine homage, the importance of which I shall now examine.

The date-palm is unisexual, separated into distinct male and female trees. This peculiarity has made artificial fertilization indispensable to the securing of large and edible date crops (Eze. SBOT., p. 182), a practice known to and adopted by the Semites of Arabia from early times (Sem. Orig., pp. 75, 78, 90, 162). It is not difficult, therefore, to understand how the date-palm and its culture played an important part in the development of ancient Semitic life, and early acquired a divine significance (*ib.*, 79), since its fertilization wrought by the wind, appeared to the primitive Semitic mind as a divine exhibition of sexual fertilization, and divine approval of it (*ib.*, 94). As therefore embodying a divine idea, the date-palm early became a sacred tree in Arabia, Israel, and Babylonia (*ib.*, 88 ff.), specially associated with the reproductive powers of nature. As a sacred tree it of course received divine homage, which from the nature of the case, included the idea of fertility. In keeping with all this, we have the representation on Babylonian-Assyrian monuments of divine homage paid to conventionalized trees, which Jastrow and other scholars, with good reason, describe as palm-trees (BAR, p. 662; Palm-tree,-Ency. Bib.). He further asserts that the comparison of this symbol with Phœnician and Hebrew Asherah, is fully justified, nor must I neglect to add that he sees in this mystic tree a connection with a design illustrating the worship of a deity (*ib.*, 689).

It is Prof. Barton, however, who tells us that the etymology of Ishtar is connected with palm tree (Sem. Orig., pp. 88, 89, 104), so that in the Babylonian-Assyrian symbol which Jastrow tells us we

may compare with the Phœnician and Hebrew Asherah, we see the emblem of Ishtar, which further justifies this comparison, since, in the Hebrew Asherah, we have identified a goddess whom we showed to be merely another form of Ishtar.

That the monuments referred to do actually depict tree worship, has now been generally recognized by scholars (Sem. Orig., p. 90), who also see in the design, homage to fertility (Oxford Bible, Exp. p. 1, lxxxiii).

The ordinary scholar, however, has failed to explain the significance of the conventionalized tree and frame, beyond the mere fact of this homage. Beyond this it has evidently been left to special students of sex-worship to carry us. Forlong, Inman and Howard see in these conventionalized trees the doorway of physical life, symbols of the kteis. While undoubtedly correct, so far as the frame-work of these trees is concerned, even they have failed to recognize the true character of the centre object. This is the female date-palm, its outer frame emphasizing the nature of the adoration offered to it, which was homage to the idea of fertility as indicated in the threshold or doorway of branches and foliage in which stands the sacred palm-tree. This latter symbolized the goddess Ishtar herself, who was thus enshrined in the female emblem of reproduction. There is nothing strange or overdrawn in all this. Trumbull informs us that "The doorway shrine is a common form on the Babylonian and Assyrian monuments, as a standing-place for the gods, and for kings as representative of the gods (TC, p. 105). This is only what we should have expected. If a doorway was, as there is abundant evidence to show, a well-understood sacred image, indicative of reproduction, then the framework enclosing the sacred tree, is as much a symbol as the tree itself. In that case we are amply warranted in seeing in the Babylonian-Assyrian conventionalized tree, two symbols, the sacred tree, and the sacred doorway of life. If, however, I am correct, then those writers are mistaken who assume the existence of a comparison between the Hebrew Asherah and the Babylonian-Assyrian mystic tree, unless it can be shown that the former was sometimes made like the latter, with two symbols in one.

Here I may refer to the discovery of the clay tree-trunk showing a goddess sitting within it. In his reference to this object, Meyer (Phœnicia-Ency. Bib.) associates the allusion in the Ma' Sub inscrip-

tion, which he reads "the Astarte in the Ashera." If it were possible to be certain of this reading, we might argue from it, all things being in order. But it is not possible, as the text is obscure, and can be explained in different ways (Asherah-HDB; Ency. Bib.). As given by Meyer, Moore does not explain it as referring to a goddess residing within a tree-trunk, for he reads it,—"to the Astarte in the sacred precincts." If this tree-trunk actually shows a goddess sitting within it, or if the object is a tree-trunk and not something else, then Meyer's acceptance of the reading as he gives it, and his connecting it with this particuler tree-trunk, was a happy thought. On the other hand, it is strange that neither Moore, Driver, nor Allen in their respective articles on Asherah and Ashteroth (Ency. Bib.; HDB), makes any allusion to this particular tree-trunk, especially as Moore quotes the same work from which Meyer has drawn his illustration. Even in his later published "Judges," he makes no reference to it, while touching the word "Asherah," he says that, "as yet the Phœnician inscription in which the word has been found once or twice, throws no light on the subject" (p. 193). All this naturally causes us to doubt Meyer's statement that a goddess has been discovered sitting within a tree-trunk. Can it be that he has mistaken another object for this tree-trunk, a drawing of which is given in Eze.-SBOT p. 110? This latter Prof. Toy seems to view as representing the sacred dovecote of Asherah. It presents the appearance of a hollow conical shaped vessel, which Toy thinks was probably used as a censer. On one side of it, or in front, we see "Astarte in a niche, and on the back of the cone, the doves of Asherah, the holes representing openings of the sacred dovecote." The goddess is represented as sitting within a doorway, which presents an exactly similar appearance to Mr. Cowper's senams, and to the structures on the Babylonian seals. It is not a mere outline mark, but a deep threshold, which I believe to be significant of the well understood threshold opening.

It is probably *this* object which Meyer has taken for a tree enclosing a goddess, and if so, he undoubtedly is mistaken, since it more probably represents a vessel of some character, the figures on its front and back depicting the worship in which it was employed. In fact, it represents one of the vessels made for Asherah, profanely worshipped in the temple, and which with the symbols of Asherah and

Baal were brought out of the house of the Lord and destroyed by order of Josiah (2 K. 23 : 4, 6).

If I am correct in seeing in Meyer's tree-trunk, a mere vessel of Asherah such as I have described, then his assertion here must be dismissed, and we can understand why Moore and other scholars made no mention of it.

This dismissal, however, leaves us without any proof that the Hebrew Asherah was represented by a single tree-trunk or post indicative of a tree.

It will be remembered that I inferred, in conjunction with Mr. Cowper, that the pillars, apart from the Baal pillar, brought out of the house of Baal by Jehu, were dual pillars which represented a threshold or doorway. That the dwellers in Mesopotamia and the senam region of Tripoli were threshold-worshippers, the objects indicating this cult fully demonstrate. Have we, however, any direct proof that the Hebrews were threshold-worshippers, and so must have employed the symbol indicating this cult? Yes, even more definite than that furnished by the first mentioned people, since the objects on the Babylonian-Assyrian seals, and the senams, need to be explained, but the prophet Isaiah himself informs us that the Hebrews were threshold-worshippers. He refers (57 : 5), to the Hebrews as sacrificing their children *before* the clefts of the rocks, which reminds us of the altars in front of the senams.

In nature-worship, all natural orifices were reverenced as representing the yoni of the mother-earth goddess. In many places it was common to sanctify children by passing them through natural openings and crevices. It was equivalent to their regeneration (Howard-Sex-worship, p. 138). The act of squeezing between natural clefts and artificial openings, dual pillars, and holes in stones, is a world-wide custom founded upon yoni or threshold worship (Cowper, p. 186; Frazer-GB, Vol. 1, p. 307). Similarly, the worship of the smooth stones of the stream, to which the Hebrews also offered sacrifice (ver. 6), was an ancient phallic practice, part of the same cult, for as the clefts of the rocks represented the kteis, so these stones represented the phallus. But even as these natural clefts and stones by all sex-worshippers were reproduced in artificial openings and stone pillars, so also was it with the Hebrews, since they also had their Asherah symbols and Baal pillars. This is further evidence that the Hebrew Ashe-

rah was not a single tree-trunk or post, but rather a threshold opening formed by two jambs and a lintel, or by two upright stakes, posts, or stone pillars, or a post indicative of original dual posts.

I said a little while back that the dismissal of Meyer's asserted tree-trunk enshrined goddess, left us without any evidence that the Hebrew Asherah was ever represented by a single tree-trunk or post indicative of a tree, a statement we have seen confirmed by the examination just concluded.

At this point it is necessary to ask upon what ground does Jastrow claim to see a comparison between the Babylonian-Assyrian conventionalized date-palm, and the Asherah of the Hebrews and Phœnicians? Simply this. He assumes that the former represents merely a pole indicative of tree-worship, and that the latter similarly represents a pole indicative of the same worship. He presents no evidence himself for either assumption, referring for this to Stade. On the other hand, the Rev. G. W. Collins (PSBA, June, 1889,) sees in the Hebrew name Asherah the Assyrian *isaru*, which denotes the phallus. He thinks, therefore, that the Hebrew Asherah was a rudely shaped pole, indicative of the male generative organ. There is no proof, however, direct or indirect, that the Asherah indicated a single pillar post structure; while the evidence produced clearly shows that whatever its form it symbolized a female and not a male deity. That the symbolical tree on Assyrian sculpture included two symbols in one, we affirm, in view of its definite appearance to this end, no other explanation according so well with the shape of this mystic tree.

But while there is no evidence indicating that the Hebrew Asherah consisted of one pole or post indicative of a single pillar-like structure, there is evidence by analogy that sometimes it may have been made out of one post. Herodotus tells us that he saw in Syria-Palæstina pillars engraved with the private parts of a woman (B. 2. 106). W. R. Smith views these as masseboth dedicated to female deities. Whereupon he assumes that the whole phallic theory, which sees in the Baal pillar the male, and in the Asherah the female symbol of reproduction, is wrecked, because the masseba represent male and female deities indifferently (Rel. Sem., p. 457).

There is no point, however, in this reasoning, because, in the instance given, the pillar with the female private parts engraved upon it had a different significance in its very representation from the pillar

which usually represented the male organ. The former was engraved to depict the natural threshold of physical life, its significance resting not in its single pillar form, but in what was engraved upon it. The significance of the latter rested entirely in its single outline shape, which may or may not have been carved into a more lifelike appearance of the organ it represented.

Prof. Moore follows Smith in rejecting the phallic view of the Baal-pillar and the Asherah, because the standing stone may be a goddess as well as a god (Massebah-Ency. Bib.). This is true, but it is necessary to explain why, except when an aerolite, goddesses were always represented by a conical shaped stone, never a pillar. Again, why two pillars are always placed at the threshold of a female temple or shrine. I have already referred to the two pillars on the Carthage stele devoted to the goddess Tanith-Artemis, as indicating a threshold, and so possessing a phallic significance. Even Prof. Smith quotes Lucian as stating that the two pillars of the temple of Hierapolis were dedicated to the mother-goddess Hera (Rel. Sem., p. 457), although he failed to see the significance here which we are tracing. The very pillars of Hercules at Gades (Strabo. 3, 5, 5) owed their existence to the idea of a threshold, the entrance to the empire (TC., p. 181). When, therefore, we come to note that the conical stone of Aphrodite on all Cypriote coins is represented standing between two pillars, indicative of the threshold of physical life, and highly suggestive of the licentious worship practiced at the shrine, we are not disconcerted because Zeus Kasios and Elajabalus were also represented by conical stones. The position and circumstances associated with the conical stone representing a female divinity would themselves enable us to see which stone represented the male, and which the female divinity, assuming that two exactly similar stones were ever represented as standing together at the same altar, of which, however, there is no recorded instance.

For these reasons I am unable to see with Prof. Moore "the awkward fact that the standing stone may be a god as well as a goddess" (Massebah-Ency. Bib.); nor can I agree with Prof. Smith that upon this fact "the whole phallic theory seems to be wrecked" (Rel. Sem., p. 457). Indeed, it is singular how these noted scholars jump to conclusions without the slightest warrant, and make statements utterly at variance with facts. For instance, Prof. Sayce in his "Patriarchal

Palestine," p. 255, says that the Asherah was sometimes made of wood and sometimes of stone, that in "Palestine it was usually of wood, but in the great temple of Paphos in Cyprus there was an ancient and revered one of stone." Yet he tells us in his "Early History of the Hebrews," p. 306, that the Asherah which Jehovah commanded Gideon to cut down and with the wood of it "offer a burnt offering," was "the cone of stone which symbolized the goddess Asherah." Others, scholars such as Moore, Collins, Allen, see in the directions given to Gideon at this time touching the Asherah, the strongest evidence that it was made of wood. It only shows how careful we must be before accepting the statements and conclusions of well-known scholars, whose recognized position does not guarantee their unfailing reliability.

I have said that Prof. Smith views the pillars that Herodotus saw engraved with the private parts of a woman as masseboth dedicated to female deities. On the contrary, I believe that they represented the Hebrew Asherah, and bore a resemblance to the "shocking" image made by Maachah. This image I claimed to have presented a life-like form of the goddess Asherah. In what then do I conceive this resemblance to exist? Mr. Collins thinks it difficult to imagine "in what way a phallus shaped pole could represent 'a nature-goddess the principle of physical life'" (PSBA.). He seemd to have overlooked his own previous reference to these pillars mentioned by Herodotus, and which the Encyclopedia Britannica (Sesostris) assumes to have been Asherim pillars, otherwise, female phallic symbols. The fact, as I have already pointed out, that the objects upon which these obscene engravings were carved were pillars, presents no difficulty in the way of the phallic theory, since the male masseba was identified by its outline, shaped more or less suggestively; while the female masseba was indentified by the carvings upon it, the object upon which they were engraved not counting as in the case of the male masseba.

The resemblance between Maachah's image and these Asherim of Herodotus, I conceive to exist primarily, and essentially, in a similar representation of the female private parts. Both were evidently constructed for the same object, and both similarly indicated that object. The only question of uncertainty seems to be as to whether Maachah's shocking image was not a single post, such as the pillars of Herodotus. For the reasons given I am not inclined to think that it was; but even if it were, it would lend no support to the opinion

that the form and intention of the Asherah was a single post or pole, since the idea sought to be conveyed by the Asherah was that of the threshold of physical life, which could equally be represented by two uprights, or the more realistic naturally portrayed orifice carved upon a single pole, or in its natural position on the figure of a woman.

The thought has presented itself to me whether Maachah may not have placed her "shocking image" between the two jambs or uprights of the ordinary Asherah. The goddess sitting within the niche or threshold on the censer, to which I have referred, is undoubtedly enshrined in a well understood sacred enclosure. This thought seems warranted by the position of the conical stone of Aphrodite, another form of Asherah or Astarte, always or nearly always represented as placed between two pillars. Manasseh's Asherah may have been similarly placed. I said some time back that I believed the pillars brought out of the house of Baal and burned by Jehu were the dual pillars of the Asherah which Ahab is recorded as having made. We are not directly told that Ahab placed an Asherah in the house which he had built for Baal, but the new Tyrian-Baal worship which he had introduced through his wife Jezebel, was if possible even more licentious than the existing obscene Baal cult of Israel. It was essentially a worship of both the male and female principles, so that Ahab's Baal must have had his Baalath, a point conceded by Prof. Cheyne in his statement, "Of course Baalath may have had her cultus by the side of Baal" (Ahab-Ency. Bib.). It is true, he adds, that a contemporary writer could not have called either Baal or Astarte, "the Asherah." If, however, the Phœnicians employed a similar symbol for their Asherah to that in use amongst the Hebrews, and there is every reason to assume that they did, then Dr. Cheyne's last remark may be dismissed as uncalled for.

I must not neglect to add that Prof. Lumby's note on Ahab's Asherah confirms Prof. Cheyne's first statement. He explains this Asherah as "the image which was to represent the female divinity of which the Baal was the male" (Kings, Cam. Bib.). We are justified, therefore, in assuming that when Ahab set up the pillar of Baal in the house he built for him, he included the emblem of his essential counterpart. This we may see in the Asherah which Ahab is recorded as having made (1 K. 16 : 32, 33,) and which we identify in the pillars burned by Jehu when he also broke down the pillar of Baal (2 K. 10 :

26, 27). The fact that an Asherah was still existing in Samaria after the total destruction of the house of Baal and all its contents, does not in the least affect our contention. Jehoram began his reign over Israel by destroying the pillar of Baal, including evidently the Asherah, which his father Ahab had made (2 K. 3:2), yet another Baal pillar and another Asherah seem to have been very soon made, the latter occupying its original place in the house of Baal when brought forth by Jehu and burned. Thus there was nothing strange in the statement that the Asherah still remained in Samaria in the reign of Jehoahaz forty-two years after its destruction by Jehu (2 K. 13:6). Nor does it mean that Jehu had not destroyed the Asherah in company with the Baal pillar. It signifies merely that its emblem had been renewed and its worship continued.

Meyer's Tree-trunk Ashera.

I said that I was doubtful as to the accuracy of Meyer's statement that a goddess had been found "sitting within the tree-trunk of Ashera," and I ventured to express the opinion that he had mistaken an Asherah dovecote incense burner for a tree-trunk. Since I made that statement I have made a careful study of Ohnefalsch-Richter's "Kypros," the work from which Prof. Meyer drew his supposed discovery, and I now give what this writer has to say about the matter.

He compares this "dovecote in the form of a hollow and slightly conical column," which "served as an incense bowl," with a triangle on a coin of Tarsos, stating that "in both cases the goddess is represented as dwelling in a cone or triangle." He adds that "at Tarsos in a triangular (pyramidal or conic) building of wood or stone there was set up the image of a goddess standing upon a lion's back." Further, on a coin of Paphos a dove sits on the head of a cone, just as one sits on the apex of the triangle on the Tarsian coin. From which he concludes that an anthropomorphic dove-goddess is conceived as dwelling in a conical structure which he calls an Ashera. Finally, he tells us that, "It would appear that the votive column of Kition (*i. e.*, this dovecote) is made after Egyptian models," and he produces by way of example an Egyptian votive pyramidion, a small pyramid, showing two anthropomorphic figures inclosed in a niche (Vol. 1, pp. 165, 167, 168).

From the above we see plainly that what Meyer described as the discovery of a terra cotta "tree-trunk of Ashera" with a goddess sitting within it, is after all a conical incense votive bowl, modeled, not after a tree-trunk, but after an Egyptian pyramidion. It bears no relation to a tree, but rather, according to Ohnefalsch-Richter's own line of argument, to a conical structure in which the dove-goddess was believed to reside.

An explanation of Meyer's mistake may be found in a note by Ohnefalsch-Richter, p. 168, where he says, "but the best illustration of the strange phrase in the Ma' Sub inscription ("the Astarte in the Ashera") is supplied by our Astarte seated in the Ashera post and dove cage." By the term post, however, he does not mean a tree-trunk, but merely a "slightly conical column, to use his own words, and which, as I have shown, he compares, not with an Asherah tree-trunk, but with a triangle on a coin of Tarsos. The fact that he gives other illustrations of dovecotes modeled after the pattern of a square house, should have prevented Meyer from seeing in the dovecote in question an object indicating a tree-trunk (pl. 134, figs. 4, 5).

It will thus be seen that I was correct in assuming that Meyer had taken this conical dovecote censer as representing an Asherah tree-trunk, and, consequently, that I was justified in dismissing his supposed discovery. It is true, as I have said, that Ohnefalsch-Richter refers to this dovecote as "an Asherah post," but I showed that he also calls it a "slightly conical column (1, 165), which he says, represents a cone" (1, 169), a dove-tower (1, 291), being modeled after an Egyptian pyramidion (1, 168). Thus the use of the word post means no more here than a tower-like conical structure. Finally, he calls the cone in which the Paphian goddess was supposed to reside an Asherah (1, 168), so that his use of the words Asherah and posts as applied to the Kition dovecote, do not signify that we have here an Asherah tree-trunk.

Sun-pillars and the Doorway Shrine.

Ohnefalsch-Richter, by comparing the graffiti (triangular markings, on the walls of the Tyrian grotto) with the triangular-vulva on the leaden idol of Hissarlik, the ancient Ilium, with the same on female figures on Babylonian seal cylinders, on Cyprus idols, and an Egyp-

tian relief depicting the nude goddess Kadesh, shows that a triangle was a well-understood female phallic symbol. This symbol he compares with the cones of the Paphian goddess as shown on the coins of Paphos, Byblos, Sidon (Tarsos), and on Cathagenian tablets (1, 147, 148, 149). We have previously referred to his comparison of the Kition dovecote with the triangle on the coin of Tarsos, where in both cases he represented the goddess as dwelling in a cone or triangle (1, 167). What better proof could we have than the above comparison for asserting that the triangle was a well-understood phallic symbol of the doorway of physical life. To put it another way, what better proof than the above could we have that a threshold or doorway was a well-understood female phallic symbol.

I previously pointed out that the goddess on the Kition dovecote was enframed in a well-understood sacred enclosure, and not a mere outline mark, supporting this opinion by a reference to the position of the cone of the Paphian goddess as placed between two pillars. Ohnefalsch-Richter not only refers to a goddess as dwelling in this cone (1, 167), but as "within a great tower-like" structure (1, 165). There is another dovecote, however, discovered at Idalion (1, 130), with which he compares the dovecote from Kition, referring to them both as shrines, used in acts of ritual as vessels for incense (1, 351). Both represent a goddess as sitting in an opening or doorway, but the former sits enshrined by dual pillars, one on either side of a doorway showing jambs and lintel in very slight relief; while the other sits within a doorway without any pillars in front, but with jambs and lintel standing out in very bold relief (p. 295, *cf.* 278; 187). May we not see in the dual pillars of the former doorway the two columns between which the cone of the Paphian goddess is so often represented? Ohnefalsch-Richter examines the cultus of the two Sun-columns, claiming that these dual pillars are the prototype of the pillars of Herakles; that they almost always appear in pairs; that the Sun-god is represented as emerging from between them; and that the columns of the primitive cult of Zeus in Arcadia reminds us of the two columns of Melqart at Tyre, Baal at Malta, and Astarte-Aphrodite at Paphos (181, 185, 186). Yes, and we may add the pillars in Solomon's temple, Jachin and Boaz, notwithstanding that Ohnefalsch-Richter agrees with W. R. Smith that they were not. He opposes the latter, however, in agreement with Movers that certain Masseboth and Asheroth

had an obscene significance, and he refers to Jeremiah 3 : 9. Solomon's pillars no doubt had no phallic carving upon them, yet their origin was the same as other such uprights, and signified the doorway of physical life.

Ohnefalsch-Richter informs us that the cultus column had its origin in Babylon (1, 191), and he associates it with the idea of the pillars or gates of the Sun, between which or out of which, as indicating the folding gate which turned on hinges, the sun was assumed to emerge every morning (1, 182). But he failed to associate the folding pillars or gate of the Sun with the doorway of physical life, which undoubtedly lay behind the idea of the gate, door, or folding pillars of the Sun (Trumbull-TC, p. 105).

With this evidence before us, we do not hesitate to affirm that in the bold relief doorway niche of the goddess of the Kition dovecote, we have the dual pillars of the goddess of the Idalion dovecote, which again are the Sun-pillars whose origin we have traced to the doorway of physical life.

In the dual pillars Ohnefalsch-Richter sees the Asherah brought out of the house of Baal by Jehu and destroyed in company with the Baal pillar. He reads 2 K. 10 : 26, 27, "they brought forth the Asherah out of the temple and burnt them; and they beat down the pillar of Baal" (1, 190). Thus has my interpretation of this passage which I gave some time back been singularly and completely confirmed.

But this is not the only important point in my present contention confirmed by Ohnefalsch-Richter's "Kypros." He asserts that "when a 'horror' is set up to Asherah . . . the female pudendum is intended" (1, 146). And on a Phœnician seal which shows a triangle on a pole before which a priest stands in an attitude of devotion, we see "the post of Asherah, the 'horror' of the Bible" (1, 149). Whether he is correct or not in the interpretation of the symbol on the Babylonian seal cylinders which he has undertaken to explain, I am not at present prepared to say. The point of confirmation is this. From my own evidence, supported by that of Ohnefalsch-Richter which I have added to my own, it must surely appear as proved that the new form given to the Asherah by Maachah was an obscene depicting of the doorway of physical life. The evidence at hand appears to confirm Movers's opinion, which is that of Ohnefalsch-Richter, that

the "shocking" image made by Maachah was a gross representation of the natural threshold of physical life. Before reading "Kypros," I was inclined to view Maachah's image as a complete figure such as the leaden goddess of Hissarlik. Now I am more confirmed in that opinion. The placing of the goddess within a threshold we have seen exemplified in the dovecotes of Kition and Idalion, an original Babylonian custom to which Trumbull alludes, and of which I shall now give an example.

The Sacred Tree and the Doorway Shrine.

In Mr. Fergusson's "Palaces of Nineveh," the author gives an illustration of an Assyrian bas-relief known as Lord Aberdeen's black stone. Here we have a small, square temple enclosing in its doorway a representation of the Babylonian-Assyrian sacred tree. Mr. Fergusson writes, "A very important question is — to whom were these square temples dedicated? or, in other words, what is this emblem that occupies the sanctuary as here represented?" He answers, "My own impression is that it is the object so frequently mentioned in the Bible as the grove or groves." Again he says, "The only remaining question is, what is the precise object meant to be represented by the emblem?" He suggests, "Asteroth or Astarte" (pp. 298, 300, 303). That it represents with the Hebrews, Astarte, and with the Babylonians, Istar, we have seen, so that we need not follow Mr. Fergusson any further, whose second suggestion that the Asherim represent the stars, and the Baalim the seven planets, may be dismissed in view of later research (*ib.*, 304). He has done good work, however, by his reference to this sacred tree with its temple-shrine. His suggestion that the former is the Hebrew Asherah, is the opinion of present scholars, which in part we are here opposing. Our contention being that as usually depicted this sacred tree includes two symbols in one, the outer conventionalized frame-work, and the inner conventionalized tree. We have described this frame-work as made of conventionalized branches and foliage, which Ohnefalsch-Richter explains as ribbons and other ornaments (1, 91). I cannot but think that my explanation is the better and truer one.

To return to Mr. Fergusson's temple. Here we have a shrine similar in significance to the dovecotes of Kition and Idalion, and the cones of the Paphian goddess. Further, this temple has two pillars

or jambs in bold relief, which correspond to the jambs on the Kition dovecote, the two pillars on the dovecote from Idalion, and in front of the cones of the Paphian goddess and elsewhere. Thus we have in this sanctuary tree on Lord Aberdeen's black stone, a Babylonian-Assyrian sacred tree standing in a doorway shrine.

On an old Babylon cylinder there is engraved the representation of the sacrifice of a bull in front of a very plainly indicated sun-gate, which Ohnefalsch-Richter refers to as "a columnar altar or other object of worship," and further on as an "altar, column, or gate" (1, 84). On page 182, he refers to another engraving of the same subject, where, he says, "we have the same pillar." I have already referred to his allusion to the sun-god emerging between two columns which he says, "represent the gate of the sun (1, 181), and which were conceived as folding gates turning upon their hinges (1, 182). "One sees at once," he adds, "from the whole technique and drawing that the (dual) cylinders with the rising sun are of the same epoch and style as those on the (single) winged pillars." I gather, therefore, from the description and drawings given that the single winged column, which, as I have said, appears as a plainly indicated doorway with jambs and lintel, was meant by the engraver to represent an actual gate or rather gated doorway, and that when it was intended to picture the emerging of the sun-god, attendants were represented as rolling back two folding half gates which turned upon their hinges, and which were depicted as dual pillars. Gradually, says Ohnefalsch-Richter, the notion of movable folding doors to the gate of the sun was lost, and only the pillars remained, at first usually in pairs" (1, 182). This may be so, but the original idea of the definite gate or doorway still remained, so that dual pillars always carried the thought back to the notion of a threshold.

On a Babylonian cylinder assumed to be "Sanherib's own seal," is engraved the statue of the king himself which is placed between a sacred tree and two lotus flowers. The statue stands within a doorway enclosure similar to that in which his father is represented as standing on the stele erected in Cyprus by Sargon himself (1, 95).

The foregoing confirms our contention that dual pillars in temples, etc., originated in the idea of a threshold; while it also confirms Dr. Trumbull's reference to Babylonian doorway shrines. Further, this gateway of the sun is a similar structure to that on the Babylonian

seals in which Mr. Cowper sees his Tripoli senams. Thus the foregoing also confirms his opinion that the latter are doorway shrines.

Having now shown that the Babylonians and Assyrians understood and used doorway shrines, I will now produce the evidence upon which I claim the general prevalence of a double symbol in the Babylonian-Assyrian sacred tree.

The Sacred Tree and its Double Symbol.

On the walls of the Tyrian grotto palm branches accompany the triangular vulva, and the evidence to be produced will show that when the Babylonian-Assyrian artists desired to represent the process of fertilization as an object of divine worship, the palm tree and the doorway of life were usually shown in conjunction.

Ohnefalsch-Richter does not believe that "the palm is the sole prototype of the so-called holy-tree of the Assyrians and Babylonians," agreeing with Sayce (Rel. Anct. Bab., pp. 241, 242), that in one district of Babylonia a conifer was the prototype, and in another the palm (1, 100). Personally I believe the conifer to have been the earlier of the two, since it occurs earlier on Babylonian seals than the latter in its association with fertilization (OR., pp. 82, 92, 100). Barton considers that the artificial fertilization of the palm, a process we are warranted in assuming underlay its representation as an object of worship, "was a comparatively new introduction into Babylonia, and perhaps not generally adopted . . . in an agricultural country like Babylonia, where grain was indigenous and easily cultivated" (Sem. Orig., pp. 161, 162).

"In old Babylonian times," says Ohnefalsch-Richter, "the part played by the cypress as a holy-tree seems to have been as important as subsequently amongst the Phœnicians. . . . Next in point of importance to the cypress comes the palm, of which we find isolated examples on old Babylonian cylinders" (1, 34). The illustration he gives showing a natural palm tree corresponding to the natural cypress tree, is the one referred to in my previous section. It shows the gate of the sun before which a bull is about to be sacrificed. It is neither an altar, nor a column, but a gate or doorway in which we can see Mr. Cowper's senams. Thus we see the separate sacred tree and the separate sacred doorway as objects of reverence on ancient Babylonian

seals. Subsequently on Babylonian-Assyrian monuments we see them united, as the Paphian goddess within her triangle, her cones between their dual columns, the goddess of the dovecote within her sacred enclosure, and the sacred tree itself within its temple shrine. That I am correct in seeing this combination, the very pattern given to the conventionalized date palm in scenes depicting its sacred artificial fertilization, abundantly proves, for we see a distinct tree standing within a distinct frame or doorway made of branches and foliage, part of the same tree, yet adding its separate significance to that of the tree, thus doubly emphasizing the idea of reproduction which the whole symbol indicates.

Having seen that in Babylonia an original separate sacred tree, and an original separate sacred doorway were subsequently united, is such a development to be met with amongst the Hebrews? I have referred to Abraham as worshipping a sacred tree, and to the Israelites as worshipping a sacred doorway in the clefts of the rocks, are we not justified, therefore, in assuming by analogy that they also combined these two symbols in one like their kindred in Babylonia? We have, however, stronger proof than mere analogy. Abraham, fresh from Mesopotamia, dwelt at Shechem by a sacred tree, where he had a vision (Gen. 12 : 6, 7). Yahwe revealed himself to Moses from amongst the branches of a tree, where the Egyptians believed Nut and Hathor had their dwelling (OR., p. 110). Finally, Abraham himself planted a sacred tree and there called upon Yahwe (Gen. 21 : 33). It is after this that we hear of the Asherim and the doorway clefts of the rocks. In agreement with Prof. Moore, I do not believe that the Asherim were tree posts which represented original living trees. Not simply, however, because the sacred tree in Hebrew had a specific name, which would naturally have been given to its representative, nor because it is difficult to account for the setting up under a living tree of a representation of a tree, both being good points (Asherah-Ency. Bib.), but partly because of the discovery of separate tree-idols which were set up by the worshippers in Cyprus in holy groves near altars, and at the entrances of the sanctuary, idols of clay patterned after a natural tree with trunk and branches, the latter without leaves (OR., pp. 31, 128). In these idols we have distinct tree-worship, whereas Asherah worship was a combination of two separate worships, that of the separate sacred tree, and that of the separate sacred doorway. On Baby-

lonian-Assyrian monuments we have seen the symbols of both worships combined in one. So far we have not discovered such a symbol in Palestine, though possibly the cherubim and palm trees of Solomon's temple were similar representations. The non-discovery here so far of such a double symbol does not in the least indicate that it had no existence amongst the Israelites. On the contrary, by analogy and the evidence given, I believe that it had. Some time back I admitted that Asherah worship was associated with tree worship, but I claimed that tree worship was also associated with Asherah worship. I meant that Asherah worship as such, while originally the worship of the sacred doorway, developed into the worship of the conjoined sacred threshold and sacred tree depicted by one double symbol such as we see engraved on Babylonian and Assyrian monuments. It will be recalled that I admitted that with the Hebrews this symbol may have been made out of a single post, yet, if so made, it was not to indicate a tree, but an original threshold. This assumption finds strong confirmation in the reference by Ohnefalsch-Richter to the fact that the original dual pillars on Babylonian-Assyrian monuments depicting the folding doors of the gateway of the sun, were sometimes represented by a single pillar (OR., p. 181). If, therefore, the Asherah was subsequently represented by merely one post, it was not as indicative of a single tree post, but the original sacred doorway. If made, however, with one post, it must have had markings indicating its original significance. These Maachah made more gross, either on a single pillar such as seen by Herodotus, or natural but exaggerated on an anthropomorphic image placed within an Asherah doorway.

Thus I have shown what I believe to have been the original form of the Asherah, and its subsequent development by the Babylonians and Hebrews. The original form was that of Mr. Cowper's senams, and Dr. Trumbull's doorway shrine. The new form was either a post with markings indicating its original significance or a complete human image exhibiting in gross exaggeration its reproductive character.

The Attire of Jewish Women 780 *B.C.*

No point of this article has received greater confirmation from the study of Ohnefalsch-Richter's "Kypros," than the section on the Hebrews as phallic worshippers. We have seen the triangle abun-

dantly proved to signify the ancient worshippers of Astarte-Aphrodite, such as were the Hebrews themselves about 780 B. C. This phallic ornament representing the doorway of physical life was not only actually worn between the breasts by women at that period, who, by such an amulet worn in such a position, imagined that they would acquire unusual influence over men, but it is even worn in the same position by Cyprian maidens to-day for the same object (OR., 307). Doubtless to-day its original significance is not known, although this might be questioned. When, however, worn by the worshippers of Astarte-Aphrodite, it must have been definitely understood as a phallic ornament. This, as I have shown, was not the only phallic ornament worn at that period between the breasts of women. We can well understand, therefore, the admonition by Hosea and others to the Hebrew women of their time to put away the whoredoms from between their breasts.

The First Human Sacrifice.

In endeavoring to trace the origin of human sacrifice, I was compelled, from the standpoint assumed, to associate it with a fresh investigation into the origin and nature of the Hebrew Asherah, since I had fully adopted the opinion of Dr. Trumbull that the first human sacrifice had been offered at a simple doorway shrine, or in other words, in front of the original Asherah.

Prof. Barton holds that "the most ancient religions of the world were developed in the great river basins of the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, the Ganges, and the Yang-tske rivers. . . . The civilization of Babylon was probably the oldest of these" (Sem. Orig., p. 155). Again he tells us, "Where the beginnings of agriculture are possible, men naturally worship goddesses which they connect with the earth, or a lake, or some spring which is conceived as the giver of fertility." He further agrees with Trumbull that amongst the Semites the threshold had the sanctity of an altar, and he refers to his explanation of the sacredness of the threshold throughout the world as associated with the relation of the sexes (*ib.*, 179 : 102).

In the Euphrates valley, then, the world's oldest religion was developed as associated with the fertility of the crops conceived of as the product of the mother earth-goddess. Thus it was that the idea of mother-

hood came to be worshipped long before the idea of fatherhood. Thus, too, from the vegetation, the assumed parthenogenetic output of the earth goddess, came the idea underlying the world-wide belief in a divine mother virgin and child. "And what was the original meaning of the term 'Virgin'?" asks Prof. Cheyne. He answers,—"It expressed the fact that the great mythic mother-goddess was independent of the marriage tie" (Bible Problems, p. 75). But this belief which originally was strong enough to perpetuate the conception of the divine virgin and child, was early added to by the thought of the death of the child derived from the annual decay of vegetation. The earth-goddess was thus conceived of as powerful enough by herself to produce but not to continue vegetation (Jastrow–BAR., pp. 483, 574). The mother goddess, then, must be stimulated by marriage,—but to whom? By the decay of vegetation it was seen that she consumed her own child in sacrifice. It was thus that her child came to be represented as her husband whom she both married and killed. Barton thinks that this later view of Tammuz as the rejected husband, whom Ishtar slew, came at a time when the original kindly relations between them had been forgotten (*ib.*, p. 85). The latter thought, however, must necessarily have followed rapidly the former. The preservation of the crops was a thought that would develop almost as soon as the recognition of their origin as the child of the mother earth, for was not their destruction readily seen in the annual decay of vegetation. Thus her child soon became her husband who was to be both married and killed to prevent the failure of the crops (Frazer–GB., Vol. 2, 254; Cheyne–BP., p. 74). But how married? and how killed? Mr. Frazer has shown the existence of a world-wide belief amongst primitive people that the intercourse of the sexes by sympathetic magic stimulates the growth of crops. In the sexual orgies of the Ishtar cult we may see the practice of this belief in early Babylonia. Here a temporary mock king was married to a sacred harlot who personified Ishtar, the mother-goddess, and having for a time enjoyed her company he, as the son-husband of Ishtar, was put to death (GB., Vol. 3, 178). But how? Mr. Frazer quotes Dion Chrysostom as saying that he was hanged or crucified (*ib.* 24). This manner of putting the mock king to death, if it was ever followed, was evidently not the original mode. If it be true that from the growth of vegetation primitive man came to conceive the thought of a virgin mother-earth-

goddess, of her child and of her marriage to the same, it is equally true that there was another train of thought founded upon an equally early observation, and one which necessitated blood-letting. This he saw in the sacrifice of maiden virtue in the consummation of human marriage for the preservation of the race. The avenue of human life, consequently, became to him a sacred threshold at which, in order to secure the desired offspring, blood must be shed. Hunger and sex are appetites which demand equal recognition in the mind of primitive man. It is simply in accordance with the logical sequence of what must have been his thoughts on these two points that we assume he united in one offering homage to the mother earth-goddess with the blood of a male spouse shed on the altar before a threshold shrine. We know that the sacred threshold was a universal object of adoration to primitive peoples. We have seen the Hebrews themselves sacrificing their children in front of natural thresholds. I maintain, therefore, in view of all this evidence, that the first of all victims offered in sacrifice was a human being, offered not to appease an angry deity, or by way of a communal feast, but to aid the mother earth-goddess to produce an abundant harvest.

In company with Dr. Trumbull I further maintain that the place where this sacrifice was offered was on an altar in front of a structure similar to Mr. Cowper's senams. I would add that not only am I in company with Dr. Trumbull and Prof. Curtiss in rejecting W. R. Smith's idea of a communal feast as the origin of sacrifice, but also with Mr. Joseph Jacobs in his "Studies in Biblical Archæology, where he notes W. R. Smith's mistake in assuming the late origin of sacrifice amongst the Semites; while he endorses Frazer's deduction from the evidence produced that "human sacrifices were offered in ancient times to ensure the fertility of the soil" (pp. 33-39).

In my former article on "The Origin of Circumcision," I referred to the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter to Yahwe as founded upon the heathen practice of the sacrifice of maidens to male deities. Reville, in his "Native Religions of Mexico and Peru," referring to human sacrifice as practiced by the ancient Mexicans says, "It was especially girls that they immolated with the idea of giving maidens to the gods" (p. 31). As with the ancient Mexicans of the New World, so with the ancient people of the Old World. Human sacrifice was first offered to an earth-goddess, and when so offered the victims were always

males. When they were females they were offered to a god of vegetation. When either males or females were offered for the securing of crops, the original idea of the sacrifice as signifying marriage had long since been forgotten. Certain women were sacred to Dionysius (Pausanias, 4:10), while others were sacrificed to him (Fraser-GB., 2:36). Greek mythology in recording that both gods and goddesses equally had amours with mortals was but continuing the belief of those before them. Thus there is abundant evidence to show that the original idea upon which male and female human victims were offered in sacrifice was that the former were offered to female and the latter to male deities to secure good crops.

RELIGION AS A MATTER OF FEELING—A CRITICISM.

By A. OOSTERHEERDT.

Of religion and its position in consciousness, there are nearly as many definitions and statements as there are investigators. Not to mention the whole array of philosophers, who usually approach the subject from a speculative standpoint, exalting or debasing religion as their respective metaphysics seem to require, even professed psychologists differ much among themselves as to the status of the religious consciousness, whether they shall class it under feeling, will, or knowledge, or indeed regard it as an aspect of all these conscious factors. Among these latter, Professor William James, who distinctly assigns religion to feeling, is by virtue of his eminent position as psychologist entitled to our consideration first.

In his book called "Varieties of Religious Experiences," Prof. James says the following: "As concrete states of mind, made up of a feeling *plus* a specific sort of object, religious emotions of course are psychic entities distinguishable from other concrete emotions; but there is no ground for assuming a simple abstract, religious emotion to exist as a distinct elementary mental affection by itself, present in every religious experience without exception."[1] James is too good a psychologist to suppose a bare emotion, as the abstract religious emotion theory appears to demand. He goes on to say: "As there thus seems to be no one elementary religious emotion, but only a common storehouse of emotions upon which religious objects may draw, so there might conceivably also prove to be no one specific and essential kind of religious object, and no one specific and essential kind of religious act."[2] The second sentence seems rather unfortunate to me, because the first quoted speaks unmistakably about a "specific sort of object" which makes the religious emotion different from another emotion. In the one sentence he says that there are no specific religious objects, while according to the other such specific objects are necessary for religious emotions to exist at all! But he explains himself farther on: "Religion

[1] and [2] Varieties of Religious Experiences, Wm. James, p. 28.

shall mean for us the feelings, acts and experiences of individuals in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."[1] "Things are more or less divine, states of mind are more or less religious, reactions are more or less total, but the boundaries are always misty, and it is everywhere a question of amount and degree. Nevertheless, at their extreme of development, there can never be any question as to what reactions are religious. The divinity of the object and the solemnity of the reaction are too well marked for doubt."[2] But, are they? If there be no one specific sort of religious object, however necessary this may be to constitute a religious emotion, will the vague notion of the divine make a feeling religious? But how can it, if *all* things are more or less divine, as they are indeed to some primitive peoples, and where consequently religion is coextensive with life. To say that the divinity of the object and the solemnity of the reaction are a criterion of religious reactions is only to say that things are divine because they are divine, and to forget the fact that other emotions also may be solemn. Here we have the strange dilemmas: there is no one specific religious object and yet that object is absolutely indispensable to any religious emotion; and again, men's emotions are to be considered religious when they conceive themselves in relation to the divine, which may be taken as coloring the object, and yet there is no one sure criterion of the divine, so that it might readily be distinguished from the non-divine. The fatal question of amount and degree in a world where things are more or less divine will not out; extremes will not help, because here, if ever, they meet and leave no absolute mark for a religious emotion.

However, let us hear Prof. James once more. According to him, "Religion makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary, and if it be the only agency that can accomplish this result, its vital importance as a human faculty stands vindicated beyond dispute."[3] Religion, born of necessity, becomes a pleasure. "Stated in the completest possible terms, a man's religion involves both moods of contraction and moods of expansion of his being. But the quantitative mixture and order of these moods vary so much from one age of the world, from one system of thought, and from one individual to the other, that you may insist either on the dread and the submission, or on the peace and the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 31. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 39. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 51-2.

freedom as the essence of the matter, and still remain materially within the limits of truth." This statement corresponds with Sabatier's definition: "Religion is a free act as well as a feeling of dependence. The force which bows me down is that which also lifts me up."[1] The cynic might object to this that there is small virtue in accepting what must in any case be taken, but no doubt there is an element of freedom, of expansion, of will, in religion, which fact controverts the position of James that it is primarily a matter of feeling.

It is hardly fair, however, to dismiss James without giving him a more extended hearing. He says: "Both thought and feeling are determinants of conduct, and the same conduct may be determined either by feeling or by thought. When we survey the whole field of religion we find a great variety in the thoughts that have prevailed there; but the feelings on the one hand and the conduct on the other are almost always the same, for Stoic, Christian, and Buddhist saints are practically indistinguishable in their lives. The theories which religion generates, being thus variable, are secondary; and if you wish to grasp her essence, you must look to the feelings and the conduct as being the more constant elements. The feelings generate the faith-state; individuality is founded in feeling."[2] Here we catch real fact, real existence in the making, for the cosmic and the general are but symbols of reality, while personal phenomena are the real things of life; our personal destinies are of greatest weight to us.

While all this is true, it is not unqualifiedly so. Feeling is by its very nature the most conservative, perhaps the deepest part of our conscious life, for it does not strive forward like the will, nor suggest the means for this striving as the intellect does, but for all that, despite the force that habit has in shaping conduct and keeping it stationary while thought advances, religion can only be considered a matter of feeling and conduct when these latter have been separated from the rest of life, when the unity of consciousness has been destroyed for the sake of a pet theory of emotions. As a matter of fact, there is no conduct determined *either* by thought *or* by feeling, because all conduct is determined by both. There is no history of feeling, as there is a history of thought and dogma, but if there were, feeling would show the same and perhaps

[1] Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, A. Sabatier, p. 29-30.

[2] Varieties, p. 504.

even greater changes than thought. So with conduct, the agreement between so-called "saints" of different religions is misleading, because all these saints correspond to a certain mystic type, while the active, true religion of the people runs in a different channel, and is quite unlike in each religion. The fact that dogmas follow religion is no reproach against them, but illustrates the general trend of science, especially of historical science. Again, although individuality may be founded in feeling, it is still more founded in will, and real existence caught in feeling would have little reference to us unless it were interpreted by thought. Feeling without will and thought would not be personal.

I come to M. Auguste Sabatier. In his "Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion" he makes the following remarks: "To conceive of religion as a species of knowledge is an error not less grave than to represent it as a sort of political institution. For instance, there is a religion of the *Unknowable*." According to him, "religion springs from the feeling of distress; from the initial contradiction of the inner life of man."[1] As the collision of the ego with the universe is the origin of pain and of consciousness, so the return to the very principle on which our being depends, and the moral act of confidence in the origin and aim of life is the beginning of faith or religion. "Faith in life both is and acts like the instinct of conservation in the physical world."[2] "This life impulse rests upon the feeling of dependence which every man experiences with respect to universal being. To be religious is, at first, to recognize, to accept with confidence, this subjection of our individual consciousness; it is to bring this back and bind it to its eternal principle."[3] To speak with James: "Whatever it may be on its further side, the 'more' with which in religious experiences we feel ourselves connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life."[4] Hence, as Sabatier says: "The essence of religion is a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it depends. This commerce with God is realized by prayer. Prayer is religion in act, that is to say, real religion."[5] This distinguishes religious phenomena from moral and æsthetic phenomena. "Where this inward prayer is wanting, there is no religion. Prayer springing

[1] and [2] Outlines, p. 21. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 22. [4] Varieties, p. 512. [5] Outlines, p. 27.

up out of our state of misery and oppression, delivers us from it. Schleiermacher erred in insisting only upon resignation. For, as has been remarked before, religion is a free act as well as a feeling of dependence. This definition reconciles the antithetic elements which constitute the religious sentiment, the passive and the active elements, the feeling of dependence and the movement of liberty."[1]

There is much that attracts one in Sabatier's writings, but the want of scientific precision often mars his best work. Thus he sets out with sensation and reaction *before* consciousness, as though such sensation and reaction had any reference to us. Furthermore, there is no reason to talk of the ego in conflict with the universe, from which pain and the return of the ego upon itself, or consciousness arises, for the very simple reason that there is no ego before consciousness. Whatever conflict there may have been in the remote past between the universe and its inhabitants, has not the least bearing on us because the fact of our conscious existence separates us forever from that past. We are a new order in Nature, a power that may defy the universe. Hence the feeling of dependence which Prof. Sabatier postulates is not mere dependence, it is more a sense of relation, a "conscious and willed relation," as he expresses it. That is to say, it is not a mere feeling, devoid of object, but has a known object, which is the end of desire. Accordingly, Sabatier does well in pointing out that religion is not solely resignation, but involves freedom as well, but still he sometimes appears to be making too much of the element of feeling. Thus he says in "The Vitality of Christian Dogma" that "intellectual notion and religious emotion remain essentially different in their nature." "The intellectual element is only the symbolical expression of religious experience."[2] "A tremor is the primary religious emotion."[3]

Here again, as with James, the unity of consciousness is given up in order to emphasize the difference between dogma and life, or rather between the intellect and feeling. Feeling is unduly exalted, and emotion held to be primal in religion, while the intellect and the will are correspondingly degraded. It is only a psychology that persists in separating the three aspects of conscious life into distinct faculties that can speak of the primacy of emotions in religious life. This question will be more fully discussed when Irving King's analysis of the religious

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 28-29. [2] p. 31. [3] p. 29.

consciousness is taken up. Before leaving Sabatier, it is well to remark that the feeling of dependence on the universe has a decided metaphysical setting, while his ignoring of the intellect and subordination of the will suggests the mystical attitude to an alarming degree. The practical identification of religion with prayer, with communion with the power not ourselves, bears out my view of Sabatier's mysticism, which would rather enjoy than will and think.

A somewhat different, yet essentially concurrent, attitude toward religion as that of James and Sabatier, is that taken by Dr. E. D. Starbuck, the writer of a psychology of religion. In an article on the feelings and their place in religion, published in the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, November, 1904, he takes up the thesis that the affective life is a direct source of knowledge as is the cognitive. Religion, art, and all forms of appreciation have their setting in the affective life. His arguments are: (1) Religion is a whole experience; (2) it points to a larger reality, of which (3) the person becomes conscious, and (4) places himself in an attitude to receive it by faith. "The end of religion always is to induce a heart and will response to the larger things of life that lead away towards unconditioned reality and boundless fulfillment. In the all-inclusiveness of its states, religion allies itself with the affective life. Its appeal is always to those states of consciousness and attitudes toward life—faith, hope, love, and service, which are directly opposed to the cognitive processes. Like music or poetry, although full of a sense of conviction and certainty, it is incapable of reduction to terms of ideation." Feeling, however, according to Starbuck, is a secondary and derived factor in the development of consciousness: the fundamental thing of life being a tendency toward reaction, as is held by Dewey's "organic circuit." And as intellection and feeling are thus derived, indexes of the deeper life, so the feelings in religion are but surface hints of movements going on beneath. Religion is at bottom a matter of spiritual dynamics, self-expression. Starbuck clinches the case by asserting that the affective life is the ultimate tribunal in science and philosophy, and hence it is such even more marked in morals, poetry, art, music, and religion. The conclusion of the article is therefore: "Religion is essentially non-rational. It is a life, not a system."

Here again, as with James and Sabatier, the intellect is discredited, but the will receives a larger share of attention than James gives it,

while feeling or the so-called "affective life" is exalted beyond compare. As to the question whether or not the affective life is a true source of knowledge we need not debate here; but this may be said in passing, that if it be, there is no ground for opposing it so sharply against the cognitive life, since there is no real distinction between them, except perhaps in degree of precision. That religion is a *whole* experience would rather seem to argue against Starbuck, unless he thinks that there is no "whole" outside the affective life, which, even on his own showing, is derived along with the cognitive and volitional life. But the crux of his contention seems to lie in the assumption that all conscious endeavor, knowing, and feeling have been developed from a non-differentiated unconsciousness, of which the subliminal tracts are the present survivals. Whatever the truth of the preconscious state, it is a fact that we all are more or less influenced and controlled by our subconscious existence. Feeling, cognition, and will are, indeed, to a great extent but surface indications of the deeper life currents flowing on beneath the stream of consciousness. And religion may be at bottom a matter of spiritual dynamics, of self-expression, a life, and not a system. Nevertheless, if it truly is a life, it cannot identify itself exclusively with the affective life, because this is, after all, but one phase of the whole life. Religious cognition may come relatively late and after religious volition, in order to mediate its desires, but not till then does religious affection appear. Hence there is no cause for associating religion solely with the affective life, because, although it (religion) is most likely deeper than any one of the conscious processes, in order to be felt and known it must always come up in a state of consciousness in which all three aspects of conscious life are involved, albeit that the varying interest of the individual emphasizes one, to the practical ignoring of the other two. Nor, in truth, is there good reason for asserting that the affective life is the ultimate tribunal of everything human, because the question of values, at least in morals, is determined far more by will than by feeling. Religion, then, is not essentially non-rational, no more than life is essentially non-rational.

It is with a sense of relief that one turns to Irving King's "Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness." In this monograph, which has been published as a supplement to the "Psychological Review," the clear vision of the psychologist triumphs over the partial views of

the feeling theory so dominant in the three foregoing writers, and the fact is brought to light that "since there is no such a thing as a *merely* emotional reaction, it would appear that the student of religious phenomena could never properly define religion as emotional or anything else *per se*."[1] To King, "religion arises as a function of a developing experience."[2] According to him, "the development of religion is essentially one of the phases of social psychology," although to be sure, "the method of its study is derived from the psychology of the individual."[3] "It is in the matrix of custom that we are to seek the first beginnings of the religious consciousness."[4] That is to say, since "among some peoples at least everything done has a religious side," this points to the fact that there was a pre-religious state of society, just as there was a pre-legal, a pre-ethical. and a pre-æsthetic state. Consequently he holds to the primacy of habit, and the derived character of the religious attitude. He says: "Religious practices are distinguished from the earlier undifferentiated attitude by spontaneous variation or through individual initiative. In proportion as these variations in custom become emotional elements in the group-consciousness they acquire religious value."[5] The objection against this explanation of the genesis of religion is that it assumes a so simple state of human society as probably never existed, although on the evolutionary hypothesis of the origin of human life a strong showing in favor of it can be made out. Functional psychology seems predisposed in favor of that hypothesis just now, and I am not inclined to quarrel with it on that account, so long as the recognition is made that origin does not determine value. Religion, then, is a differentiation of social habits and customs from an unorganized state of humanity, is a valuation of these habits from the standpoint of the welfare of the group.

For it must be remembered that primitive society knows nothing of the individual, but only of the tribe or group. Religion in the lower stages of humanity inevitably becomes a system of control: the group organization is the primitive form of religion, morality and law. And hence it is actually found that organized society makes for religion, as well as for law and morality, this being especially brought

[1] Different. of the Rel. Cons., Irving King, p. 56.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 2. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 4. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 9. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

out when magic is contrasted with religion, and is seen to depend upon a relatively loose tribal organization. "In communities of loose organization, magic might be quite indistinguishable from religion, and in those of strict organization the opposite would hold."[1] Religion reigns in the realm of the habitual and universal, magic in that of the occasional and particular. In proportion as society becomes organized, habit or religion grows in influence with the group as a group; in proportion as society is disorganized, magic appeals to the primitive man living without almost any consciousness of unity with a group. I have insisted upon this identification of the religious consciousness with that of the group in order to bring out its social character, as King conceives it, and its purely external nature, which makes religion consist of a lot of tribal habits and observances, invoked whenever the group acts for itself. As Robertson Smith says in "The Religion of the Semites," "Broadly speaking, religion was made up of a series of acts and observances, the correct performance of which was necessary to secure the favor of the gods; and in these observances every member of society had a share. Ritual and practical usage were, strictly speaking, the sum total of ancient religions. Religion was a part of the organized social life into which a man was born." This view of religion, which is more and more borne out by ethnology and anthropology, does away with the necessity of finding a psychological notion of a specific religious nature in primitive man, and recognizes that the ideas of the supernatural and the natural have as yet no existence, while it emphasizes the function of religion as consisting in social development and control. "If we have the correct conception of religion," says King, "it would seem that every human society would differentiate elements which would be analogous, if not identical, in function with what we have recognized as religious. That is to say, every society must have its systems of control, the more fundamental of which inevitably assume the religious form as they are taken up into the sphere of habit."[2] So far so good, one may say, but how does this social religion become individual?

King's answer is this: "If the religious attitude is a differentiation with reference to certain situations (those that concern the group as a whole), we cannot hold that it is continuous except as these situations

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

are more or less continuously present in consciousness. In so far as religion continues a social phenomenon, that is the expression of a certain tribal or social attitude in which the life of the whole is bound up, it is naturally present in all members of the community in approximately equal degree. As individuality becomes prominent, and social pressure less imperative, there is less likelihood of social suggestion exerting so great an influence and hence there is less uniformity in the conception of ultimate values. As individuality has developed in the modern community, the more suggestible conform to the general type more than those of overt and active temperaments. Still others by contrary suggestion tend to assume an opposite type. Still others never have their impulses defined in this way because of the looseness of the organization of modern society. Thus in two different ways a type of consciousness which is more or less non-religious is gradually produced."[1] The shift from society to the individual is thus apparently fraught with disastrous consequences to religion. But, as a matter of fact, "a great many religious values are carried over into the conduct and life of those who recognize no religious consciousness, because religion has so thoroughly mediated certain forms of conduct that they have become automatic. The religious mind is distinct from the non-religious in that it not only embodies in its life the values of religion, but does it more or less consciously."[2] In modern society, it is accordingly a matter of temperament whether a person shall observe the general standard of outward religion or not. Having become emancipated from external social control, he can follow the religion of the masses or shape his destiny in a different way. It is evident, however, that with every human being the question of ultimate values must be determined in some such fashion as religion employs, and it might, therefore, be urged that every one remains religious, provided the term is not taken in a narrow way. It must also be remembered that those persons who go contrary to social forms of religion usually live in an ideal society of their own mind, and in nowise escape the influence of the society which bred them as individuals. But does this account of the individualization of religion take sufficient notice of the intension which results in its conceptions and ideas? King pays but little attention to this, but I believe a plausible explanation

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 52, 53, 54.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

might be given by referring to the growth of personality and the deepening of its aims which comes when the external shackles of society have been removed. The upshot of this last paragraph seems to be that religion, individual religion, is a much wider affair than would be thought from studying the lives of some emotional saints and that it is to be found in all expressions of the human mind whenever an ideal social world is recognized.

Having arrived at this general conception of religion, we are able to understand why there has been such a notable failure so far to analyze religious reactions. For, religion being confined to external and internal manifestations of a certain kind, one has found the emotional aspects usually the most tempting to describe and has passed these off as the "essence" of religion. As we shall see, Prof. King utterly repudiates this theory. Starting out with the thesis that "every reaction involves necessarily both the values of previous adjustments and as well the adaptation of these adjustments to the specific nature of new stimuli,[1] he goes on to define emotional, intellectual, and habitual reactions, and ends by concluding that it is impossible, from the nature of a reaction, to describe it offhand as emotional, intellectual, or automatic. "If a reaction or attitude, therefore, is described as emotional, the question still arises as to the nature of the organization of the reaction that causes one part of it to stand out more prominently than the others,"[2] and as to why the reacter has been led to emphasize that aspect. "The first is answered by the statement that all expression consists of entire reactions, which are differentiated, not through their inherent and ultimate constitution, but through the varying interests and points of view of the individual himself. The second question relates to the influences that lead the individual to have constantly a certain interest or point of view regarding his reactions entirely aside from what they are as contents or processes to the psychologist. The real problem of the psychology of religion is thus not whether it is predominantly emotional or intellectual or both, for religion consists essentially in entire reactions. It is rather as to why certain elements in these reactions have been regarded as of more worth than others and consequently have tended to be abnormally developed."[3]

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 56. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 57. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

From this point onward King goes strongly against James and Starbuck. "The religious attitude is not something that exists entirely in and of itself. If it exists at all it is as an organic part of the entire life-process. It is a specialization of the elements involved in this process with reference to certain conditions and certain stimuli."[1] So much for his general position. Since both James and Starbuck virtually relegate religion to the subliminal consciousness or fringe, with which feeling is supposed to have an intimate connection, King replies: "Through the notion of the fringe we account for the more or less unconscious influences upon present activity and thought of a vast mass of one's past experience as well as the whole circle of instinctive impulses and tendencies. . . . . Whatever forces tend to cause the focal portions of consciousness to dissipate, in so far emphasize the marginal control."[2] . . . . "It is not conceivable that the mind, an organization of forces for use in practical affairs, should, in unbalanced condition, be used by nature as an avenue for important revelations as to truth and duty."[3] This is the gist of the whole matter. Postulate, like James and Starbuck, an extra-critical faculty for the acquiring of knowledge, and you have the way open to all kinds of vagaries and grovelling superstition, which quickly come to dominate the mind and reduce its proud superiority to imbecility. And yet, this fringe has some relation to the centre, is even organized to a certain extent, and is the producer of intuitive knowledge, all of which goes to show that it is not so incapable of explanation and criticism as the feeling advocates would like to have it. Their error, accordingly, lies not in their recognition, but in their extraordinary use of it, in making it transcend "puny" intellect and reason, which is the same as preferring anarchy to order. "We might say that the normal religious reaction is one in which the normal mechanism of control organizes the ultimate values."[4] The question is thus not whether the fringe shall be ignored, but whether it shall have an undue influence and be translated by feeling apart from the other aspects of conscious thought, whether we shall depend on sudden conversion brought about through mysterious powers operating on the subconscious part of our existence, or upon the slow processes of education strengthening the focal control of reason. Here the utter untenability of the position assumed

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 58. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 60. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 63. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

by James, Sabatier, and Starbuck is clearly disclosed, since it not only requires abolition of the unity of the consciousness, but also prefers the least disciplined portions of mental life to the highest organized control.

Nevertheless, although the work of King is a distinct improvement upon that of the three preceding writers, it is by no means above criticism. First of all, I desire to quote a statement which conflicts with another already mentioned, in order to bring out a contradiction which appears to run through the entire paper. "The religious consciousness is of the internal and mediating kind, influencing the general tone of activity as a whole rather than affording data for the solution of immediate problems."[1] Here religion is conceived as an attitude, which influences the general *tone* of activity as a *whole;* in the sentences previously quoted, the "religious attitude is a differentiation with reference to certain situations," that is of life not as a whole. Or again, "it is a specialization of the elements involved in the life-process with reference to certain conditions and certain stimuli." The contradiction is made sufficiently clear by merely quoting it, but, since it involves a central point, it is well to emphasize it. The first definition of the religious attitude maintains that it influences the whole of life, while the second limits it to certain situations and stimuli. It seems to me that the first definition is an admission to the whole-souled religionist, and that the second is more psychological. As it is, the whole of activity is opposed to a part of activity, and hence, because those situations that call forth the religious attitude may not be continuously present in consciousness, it is an easy matter to account for a non-religious person. King, in fact, agrees here with James, that a religious reaction is caused by a specific sort of object or stimulus. The difficulty of finding this specific religious object has been pointed out, and this difficulty is but increased when religion has become a part of the social organism. If it is identified with the group consciousness, why should government and religion ever have separated, unless there was from the beginning something more involved in the habits that constituted the system of control than mere social organization. If there was, what was it, and what distinguished it? If there was not, how account for the present fact of religion? This means that one must not explain even primitive

[1] Differentiation of the Rel. Consciousness, p. 49.

society in such a mechanical way, and that any such explanation of religion as King makes is bound to be very narrow, since it lays too much stress on external appearances and ignores the fact that there are no fences in mental life. He is quite right, however, in ascribing a social origin to religion, and I otherwise am fully in accord with him, although I do not think primitive society to have been composed of impersonal beings.

Of course, King would say that religious reactions require no specific objects, but are determined by the varying interests of the individual. Granted, but how then, if religion is a general attitude of life, why should one reaction be called religious and the other not; or ought religion be named a partial attitude, which only comes to light under certain conditions and through certain stimuli? The former position has usually been held by religious fanatics, who would do all things "as unto the Lord," but it now seems that it is untenable psychologically. King's position indicates the general psychological opinion. Of a certainty, the difficulty of finding a specific religious object remains, and hence also the difficulty of assigning to religion its proper sphere, because even if it is admitted that the religious reaction is in nowise different from any other reaction, and that it is caused by the interest of the individual, in mental life there are no sharp demarcations which separate religious reactions from the others, especially in a world "where things are more or less divine." Again, institutional religion has had such a long growth, and presents so many phases, that to some nearly all of life takes on a religious tint, while to others only a few actions have a religious bearing. To the earnest seeker after God the psychological explanation of religion will hardly be satisfactory, however, even if he cannot deny the validity of the psychological premises and conclusions. It appears to me that he must again question the "meaning" of religion, whether it is merely a psychological affair, or whether it is perhaps also a metaphysical matter. If the latter, then the psychology of religion will not greatly disturb him. He will grant, indeed, that "functional religion" is social in origin, may apparently disappear in some individuals, and is throughout of the same nature psychically as every other conscious aspect, *i. e.*, not primarily emotional, nor anything else, but partaking of the whole personality, but yet he will also claim that there is a metaphysical relation of all acts toward God, which in a completer sense than the functional, is true and right religion.

TYPES OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.[1]

By JAMES BISSETT PRATT.

The psychology of religion is so new a field that many of its most promising corners remain as yet unplowed. One of the most important questions which come within the range of this young science, and one which has as yet received but scant attention,[2] is the problem of the basis — or the bases — of religious belief. We find our friends and neighbors almost to a man believing, with a good deal of firmness, in a being whom no one has ever seen, and whose nature they can but dimly conceive — and whom (for want, perhaps, of a better name) they call God. This is surely a striking fact — one of the most striking among the many odd facts that characterize this strange creature whom we call man. Why is it men believe thus, on what does their belief actually rest, from what does it draw its strength, and in what region of psychic life is it mainly intrenched? These are questions of the utmost importance, not only to the student of psychology or of sociology, but still more to the minister, the teacher, and the lover of men.

It was to help break ground in this new field that I made out the questionnaire on which this paper is based — a copy of which will be found appended. My chief aim was to discover, if possible, the relation of argument and of unreasoned experience to popular belief, and more in particular to gain some idea of the prevalence of any real and vital experience interpreted by the subject of it as an immediate knowledge of God — in other words to see roughly how far the "mystic germ," as Prof. James calls it, has spread in the religious community. Much is said in religious circles about "the experience of the presence of God;" my object was to discover what in general was

[1] This article is to form a chapter in a book I am now preparing on the psychological bases of religious belief.

[2] Excellent work has been done on closely related questions by Leuba, Starbuck, and Coe, but so far as I know not much has been done *directly* toward collecting data and coming to conclusions on this problem of the bases of religious belief.

meant by that experience, and whether it is confined to a very few or is a fairly common possession.

No one is more keenly alive to the dangers of the questionnaire method than one who has tried it. In the first place, the number of answers that one can by any possibility get is insignificant in the extreme compared with the size of the community from which they are gathered, and in which alone one is interested. The value of these answers depends, therefore, wholly upon their being thoroughly typical — "a fair sample," as Mr. Pierce would say. And with the questionnaire method fair sampling is, for several reasons, especially difficult. In the first place, Natural Selection brings answers from only one or two types of people. Those who are in any way extreme or unusual are likely to jump at the opportunity to express their views; while the people who are really typical of the community at large — just the ones, that is, whose answers would be especially valuable — often think it not worth their while to answer, since they have nothing unusual or particularly interesting to record. The interest and the value of a response often stand in inverse ratio. Moreover, even when truly typical persons do answer, their expressions as written often represent merely the mood that happened to be uppermost at the hour of writing, or depend on the chance presence in the mind of certain ideas at the time. Lastly, the mere fact that a question is presented tends to put the mind in a theoretical and unusual state and thereby very considerably to influence the answer.

While all these things are true, however, I do not think they destroy the value of the method if used with great care. The first danger — namely the tendency of Natural Selection to bring in answers chiefly from extremists — I have tried to avoid by letting Natural Selection have as little as possible to do with it. My endeavor was to distribute the greater part of my questions among truly typical religious people (so far as one can judge of "typical religious people"), and a large proportion of my responses come from persons whom I know personally to be (to all appearanec), "fair samples" of the religious community. I have also carefully weeded out from the answers sent in several that obviously come from religious freaks. The second and third difficulties pointed out above of course cannot be fully obviated; yet I believe that their evil effects have been largely avoided by the fact that in my treatment of the responses I have

throughout refused to take the answers at their face value, but have interpreted each paper as a whole. Some of the questions were put in purely with this in view, — namely numbers 1, 7, 8, and 10 — while nearly all, as will be seen, bear upon one general question. In a number of cases, also, I have called upon the respondents and talked over their answers with them; or when this was impossible, have sometimes written for further light on particular points. I sent out 550 copies and received 74 answers. My respondents are divisible roughly into two classes: (1) those whom I believe I may rightly call typical "church-people;" and (2) a somewhat motley collection of intellectual people, professors, graduate students, a few members of the Society for Psychical Research, etc. Whether these latter form a really fair sample of the intellectual community of America I am not certain. Of my 74 responses, 51 come from class (1), 23 from class (2). Three of my respondents did not believe in any sort of God, two were obviously "freaks," and one response could not be safely interpreted. This leaves, therefore, 68 cases for our use.

Anything like definite statistics from so small a number of cases would of course be valueless; but I do think it will be of considerable value for the purpose of our investigation to treat my cases as types of the religious consciousness — as "straws," so to speak — and as indicating in a general way the nature and the strength of the belief in God as it exists to-day in the Protestant communities of the eastern part of our country. If the cases be thus viewed in relation to our problem of the basis of religious belief, they fall into five classes, which I shall now consider in some detail.

The first class is made up of those who believe in God chiefly from argument or reasoning. Of my 68 cases 14 belong here. Reliance on feeling is frequently disparaged by this class of mind. One man says "I believe in God as an intellectual and moral necessity. Any feelings which I may have in the matter grow out of the perception of the realities which create these necessities — God is a reality to me as a rational being. Any experiences which I may have had which were accompanied by 'feeling' I have explained as above, and this, it seems to me, forms a rational basis for the explanation of all such phenomena in others." The reasons given are various; some times the order and design in Nature are mentioned, sometimes the progress of the race. One says, "I believe in God because I cannot

conceive of a world like ours except as made and controlled by a Person." An example of the queer twists that get into some minds who consider their faith founded on rational grounds is seen in the following answer: "Reasons for the belief in God: (1) The argument of my belief is that I have it as a gift from Him."[1] In striking contrast to this is the following: "Defining God as the Supernatural of Answer to question 2, I think I believe in Him for the following reasons; (1) I find in every day experiences that there are impulses, attitudes, valuations, made by myself and other people which seem entirely unjustifiable by any experiences we have of things and courses of events in the world about us. The chiefest example is the way otherwise rational people act *altruistically* while every dictate of reason would seem to compel them to act with an *ultimate selfish end*. . . . (2) More intimately, I seem to have quite frequently a strong feeling of the *goodness* of certain courses of action, states of mind, etc., apart from any good this may do me, or anybody else. These feelings of goodness *seem* somehow to be *very valid* and to carry their own credentials so that they disarm doubt." One man writes, "The modern demonstration of telepathy has helped me greatly." The old argument to a "great First Cause" is not once mentioned.

A second type of religious people are those who believe in God from authority. The literal inspiration of the Bible is still accepted by a very large portion of the community, and belief in things divine is based largely upon it. Especially is this true among the less thoughtful classes, and those who are too busy to give the question any attention. Here, of course, should probably be classed the majority of Roman Catholics. I have a Catholic friend who puts the matter thus: "If I am sick I go to a doctor, for it is his business to know about medicine and the body; if I want to learn Latin I go to a Latin teacher, for he has studied and knows; in like manner, if I want to know about God I go to the Church, as represented by some priest, for the Church is the authority in religious matters, just as the physician and the teacher are in their spheres." This is doubtless the attitude of thousands both Catholic and Protestant. Nine-tenths of our "facts" we accept on faith—why not our religious facts as well?

[1] This is not one of the answers I have put in Class 1. The whole paper indicates that the man's real basis for belief is authority, but he *thinks* it is reasoning.

—especially since so many others have done so for so many years, and with such good results. Belief from authority is by no means an unreasoned belief, and differs from our first class only in the choice of the particular fact on which the reasoning is based. Of course such an argument often goes in a circle; but this is unnoticed—as for instance, in the following: "I believe in God from authority, as contained in the Bible in passages declaring Himself as God, as 'I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me.' There are many other assurances that might be quoted." Many thoughtful persons, however, who would see as quickly as any one the inconsistency of such a reason for belief, still cling to authority, but in a different sense. They may have given up the literal inspiration of the Bible, but still retain their confidence in the authority of certain prophetic persons, especially of Jesus. One woman writes, "More than on anything else I believe my belief rests on the strong and unreasoned assertions of Jesus Christ. But his assertions do not stand out in my mind as isolated facts. I find them coming as the culmination of what may well be called revelations of God through human life."

In this connection it will be of interest to consider the answers to question 9, which had to do with the authority of the Bible. The 65 answers to this question were divided into two almost equal parts, 32 accepting the authority of the Bible and 33 rejecting it. As was to be expected, nearly all those whom I have described as belonging to the "intellectual" rather than to the "church" class were among those who answered No to my question, only 2 out of 21 recognizing the Bible's authority. Of the 44 answers from church people 30 accepted and 14 rejected the book's authority, 22 saying that their religious faith and their religious life were based on it. That is, exactly half of the "typical religious people" who answered my question feel that their belief and their religion are dependent on the old way of viewing the Bible, the other half feeling independent for their religious life from its authority or rejecting it (in the old sense) altogether. To the question "How would your belief in God and your life toward him and your fellowmen be affected by loss of faith in the *authority* of the Bible?" a few responses were received like the following: "It would take away the foundation through which I was led to believe in God." "I would as soon give up faith in God himself

as in the authority of the Bible." "I think I should be utterly miserable and unable to accomplish any good thing." But in most cases no such serious results are imagined, the following being typical: "It would not affect my faith in God but would greatly lessen my comfort." "I believe I would still cling to my faith." "My belief in God would not be affected." The position of those who no longer accept the authority of the Bible is fairly well exemplified by the following: "There is much for me in its teachings, but I feel it is a rather second-hand statement of what I feel in my own experience." The results of question 9, if the responses are fair samples, would seem to indicate that while a good proportion of the community still cling to the authority of the Scriptures, they are gradually giving it up with increased intelligence and study, and would be able to give it up altogether without any very serious injury to their religious faith. This conclusion is illustrated also by the fact that out of 68 respondents only 6 made authority the chief basis of their belief.

The third type, according to my classification, is made up of those who believe not from argument nor authority but from habit. Inertia plays a large part in religious belief. Once started in a given direction of thought, it is hard to stop or to change the direction. "As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined." It is hard to over-estimate the tremendous influence of this factor in beliefs of all kinds. Most of us would now be good Buddhists if we had been brought up in Burmah. What we would be had we lived all our lives alone on desert islands, there is no telling. Certainly every one of us began to believe in God because when children we were taught so to believe. Hence if my question had been Why do people begin to believe in God? there would have been but one answer, and that very simple. But while this is true, it is also true that during adolescence the old beliefs of childhood get very rudely shaken; all sorts of ideas formerly held are given up, and we do not settle down to adult life until our views of things, and particularly our religious views, are considerably reshaped and made really our own. Thus it comes that these beliefs are based on many things beside the teachings of childhood. On the other hand, these early lessons retain some influence with nearly all of us, and with a large number of people their importance is immense. There are a great many intelligent people who believe because they always have believed. Others retain their faith because it is the easiest

thing to do—scepticism and atheism require rather too much energy for a busy man. The following is typical: "Entirely a matter of training. I was brought up in the Presbyterian Church—took pride in being an atheist all through my college course—though always attended church and Sunday School. When I got into life other questions crowded this one into the background where it has hovered, unsolved, ever since. So far as I have come to any conclusion at all it is this: that if there is n't a God there *ought* to be, and I'll act accordingly." With all his theoretical scepticism this same man in answer to question 5 says, "I think I may say He is a very real Person to me." The exigencies of a life given up to scientific research, have prevented him from ever getting to the end of his thought on religious questions, so he easily and naturally falls back on the habit of childhood, with the remark "My religion is a bundle of inconsistencies which I have long ago quit trying to reconcile." I think this to be a fairly common experience. There are doubtless a great many people who simply take God for granted without further thought; they believe because they do not disbelieve. This same influence of habit is seen even more often among a large number of those whom I have called "church people." Typical among them are such expressions as the following: "God, as I have been taught from youth up, by parents and publicly, is a spirit," etc. "I believe in personal immortality because I have been taught it."

Type 4 is characterized by "the will to believe." One writes he believes, not because he has experienced God's presence, "but rather because I need it so that it 'must' be true." Another believes "chiefly because God is the only hope of the universe. Take away this belief and our existence is hopeless." One of the most explicit is the following: "Because I personally, subjectively want to believe in Him. . . . I pray because I like to. . . . I believe in immortality because I like to." Doubtless a great many people belong to this class without knowing it. They think it is the authority of the Bible or some argument on which their faith is based, whereas it really is the picture of the fear and despair that would follow the loss of faith that makes them cling to it. An analysis of the arguments used in many sermons whose aim is to defend orthodox doctrines would point to the same conclusion; the question discussed seems often to be not What is true? but What is pleasant to believe? The pragmatic appeal is

constantly made; the old doctrine brings happiness, therefore let us cling to it. One respondent writes that after several years of scepticism and argument, and of keeping his nerves "on a constant and useless strain," he had to come back "to the plain, solid ideas which were drilled into us in childhood. Then comes a peace of mind regarding our religious status. We have seen the practical application. We have seen men die as Christians and others as infidels. We are awakened from our dreams of youth."

My fifth type is characterized by what seems to be a touch of mysticism, found in a variety of stages which range from vague cases, somewhat conventionally expressed, up to experiences of a very intense sort. They all agree, however, in basing their belief in God on some experience which they interpret as an immediate knowledge of Him. Typical expressions are the following: "I believe in God principally because I have experienced His presence: if at times my belief grows weak, the memory of such experiences help me." "Authority and 'argument' are practically without significance as factors determining my belief; immediate experience of Him as an ever present Reality is my main basis for recognizing His existence." "My belief in God rests primarily I think upon experiences reaching back into childhood. . . . I have never seriously doubted the existence of God. If I ever had done so I think I should have fallen back upon my own consciousness of Him at certain times of my life as evidence that I could not doubt."

My results indicate that this is a very large class, 36 out of my 68 respondents belonging to it, while 14 more claim to have had the experience referred to, though in their case it does not seem to be the principal foundation of belief. These figures are certainly significant. That 50 people out of 68 should believe firmly that they have been in immediate communion with God is a striking fact. Moreover this is admittedly the religious experience *par excellence;* here we are at the very heart of religion. It is, therefore, a burning problem for religious psychology to discover, if possible, just what these people mean by "communion with God." What sort of an experience is it? How does God *feel?* Almost my whole questionnaire was directly or indirectly aimed at collecting data that should bear on this problem, while question 5 was written especially for that purpose. The importance of the

phenomenon will necessitate a more detailed study of the responses than I have given in the case of any of the preceding types.

There is no sharp and fast line between those who have been "conscious of God's presence" and those who have not. The experience shades down through all degrees of intensity, and the interpretation one shall put upon it depends largely on one's general religious notions. There are people absolutely devoid of any experience like that referred to. On the other hand the number of those who have had at least flashes of some faint form of mystical experience is probably considerably larger than is generally believed. Many of those who are utterly ignorant of what is meant by "communion with God" have a dim, unreasoned and untaught feeling for a beyond that is really a faint approach toward the more typically religious experience. One of my correspondents, for instance, whom I have classed as having no sense of God's presence, tells me that though he dislikes all exact definitions of God and has in vain tried to pray, he has in the background of his consciousness a dim sense of God. In its elusory, vague nature it is like a tune that keeps going in the back of one's mind and which, though always present, one can never grasp or define or analyze. His sense of God is no less faint and elusive. And yet he feels that if it should vanish, there would be a great hush, a great void in his life. Especially in times of moral crisis he feels it, as a sense of an unknown something backing him up. And although devoid of *Gottesbewustsein* in the directer and stronger sense, he adds "there is *something* in me which makes *response* when I hear utterances from that quarter made by others. I recognize the deeper voice. Something tells me: — thither lies truth."

One of the vaguest forms of experience which is interpreted by those who have it as the consciousness of God's presence is scarcely distinguishable from æsthetic emotion aroused by the beauties of nature, and coupled with the thought of God which is already in the mind. "His presence," writes one respondent "I find in the deeps of Nature and of human nature. I never feel so devotional as when in a great wood where I cannot see out, on the sea, on the seashore, or out at night, under the stars." Another writes, "yes, in one sense He is real. When I see the sunlight shining through the leaves of the forest trees and lighting up the ferns and flowers unseen by any one else save myself, I have felt a nearness of God that I have never felt

under the influence of any sermon." In such a case it is, of course, the belief that one happens to hold which turns what would otherwise be merely æsthetic pleasure into what is interpreted as a religious experience. It must be noted, however, that the emotion as actually felt *is* a religious one and is decidedly different from mere æsthtic delight in Nature, and, whatever its cause, it assumes great significance and authority in the life and belief of the individual.

An evanescent form of what might be called vague cosmic emotion would also belong here,—as, for instance, the following: "I do not like the masculine pronoun in speaking of the Divine Energy; consequently have not experienced *His* presence, but have felt a thrill of unspeakable joy and pleasure, as the thoughts of the Higher Life have come to me. . . . I will say in addition that *Something* comes to me, as a great mental stimulus and spiritual uplift."

The experience of the divine presence comes to many people in more definite form in times of great trouble. The emotional life is then already most intense, the sense of loss and despair is almost crushing, the will demands help but cannot find it. At such a time the idea of the "Divine Helper" in whom one has been taught to believe forces its way out of the background of consciousness, dominates the thought, and forms a centre round which the varied emotional elements crystallize. The whole organism is roused to intense excitement, the threshold is lowered and becomes, so to speak, very thin, and the conscious and the subconscious regions are less definitely separated than at quieter and more normal times. The deepest vital needs of the whole personality, ordinarily half dormant in the fringe-region, take control. It is at such times, in particular, that the sense of an invisible presence comes. One woman writes, "God as my Father is *very real*. Have I experienced His presence? Yes, and more than once. The most vivid and never to be forgotten was the strength, peace, and quietness that came as we watched the outgoing of our first little boy." "I do feel that I have experienced His presence very distinctly many times. . . . When praying for the life of very sick children, the voice came, What if it be my will to take them? Through His help I was enabled to say Thy will be done. He took them, but not only helped me to bear my burden but gave me a bright revelation of Himself." "I shall never forget the feeling of the presence of God with me on that night when all alone in a stranger's house on the hill I worked

over my precious child, realizing as I worked that I could not save his life, and that nothing could. I could almost hear the words 'When thou passest through the waters I will be with thee'—and in the dreadful loneliness and anxiety and grief there came a wonderful peace and a feeling of God's presence that I am very certain of."

A not uncommon but striking form of this experience is the sudden conversion, of which so many cases are reported by Leuba, Starbuck, and James. Habits of years' standing are overthrown in as many moments and not only the man's evaluations of objects and his general outlook upon the world, but his very organic impulses and desires are so utterly transformed that he can scarcely recognize himself, and must needs consider such a momentous change the work of a power not himself. One of my respondents, who is now a city missionary on the East Side in New York, writes: "I came to Him a dying drunkard and He gave me repentance. I cried to Him and He saved me instantly. I have never wanted a drink, nor sworn an oath, nor stolen a cent since."

An instance much less striking, but of the same general nature, was told me by another of my respondents. Though he had always lived a respectable and moral life and frequently attended church for his wife's sake, he had never taken any interest in religion and had no notion of what was meant by a religious experience. One day his wife asked him to teach a class of boys in the Sunday School, and he of course refused. The next Sunday he was at the post office just before the Sunday School opened, and suddenly felt an irresistible impulse to go to the church and take a class. His words are "If a rope had been round my waist and twenty men at the other end pulling me toward the church, the impelling force would not have been stronger." He taught the class for six months but with no special religious interest. At the end of that time his wife persuaded him one evening to go with her to "preparatory lecture." He went merely to please her and paid no attention to what was said by the speaker. But during the course of the meeting he began to feel that he must make a change in his life then and there, and that he must get up and declare his purpose before the end of the meeting or he should die in his seat. He rose and did so, and a new experience began for him from that hour. Ever since then he has had the constant feeling that he is "never alone"

but is being guided by a power that is not himself. What this power is he does not know but he interprets it as the Holy Spirit. He cannot conceive of anything that could shake his faith, so unquestionable is the experience. It does not come in waves, but is constant; a feeling of joy and peace, but best expressed by saying that he is never alone. The *otherness* of the experience seems to be its chief characteristic.

The influence of the sub-conscious in this case is obvious. The thought of teaching the class and the feeling of duty connected with it, which he resolutely put out of his mind, had been working throughout the week in the subliminal region, and when the arrival of the hour for Sunday School suggested the thought of the class, the feeling of obligation, made intense by the week's sub-conscious gestation, forced itself upon him with a strength not to be resisted, and in a way suggested an external power. The same sub-conscious working was evidently influential in his final conversion. The necessary influence of these experiences upon his belief is obvious.

The descriptions thus far given have been somewhat indefinite as to the nature of the experience in question. Nothing seems to be harder for the average person than to put himself into the psychological attitude, or even to conceive what that attitude is. Nearly all write as if "communion with God" were a universal experience and needed no further description. I have had, however, a few definite statements and a number which though rather indefinite still help one to make out what is meant by the phrase in question. It must be remembered, however, we are dealing here with an experience which all those who have had it agree in describing as indescribable; and if such a virtuoso at introspection as St. Teresa had to despair of putting into words the nature of this experience, we must not expect too much of my respondents.

One of my questions was: "How does it (the 'communion' experience) affect you physically?" This was simply ignored by the majority, while many of the others insisted that there was no physical affect whatever. The chief reason for these answers is, of course, lack of introspective power; though there seems also to be at least one other, namely that hinted at in the following somewhat naïve expression: "When I try to describe such an experience in words, the terms are terms of sensation and they should not be."

I have, however, two definite answers, which will help to show us, in the case of two individuals at least, how God *feels*. "When I experience the presence of God . . . . . I feel, physically, aggressive but self poised, exhilarated, but not impulsive, my chest swells, my breathing is deep and satisfying, and I seem to see the way to action opened up and the strength to do it." "With me the physical effects begin usually with a quivering and upheaving of the diaphragm which starts a wave of sensation upward through the chest region and into the pharynx, and results in incipient yawning. This in turn is followed by an excitement of the lachrymal glands and tears sometimes fill my eyes. All these physical sensations, considered merely as such, are mildly pleasing. After they are over comes a sense of great refreshment."

The "mental effects," as might be expected, are much more generally described—perhaps it would be more exact to say that the descriptions are more often given in conceptual than in sensational terms. The sense of God's presence, apprehended with something of the certainty of a visible presence, is frequently the only thing mentioned in the experience.[1] "God is very real to me in the experience of His presence. I talk with Him and He talks with me. He is my companion. When our fellowship is undisturbed He controls my thoughts and likewise my body." "Yes I have experienced His presence, but not so vividly since childhood. I remember, very distinctly, when I had been harshly, if not unjustly treated, and sent to bed, feeling His arms about me, so that I would even be glad to finish my prayers to feel my Heavenly Father comfort me. Since I have been a woman grown it has been only a sense of some one with me, correcting, reminding, or comforting." "As a child of seven I remember the emotion that filled me one evening at the sight of the evening star in a clear sky. It was an overpowering sense of infinity and of purity, and was perhaps the beginning of a strong personal desire to know God and to be in harmony with His great purposes. Often since then I have felt the same kind of emotion, with the sense of an encircling presence as vast as the universe and perfect in purity. The effect upon me I could describe only as calm and peace; physically

[1] *Cf.* Prof. James's discussion of the "sense of presence," Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 58-63.

there was nothing." The "presence" is not to be further described, but merely to be felt. "God is as real to me as the sense of happiness or the sense of love. As I sit by my friend, even abstracting the expression of his face, I often, by the communion of his soul and mine, know that he is my friend. So is God real to me. I feel that I have experienced His presence just as in church you sometimes *feel* the benediction. It is not tangible and so neither vague nor distinct. I *feel* it and I trust my feelings."

The same "sense of presence" with the added feature of clearly spoken words, resembling St. Teresa's "locutions," is seen in the following: "The experience of His presence was as definite as the sense of touching an external object, but the sensation seemed to come, so to speak, from within instead of from without. Still the personality was clearly distinct from myself—and from any detached segment or substratum of myself. An illustration of this separate action is in the fact that the other personality could *speak to me* in words clearly enunciated but without sound. This silent form of speech . . . had the convincing force of a new revelation to me."

The experience is described in a number of other ways, some rather indefinite, but most of them emphasizing its intense nature. As for instance the following: "God is to me more real than all else besides. . . . . I am thrilled and filled with his love at times." "His presence in my thought is uplifting and helpful to mind and body. It is as distinct as the effect of tea or coffee."

The appearance of the outer world is changed—a phenomenon that commonly accompanies any sudden emotional disturbance, as conversion or love. "He gave me a bright revelation of Himself; even the grass and trees looked oh so beautiful."

Joy and intense love are common characteristics of the experience, the thought of God's greatness and majesty seldom entering the mind at the time. God is a Companion—the "Lover of my soul," etc.,—it is the personal rather than the cosmical aspects of the concept that are of importance. The latter, however, are sometimes of considerable influence, as in the following: "Although I believe at all times that God is great, good, omnipresent, etc., and that I am actually in communication with Him when I choose to be, it is only at intervals, and rare at that, that I realize what it means to be in such a situation. The feeling is then one of awe and exaltation as nearly as I can express it,

and on the occasion when I can remember to have had the most vivid experience of this kind, it was so intense that I could only ask to have it taken away; it was almost crushing."

Clearer intellectual vision and a strengthened moral purpose are frequently mentioned among the effects of the experience. The two following responses, though illustrating a number of other matters, are here in point:

"God is a very real presence to me. I feel that He is present with me at all times, only occasionally do I have an experience that seems particularly clear. It is usually at a time which seems critical to my development, when an influence may turn the course of my life from one extreme to another. At such crises I am conscious of an increase of power and will which makes stronger my determination to press forward toward righteousness. I hear no voice, I see no light or person,—but I feel an assurance that the course toward which I feel drawn is that which is best. Mentally I receive courage and a clearer vision, an added power of will, and a purer thought; physically I have the common results of courage, a carelessness of pain, or of mental anguish, that enables me to reach an end that otherwise I am assured I should not attain. At these crises the experience is very real and distinct."

"At times God is very real to me. At such times He seems nearer and more real than any human being could be. At other times He seems real but more or less remote. There have been times throughout my life, beginning in early childhood, when I have believed myself to come consciously into the presence of God. Sometimes this has occurred when I have been in great sorrow or in great fear and dread. But sometimes I have felt this Presence without any special reason for it,—*e. g.*, when I have been alone out of doors or reading something that has touched me by its beauty and truth, I have felt a quick glad sense that He was near, "closer to me than breathing, nearer than hands or feet." Such experiences, while they last, make me feel that I have come to my true self. I seem to understand life better for them. They are accompanied by no emotional excitement, only by a deep peace and gladness. I have never spoken of them to any one. These experiences are not habitual with me, that is, they do not occur very frequently. They afford me my strongest ground for belief in God."

The last quotation suggests an interesting question, namely the age

at which these experiences begin, and how far they can be considered imitative. That they are largely imitative as to their ideational content there can be no doubt; they occur in much the same form in all lands and at all times, the particular ideas involved being always determined in a general way by the ruling beliefs of the community. That the emotional experience itself, however, is principally imitative seems improbable. It is the almost universal assertion of those who have known it, that the experience is in reality indescribable; that no one who has not experienced it can form any idea of what is meant by it. This may very possibly be an exaggeration; but at least it seems to preclude the possibility of its being induced in the first instance by a description of it given by some one else. The age at which the first such experience occurs and the attending circumstances would here be in point. If, for instance, its first occurrence were very generally an incident of revival and came only at times of great religious excitement in the community, the social and imitative factors would seem to be of the first importance. Unfortunately it did not occur to me till too late to make this one of the questions of my circular. I have, however, collected ten answers to it from my respondents. Of these, two had their first experience of the kind in question during revival services—one of them at 16, the other when further along in life. In the case reported on page 86 the first occurrence was in adult life, but quite spontaneous in nature and quite uninfluenced by any social excitement. In the remaining seven cases, the experience stretches back into childhood and in most cases (so far as the memory of the respondents holds good) is quite spontaneous—though of course entirely imitative as to the ideas involved. One woman writes: "I think I was just thirteen when one night for a moment there came a feeling of great peace or rest. I almost held my breath to keep it, but it was gone, and left only the memory which became an ideal for whose realization I began to hope and work. I called it *peace* for the verse in Isaiah 26 : 3 seemed to describe the experience better than any other. I have found some old notes of that year with the verse copied, and think that it perhaps marked the beginning of my search. . . . . It may be that it was Miss Havergal's word about 'the permanence of the joy of the Lord' that gave me the assurance that such a feeling of peace ought to be constant instead of coming in flashes. It came to me only in that last way at first, and I could not find a cause that

would always produce them, and yet I remember feeling that they must be governed by some law, and if I could find that law I could reproduce them at will. . . . . One day I found in an old commentary a description of my experience, and it gave me as its cause absolute obedience to God. I had already felt that study of His word and prayer had a great deal to do with the coming of the peace. . . . . Gradually, by spending some time alone each day, the experiences became longer and perhaps less intense. They were best expressed by the word *peace*, and I began to know that I might always have the feeling if I would instantly do the right as I saw it and would save the time for quiet study. I found that when actual necessity interfered with that, the peace would not go, but carelessness would always drive it away."

Every one will note the marked similarity between this and the descriptions given by a number of the Christian mystics. The experience comes at first unsought and in a sudden flash. This is interpreted in accordance with the religious ideas already held and is thereafter deliberately sought. Methods for regaining the experience are found in records of the experience of others—in this case an old commentary, in the case of many of the mystics the description of the orison of some previous mystic. The state is systematically cultivated. In this my quotation is certainly typical of a very great number of religious people. All the sources to which I have access agree that the experience is at first spontaneous but is thereafter very susceptible to cultivation.

Summing up the results recorded in this paper, one should note particularly that the data here collected, if at all trustworthy, point decidedly to the great preponderance of affective experience over reasoning and authority as the basis of belief. The researches of Leuba and Starbuck, so far as they touch upon this question, point in the same direction. The importance of the affective life in the religious belief of my respondents is especially striking if we consider only those whom I have called the "church people." 30 out of 49 of these were of the fifth type, while all but 7 of the 49 were persuaded that they had experienced God's presence. If my respondents are really fair samples (as I believe them to be), we may conclude that belief in God to-day, with perhaps half the religious community at least, is based not on argument nor on authority, but on a private experience spring-

ing from the great emotional background which forms the deepest and most fundamental part of our consciousness, the part most intimately bound up with life and all that life means to us.

Questionnaire.

Please answer the questions at length and in detail. *Do not give philosophical generalizations, but your own personal experience.*

1. What does religion mean to you personally? Is it
   (1) A belief that something exists?
   (2) An emotional experience?
   (3) A general attitude of the will toward God or toward righteousness?
   (4) Or something else?

If it has several elements, which is for you the most important?

2. What do you mean by God?
   (1) Is He a person—if so, what do you mean by His being a person?
   (2) Or is He only a Force?
   (3) Or is God an attitude of the Universe toward you?

How do you apprehend His relation to mankind and to you personally?

If your position on any or all of these matters is uncertain, please state the fact.

3. Why do you believe in God? Is it
   (1) From some argument?
   Or (2) Because you have experienced His presence?
   Or (3) From authority, such as that of the Bible or of some prophetic person?
   Or (4) From any other reason?

If from several of these reasons, please indicate carefully the order of their importance.

4. Or do you not so much *believe* in God as want to *use* Him? Do you accept Him not so much as a real existent Being, but rather as an ideal to live by? If you should become thoroughly convinced that there was no God, would it make any great difference in your life—either in happiness, morality, or in other respects?

5. Is God very real to you; as real as an earthly friend, though different?

Do you feel that you have experienced His presence? If so, please describe what you mean by such an experience. How vague or how distinct is it? How does it affect you mentally and physically?

If you have had no such experience, do you accept the testimony of others who claim to have felt God's presence directly?

Please answer this question with special care and in as great detail as possible.

6. Do you pray, and if so, why? That is, is it purely from habit, and social custom, or do you really believe that God hears your prayers?

Is prayer with you one-sided or two-sided—*i. e.*, do you sometimes feel that in prayer you receive something—such as strength or the divine spirit—from God? Is it a real communion?

7. What do you mean by "spirituality?" Describe a typical spiritual person.

8. Do you believe in personal immortality? If so, why?

9. Do you accept the Bible as *authority* in religious matters? Are your religious faith and your religious life based on it? If so, how would your belief in God and your life toward Him and your fellowmen be affected by loss of faith in the *authority* of the Bible?

10. What do you mean by a "religious experience?"

THE UNIVERSAL BELIEF AND ITS RATIONALITY.

By JOSEPH I. FRANCE, M. D.

So unsatisfactory to my mind are the theories, with which I am familiar, of the origin of religious beliefs and conceptions, that I wish to state the facts, which seem to me to be the most important, in the discussion of this problem, and, while the views which I express, may all be more or less familiar, yet they are, I believe, of sufficient importance to deserve repetition, even though they may have been advanced frequently before.

It would, of course, be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss at length the prevailing theories, and I shall only mention two, the first of which would explain the existence of religious ideas by saying that they originated in the erroneous explanations which primitive man gave of natural phenomena, the second of which says that religious ideas are internal, psychic adaptations which were developed and preserved because favorable to the individual. I shall leave it for these theories to explain, as they have not yet done, why in the first instance such erroneous explanations satisfied the rational mind of primitive man, or in the second why such a complicated adaptation as religious belief was necessary to any individual, unless we assume that he had in the beginning just what we are attempting to explain, namely, a feeling of need which made religious belief necessary.

The above theories attempt to explain the existence of what they at the outset assume are fundamentally irrational conceptions, and it is not therefore strange that they are so absolutely inadequate, for, it seems to me, that with our present theories of the origin of the content of mind, we should start out, in seeking the genesis of any deeply rooted conception, to find its ultimate rational element or, in other words, its final objective source, for if we assume that there must be some sufficient and adequate cause for every one of the great fundamental instincts and feelings, we have a field of inquiry which lies in reality and not in fancy.

So far as we know, all the great fundamental instincts and feel-

ings are the result of the great primal objective facts which the organism was compelled to recognize, and these I wish to summarize:

(1) The physical and psychic life of every organism is first and always one of relation to, and absolute dependence upon, its environment or the universal.

(2) This absolute unconditional dependence is and must of necessity be recognized by every form of life, either sub-consciously or consciously.

(3) As a result of this dependence, there are developed in the organism definite physical, chemical and psychical states which impel movements which are made for the satisfaction of the specific, imperative organic need which the given state expresses. In these states of protoplasm growing out of various needs, we have the primitive, specific instincts which are later developed and specialized, but which form ever the bulk even of the highest forms of psychic life. The most primitive concrete instincts are of course the food instincts in the broadest sense, and fall under the heads of chemotropism, heliotropism, geotropism, stereotropism, etc.

(4) As a result of the active movements of the organism, portions of the external are appropriated, become internal or organic and constitute for a time the vital and nervous mechanism until discharged, to be replaced by other elements.

(5) In a word, there is a physical and chemical continuity between the individual and the universal, and this being the primal fact, the question arises whether we find in the content of mind any great feeling or instinct, in recognition of it, which would express this general sense of dependence, as the special instincts express the concrete needs. Is there a widespread world belief or feeling which is a subjective recognition of these great fundamental facts?

If, in order to answer this question, we examine carefully the different religious and philosophic systems, we do find, as we should expect, that there are certain fundamental conceptions common to them all, or, in other words, that there is a universal world belief which constitutes the foundation of every system of thought, and that consequently in the last analysis all the different systems are in essential agreement.

If it is granted that there is such a world belief or philosophy, we cannot explain its existence unless we assume that it is the universal

subjective reaction to objective reality, that it is a rational conception gradually developed by sub-conscious and conscious observation and reasoning concerning the natural processes of the universe, and that there is an essential harmony existing between the subjective conception of the universe and the external reality. If we do not assume that these conceptions are rational, we must grant, after a world belief has been shown, that it is a universal delusion or false judgment and this, from the standpoint of practical psychology, is absurd, since the more we come to realize that the content of mind has a phylogenetic as well as an ontogenetic origin, the more we are forced to trust its ultimate rationality. Indeed, to one who takes this view, the old objections to the ontological form of proof seem to fall short, for we inevitably incline toward the view that nothing can be in the mind which has not been perceived in some form at some stage of mental evolution. How any organism could originate a purely extra-natural delusion, or what such a delusion would be, it is impossible to imagine. To restate and reverse Kant's argument: If a poor man has an idea of a hundred thalers, they must exist, although their time and space relations may be such that they may not be in his own purse. Even an insane delusion is such not in the sense of being an extra-natural conception, but because a rational and natural conception has lost its proper time and space relations, or the sense organs report a natural phenomenon as existing which does not exist at the time, which is an hallucination. Every idea must have an ultimate basis in fact. No one could have conceived of the possibility of Lazarus being raised from death, if the vitalization of apparently inanimate things were not a universally perceived world process.

If we accept the views of modern genetic psychology our mental content is the result of environment acting on organisms during indefinitely long periods of the past as well as the product of our individual perceptions. We might roughly divide the perceptions of organisms into three great classes, the first of which embraces the most primitive sensations; the last two of which belong to the intellectual or human period of observation.

The first class would include all of those most fundamental of all perceptions which are so simple and primitive that the resulting state of the organism cannot be called a conception nor even be defined in terms of mind. I would describe them as somatic sensations, and they

result in some sort of a sense of contact or relation which constitutes the whole psychic life among primitive organisms. It is the internal state which results in chemotropic, heliotropic, etc., movements, which are the primordial reactions which bring the organism and the necessary external elements together. It is the most elemental expression of that sense of dependence which the individual feels for the universal. To what extent these primordial states and reactions of free moving cells are preserved in the specialized cells of higher organisms, we cannot say, but in some form they must be co-extensive with protoplasm, since, no matter how highly specialized an organism, the ultimate problems of nutrition reside in the individual cell and the reaction of its individual self to the external. A little thought will make it clear that not only then in higher organisms is there a sense of dependence on the external which resides in higher centres, but that it is present also in the lower sub-conscious levels and far lower there still exists the ultimate cell hunger for and cell dependence upon all the elements of the external. Through all the forms of life below the human, we have observations and sensations and reactions of increasing complexity, but we need not for our purposes discuss these, but pass at once to the second class of observations, which are those conscious and sub-conscious ones made by man from the beginning.

Primitive man was alert to every changing phase of his environment, and with every observation that he made there was the unconscious and conscious recognition of his dependence upon it. Every aspect of nature in all of its manifold details was perceived, and upon the multitude of these observations grew the primitive philosophic and religious system. The systems of thought thus developed were merely the conscious and rational reaction to what was perceived and felt. The ideas and religious conceptions of primitive peoples and the early systems of philosophy which followed much later, while called *a priori* for the sake of distinguishing them from conclusions and theories based upon the facts observed by a certain method which we arbitrarily call scientific, were in reality inductive, as is all so-called metaphysics, since its ultimate source and data are found in those sense perceptions which are forced upon every organism.

We have thirdly, the observations made by modern science, equipped with its marvellous intricacies of apparatus and technique. These observations while carried further into the finer relations of

things, while they are capable in many instances of quantitative statement, and while able to show the universality of certain phenomena and to state them in the abstract language of a general law, are after all not essentially different either in their scope or in their ultimate significance from the observations made by man for ages, nor is it conceivable that they will have any effect in changing those fundamental beliefs which seem to be so universal.

If mankind as a whole, as the result of ages of close observation and study of natural processes, has not arrived at a proper interpretation of them, if the content of the mind of the race is not in harmony with the objective reality, if sense perception has for ages been distorted, then, indeed, may we hope for but little light on ultimate problems from the observations of modern science, and we may as well resign ourselves to the chill and deadening atmosphere of agnosticism, surrender our hopes and efforts, and close our eyes with horror on the scene, the end of which can only be the destruction of every lofty motive, and the despair which would result from a universal acceptance of the philosophy of negation.

If, on the other hand, the external world has been correctly perceived and understood; if there is a harmony existing between the objective reality and its subjective conception, then we should expect to find, as I have said before, certain universal beliefs, and that in their last analysis all philosophical and religious conceptions, being the inevitable effect of reality upon the mind, should show an essential agreement in fundamentals. This does not mean that every individual must involuntarily consciously arrange his perceptions in a certain fixed way, or that he must necessarily be conscious of the presence in his own mind of the universal norm of belief, any more than it means that the root philosophy or belief must always be evident to the superficial observer of the different systems of thought, for in either an individual or among classes of individuals, it may be obscured or almost completely hidden by a mass of non-essential details. In spite of the multitudinous systems of thought and belief, we are coming more and more to realize that such a great fundamental world belief does and must exist from the very nature of man and the external reality.

I undertake to give below the elements which make up this universal world belief, and I present them in three forms, which differ very

little; the first being the general statement, the second its religious statement, and the third its scientific.

I. General.

(1) There is a universal all embracing matrix, of which all concrete things are special manifestations.

(2) Man, as all other creatures, is at one with and hence absolutely dependent upon the universal.

(3) The universal has a psychic quality which is made concrete in nervous and mental phenomena.

(4) The universal and its parts are subject to constant change, but no part of it can be destroyed.

II. Religious.

(1) There is a universal omnipresent God.

(2) Man is absolutely dependent upon Him, since He is the all powerful creator.

(3) He has a spiritual nature.

(4) Man is immortal.

III. Scientific.

(1) A primal universal force with many manifestations.

(2) The individual is a manifestation of the universal force in a given direction and hence dependent on it.

(3) The universal force possesses a psychic power or potential n talit y.

(4) The conservation of energy and matter.

I am perfectly aware that there are many technical objections which may be raised against the above statements of what might be called the fundamental norm of belief, and the form is very imperfect, but it will suffice to convey the general idea. Of course it will be objected that it would be impossible to establish the existence of such a world belief, and that even if it could be demonstrated, it would be of no value, because its terms are too general. Certainly in the present paper, it would be impossible to meet the first of these objections, with all the details which would be necessary in order to establish a proof, and I do not attempt to do more than give a most general outline of the facts, recommending that those who are sufficiently inter-

ested weigh the evidence for themselves, so far as they may obtain it, first hand. As to whether the establishment of the existence of such a universal belief would be of any value, that, of course, would depend entirely upon the individual point of view.

If one approaches the study of religious and philosophical systems and the generalizations of modern science with the idea of ignoring the variety and terminology and the manifold non-essential details, he will, I think, soon perceive that the evidence in favor of the existence of such a world belief is at least considerable. The field of inquiry would embrace primitive religious systems, the great religions of the higher type, the ancient and modern systems of philosophy, and the theories now being advanced by modern science as they are expressed by its greatest exponents.

If in this way we first consider the religious philosophic systems of primitive peoples, we are at once impressed with the fact that primitive man views his environment as a whole, that the subjective and objective are not clearly defined, that resemblances and not differences are first observed, and that on the whole his philosophy is synthetic. The self shades off imperceptibly into the not self, and to him what, to the more analytic mind, seem widely separated phenomena, are closely related. The sense of his relation to his environment, and his dependence upon it, is very intense. He indeed feels the ultimate identity of the subjective and objective, and attributes to inanimate things a volitional and psychic power. Spencer says that in seeking to explain that which puzzled him, he formed a theory which was erroneous, while the fact is that realizing as he did his at-oneness with his environment, and that he was a part of the same, he formulated the only possible explanation, and one which, while partly incomplete, was in its last analysis rational. With him it was more a rational feeling than a judgment, and must have been the result of a sub-conscious mental process, acting on necessary observations.

If the origin of his theory was not by rational process, it remains a mystery as to how he could have originated such an extra natural or supernatural explanation, or, indeed, why as a biological entity he should have explained at all. That there was in specific instances and applications of this theory an element of error, does not affect the ultimate rationality of it.

The primitive and child mind perceive resemblances easily, and

their reasoning is synthetic; the scientific mind is analytic; the well-balanced mind, with both its analytic and synthetic powers properly developed, while recognizing outward diversity, perceives also the necessity of ultimate similarity and unity. Of these three classes of minds, the first will tend to be superstitious, the second sceptical or agnostic, while the third will develop a conception of reality which is both discriminative and comprehensive. The first will be wrong in details, the second weak in generalizations, while the third perceives the general behind the details. The first will feel truth, the second doubt it, the third will perceive the error of the other two.

Brinton says that "the universal postulate of all religious thought is the recognition or, if you will, the assumption, that behind the sensuous phenomenal world lies . . . . the immeasurable power of mind analogous . . . . in some way to our own, ... the unalterable faith in mind as the source of all force, all life, all being."

The primitive views of death and immortality are so diverse and so involved in various details that it would be impossible to discuss them here, but in a general way we may say that in some form a belief in life after death and in another world is universal.

If we look next at the great religious systems of a higher type, we find the same fundamental belief clearly expressed but under a wide diversity of form. "The universal postulate" of Brinton, or the world belief, is the foundation on which is built the superstructures, which in many instances are so complicated. Whether we examine the religion of the East, with its faith in a divine essence of which all is the expression and to which all returns, or the monotheism, which in its extremes becomes anthropomorphism, or the polytheism, which is a more detailed and analytic expression of the same idea, we find in them all *an ultimate essential agreement.*

If we turn to the more distinctly philosophical field, there is little difficulty in finding the presence, in each different system, of the same elements. From the system of Thales, who conceived water as the universal matrix, assuming various forms down through the early monotheistic systems, the idealism of Plato and the materialism of Democritus, which seemed its antithesis, we can trace the same conception, finding differences in terminology and in the details of its elaboration. The universal postulate which, as mentioned above, underlies all religious thought, is found also in the different systems of

philosophy. Weber brings out very forcibly in the conclusion of his history of philosophy, the idea that there are common factors present in all the different systems. He says, "if anything has remained in agreement with itself for more than two thousand years, it is metaphysics. The great hypothesis of the unity continuity and immortality of being existed prior to Plato and Aristotle, and constitutes the immutable substance, as it were, of ancient and modern speculation. . . . The historian of metaphysics is most impressed with the open and tacit agreement existing between rival movements and schools."

It would, of course, be impossible at this time to attempt to prove that both practically and theoretically present scientific thought is and must be monistic in its trend. The four axioms of the world belief, as stated above, constitute the foundations of our modern science. In no sense is modern scientific thought materialistic, according to the meaning ordinarily conveyed by that term, since the dynamic conception of matter would necessarily change the term to dynamism, and everywhere, as it were inevitably, the dynamic force tends to become stated in terms of the psychic or will. We constantly assume that nervous reaction has a chemical basis and is ultimately itself chemical, and there is no reason why we should not, but if it is chemical, it simply means that the phenomena of chemical reaction in general are different and vastly more complex than we have hitherto conceived them. If we push our study of nervous reaction down until we reach the simplest form of protoplasmic irritability, we reach a point where reaction is so direct and so inevitable that we are forced to recognize it as chemical, as we do in the terms chemotaxis, etc., and yet there has been no change, except that the reaction has become simpler and more direct. We cannot reduce nervous reaction then to chemical terms unless we modify our conceptions of such chemical reactions themselves, as we are now inevitably doing.

The above is but a most brief and superficial statement of what I wish to convey, and it is probably at the same time very incomplete, but I believe that further thought and investigation on the part of those interested, will bring them to a realization that through all ages and systems of thought we can trace an elemental conception or belief. If we now summarize the views I have advanced on the origin of this root conception, we might state it as follows:

(1) At all times, from the beginning of his existence, each indi-

vidual is not merely in contact with his environment, but he is rather continuous with it. He is merely a vortex and aggregation of substances and force existing in the universal substratum or matrix. The apparent discontinuity between the subjective and objective is an abstraction which the mind necessarily learns as it advances from the simple to the complex condition. The system of forces which we know as the individual is continuous with those of the universal. Elements from the outside are absorbed, transformed, become for a moment part of the microcosm, and are then removed to be again replaced. Every universal force is continuous with him, and portions of the external are becoming internal and individual, and the internal are constantly becoming external and general. There is an actual physical and chemical continuity and unity between the organism and its environment. Very little thought will show not only that this must be so, but that any other idea is absolutely inconceivable. Now the continuity, the unity of the individual with his environment and his dependence upon it, is the one primal fact of life. It is the general and fundamental thesis which lies deeper than even its particular concrete aspects, such as the hunger for air and food. The need for the last are concrete and particular expressions of the general environmental need, which expresses all of the concrete needs. Now remembering these facts, it is not strange that even the primitive mind perceives unconsciously the at-oneness with the general, the continuity of the individual with and his ultimate identity with the universal. Separate organs give special sensations for special needs, but every organ and cell unconsciously feels the need for the universal, which is the whole and embraces all the elements exciting the concrete hungers. Now the organism thus feeling constantly the unity of subjective and objective, forces the mental assumption of ultimate similarity, which last gives rise to all the various philosophies, the norm of which is monoism, the forms of which are so various, such as animism, monotheism and its equivalent, polytheism, theism, hylozoism, idealism, materialism, anthropomorphism, pantheism, and all the varieties practically of philosophy and religion, all of which contain the expression of the same fundamental conception.

(2) At what stage of evolution this fundamental organic sense of the dependence of the individual upon, and his identity with, the universal, develops a definite emotional accompaniment or counterpart we

need not enquire since it is sufficient, for our purpose, to note that such an emotional reaction probably appears much earlier than is generally believed, and hence we must go far back for the elements which later develop into the religious feelings. However this may be, when we reach the higher stages of mental development we find that this feeling of dependence and unity and the consequent necessary positing of ultimate similarity, results in a spiritual or psychic interpretation of natural phenomena, and there logically follows on this the conclusion that the supreme will, which manifests itself in the impressive changes and awful cataclysms of the environment, should be propitiated, which in turn, develops all the elaborate technique of ceremony and worship which occupies such an important place in all religious systems.

The vital point to bear in mind is that the religious ideas and emotions do not arise from an accidentally discovered theory adopted to explain puzzling natural phenomena, but that we must look for their source in those organic sensations which are the inevitable result of the relations existing between the individual and the universal; that they arise in those primitive perceptions and observations, the rationality of which are proven by their resulting reactions, which preserve the organism.

(3) The individual then feels his unity with the universal, his absolute dependence, and attributes a psychic or will power to the objective, and lastly there develops the belief in immortality of the individual. Under all the changing phenomena of the universe there is inevitably recognized the final relative permanence and indestructibility of its nature. The individual passes away but the universal, into which he sinks, goes on, and if the individual is at one with it, the conclusion is that in some way the part must share the indestructibility of the whole and must be preserved. Such a fundamental belief is universal and has a rational basis, even in the light of modern science since, if we accept the doctrine of the conservation of energy, we know that the passing of an individual merely means that the universal has ceased to be individualized or vitalized at a given point, and that there has been no destruction but only a transformation of the specific forces which were centered in that particular organism. In what manner vital and nervous energy are transformed, and whether they have a mechanical or other equivalent, we do not know, and it does not concern us here since it is sufficient for our purpose to note that the

doctrine of immortality, in its broad sense, is indeed but a corollary of the proposition of the conservation of energy and matter.

The primal facts of the universe, from the standpoint of the individual, are: Unity, Dependence, Similarity, Immortality.

The most primitive form of life recognizes by some internal state preceding reaction its absolute dependence upon and unity with the universal. The special hungers are concrete expressions of this general sense, which is co-extensive with life. The assumption of ultimate similarity and the belief that the individual shares the indestructibility of the whole follows later of necessity. When we reach the intellectual stage of development, the great primal facts are more clearly perceived and given abstract expression in philosophy, and the emotional reaction to them gives us religion. The world belief, which is the recognition of these great primal facts, forms the foundation of every system of thought, and is and must be rational from the very nature of the universe itself.

PRAYER: A STUDY IN ITS HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

By FRANK ORMAN BECK.

Indianapolis, Ind.

This study has been pursued according to the following outline:

I. Its history.
   1. Among the primitive races.
   2. In ethnic religions.
   3. In catholic religions.
   4. In Jewish Polytheism—later in monotheism.
   5. In the Christian system.
      a: In the teachings of the founder, Christ.
      b: The Pauline conception.
      c: In the Church Fathers.

II. A study from example.
   Including Saint Augustine, Saint Francis d'Assisi, Martin Luther, John Wesley, and others.

III. A study from experience using the questionnaire to collect data.
   (See list of questions at the beginning of Part III of the study.)

Part I. History of Prayer.

The writer has had in mind not only a study in the psychology of prayer but the ethical and sociological phases of the study.

Sabatier, in his "Philosophy of Religion," says, "Perhaps a History of Prayer would be the best history of the religious development of mankind."

Among primitive people, the words to their gods is prayer. It is the ordinary concomitant of sacrifice: the prayer explains the reason of the sacrifice and urges the god to accept and in return to offer the aid that is asked. Their earliest prayers are offered at times of great emergencies and contain requests of the most primary sort.

"The earliest prayers do not, as a rule, contain definite requests, but are general appeals to the gods to be present, to partake of the feast, to join the dance, to continue his good offices toward those who call upon him." Ancient Nahnath Poetry, by D. G. Brinton.

Their prayers have a ring of urgency: they state the claim the wor-

shipper has on the god. "Most of the petitions in primitive prayer are for material benefits." Religion of Primitive People, by D. G. Brinton, As life grows more secure this note of urgency fades more or less out of prayer. You find signs of an appreciation of something higher. "O Lord, we know not what is good for us. Thou knowest what it is. For it we pray." (From prayer of Khonds—a tribe of Northern India.) "O merciful Lord, let this chastisement with which thou hast visited us give us freedom from evil and follies." (The prayer of an Aztec quoted in Sahagu's History de Nueva Espana.) Among primitive people the Indians perhaps are as prayerful as any. "It seems a startling assertion, but it is, I think, true, that there are no people who pray more than the Indians. Both superstition and custom keep always in their minds the necessity of placating the anger of the invisible and omnipotent power, and for supplicating the active exercise of his faculties in their behalf." Captain Clark's "Indian Sign Language," page 300.

Studying the prayers which are offered in connection with sacrifice we notice that they tend to run into form and to take the nature of a liturgy. Finally, the words of the prayer are in themselves supposed to be efficacious and to take the place of the sacrifice itself. So prayer comes to have the same virtue as sacrifice.

In the religions which belong exclusively to one nation — the Ethnic religions — we find about the same petitioning for outward good that characterizes prayer among the primitive races.

James Freeman Clarke thinks another and very important element enters into prayer among the ethnic religions—the element of adoration. He quotes the following from the Vedic hymns in illustration of his position: "Of which god now, of which of the immortals, shall we invoke the amiable name? Let us invoke the amiable name of Aditi; of the divine Agni, first of the immortals; of Varuna, the thousand eyed, skillful-handed, possessed of all resources, embracing the three worlds, whose breath is the wind, who knows the flight of the birds, the course of the far-travelling wind, and is a witness of human truth and falsehood."

Other and equally prominent illustrations of adoration are to be found in the ethnic religions. The Vedic hymns are filled with strains of adoration. Such statements as the following abound: "The light has arrived, the greatest of all lights, the glorious and brilliant illumi-

nation has been born. The shining Ushas, fair and bright, has opened the doors of the sky, setting in motion all living things. Usha has awakened all creatures. Daughter of the sky, youthful, clad in shining attire, auspicious, shine on us to-day! O best of all dawns, arise! Magnificent Goddess, protecting right, imparting joy, undecaying, immortal, arise! our life, our breath!"

We have many examples preserved which indicate the conception and place of prayer among the Greeks and Romans. The philosopher, Seneca, says, "We worship and adore the framer and former of the universe, governor, disposer, keeper; him on whom all things depend; mind and spirit of the world; from whom all things spring; by whose spirit we live; the divine spirit diffused through all; God all-powerful; God always present; God above all other gods; thee we worship and adore." Plato, before beginning the Timaeus, says, "Since I am about to speak of the nature of the Universe, I must first invoke the gods, that I may say what is reasonable and true." It was habitual with the Greeks to pray for every undertaking which they attempted. This is an almost universal practice, in fact so generally so that Plato says, "Every man of sense, before beginning an important work, will ask help of the gods." Xenophon prays before each day's march and Pericles before each of his orations. Socrates prays at the conclusion of the dialogue which he held with Phaedus under the palm tree, "Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one." These and other illustrations which might be offered furnish evidence that we have here a different and undoubtedly higher form of prayer than is found among the primitive religions. Adoration becomes very pronounced here.

Passing into the Catholic religions where we meet a marked tendency to universality we also meet that which is characteristic of their prayers. In this group is included Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, and the religion of the Hebrews. Here we meet with religions that seem to have no place at all for prayer. Confucianism seems to have no need of prayer and there is no prayer in Buddhism. It believes that the world is unalterably ruled by the law of Karman, hence prayer would be useless and its place is taken by meditation. On the other hand, Mohammedanism places large emphasis upon prayer. To followers of this religion prayer is en-

joined as an imperative duty. Both the times and forms of prayer are very scrupulously observed. To them, "prayer is better than sleep, as the sleeper can be aroused by the musical cry of the Muezzion." The Koran pronounces a woe upon those who pray carelessly; who make a long show of devotion and yet refuse to help the needy. Sufis, a Mohammedan writer, gives us the following concerning prayer: "There are three degrees of prayer. The first is when it is only spoken by the lips. The second kind is when, with difficulty and by a resolute effort, the soul succeeds in fixing its thought on divine things. The third is when it finds it hard to turn away from God. But it is the very marrow of prayer when God takes possession of the soul of the suppliant, and he is absorbed into the Divine Being and ceases from all thought, so that the prayer seems like a veil between himself and God."

In this group of religions I think I discover that which is not to be found in the ethnic religions, namely, a petition for divine leading and blessing in experiences not yet passed through. Not only a looking behind with sacrifices and pardon, and a present adoration, but a feeling that somehow Deity can and will have power over that which is yet to come to pass.

In Jewish polytheism and later as it became monotheistic we find a different conception of prayer and an evolution of the idea within the development of this one religion. In the earlier years prayer was little less than an effort to get the gods on your side. Jacob prayed, "If God be with me, and will keep me in this way," etc. He wished to make God his ally. The thought here seems to be, How can I get God to serve me? Later we find an entirely different conception. Mohammedanism regards prayer as a practical duty while the later age of Judaism makes it a voluntary communion. To David, God was near and prayer was the communion of happy trust and willing obedience. In the last days of centralized Judaism we find a very different conception prevailing. It became outward and very formal. There were rabbinical ordinances about it and it became confined in the fetters of a rigid mechanism.

In the religion of Jesus prayer seems to be a voluntary communion with God rather than an enjoined duty. Jesus surely did not attempt a philosophy of prayer. He prayed as though it was the normal and reasonable thing in life and that the promptings to pray were natural

and instinctive. Jesus had the habit of prayer; at least fifteen times the Synoptic Gospels mention his prayers. Mark 1 : 35, gives us one of his times of prayer, the early morning. John also mentions this time and together with other times noted we are led to think that while Jesus did not teach stated times to pray, nevertheless, His practice was such. Somewhat contrary to this idea is His statement, "Men ought always to pray," but this was given as a corrective to an established habit and not to form a new one. Some statements in the Synoptic Gospels would lead one to think that Christ shared with the Mohammedan the idea that prayer demanded a certain posture and place, but this position can surely not be maintained. It is true many of his prayers that are recorded were prayed in the desert place, on the mountain top and side, but if this teaches anything it is the value of retirement and solitary places as aids in reflection and meditation. These places no doubt furnished an opportunity for undisturbed communion. In one place Jesus says, "Men should pray in every place," but in Matt. 6 : 5, 6 he enjoins men not to pray in public. This injunction is no doubt given as a warning against practices which existed among the Jews. The Gospel writers represent Jesus praying at the great crises of his life : his temptation, the time of the choosing of the twelve Apostles, the time of the Galilean uprising and His experience in Gethsemane. They also represent that the great blessings of His life came during or closely connected with a season of prayer : the descent of the Holy Spirit, the Transfiguration, the heavenly Voice, etc. He prayed with others and for others. But in the little teaching he gives He seems to be much more concerned about the spirit of prayer than the form. The form would probably not been mentioned if his disciples had not insisted that he imitate John and teach them a form of prayer. He was unique in this particular as in all others, but in response to their request gave them the short prayer commonly known as the Lord's Prayer, but I think with no thought of giving any formal prayer or of suggesting a liturgy. The spirit of prayer was uttermost in Christ's life and that was determined largely by His conception of God. He regarded God as His father, and that spiritual affinity and relationship determined His conception of prayer. It was consequently natural to have the freest intercourse and to enjoy communion.

Paul accepts the theological dogma of the Holy Spirit, so in his

teaching concerning prayer he says in Romans 8 : 26, "And in like manner the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity ; for we know not how to pray as we ought ; but the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered ;" God knows our needs, the Spirit makes intercession, and our petitioning only re-enforces the petition upon us.

In the Church Fathers we find a great many references to prayer and a variety of teaching.

St. Ignatius in "The Epistle to the Ephesians," "Pray also without ceasing for other men." "Pray for the Church which is in Syria." "But if Jesus Christ will give me grace through your prayers." In both the Epistle to the Trallians and the Romans we find a request to pray for the Church at Syria. In the Epistle to the Magnesians, "For I stand in need of your joint prayers in God." Tertullian writes thus concerning prayer : "In the Lord's Prayer is an epitome of the whole Gospel. Touching times of prayer nothing at all has been prescribed, except clearly, to pray at every time and place. The refreshments and nourishments of the spirit are to be held prior to those of the flesh. Old world fires used to free men from fire (Daniel 3), famine (1 Kings 18), and from beasts (Daniel 6). But how far more amply operative is Christian prayer. Christ hath willed that it be operative for no evil." In De Corona Militis he says, "Oblationes pro defunctis pro natalitiis anma die facimus," and in his De Monogam he speaks of a widow praying for her dead husband. Tertullian also cites from Marcus Aurelius's address to Scapula (Ad. Scap. 3 : 4) where he testifies to drought in Germany which is removed by prayer of Christians which served in his army. In the Twenty-second Letter of Jerome is this reference to prayer, "Prayer, as every one knows, ought to be said at the third, the sixth, and the ninth hours, at dawn and at evening." The Ninth Commandment of the "Shepherd of St. Hermas," contains the following on prayer : "Remove from thee all doubting, and question nothing at all, when thou askest anything of the Lord, saying within thyself, How shall I ask anything of the Lord and receive it seeing I have so greatly sinned against Him? Do not think thus, but turn unto the Lord with all thy heart, and ask of him without doubting, and thou shalt know the mercy of the Lord, how that he will not forsake thee but will fulfill the requests of thy soul. For God is not as man mindful of the injuries he has received ; but he

forgets injuries and has compassion on his creatures. Therefore purify thy heart from all the vices of this present world, and observe the commandments I have delivered unto thee from God, and thou shalt receive whatsoever good thing thou shalt ask and nothing shall be wanting thee of all thy petitions, if thou shalt ask of the Lord without doubting. But they which are not such shall obtain none of those things which they ask. For they that are full of faith ask all things with confidence, and receive from the Lord because they ask without doubting. But he that doubts shall hardly live unto God, except he repent, wherefore purify thy heart from doubtings and put on faith and trust in God, and thou shalt receive all thou shalt ask. But if thou shalt chance to ask somewhat, and not receive it (immediately) do not therefore doubt because thou hast not presently received the petition of thy soul. For it may be thou shalt not receive it presently for thy trial or else for some sin which thou knowest not. But do not thou leave off to ask and then thou shalt receive. Else if thou shalt cease to ask thou must complain of thyself and not of God, that he has not given unto thee what thou did'st desire."

Thus we have traced the history of prayer. History always embraces but a feeble part of the reality. It is indeed difficult to discover the heart of man. This historical study surely shows a growing conception of prayer: from the simple means of gaining worldly ends to spiritual communion.

Part II. A Study from Example.

The Middle Ages form an organic period in the life of humanity. The movement of thought was decidedly religious. These were the centuries of saints and heretics. We take for study from these centuries Saint Francis of Assisi But first we wish to give the teachings and practice of an earlier Saint, Augustine, who lived in the third century.

Saint Augustine lived in an atmosphere of prayer. He was earnest, impassioned and often spent entire nights in prayer. His prayers were frequently short, ejaculatory, as, "O Lord, may I know thee." "O Lord, may I know myself." "Licet orare quod licet desiderare." In one of his writings we find the following: "Thou did'st at that time torture me with toothache—exceeding great—I urged all my friends to pray for me to Thee. Presently we bowed our knees and

the pain departed." In his little book "On the Care of the Dead," he commends the practice of praying for the dead, though he thinks the prayers will only be a service to them.

Saint Francis of Assisi was pre-eminently the saint of the Middle Ages. The leader of the Franciscan movement, he protested against conditions: a protest against the purely contemplative life. He never occupied himself with questions of doctrine. His faith was of the moral domain, hence his prayers have more than usual interest.

To Saint Francis prayer was a necessary part of life: it was an impulse of the soul. His prayers show at once that the emphasis of his life was upon the active virtues: he petitions for strength in labor, for a mind to sacrifice, and exchanges clothes with the beggar and kisses the leper.

Of Martin Luther, Matthesius, his pupil and intimate friend, says, "He began the work of every day with prayer, according to his motto: Bene orasse est benne studuisse." (To pray well is to study well.) Concerning his own prayers in the cloister, he says, "Such prayers were not what the Holy Scriptures knows as prayers. There was no joyful communion of the soul with a reconciled and loving father. Estimated by the number and frequency, so that prayers omitted at one time could be made up at another, they were only exercises of self-mortification, whereby an attempt was made to purchase God's favor." He always kept and used the prayer book. He uttered a most remarkable prayer on his dying bed and in 1520 he anticipated the Bull against him by an address in which he said, "God cares not for much prayer, but for good prayer." In this address he also says, "Few words and much meaning is Christian; many words and little meaning is heathen." Luther believed in prayer for the sick. "The prayer of the Church works great miracles. Three persons in one day it has raised from the dead, viz., me, who have oft been mortally sick, my wife, Katie, and Philip Melanchthon, who lay sick unto death at Weimar in 1540." While prayers for the dead are without any Scriptural foundation, he is unwilling to forbid them absolutely. "For the dead, since Scripture mentions nothing concerning them, I do not consider it a sin to pray thus, or the like: 'O God, if Thou hast such relationship with souls that thou canst help them, be gracious to them,' and if this occurs once or twice, let that be enough." (Confession concerning the Lord's Supper—1528.)

Spurgeon often prayed informally: naturally and spontaneously. He was one day walking with Dr. Wayland Hoyt through a wood. They were talking together and suddenly Spurgeon said, "Let us pray," and kneeling beside a log, he prayed, as though he could not help it. (I wrote Dr. Wayland Hoyt concerning this incident and he replied that it was true as here related.)

Bishop Phillips Brooks had an exalted conception of prayer and in a statement of his theology which he formulated upon his return from study abroad while yet a young man says the following on the conception of prayer: "The revelation of Christ of the intrinsic relationship of man to God furnishes the true ground for the idea of prayer, the presence of prayer outside of Christian influence being, as in the other points mentioned above, an indication that the essential truth of Christianity is everywhere present in the world. Prayer, as Christ not merely by his practice and precept, but by his nature makes it known to us in the entire expression of loving and dependent sonship —the complete resting of the life of man upon the life of God, of child upon the Father. While petition will be included in the utterance of this, it will not be limited to petition. Confidence, love, sympathy, thankfulness, all will be part of prayer. And when petitioning comes it never will be absolute, but always conditioned on the higher knowledge and complete love of the father to whom the prayer is offered. See Lord's Prayer, "Thy will be done," and prayer in Gethsemane which is the pattern of all petitions.

In this view so called difficulties of prayer by no means disappear, but are seen to be identical with difficulties of moral life in general. They are not involved in any relation of a subordinate to a superior will, one working within the other. They do not make prayer impossible or unmeaning any more than the difficulties of free-will life make choice and action impossible or fictitious. The evidence of the reality of prayer and of its efficacy must lie not in our recognition of its specific answer, but in our assurance of the nature of the Being to whom it is offered.

III. A Study from Experiences.

To secure data for this study in the psychology of prayer the following syllabus was circulated:

1. Do you regularly feel the need of prayer? When regular, how frequent is your practice? Does this vary with Sunday or festival days?

2. If the desire to pray is periodic or occasional, when is it most imperative?
3. Have you a fixed form of prayer or does the form vary with the circumstances?
4. Is any bodily posture habitual with you in prayer? Does posture seem necessary to induce the proper mental state? Does it vary with mood: time (morning or evening): or place (solitude, family circle, cemetery, church)?
5. At what age in your life have you prayed the most, childhood or maturity?
6. What did you most frequently pray for when a child? What when you became older? (Concrete material goods or things spiritual: benefits near and immediate or remote: better disposition, firmer resolution, redeemed inward nature)?
7. Which feeling is the stronger when you are praying: dependence or communion without dependence?
8. Do you feel the presence of a higher power while you are in the act of prayer? How does this presence manifest itself: do you have any imagery or vision? Does it seem near or remote?
10. Is prayer for you chiefly: A. Confession? B. Supplication and pleading for mercy? C. The desire to find God's will, with the readiness to follow wherever it may lead?
11. What are the mental results of prayer: A. Do you get relief from confession? Have you a clearer realization of sin or fault, or is there sometimes greater confusion? C. Have you clearer realization of duty? D. Are you ever disappointed in not receiving the mental results you desire from your prayers?
12. Do you believe the results of prayer to be wholly subjective, that is, effective only in changing your outlook, vision of right and wrong, your disposition and resolution, or do you feel that external things and circumstances are changed as a direct result of prayer?
13. What do you think of praying for changes in the weather? For people who have no knowledge that you are praying for them?
14. Do you ever feel manifestations of unusual power that gives ability to accomplish ends? Do you believe this addition to your strength comes from without or is purely a manifestation of energy already latent within yourself?
15. Do you think the prayerful attitude of the mind will ever give such marked dependence upon higher power as to result in weakness to the individual?
16. Give two of the most remarkable answers to prayer that you have ever experienced.
17. Are you a member of the church? If so, of what denomination, and when did you first unite with it?
Please give age, sex, health and habits.

Inadequate as the data are in point of number replying, range of age and sex, it nevertheless is of much suggestive value.

The returns yield the following:

1. Ninety-eight per cent. of those replying state that they regularly feel the need of prayer and the majority of these pray regularly twice a day: in the morning and in the evening. Of the remaining 2% they all pray but do not feel the need of it. One says, "I say my prayers every night, but I do not always feel the need of them." Another, "It never comes from a feeling of need." The uniformity of time, morning and night, leads me to wonder if time of prayer is not regulated by habit rather than feeling of need. One says, "I believe that sometimes I pray from force of habit." Most of those replying pray most upon the Sabbath day on account of being in public worship that day, but some find greater need during the week:

"The strenuous life of the week day is very different as compared with the helpful spiritual atmosphere of Sabbath services."

2. More than 75% of those answering said that the desire to pray was periodic, but in these answers again I thought I could see that this was a habit rather than a marked desire. Of those to whom the desire to pray came occasionally it was most imperative under a great variety of conditions: At Christmas time, at Easter, when witnessing any impressive ceremony, at sacramental service, when hearing beautiful and impressive music, when some special religious work was to be done, etc. Two answers agree in the extremes of experience, that is they feel most inclined to pray when they are either "in trouble" or when "very, very happy." A number feel the need of prayer most when taking up any special and significant work, while one says: "It is most imperative after an exhausting duty or series of duties, when mind and body are very tired, or after a great deal of carelessness in spiritual things."

3. Thirty-six per cent. have no form at all, *i. e.*, in their prayers, since they have become mature, 24% claim to pray a fixed form of prayer, while the remaining 40% vary from a fixed form, according to circumstances.

4. While very few admitted that any special posture was necessary to induce the proper mental state for prayer, 46% were inclined to think that kneeling induced the proper mental state more easily.

The prejudice of a conventional bodily posture is present in many replies, and in some there is a desire to in some way atone for a lack of ability to kneel, as the following: "In my secret prayer I always sit (I am unable to kneel), but I sit with my face turned heavenward and often hold my hands above my head." Another answers, "Frequently walking is most effective. Kneeling is probably more habitual in times of relaxing; walking, when any intense personal problems are to be worked out. In morning, sitting or walking is perhaps more indulged in; at evening, kneeling."

5. Sixty-eight per cent. answer that they have prayed most at maturity but 8% answer that they have prayed most in childhood, and 20% prayed about the same in childhood as in maturity.

6. Childhood prayers were scarcely more than a form. "Cannot remember that I prayed for anything when a child except the child prayer, 'Now I lay me down to sleep,' and the Lord's Prayer, the

meaning of which was vague to me." "Rarely more than a prayer for prayer's sake as, 'Now I lay me down to sleep,' etc." "When a child my prayers were mostly just the Lord's Prayer and the little prayer, which most every child learns, 'Now I lay me down to sleep.'"

The things first prayed for after this formal stage were first, that God would keep themselves and their family from bodily harm and injury; second, material things, such as new books, privileges, etc. "One evening, just when leaving school, I tore a page in a new geography of which I thought a great deal. I placed it in the desk greatly worried, and leaving the room sadly I recalled that the teacher had taught that God could do anything, so I just prayed that he would mend my torn book. Many times that evening and the next morning I asked him in prayer to mend the page. I hastened to school early and went at once to my desk to find to my sorrow that the leaf was still torn."

Seventy-three per cent. of answers characterize the prayers of maturity as prayers for spiritual things: *i. e.*, better disposition, firmer resolution, and redeemed inward nature.

7. To 66% of those answering these questions, Dependence was the stronger feeling while engaged in prayer, and to 22% Communion was the stronger; 12% answered that the two were so intimately and closely blended that they could not tell which was the stronger.

8. Nearly 70% state that they feel the presence of a higher power while in the act of praying. To some this presence is as a vision. "I always feel a divine presence and this divine presence manifests itself to me as a divine person at my side. Sometimes this divine presence seems as if it were a great ways off, but I never feel satisfied until I feel that it is very near me." "On a very few occasions I have had vivid imagery of the presence of Christ, and in one instance that I recall a clear voice (born, of course, out of my perplexity)." "A vision but do not know if it is a higher power or imagination."

9. Many feel this presence but have no vision or imagery. One recognizes its presence by being melted to tears. "Sometimes this presence seems very near as though a very dear friend were placing his hand on my head and trying to comfort me, but yet I have nc vision." "Manifest by a thrill similar to that caused by a strain of beautiful music or picture." "It might be called a mental image, *i. e.*, an abstraction, there is nothing concrete about it." "Feel its existence

rather than its presence." "I often feel the presence of a Higher Power while in the act of prayer, but it seems to me more like the very best thing in my own nature rather than anything external."

10. Confession 19%.

Supplication and pleading for mercy 9%.

Desire to find God's will, with the readiness to follow wherever it may lead, 72%.

11. But two answers did not admit that there was relief in confession, and one of these said, "there is no confession in my prayers." A very few indeed realized their sin and faults more vividly after prayer, but to most the marked mental result of prayer was the clearer realization of duty. Very few were ever disappointed in not receiving the mental results they anticipated from prayer for a willingness to accept any result was a part of the prayer itself.

12. Eighty-three per cent. believe the results of prayer to be wholly subjective; 12% believe that results are both subjective and objective. While there are but 5% who believe that the results of prayer are mostly objective, some of this class are very dogmatic. "I know that external things and circumstances are brought to pass or changed as direct result of prayer." "In all my reasonings on the subject I believe the results of prayer to be wholly subjective, and yet sometimes when I want things very much I feel like praying for them, although I may feel at the same time that it is no use." "I do not believe the results of prayer are wholly objective. Prayer certainly changes the outlook, vision of right and wrong, disposition, and resolution, because it is such an intense mental occupation backed up by the emotions."

13. Over 75% are very positive in their conviction that it is always a mistake to pray for a change in the weather. The other 25% have a variety of convictions or none at all. "Ordinarily I think it would have no result. I can conceive of a case where the welfare of a great movement or the extension of God's kingdom might depend upon such providential guidance. In such case I think prayer would be efficacious." "I believe the will of God manifests itself very noticeably in a universal longing." "I believe God wants us to realize our dependence upon him, and I think he sometimes withholds rain to make us ask for it."

Most of the answers practice the second form of prayer: praying for people who have no knowledge that you are praying for them.

" Of no avail except in so far as it may change your attitude toward them."

14. Most every answerer feels the manifestation of unusual power which gives ability to accomplish ends. They are about equally divided as to whether this added strength comes from without or if it is purely a manifestation of energy already latent within one. " Yes, I feel the help of God to accomplish an end. I believe the power is latent and trust in the Divine is the stimulus that sets it off." " Why should not the God life stimulate the latent energy?" " I believe that I get extraordinary power for extraordinary purposes. I believe God gives us this power through our latent energies."

15. About two-thirds answer this question no, but some are very emphatic with their yes. " It might be possible to become overly self-reflective, introspective, through too much prayer." " Yes, the same as continually borrowing money to save working will weaken one's credit."

16. Comparatively few have ever had remarkable answers to prayers, and where they are given they are mostly in connection with their own " conversion," of the " conversion " of Sunday School pupils, members of their family or friends.

One mentions physical healing. One the taking away of a vicious temper. One the surrender of a large number of college men to Christ. " I found myself confronted in an important college visit by a most distressing series of unfortunate circumstances and events. Past experience in the field made me aware of my utter futility. I addressed myself to careful prayer and hard work. The situation was untangled in a really remarkable way. I cannot account for it except by providential guidance."

Among the answers there was but one that bordered on the miraculous. " Father was absent from home ; mother and we children were in the little log cabin when a terrific storm swept over us. We knelt and prayed that the cyclone would not wreck our home and destroy our lives. When the storm subsided we found that the barn, a much stronger structure, was swept away, and the house not harmed, and that when it stood in the path of the storm and in position that the storm would strike it before it would the barn and other buildings which were destroyed. I cannot but believe that this was a providential answer to prayer."

These answers, together with parts I and II of the study, indicate a conclusion or two, and the following may be at least tentatively suggested:

(In making these suggestions I wish to admit the difficulty in studying prayer by this method. The objects of experience are of so intimate a nature, so close to the subject who observes that they are not accessible entirely to objective appreciation.)

1. The experimental method cannot completely solve the question as to whether the answer to a petition comes from a superior force of energy (God) as cause and effect, or is but the reflex effect upon the one who prays. It would require the testimony of God to establish this beyond a peradventure.

2. Prayer is the complement of work. It is a mode of correspondence with God, as is any intelligent labor.

3. Thus the same speculative difficulties can be raised against prayer as are raised against work: if God intends certain goods for us why does he not give them without our labor, etc.

4. Prayer is borrowing from the general energy or from God, the centre of energy. Thus prayer is not the cause of God's blessing but the occasion of the same.

5. The essential fact of prayer, considered from its objective side, is personality. It is the touch between life and life; our life enters into communion with the larger, exhaustless life. Not life in contact with a machine or a system of law, but a personality, God. This makes God the source of Divine blessing.

6. In this study I have been again impressed with the unconventional and extreme replies of some. These are types, and from their own statements concerning their health and habits I am inclined to regard condition pathological. You must have sound eyes to see straight; steady nerves to measure exactly. Soundness of body and mind is scientifically essential to prevent bias and impartiality.

LITERATURE.

Education in Religion and Morals, by GEORGE ALBERT COE, Ph. D. John Evans, Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in Northwestern University. Fleming H. Revell Company, 1904. pp. 434.

The aim of this book, in the words of the preface, is "to bring the broadest philosophy of education into the closest relation to practice; to show how principles lead directly to methods, and so to strike the golden mean between unpractical theorizing and mere routine."

The fulfillment of this aim is divided into four parts: the first, "The Theory," occupying nearly half of the book; the second, "The Child," occupying four chapters, and devoted to the development of the religious impulse; the third, "Institutions," occupying five chapters, and considering the family, the Sunday School, young people's societies and clubs, academies and colleges, and State schools; and the fourth, "The Perspective," occupying two chapters, and discussing the past attitude of the church toward the child, and the present problem of religious education. The whole is written in a series of numbered and annotated sections, permitting easy reference and reading, and is provided with a table of contents, fifteen pages of valuable selected and classified bibliographies, and a serviceable index. The volume is attractively bound, light, and barring a number of typographical errors, well printed. The style is easy, the composition of the whole good, and the interest compelling.

To follow briefly the course of the argument:

Considering the place of character in education, the author finds education to be ethical in both end and process,—"education is any effort to assist the development of an immature human being toward the proper goal of life."

Religious education is necessary to develop the religious nature, to transmit the religious history of the race, and to adjust the race to its divine environment.

The three agents in education are God, nature, and man; of these three God is the real teacher, parents and teachers having from Him their divine vocation, and carrying forward what God in nature has already begun. "And what a vocation is this of parents and teachers! In their hands as in no others lie the reins of the chariot of God."

"The Christian view of childhood" is essential in the whole discussion. Jesus found the life of children bright and wholesome, and assigned His kingdom to them, not in a typical but a real sense. "Normal child development, then, takes place entirely within the kingdom of grace." Conversion is not a step into, but within, the Christian life. Children should be taught that they are already children of God. The doctrine of total depravity is no longer held to-day,—it would contradict the whole procedure of religious education. With Horace Bushnell, let us say, "the child should grow up a Christian and never know himself as being otherwise." True, the child has unlovely impulses, traces of his animal ancestry, but it is also natural that he should win his human traits. As to religion, the

child's nature is neither negative, nor neutral, but positive. The "new birth" is properly life "from above," which the child always has and ought never to lose.

A fine summary of the modern movement in education, in contrast with the mediæval, is given, indicating also the necessity of authority in all education or "the self-expression of our higher nature."

Religion and modern education are related to each other in one sense as theory to practice,—"the modern educational movement as a whole has consisted in the working out of certain pedagogical aspects of Christian belief."

Education is a development of live beings and persons. "The best thing that can happen to any child is to have the means of living his own life completely at each stage." The means must be free self-expression and the end must be a personality knowing itself and controlling itself.

Common mistakes in punishment are considered in contrast with the true practical aim of bringing the child to realize "that his deeper will is in harmony with the hand that chastises," that he is really punishing himself. The play impulse of children must also become a part of religious education and Christ must be presented as the master of the playground.

Reality in the form of habit and insight, must precede the symbol in the form of belief or picture, but the symbol is necessary.

After all, the great forces in education are personal and social; suggestion, imitation, and free self-conscious choice tell the story. "The one prime essential for moral and religious education is that the young should live a common life with moral and religious elders."

Seventy pages are devoted to the normal method of growth of the religious impulse in children. An analysis of the primitive religious impulse permits us to describe it as "the progressive unification of the man with himself, his fellows, nature, and all that is," involving the sense of dependence, the essentials of the ideal self, the need of God, and anthropomorphism. In the race and the child, religion begins with the beginning of experience.

The religious impulse develops primarily from within and secondarily through contact with religion. The sense of dependence is manifested toward parents,—the earliest stage of the religious impulse in the child. "'I don't need to pray to-night,' said a little child, 'for papa is going to sleep with me.'"

Then follow in succession the idealizing impulse, conscience and the sense of law, and the adolescent acceptance of God.

The periods of infancy, childhood, and adolescence are analyzed with care in the light of modern knowledge, and specific recommendations are made for religious training in each step of development. These pages are a manual for all religious teachers, to be read and re-read for guidance in dealing with specific cases. In them appear brief pointed discussions on the imagination, the expressive activities, "gangs," the sex question, athletics, hero-worship, the age of conversion, the sentiments, emotional crises, morbidness, adolescent doubts, and the spiritual value of human love.

Coming to the discussion of "Institutions," it is to be noted that family training has declined, because of our transitional era of culture from repression to spontaneous methods, our new industrial conditions, city-life, and the tendency to luxury. The family is really a moral and religious community, in which the child's character grows, not by mere conformity but by exercising the functions of a member. Home training may be improved by recognizing the family as an edu-

cational institution, by sufficiently simplifying interests to secure family companionship, by joint home occupations, by the re-establishment of regular family devotions, by specific home instruction in the truths of religion, and by making the family the unit of church membership.

The Sunday School occupies a long chapter, and one of the most serviceable of all. The church itself is a school, whose head should be an expert leader, one of whose departments is the Sunday School. The aim of the Sunday School is "the normal development of the life of its pupils." A useful outline of study is suggested for the teacher's training class, to include a general introduction to the Bible. Both pupils and lessons should be graded according to the periods of mental development. Four modern specimens of the Sunday School curriculum are presented in parallel columns. But our hope is not so much in the curriculum, important as this is, or in the use that is made of it by vital teachers, filling it in with interesting material, correlating it with week-day studies and occupations. Their proper places are assigned to the materials for impression and expression, decision-day, and catechetics.

The Young People's societies receive approbation for their emphasis on the social and expressive impulses, and their wholesome occupation of time that might otherwise be misused; they also receive several needed strictures,—the educational idea has been neglected through immature leadership, the proper age limits have not always been noted (a little girl of seven advertised as leading the devotional service in a junior rally!), and their vows and pledges contradict "the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free from legalism." The multiplication of organizations demands a unification of the forces by the church, whereby the junior and intermediate societies might be provided for in the Sunday School.

The Christian colleges and academies cannot afford to slight their educational work in the supposed interest of religion, or be partisan in any way. On the other hand, they must not forget, as they tend to do, that true education implies religion. In short, the religious college must recognize the unity of education. Its students must have a quickened sense of a divine mission to perform in society, the means to which are instruction, worship, and philanthropic work. There is considerable confusion at present as to the question of religion in the State schools. The next move forward is not faultfinding, nor restoring the Bible to the schools, nor the formal teaching of religion, but better education in home and church, and closer acquaintance between these and the school. The last needs only to take religion for granted, all public school teachers, of whatsoever faith, being a positive religious influence in their lives.

"The Perspective" shows the history of the attitude of the church toward the child in the past, from the intimacy between them in ancient Israel to the mediæval aloofness of the church and to the modern growing return to the child. The church has failed whenever any mechanism took the place of vitality, and has succeeded because her life has always been deeper than her machinery.

The concluding thoughts are that education demands the historical method of Bible study in order to put the concrete before the abstract; that education in religion which is constructive, not the revival which is remedial, is the chief means of saving the world; that the social problems can be solved only by developing the social sense in the young; and that "the historic Christ is the supreme Educator."

In reading through the whole discussion a number of noticeable features appear which a summary cannot show. A vein of conciliation between old and new views

runs through the whole; *e. g.*, the organic unity of mind and body in the present life is defended from Paul's conception that the soul has a body in the future life (p. 101).

Educational tendencies are related throughout with social and historic movements, the gospel of freedom in education being correlated, for example, with the political doctrine of freedom in the State (p. 132).

The simplicity of truth, not the confussion of argument, appears on every page, as, for example, in the treatment of the difficult matter of using wonder stories with children, and of answering the child's question aright.

Fine taste is everywhere evident, as in the relegation of the sex question to a footnote.

All the leading pertinent problems seem to have fallen under the author's comprehensive review, the parochial school problem, for example, receiving a full discussion.

The utilization of all educational material for religious purposes appears, *e. g.*, manual training,—in keeping with the author's fundamental idea that right education as such is religious.

The great point seems to be, true education is the sharing of life. This principle enthrones the teacher above any mechanical methods, and even permits us to call Jesus Saviour because he was teacher.

Religion as here presented becomes a convincing reality, and the principles by which it is to be developed in the souls of children rest upon modern knowledge of the nature of children and upon a broad philosophical foundation.

Some of these principles of Professor Coe may be here set down. Education is a unity; religious and moral education are education, not a thing apart; religious education is essentially a growth, not the safe passing of a crisis; all education is mature life showing immature life; education is by expression, not impression, nor suppression; the home is the place to begin; the church needs to unify all its educational agencies under expert leadership; the school needs not formal religious instruction but vital religious teachers; life is primary, belief is secondary, but necessary; habit first, then definition; the reality in religion before the symbol; the kingdom of God can come only by the education of youth.

The social background for such a broad, liberal and unifying treatment as this is found in two large and insistent American demands to-day, viz., that religion shall be educational, and that education shall be religious. Neither of these demands is to be interpreted narrowly, religion is not to transform itself into education, nor is education to cease being educational in becoming religious. Rather, religion must bring up to par its educational work, and education must be inspired by the indwelling presence of the religious spirit.

These demands are expressing themselves through newly organized societies, for the promotion of religious education, through the establishment of journals of religious pedagogy, through the opening of schools for the training of teachers of religion, through the introduction into theological seminaries of departments of education, and are re-echoed through the columns of the public press, and articles in magazines.

The whole movement may be regarded as a part of the practical evangelism of the new theology. It is the new bottles for the new wine. It should give confidence to all those who feared the foundations were giving way with the historical and critical movement of modern scholarship. The modern scholar is essentially a

builder. And the truth underlying the whole practical movement for religious education augurs well for a present rapider pace toward the establishment of the kingdom among men.

Toward this end Professor Coe's books, and this one in particular, are a great aid. "Education in Religion and Morals" may deservedly become a widely circulated text of the new movement. His aim, "to bring the broadest philosophy of education into the closest relation to practice," is indeed high, and I cannot but pronounce it to have been well attained. The book gathers up, arranges, adds to, and applies, the best modern results in religious pedagogy. It has made the present reviewer a better parent and teacher,—I should think it might also do the same for a minister, giving as it does a new comprehensiveness to the conception of religious education and to the religious nature of the child. A certain sanity and directness characterize the whole. The positions taken are constructive and definite, and an independent attitude is maintained toward all the current pedagogical principles, often with a critical revision, as in the case of the "recapitulation" theory.

The whole is philosophical, yet there is no philosophizing. The author's philosophy, like his religion, is a presupposition of his thiuking. There are no elaborated definitions of religion, morality, God. The whole is concrete, its philosophy and its religion appear only at work. "Morals are not religion, and religion is not morals; nevertheless fullgrown religion includes morals" (p. 7),—that is all. Yet one feels there is a great deal in reserve that could be said in defense of any position brought in question.

The book has in part the defect of its virtues. Given its title, one expects rather more attention to moral education than is given. The reader, if the theoretical impulse is strong in him, may also wish for at least one paragraph in which Professor Coe should frame for us a modern tenable conception of God,— a conception that can underlie and interpret all our busy practicality. "The broadest philosophy of education," which he aims to apply, must include so much. But it is evident that the author is so intent on the realities that he does not stop to define them, and this to most readers will be welcome. Again, if education *is* identical with religious education, which is the foundation of the book, there is danger lest every educator consider his work religious as it is, without *making* it so. That is, the discussion does not make it quite clear that the unity of education is an *ideal*, not an actuality.

For the sake of completeness one may naturally desire discussions of the formal method of religious teaching, and of the effect of the state and business upon morals. But for this book we are grateful to the author for what he has done instead of censuring him for not doing more.

A few of the obvious typographical errors may be appended, "deveyoping" (p. 143); "reflectve" (p. 153); "overage" (p. 228); "atendance" (p. 307); "adolesence" (p. 310); "worhip" (p. 328); "entaglements" (p. 381).

Hanover, N. H. H. H. Horne.

The Philosophy of the Movement for Religious Education,[1] by Geo. A. Coe.

The purpose of this article is to show the philosophical ideas implied in the present widespread practical movement for religious education.

[1] The American Journal of Theology, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 225-239.

Religious education is also education, and consequently the philosophy of education in general includes the philosophy of religious education in particular. In education to-day man is conceived as a continuous part of the world, and at the same time as acting for ends; so education presupposes a teleological view of the world.

Again, education implies the metaphysical theory of "personal idealism," for "the modern school reform is essentially an effort practically to fuse together nature, culture, and society," which is a reasonable undertaking "if reality is a society having the grandest of its unity in a universal person." The relation here between this metaphysical position and education seems a little strained, or it may only need further elucidation from the author.

Also, contemporary emphasis in education are, or, better, ought to be, on the ultimate spirituality of the practical and the practicality of the spiritual, thereby implying the doctrine of the immanence of God. Here, it is rather philosophy saying what education ought to be than education leading the way to philosophy.

Education touches modern psychology at several points; in rejecting "faculties," in using its laws of mental development, in emphasizing voluntarism as against intellectualism, and in adopting the evolutionary point of view, thereby revising the doctrine of depravity in favor of the category of "becoming" for the child. Incidentally the author suggests a much needed caution against regarding education as simply applied psychology; "education is the communication of life."

With the ethical revival of recent years religious education finds itself somewhat in conflict, for "ethics independent of religion is in fashion," while "moral education can complete itself only in religion."

The affiliation of religious education with the recent philosophy of religion is much closer,—the history of religion is itself a vast educational process; religious education is natural from birth since God reveals himself progressively in the developing consciousness of man; and also, epistemologically, any knowledge which education can give really implies the divine Presence.

Religious education and the philosophy of Christianity are even more closely at one, for they have the same foundation, the sharing of life by higher life. "Thus we reach our final and highest conception of religious education, namely, that it is God's self-communication through Christ and through Christly men and women."

Professor Coe thus clearly and comprehensively relates the movement for religious education to the current philosophical tendencies. Omissions that might doubtless have been profitably supplied are the relations of æsthetics, and "pragmatism," to religious education. The undertaking, itself, to see the bottom of a practical social movement fraught with so much significance and importance, must commend itself to all thorough thinkers. H. H. Horne.

Hanover, N. H.

The Relations of the Young Men's Christian Association Movement to the Boy, and *The Work of a Boy's Department in a Young Men's Christian Association*, by George A. Coe, Ph. D. Published by the Secretarial Institute and Training School of The Young Men's Christian Association, Chicago, 1902. pp. 45.

These are two addresses read before the Fifth Annual Conference of Volunteer Workers in City, Town, and Railroad Young Men's Christian Associations, Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, August, 1902. In the first address the author discusses the topics, "Why should Young Men's Christian Associations assume responsibility

with respect to boys?" and "What it means to bring boys to Christ." He points out that there is a relative decrease of direct evangelism in the Y. M. C. A., that formative agencies guided by religious aims are taking its place, that the years from twelve to eighteen are the most favorable for molding the life of young men, that boys are qualitatively different from men and must therefore be differently approached, that religious training should be a training *in* religion and not merely a training *for* religion, and that such training may best proceed not from the point of view of innate depravity but of innate grace. In the second address, the author discusses "Some principles of modern education in their application to Boys' departments," "The mind of an adolescent boy," and "Methods of work." Here are presented the unity of the educational process, relation of Y. M. C. A. work to other educational agencies, education as a means of self-expression, gradation of boys' work, qualities of the adolescent, boys' games and interests, development of self-government in boys, boys' leaders, etc., etc.

These addresses combine in an admirable way scientific insight and practical grasp of the needs of workers among boys. They should prove helpful to all those who are trying to ground the religious training of boys in the principles of life which modern science is bringing so clearly to light. GEO. E. DAWSON.

The Spiritual Life, Studies in the Science of Religion, by Professor GEORGE A. COE, Ph. D., of Northwestern University. New York and Cincinnati, 1900.

There are two features of this volume, which is now deservedly well known, that commend it for discussion in this *Journal*. The first is that it is the chief repository of Professor Coe's strictly scientific work in the study of religion; the other is that he not only illustrates in the volume, but criticises, the methodology of the psychology of religion.

The most imposing of the facts established is that the characteristics of religious experience are conditioned by "natural" physiological and psychological factors, chiefest among which are temperament and suggestion. That the varieties of religious experience are a function of temperament is demonstrated with the nicety of a scientific proof. The method by which it was ascertained is a good instance of painstaking scientific procedure. The well known and (for most problems) questionable questionnaire method was supplemented in various ways. "First, personal interviews were had with a large proportion of the persons examined. Second, a large proportion of the subjects were placed under careful scrutiny by myself and others, with a view to securing objective evidence as to temperament. Third, interviews were had with friends and acquaintances of certain of the persons under examination. Finally, in order to get at the facts of suggestibility, hypnotic experiments were made upon all the important cases that were accessible" (p. 109). In order to surround the subject completely, the study was wisely limited to the question of the attainment, or failure to attain, a sudden religious transformation. What are the conditions, — of temperament, of expectancy, of suggestibility and the like — which determine the attainment of such an experience, or disappointment in the presence of entire anticipation of the change, and what determines the degree of abruptness of the transformation? Temperament, which was found to be an important element, was classified in two different ways: first, as to whether sensibility, intellect or will seemed to be the most important constituent in the life processes of the person studied; and secondly, a classification combining, somewhat, the conventional fourfold grouping and the Wundtian analysis in terms of promptness and intensity of response. It is found that those persons who expect a

striking transformation and succeed in attaining it, have, with almost no exception, sensibility distinctly predominant, are either prompt-weak (sanguine) or slow-intense (melancholic), are subject to motor-automatisms and hallucinations, and under hypnotic suggestion are of the passive type. Correspondingly, those who expected a striking transformation and failed to experience it are those, for the most part, in whom intellect was predominant, are prompt-intense (choleric), are not subject to automatisms and hallucinations, and under hypnotic suggestion, are of the spontaneous auto-suggestible type. This conclusion is as important and far-reaching as it is unequivocal. "'Would you cast the horoscope of a human life,' says Fouillée, 'do not study the conjunction of the stars but those of the (bodily) organs.' Similarly we may now add," says Coe, "would you understand the emotional aspects of religious experience? Do not ascribe them to the inscrutible ways of God, but to ascertainable differences in men's mental constitutions; do not theorize about divine grace, but study the hidden workings of the human mind."

Having established so clearly and unquestionably his facts from exhaustive study of concrete instances, Professor Coe has a vantage ground, in the rest of the volume, from which to approach, with a high degree of conviction, the phenomena of trance, visions, suggestion in religious meetings, and various kindred phenomena as they have shown themselves historically and in recent times. Chapter 4 is devoted to the topic of "Divine Healing." Both the wisdom and the folly of a narrow cult are made to appear in the light of more basal mental and spiritual laws.

The closing chapter, an extremely vital one, is on "Spirituality." It is shown how "the religion of Christ has been warped into special temperamental forms. What Jesus made so broad has been narrowed down to fit a particular kind of men, and temperamental differences have been mistaken for grades of spirituality. More than justice has been done to the melancholic and sanguine temperaments and less than justice to the choleric." (p. 206.)

An analysis of the experiences of St. Anthony, St. Francis of Assisi and Augustine lead to the conclusion that feeling is the predominant quality, according to conventional standards, of sainthood. "The typical saint is the one who feels most, who has great fervor in prayer, or a permanent mood of calm truthfulness, or ecstatic communion with the divine, or great billows of triumphant joy. Before such experiences can be common or characteristic there must be present, first of all, a mental organization of a particular kind." (p. 213.)

A similar truth appears from an analysis that Professor Coe has made of the matter contained in the Methodist Hymnal. He classifies the hymns on the basis of the number that have for their theme Christian activity and service viewed in a disinterested or "objective" way. Only 17 out of the 1,117 "take up the problems of the every-day activities of the adult Christian in this spirit." (p. 226.) The greatest unfulfilled need is that of the "dynamics of a poetry of active love."

A discussion of the temperamental differences of the sexes and of their corresponding differences in religious experiences shows that in women sensibility is more predominant, emotion is more constant and diffused, they are more suggestible, and passive virtues are more prominent than in men. "The persistent excess of women in the churches is chiefly due to a superior adaptation of church life to the female nature" (p. 247).

These conclusions are of imposing significance and they ought to be revolutionary in respect to the dominant notes that are sounded in religion. The author rightly proclaims: "The spiritual conceit of the melancholic temperament must be

resisted. The spiritual trivialities of the sanguine must be transcended. The spirituality of the moral will and of the truth-loving intellect must be not merely conceded, but preceded, insisted upon, gloried in. This is the foundation upon which the rebuilding must proceed " (p. 251).

It is one of the triumphs of the present time that religion is becoming not only practically efficient but self-critical. There can be no doubt that, in its childlike way of taking whatever happens as being *objectively* true, it has been placing on many of its conceits and mere accidents of temperament, the value of divine reality. This volume should be known and pondered by every man who regards his own self-perfecting as part of the divine plan and especially by those who, by profession, direct the destinies of their fellow-beings.

Chapters I and II, though less original, are, nevertheless, valuable. The first chapter, on "Religious Awakening," confirms the peculiarities in respect to the distribution of the age of conversion during the teens that had already been established in so far as the data were adequate. With the accumulation of evidence it tends to settle into the certainty of a law that among men, awakenings occur most frequently at 16 and 17 and that there are two other somewhat less likely periods at the very beginning and end of the teens with two quiescent periods between the three peaks of frequency.

Chapter II, on "Adolescent Difficulties," is acute in its psychological analysis, but is especially good in its sane and frank treatment of adolescent temptations.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

The Web of Indian Life, by the SISTER NIVEDITA. London, 1904. pp. 301.

The authoress, Miss Margaret Noble, is a young Irish girl, whose life, if ever it is adequately prepared and published will be a most valuable contribution to the literature of Psychology, and probably one of the most fascinating and romantic accounts of the development of a human soul that can be found in the biographical records of any time or people.

The book is an attempt, and a remarkably successful one, to set forth for English readers a brief, but careful and accurate analysis of the underlying motives and the ideals which form the cultural basis of Hindu society to-day together with suggestions for a new view point and for the construction of a new synthesis, in harmony with, and along the lines of, civilizational growth and development, which, whilst recognizing the necessity and desirability of a European or Western contribution or supplement, pleads for the preservation, cultivation and continuity of those basic and elemental conceptions now in danger of being lost or destroyed through the dominance of the foreigner. These influences, which have shaped the past and laid the foundations of moral and religious enfranchisement in the East have also entered unconsciously and organically into the thought of the West and are even now helping to rejuvenate our science and our art, our education and our philosophy, at the very moment when the rightful heirs are parting with the essentials of their heritage and making their own further advance impossible.

The chapter on the "Oriental Woman" gives an excellent analysis of some of these anti-social forces now tending to destroy the most valuable elements of the old civilization of India, especially as these affect the home and the national character. The use of common soaps manufactured in Europe instead of native earths and oils, which exercised no injurious action on the skin, the introduction of kerosene oil and the substitution of chairs for mats, etc., are noted as amongst the signs

of a decay of the national taste and judgment, and marking the loss of those high standards of living reached through many generations of human toil and effort, and of adjustment to environmental conditions, which, therefore, had become a part of the mental heredity of the people, the result of racial growth and acquirement.

India to-day is thus becoming more and more a host and a parasite of European merchants, because these civilizational changes are not the result of, nor accompanied by growth from within, or concomitant with the development of the old national conceptions, but are the result of conditions and forces imposed from without. The chapter closes with a fine declaration and an appeal to the best interests of Indian womanhood.

But it is certain that woman, with her determinately synthetic interests, will refuse long to be balked of her right to consider things as a whole. The interest of the mother is ever with the future. Women will readily understand that a single generation of accomplished defeat is sufficient to divorce a whole race from its patrimony, and she will determine, and effectively determine, that the lot of her own sons shall be victory, and not surrender.

And if once the Oriental woman seize the helm of the ship in this fashion, solving the problems of her whole country, whom is it suggested that she shall afterwards petition for the redress of her own grievances?

The enormously far reaching and benign influence of woman in the development of the best and highest instincts of the race is well brought out in the early chapters of Miss Noble's book, deeply embedded in the national and the religious consciousness of India, and expressed as these concepts are in the Sacred writings, which the chapters on the Indian Sagas, A Study of Indian Caste, and a Synthesis of Indian Thought bring to the comprehension of the ordinary reader with a clear insight and an appreciation of the underlying meaning and the significance of the creative genius of these wonderful Eastern peoples, coupled with such a masterly analysis of the philosophy and the religious ideals revealed in these old documents that has probably never before been put into the compass of less than one hundred pages of ordinary type; enabling any one, even without effort or special knowledge, in the space of an hour or so to clearly grasp the essentials of Eastern Psychology, and at once puts one into sympathetic relations with the best elements of Hindu culture.

The reader is taken by Miss Noble, almost without effort, through these subtleties, and along the road which has hitherto been unfamiliar or entirely closed to him, owing to the barriers raised by Western scholarship, which has succeeded only in losing itself in the jungle of Indian mysticism and symbolism, perhaps through the want of those inner and sympathetic relations and the real "endeavor to understand" which Miss Noble has brought to her task, qualifications which with her Western birth and education, have fitted her, more than the possession of other gifts, to be the interpreter of the real mind of her beloved East to the unimaginative, "practical" English or American reader.

The concluding paragraphs of chapter X, in so far as the judgment is just, show us that we may still gather materials for our own thought and guidance, not only in philosophy and religion, but for social direction, and that the East to-day has its contribution to offer us, rich as the past has been, and deeply indebted as we are to it already for some of the truest and wisest elements in the structure of Western thought and civilization. The Western mind has hitherto been unconscious of this indebtedness to India, and even yet misunderstands or is still ignorant of its

obligation or of the value of what India has given and still more of what it has to offer. Such a book as the one before us will help to bring East and West together and so help to secure that due understanding and establish such relations between the two as will do more than anything else, at this juncture in the world's affairs, to promote the highest interests and the onward march of humanity.

Whatever knowledge of Eastern thought and culture one may possess, the book must be of special interest to the student of education or psychology, both on account of the unique point of view and the entirely new interpretation of the East which Miss Noble offers us here. This is emphasized when we consider that it comes from a soul whose yet unknown depths have been sounded, undreamt of capacities awakened, perfect freedom and peace secured, which has in the short space of four or five years developed and blossomed to a power of utterance and an eloquence almost phenomenal under the influences brought to bear upon it by Eastern culture and surroundings, embraced with hungry and almost passionate longing, after many attempts and failures to find a home or a shelter with Western thought and aspirations, as voiced at the close of the last century by the high priests of science and religion.

Throughout the volume the fine, nervous, English style, powerful diction, ease, grace and felicity of expression arouse and sustain admiration, and, whatever our attitude may be towards Eastern mysticism, these unusual qualities compel us to recognize that we have here a genuine work of art of high rank, and possessing claims to be placed with our permanent literature. J. C. Hudson, London.

Tales from Old Fiji, by Lorimer Fison. London, 1904. pp. 175.

In this interesting volume the author has sought to rescue the knowledge of a fancying people who unite the character of childhood with the passions and strength of men. To those who know them slightly there is much of the simplicity and even of the amiability of childhood about them, but beneath this exterior there is also, too often, a horror of both cruelty and filth. In many a house where babe and mother slept and children played there were within hand-reach underground skeletons embracing the corner posts; for with every new building, and indeed with every new venture, human victims must be sacrificed. Fison gives a large number of words, the meaning of which seems innocent on the surface, but which really designate indescribable practices. For instance, thotho, the word for "grass" reduplicated, has as its fearful secondary meaning the strangled women with whose bodies the bottom of the grave for the dead chief is carpeted. Lango means logs in a row, but these rollers, on which in a war canoes were launched, were often the bodies of men. Another word meaning "the bird of the sail" is really a child suspended by one foot from the end of the gaff when canoes returned from successful raids. A word meaning trust flag once meant a man baked whole by processes described elaborately and which were too often actually put in practice. The young warrior is of no account until he has killed a human being, and it is greatly to his credit and there is no thought of cowardice in stealing into a tent by night and slaying a sleeping woman or even child. Some killed their dearest friends treacherously, in order to coroi, which is a kind of title or degree applied to murderers. Argument with them against this custom they meet very calmly, but it has no effect whatever.

The author holds that "man is a carnivorous animal, whatever the vegetarians may say." While he admits that it cannot be conclusively proven that cannibalism arose out of flesh hunger, he believes that his facts pave the way for such a theory.

Long continued diet on fruit, vegetables, fish, sometimes seems to give an almost irresistible craving for flesh. It is, however, carefully explained that where children were eaten, it was not those of their own tribe, but children of other towns exchanged for their own.

The body of the book is devoted to many interesting stories which have been collected and are literally reproduced and translated.

Votive und Weilegaben des katholischen Volks in Süddeutschland, von RICHARD ANDREE. Friedrich Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig, 1904. pp. 191.

The author's wife, to whom this work is dedicated, had for many years made collections of south German votive offerings, and here they are described with many cuts in the text and 32 full-page tables at the end. First, consecrated gifts in general are described, together with their motives, both in ancient and modern times, how they were affected by the agrarian character of culture and by the Catholic feeling for patron saints. Often polytheistic traits stand out very clearly. Some saints with power over disease and in other extremities have been created by the people without the sanction of the church; many pilgrim chapels and sacred fountains, with market stalls, great pilgrimages and the motives thereto, railroad tickets to heaven, the power of pictures, healing waters for headache, dumbness, etc., pilgrimage as an ascetic act, often connected with the carrying of a cross, chain, creeping on the knees without clothing and its relations to fasting. Many of these offerings even show the popular feeling toward the protective patrons of domestic animals. Saint Leonard in all this plays a very important rôle in south Germany. His statue at Kundl and Tamsweg was miraculous. He had many healing functions, presided over birth and was the friend of prisoners and of the insane. Some of his altars gave the right of asylum, and the method of protection was minutely prescribed. The processions in his honor were very numerous. His offerings, first animals themselves, were then images of the same, especially cast in iron, but later in the form of edibles. His churches were often entirely encompassed by a great chain, horseshoes, and countless wax offerings were his. The technique of performing some of these ceremonies is described. Indeed, there were idols and even phallic figures significant of cure of disease. The various parts of the body helped were cast in iron and offered to him—the lungs, heart, mouth, intestines, limbs, and so on. The offering of living animals, even of horses, persisted into the seventeenth century. Later the animals could be ransomed by purchase. Then they were cast in metal. Even bees played a somewhat important rôle here, as did hammers, anchors, houses, dress, crops, butter, etc. In some places there seems to have been special predilection in painting the votive offerings. Among this list we find trophies of war, offerings of hair, crude imitations of wounds and sores, bandages, ear pendants, spoons, jewels, etc. The last chapter is devoted to the story of the gradual decline, and, in some cases, the sale, burning and burial of these offerings.

La Magie dans l'Inde Antique, par VICTOR HENRY. Dujarric & Co., Paris, 1904. pp. 286.

Here we have an interesting treatise not, to be sure, based upon original documents, but from a very copious use of publications on India in European languages. The author first compiles the general ideas of Hindu magic from Vedic times, as to the operators, operations, beneficiaries, ingredients and accessories. Under divination he treats the arts that determine or influence posterity, involve temporary pre-

vision concerning the issue of combats, the finding of lost objects, and spurious divination. There were many sacraments, ceremonies and amulets that wrought as charms to produce long life; others that concerned sex, dealing with love, marriage, rivalry, constancy, reconciliation, virility, fecundity, pregnancy and birth; others dealing with war and peace. There were many anti-demoniac rites, such as exorcisms and reprisals. Very copious, of course, were charms, curative of fever, worms, skin troubles, wounds, hemorrhages, vermin, chronic and hereditary troubles, etc. Expiatory rites, although not so numerous, are well developed and clearly appear even in antiquity. Finally, under black magic, the author treats of demoniac liturgies, imprecations, oaths, vows, sorcery, etc., and ends with certain conclusions concerning the relations of magic to myth, religion and science. This he deems to have been very close.

Der Ursprung des Harlekin, von OTTO DRIESEN. Alexander Duncker, Berlin, 1904. pp. 286.

This culture history problem connected with the origin of the harlequin is treated here in a large and essentially historical way, with seventeen illustrations. The author is unable to decide whether the word is of Italian or French origin, but inclines to the view that it is the latter. Probably the harlequin people were originally comic demons which were made objects of mimetic presentation. They were related to the hell of the old religious theatre, and it was only slowly that the devil in grotesque human form appeared upon the comic stage. There were often many under a chief, and the dramatic mode of presentation took different forms in different countries. He finds the harlequin of the present day pretty well developed as early as 1580.

Die Heilgotter und Heilstätten des Altertums, von LUDWIG HOPF. Franz Peitzcker, Tübingen, 1904. pp. 69.

This study in the archæology of medicine traces curative deities and sites back to ancient Shamanism. He first describes the curative value of sleep in the temple in Mesopotamia, then describes the saints and deities that are believed to preside over the cure of disease in Arabia, India, Japan, Egypt, Greece, Rome and among the Celts and Germans, and in the last section describes the hospitals of the Buddhists in Ceylon, India and Cashmere, Jewish, Greek and Byzantine hospitals, showing in each how much power was ascribed to various deities.

Die Sage vom ewigen Juden in der neueren deutschen Literatur. von JOHANN PROST. Georg Wigand, Leipzig, 1905. pp. 167.

Prost gives a brief account of each German treatment of the story of the Wandering Jew. These are by Goethe, Schubart, Heller, Schlegel, Schreyber, Arnim, Horn, Klingemann, Jemand, Laun, Müller, Haupt, Hauff, Seidl, Auerbacher, Auerback, Chamisso, Zedligz, Lenau, Schenk, Vogl, Smets, Duller, Hauthal, Mosen, Eugene Sues, Hamerling, Heller, Giseke, Stolte, Herrig, Mauthner, Carmen Sylva, Schönaich-Carolath, Haushofer, Varii, Lepsius, Seeber, Wolff. Since this mysterious wanderer first appeared in Hamburg, in 1542, and entered into literature in 1602, he has had an extraordinary career and has been treated in very many ways. Some emphasize the curse that impelled him on; some his blasphemy; others the wandering; others the longing for rest or death or a satisfying ideal. He has been treated as a hero, as a martyr, as a type of the Jewish race, as a representative man, a pharisee, a heretic, skeptic, a social democrat, a man with chronic

discontent, a Prometheus-like deity. Most assume that his fate will have an end, perhaps at the last judgment or at Christ's return or at the Golden Age. In some he finds rest and sleep or dies at the present day. For others he will forever wander. The author thinks that even yet despite all these efforts no one has successfully treated this great theme in a way to bring out at once its philosophic and epic possibilities. The great Dante mind that can do this is yet to appear. It needs a treatment no less noble than Goethe's Faust.

Die Entstehung des Gottesgedankens und der Heilbringer, von KURT BREYSIG. Georg Bondi, Berlin, 1905. pp. 202.

Breysig has made a careful study of the religion of the American Indians. He finds their ideas at bottom quite consonant with those of earlier races in the old world. The stage where deities are personifications of nature has already been transcended. The mind of primitive man is exceedingly rich and active and in religion we deal with tangled meshes of psychoses mingled from different nationalities, but all with real, warm, heathen blood in them. The blessing bringers or saviours of mankind are innumerable. They have power enough to recast the world and human nature. They are often involved in a fight with a great animal like a dragon. The ideas of flood and chaos are universal but often fused.

Perhaps the oldest of these blessing bringers or saviours are the fire gods who brought light, created the sun and moon and rule their course. Next come the water legends of flood and chaos with dragons and snakes. Third are the great exterminations of monsters ; fourth, the gods that teach agriculture, fishing, building, metallurgy, and how to found kingdoms.

This human stage is in advance of the nature stage. In adoration of the culture gods old blessings are forgotten. Often the achievements of the former are thought to be quite recent and there are many reflections of the idea of human evolution from animal ancestors. The first man often becomes a god. This state is very akin to the step from animals to man or perhaps from plants to animals, and shows the vigor of the primitive faith of the race. Indeed all gods are from men. Thus they must be revered because man cannot see his inmost self made an object of ridicule. They need distance to be revered and so are placed far back in the past. They are so exalted that they come to be invested with creative power. This is the origin of gods which are not evolved from ghosts or nature. Jesis is the best case, for he became God just as Jehovah did, but in his legend are combined many of the most essential and abiding vestiges of Indic, Persian, Egyptian and Babylonian thought. This book is a very able and new, yet learned, attempt to explain the origin of religions, and emphasizes an element not here discovered for the first time, but worked out with far more fullness than anywhere else.

Christ's Credentials, by DANIEL P. BALDWIN. Longwell & Cummings, Logansport, Ind. pp. 43.

Jesus was a sublime egoist but not an egotist. Indeed, "Jesus Christ was the most colossal egoist the world has ever known. He claimed for Himself more and uttered more colossal promises than any other character in history. In fact, the four gospels are but the succession of gigantic I's." In the swan-song discourse the night of His betrayal, there are 658 personal pronouns, 137 in the first person singular. Again, He never reasoned or argued. "His final and only authority is and was 'I say unto you.' Of no other teacher can it be said that his death made any difference whatever in the system he taught." The death of Plato, for instance,

added nothing to his teaching, and so of many more. But with Jesus all this is reversed. But for the Resurrection, the two hundred million living Christians would have had no existence. "The Saturday after His murder the heresy endorsed by Him was completely stamped out." Thus apart from His personality His whole system is mere ethics. Upon Christ's sixty-five miracles rest His claim to worship and all His promises. No one could possibly know the actual facts concerning Christ's paternity except Himself. And she had motives of the strongest kind to tell the story she did. If Jesus had an earthly father then Mary was forever disgraced. "Here, then, on the slender word of an hitherto obscured Hebrew girl rests the beginning of the structure of Christianity." The miraculous birth is the most difficult to prove of all the miracles, more so than the Resurrection, and yet "we believe this unspeakably sweet story." "After years of anxious examination I believe that the Virgin story is true. Why? Because it is so powerfully corroborated," by the potency of Jesus' later life. The miracles have a sweet reasonableness. One must, however, in a sense be born a second time to believe in them.

As to the Sermon on the Mount, if literally construed it is the romance of altruism, the message from another world not entirely mistaken. Even the doctrine of total depravity has its justification, but the law of service and the brotherhood of humanity is supreme. The Holy Spirit is simply Jesus' personality or the shadow of it dominating ours. Regeneration is the substitution of His personality for ours. The moment we drop the Resurrection Christianity is only a sweet-water ethical exhortation to be good and happy.

Life More Abundant: Scriptural Truth in Modern Application, by HENRY WOOD. Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Co., Boston, 1905. pp. 313.

Henry Wood has written another book about Eden, the Fall, the Bible, nature, idealism, poetry, fiction, miracles, priest, prophet, the higher criticism, sacrifice, the seat of authority, salvation, manuscripts and tradition, faith and the unseen, the glory of the commonplace, the forward march. This author of many books (this seems to be the seventh) is penetrated with the idea of humanism, God's image in man, a thought world of harmony and suggestion of a believer in immortality, with an inviting attitude toward mind cure, if not toward a higher spiritualism. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a conscientious critic to give such a book much praise or blame. There are many to whom it is well calculated to do much good, but above a certain level of intelligence and mental development it will seem a little thin, trite and goody. No one can read the book without the utmost respect for the author's sincerity, and the worst critic would find it hard to point out any serious harm that such a book can do anybody.

The Boy's Life of Christ, by WILLIAM BYRON FORBUSH. Funk & Wagnall's Co., New York, 1905. pp. 318.

This is a bold and very unique innovation which, if it attracts notice, will be sure to be criticised, but which the writer has only approbation. It is an attempt to reconstruct the life of Jesus, to make it vivid with many original incidents, and anecdotes which, however, serve as a setting for texts.

Jesus was described as a boy from nowhere, his school days are described and characterized. There was a camping tour in the mountains. He was a village carpenter, then comes the story of his public career. We wish the author had told us a little more fully whether he had actually carried this on with children. He designs it for home reading by boys old enough to be faithful and intelligent. The appeal is, of course, throughout to the story interest.

Mutter Erde, ein Versuch uber Volksreligion, von ALBRECHT DIETERICHS. B. G. Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin, 1905. pp. 123.

Dieterichs in a very interesting and learned book gathers from varied sources, and especially the classics, illustrations of the worship of Mother Earth. These works suggest to the author that this is a well-nigh universal cult and one of the first questions of primitive man was whither he came and whence he went. One of the first answers to the above questions was, the earth. Infants at birth are laid upon the earth as if given to her protecting care. The sick are taken from their couch and placed upon it to be revived. There are superstitions that children must be born on the first floor of the house. There are certain stones, passing near which, are reputed to cause conception. Tellus or Terra Mater was a very common thought among the Romans and was connected with the theory of Antochthomes. In some superstitions it is believed that by laying the ear upon the earth one can hear how the unborn children laugh and carouse. All plants and fruits are thought to be children of the earth, expressions of its good or ill will to man, and agriculture is often sacramentalized. In Greece, Ge has her priest and oracle and Odonna, where the oracle spoke under the inspiration of gas rising from the chasm, originated in a kind of earth cult. There are legends of people going down to the heart of the earth and coming up from it with messages from the subterranean gods. Often there were phallic elements observable in this cult.

Even yet traces of this worship are abundant. The very idea of Phuses and Natura suggest it, and Atheists who abandon the higher forms of faith often adhere all the more blindly to lower ones like this. It is doubtful whether this idea has any intimate relation with morality, although it may have with that of Demeter and Isis. Christendom felt the need of an impartial deity and in nearly all mythology earth is feminine while heaven is masculine.

The Scientific Temper in Religion, and other addresses, by P. N. WAGGETT. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1905. pp. 286.

Waggett prints a few shorthand notes of addresses given at his church in Lent. Although not marked by eminent scholarship or new views, they are in the main unusually sensible and wholesome. He treats mostly for laymen such topics as the scientific temper in religion, the effect of evolutionary doctrine, agnosticism and determinism, natural selection and theism, and Bible and evolution, biology and our view of human nature, spiritual experience and dogmatic religion, the aids which science gives to the religious mind.

Comparative Religion. Its Genesis and Growth, by LOUIS H. JORDAN. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1905. pp. 668.

Jordan gives us here a very valuable new book which hardly needs the brief introductory note of Principal Fairbairn. It is essentially the history of the development of the study of comparative religions, an account of its methods, aim, scope, founders, masters, schools, auxiliaries and tangible achievements.

The Cheyenne 2. The Sun Dance, by GEORGE A. DORSEY. Field Columbian Museum. Anthropological Series, May, 1905, Vol. 9, pp. 186.

Here, at last, we have an admirable study of the Sun Dance among the Cheynnes in all its intricacies of detail, with two hundred illustrations, a number of them colored, so that we now realize what this intricate ceremony really means as never before.

What is Religion? and Other Student Questions. Talks to College Students by Henry S. Pritchett, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1906. pp. 117.

These five little lay sermons are entitled, What is Truth; What is Religion; The Science of Religion; The Significance of Prayer; Ought a Religious Man to Join the Church? Their interest, too, outside the class of technological students, to whom they are addressed, consists in the fact that they are given by a man whose sympathies are with applied science. In answer to the first question he cites a Swiss peasant of whom he asked the way to Kandersteg, and who replied, "I don't know, but there is the road to it." This illustrates our relation to truth. The momentum of a man is the formula, "His efficiency equals the moral purpose multiplied by the ability to think straight."

He quotes a patron of his school who told him that he sent his boy there because he felt that neither his religion nor his politics would be affected. This implied a low and even an impossible educational institution. Religion is divine energy typified by the sun. We have so much energy, and only a remnant of it, comparable with that which in a steam engine is transmuted into electric light, becomes spiritual efficiency. The science of religion is to the author theology, of which religion itself is as basal as chemical phenomena to chemical formulæ. The church ought to be able to invite people to its fellowship without asking them to throw away all that science has taught. Religion is psychic health.

As to prayer, one type asks for personal advantage—for instance, rain. Another is like Jesus' prayer, that the cup might be taken away, but seeks resignation if this is impossible, and the third is typified by Chrysostom's, "Grant us in this world knowledge of thy truth, in the world to come life everlasting." Prayer rests on a conception of an inner man, voice or consciousness. This impels us to the view that nothing is worth while but the truth, and that there should be no compromise or delusion. This is the note of science.

The religious young man should join a church because his religious life will be quickened by association, but he must not think this constitutes religion.

This is essentially all there is in this book. No doubt these talks were worth giving and their publication may stimulate other scientific men to a similar rapprochement with instituted religion. Everything in the book is good and commendable, but to those who know anything of the present state of thought in these fields, they must seem tedious and commonplace compared to the kind of talks that might have been given in their place. There is a curiosity, never so strong as now, to know what men, whose sympathies and associations are scientific, can have to say good about religion. But this curiosity itself is largely idle, although it is only this that President Pritchett gratifies in his book. Unfortunately it appears just at a time when it challenges comparison with the lectures of Osler and Oswald, both of which are published essentially in the same size and form, Oswald's little book being itself a great and precious addition to the world's religious thought, small as its compass is.

Etude psychologique des plus anciens réveils religieux aux Etats-Unis, par Jacques Kaltenbach. Genève, 1905. pp. 152.

The aim of this review can hardly be more than a statement of our general appreciation of this most interesting account and lucid presentation of the most salient features of the different stages in the development of religious ideas relative to the phenomena accompanying revivals in this country.

Although the author has confined his study to a distinct period, the first group of such phenomena, known here as revivals, yet his aim has been all through to show by comparison with later developments how progress in religious conceptions has evolved from these earlier forms of belief and practices. In thus tracing back the evolution of religious revivals, and thought in connection with them, we are at once met with the difficulty of distinguishing between fact and theory, a difficulty which the author's method of treatment obviates, however, by remaining consistent with fact (or by constant reference to the facts).

In the early Puritan communities, the circumstances giving rise to revivals, whatever may have been the direct or immediate causes of their issue, must of necessity have reflected the character of the people. So we see many local or scattered patches of revival interests, where religious zeal seems to have been very inflammable and intense, for a short season only, till the receding waves of emotional stress allowed the religious life of the community to sink back to its former level. These earlier, incomplete revivals may, perhaps, best be characterized as adolescent types, which were later eclipsed by the greater, fuller and more expansive dimensions of the Edwardian type of revivals, and which are, in this book, used to illustrate all the conditions that were operative in creating the spirit of religious enthusiasm; first, as occurring in the small town of Northampton, and from thence, spreading to other localities. If, now, we stop here to compare briefly the points of similarity and dissimilarity which appear in these different stages of the development of revivals, we should first say that, although the younger elements of the population always took the initiative in religious exercises of that sort, in the latter, namely, the Edwardian revivals, the rest of the community was ultimately won over to their side. And, in the second place, that both sexes were equally represented, which was not the case in the former, when the number of women far exceeded that of the men, at all ages. In these revivals of 1735 and 1740, it was observed, as shown from different records, that when religious enthusiasm had reached a maximal point of intensity, a higher moral tone prevailed in the community, with better attendance to regular services. And, on the whole, it may be safe to assert here that these revivals were attended by good and permanent results.

In regard to the general discussion of the different phases with individual variances of conversion, the author classifies them roughly under two heads: those who are more suggestible by temperament, and those in whom physical fatigue has lessened their strength of resistance at times of great religious stress. Without wishing to do more here than to follow the general lines of development in regard to conversion, since the Edwardian revivals as compared with those of our own time, we may add that revivals have had a decided influence over the spirit and manner of preaching and the nature of religious motives upon conduct. Such emotional upheavals as are recorded in connection with the Edwardian and Kentucky revivals (in the latter were observed so many different degrees of hysteria, known then as "jerks" and "falling," when both men and women would fall to the ground) are now comparatively rare occurrences, and never thought necessary for entrance into the kingdom.

As to the moral side of revivals, the author's general conclusion is that they may serve to awaken, in a normal way, consciousness to a deeper and fuller meaning of religious experience, and bring to bear upon life higher motives of action. It must therefore follow that their effects upon our physical well-being are wholesome and beneficial.

EUCLID HELIE.

The Shadow of Life, by ANNE DOUGLAS SEDGWICK. The Century Company, New York, 1906. pp. 333.

It is difficult to say whether this novel is more philosophical or religious. It is a pathetic story of a very vigorous, healthy and intensely alive young English girl who early in life fell in love with a boy four years older than herself who had been brought up in India and had inherited the dreamy, inactive tendencies of that land, although he was of English birth. When he was fourteen or fifteen they separated, vowing eternal love, and did not meet again for sixteen years. Meanwhile both had had profound life experiences. When they were again thrown together in the country, their discussions, which make nearly half the book, are concerning the nature of reality, whether life is worth the living, whether there is a God, an ultimate sanction to morality and other questions that make up so large a part of the staple of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. These the girl knows, but detests, while for the man they sink deep into his oriental soul. Although she is constantly quarrelling with him, she becomes intensely in love and makes most of the advances, discards a very ardent, healthy and fit suitor for her hand, and finally brings him to the point of embrace and avowal and pledge of marriage, on the brink of which he has often hovered. When finding himself entirely committed, he fears he can never make her happy because he thinks everything is vain, and after the avowal steals away to his own home. She sickens and on her death bed, calls him to her and expresses only tenderness and love as she dies, while he, although he has often contemplated suicide, lives on his soulless life. The moral appears to be the desiccating, desouling influence of the conception of a world without a personal God or a definite moral law. The general effect of the dénouement of the story is simply hideous. Instead of the satisfaction we usually expect in novels, it leaves the reader with his nerves quite frazzled out with sympathy for the heroine and detestation for the moral cowardice of the hero, although he is a man of the highest sense of honor, spotless personal purity and the keenest intellectual perception.

The Aims of Religious Education. The Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention of the Religious Education Association, February 12-16, 1905. Published by the Association, Chicago, 1905. pp. 525.

This volume contains a condensed résumé of over a hundred different addresses given at the Convention in Boston, in February, 1905. They cover many departments: The alliance of workers with boys, religious art, summer assemblies, correspondence instruction, the press, libraries, home, young people's societies, Christian association, teacher training, elementary and secondary public schools, Sunday schools, churches and pastors, theological seminaries, universities and colleges, council of religious education, etc.

NOTE.

The readers of this *Journal* may be interested to know that *L'Année Psychologique* publishes in each of its yearly issues a critical review, written by Professor J. H. Leuba, of the most important articles and books on the Psychology of Religion that have appeared during the year.

THE AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY
AND EDUCATION.

VOLUME 2 DEC., 1906, — JUNE, 1907. NOS. 2, 3

RELIGION AS FUNCTIONAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND NORMATIVE. AN EXPOSITION.[1]

BY A. OOSTERHEERDT.

Those who read the paper on "Religion as a matter of Feeling," published in Vol. 2, No. 1, of this *Journal*, will have noticed that we came to two very important conclusions. In the words of the last sentence, we found that "functional religion is social in origin, may apparently disappear in some individuals, and is throughout of the same nature psychically as every other conscious aspect, *i. e.*, not primarily emotional, nor anything else, but partaking of the whole personality." That is to say, on the one hand the supernatural, divine origin of religion is given up, and its genesis is sought for in social phenomena, so that it becomes rather an immanent growth than a transcendent revelation, while on the other hand its importance and influence is limited to certain states of consciousness, which, although they most certainly represent the whole of personality, and cannot arbitrarily be confined to any one conscious phase, nevertheless come to light only under certain conditions and through certain stimuli.

This latter point of view has been confirmed by James H. Leuba, in his article on "Fear, Awe and the Sublime in Religion," which appeared in the same number of this *Journal*. He says: "Objectively considered, religious life consists of a portion of the actions by which

[1] The writer desires to express his gratitude and appreciation to Prof. Edward Scribner Ames and Mr. William K. Wright, both of the University of Chicago, for the many valuable suggestions received from them in the preparation of this article.

man strives to reach the ends of existence: protection and increase. . . . . Will, feeling and intellect have in religion the place which belongs to them in the general economy of animal and human existence and no other. It is wrong conception of the nature of religion, or a faulty psychology, or both, which leads to the belief that feelings and emotions play a peculiar rôle in religious life."

As we have drawn so sharp a contrast in the preceding paper between "functional religion" and "metaphysical religion," it will now be in order to elucidate this distinction and develop our idea of "metaphysical religion." This appears the more necessary because we have ascribed to the latter a higher value than to the first.

I once wrote: "If the religionist boldly took the position that all reactions are non-religious, that religion cannot be stated in terms of reaction, or institution, or dogma, but only in terms of relation, just as morality and truth, he would occupy an impregnable position, from which he could not be dislodged." I added: "Religion, according to this theory, would be the relation of any part of the universe to the whole of the universe; in the case of conscious personalities, it would be the relation of the finite self to the Infinite Self. And consequently, being essentially a matter of relation, it would be as wide as human culture and as deep as character, and hence could not possibly be embraced in a few isolated experiences, but must be sought in all experience, in all of life, the reverse of which it is." These sentences were written in the light of the metaphysical relation, which quite ignored the functional side of religion, as it comes up in our consciousness. Today, however, I have been driven back to recognize the religious element in our consciousness, and call this "functional religion," using the word "functional" in the sense of modern psychology. As to this functional religion, I am most in accord with Prof. Irving King, the writer of the monograph called "The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness." With reference to the "metaphysical" religion, I still occupy about the same position as before, and cling to it as being the relation of all our acts toward God, but as it is the *reverse relation* from what appears to us, it is plain that this metaphysical religion can never become a conscious affair, can never enter consciousness. From the standpoint of this metaphysical religion, all reactions are religious, but since this is the standpoint of God, which cannot even be entertained by us, it needs must be that from our point of view, speaking

metaphysically, no reactions are religious, or speaking functionally, some, and some not.

It would seem, on the surface, that if this view be correct, then the validity of "functional religion" is destroyed. And indeed, functional religion with its elaborate dogma, its setting off of one part of life as religious over against the ordinary secular life, would lose much of its vaunted superiority and holiness. But, on the contrary, when one sees that metaphysical religion is the logical implication of the ordinary or functional religion, it necessarily follows that the former cannot altogether destroy the latter, however much certain phases of it might be altered. For functional religion does assume man to stand in relation to the divine, to God; dogmatic Christianity, for instance, postulating that God is a triune Spirit, who has created the world and man, and who demands of man that he serve the Lord with his whole heart, and love his fellow-man as himself. Functional religion has assumed that what is essentially a non-conscious, metaphysical relation could become a conscious service. But because (in our traditional theology at least) the doctrine of the Fall had set Nature over against Grace, there was always the groaning of the spirit on account of the fact that the carnal nature of man too often ruled the day. And so the conscious service became, even with the best of Christians, confined to certain specific religious acts and attitudes. There, beyond the sphere of the Church, lay the World with its business, politics, art, science, literature, in which Christian principles might indeed obtain, yet which could not be called religious in the strict sense of the word. Yet through it all there was the constant recognition that man, somehow, was in continuous relation to God, and that this relation was far more dependent upon the actual life of a person than upon the doctrines he might profess and the specific religious acts he might do. To be sure, this relation was often nearly obscured by the emphasis upon doctrine and "faith," and practically the division of things into secular and sacred held full sway.

Now, this view of the metaphysical relation that we sustain towards God, would do away at one stroke with the distinction between sacred and secular life, deny the sacredness of functional religion as over against the rest of life, and make all of life sacred and religious. The opposition of religious life to ordinary life, would not hold. Hence functional religion would not be destroyed, but its scope would be wi-

dened, so that it would become truly universal, universal in extension, as applying to each and every act without exception, and universal in intension, as applying to every such act in its entirety. Just like space and time are the forms of our knowledge and are universal in their extent and content, so would religion become a *form* of consciousness, and apply to each and every content of it. This is just as much possible for it as for space and time: we are no more conscious of their presence as forms in our ordinary thought than we would have to be of the religious form.

If faith in God, as the Unseen, be the essence of conscious religion, then the metaphysical religion requires this in a much higher degree than the merely functional religion. For the functional worships the conceptions of the mind, the metaphysical (which is, after all, but the logical consequence of it), the Reality beyond all conception, God, not as he is made by our thoughts, but God believed in as an actual reality beyond all possible demonstration. Here, however, we have to meet the claims of pragmatic philosophy and functional psychology, which deny the validity of such an ontological faith.

Now, modern functional psychology has made us aquainted with the theory that none of our concepts have any ontological value. As King puts it in "The Monist" for April, 1905, in an article entitled "Pragmatic Interpretation of Christian Doctrine," "Our only realities are functional realities. If there are others, we know not of them."[1] Again, "There is no such thing as absolute thought, for thought is essentially a process of abstraction from an undefined matrix of possible experiences for the solution of particular crises. If this is the nature of thought it is manifestly invalid to hold that the tools that it creates for the solutions of particular tensions are valid for reality as a whole."[2] Prof. Charles Horton Cooley, in his book on human nature and the social order says: "The ideal person or persons of an ethical religion are the highest expression of this creative outreaching of the mind after the admirable in personality. It can hardly be supposed by any one who is willing to go into the psychology of the matter at all, that they are radically different from other ideal persons, or in any way sharply divided from the mass of personal thought. Any comparative study of idealism, among nations in various stages of civilization, among persons of different in-

[1] The Monist, April, 1905, p. 256.

[2] *Idem*, April, 1905, p. 261.

tellectual power, among the various periods of development in one individual, can hardly fail, I say, to leave a conviction that all hangs together, that there is no chasm anywhere, that the most rudimentary idealizing impulse of the savage or the child is of a piece with the highest religious conception. . . . All ideals of personality are derived from intercourse, and all that attain any general acceptance have a social organization and history. . . . It is especially true that the persons of religion have this character. They are communal and cumulative, are gradually built up and become in some degree an institution. In this way they may acquire richness, clearness, sanctity and authority, and may finally be inculcated as something *above* and *outside* of the human mind."[1] Here too, though in a different way, the denial is made that there is any ontological reality existing apart from and yet corresponding to our ideas.

One more quotation of functional psychology must be made, to show how completely this psychology, which aims to be a philosophy as well, has abolished the ontological concept. In an article entitled: "Theology from the standpoint of Functional Psychology," Prof. Edward Scribner Ames points out in the American Journal of Theology, Vol. 10, No. 2, how thoroughly teleological mental life is, and how our concepts are simply the registrations of experience, no more, no less. He says: "In so far as an idea aids and furthers experience, it is true." With reference to the idea of God, which he claims is not innate, he says: "The question heretofore from the standpoint of transcendence, has been: Does a supreme, absolutely perfect being exist? Is there an actual, objective reality corresponding to the subjective idea of God? No one has ever been able to produce any adequate answer to that question."[2]

"The question itself has fallen under suspicion. There is no criterion by which it can be judged. It is impossible to get outside of experience to investigate the assertion that something exists there. The implications of present knowledge may point to further related experience, but it is difficult to realize how they could prove the existence, truth or objective reality of anything beyond experience."[3] Thus he declares that the idea of God has a regulative function, as Kant taught, but can not become a constitutive object of knowledge. Finally he says: "In

[1] Human Nature and the Social Order, C. H. Cooley, pp. 368-369. Italics mine.
[2] The American Journal of Theology, April 1906, p. 228.
[3] The American Journal of Theology, April 1906, pp. 228-9.

functional terms truth means value. The question, Is the idea of God true? means: Is the idea of God of value in actual experience? Does it serve to organize the highest interests of life, and to vitalize them with dynamic power in eliciting and controlling efficient reactions of the will? If the idea of God has these values and performs these functions, it is true. . . . The idea of God in this view becomes the great working hypothesis of religion." [1]

These are bold words and require similar treatment. To all the pragmatists and functional psychologists it needs to be said: Consciousness is not merely teleological, it is not merely an adaptation for life, but after it has arisen, it becomes in a sense greater than life: life would not be worth living without consciousness. Further, the idea of God is unique, not indeed in its origin, but in its significance; unless an ontological correspondence is *believed in*, no action will follow upon it. Let any functional psychologist try to act upon the idea of God, and at the same time disbelieve in his existence. The idea of God, whatever its origin may be, has had such a tremendous effect *just because* an ontological reference was given to it. Again, the *idea* of God may be evolved, but we cannot hold that *God* has been evolved. Whatever has been evolved, *God* is not evolved. Hence we must criticise the position that the conception of God would have dynamic value after its ontological premise has been taken away. The idea of God is indeed an immanent growth, but it refers not simply to the divine immanence, but also to the transcendence of God. What we want is not only a God within experience, but even more a God without experience. We cannot do without either proposition. To have solely a God within experience leaves us to the despairs of Pantheism, to have no God but without experience surrenders us to Deism. We need something bigger than experience to explain experience. Hence we are not to believe the pragmatist when he says that truth simply means value. Consciousness cannot be separated from Being, it is a phase of being. Both, being and activity are complementary, there is no being without activity, nor activity without being.

Space and time may be functions in a developing experience, but they are so because they are forms of that experience, something which God can never be. Religion, to be sure, may be a form of experience because

[1] *Idem*, p. 229.

it is a relation of it to a larger experience, but the idea of God has no such function. Its ontological significance may be denied, yet no man can act without its tacit acceptance. Life is stronger than words, no one can set at naught the laws of truth, justice and goodness, without condemning himself. We cannot grant that the idea of God is simply the "working of hypothesis" of religion, just as all sciences have their working principia, which may be supplanted by better hypotheses, because religion is not a *science*, but a life, or rather the reverse of life. The idea of God is something more than a working hypothesis; religion cannot be in any conscious sense when God becomes merely an immanent evolution. There is, undoubtedly, an evolution of theology, and so also of ideas about God, but the fundamental thing about the idea of God, as we now have it, is that it refuses to be merely a mental presentation, and points beyond the mind for its objective counterpart. If this be realism, let it be. The critic himself cannot escape realism.

Functional psychology has not escaped the ontological problem by putting all the ontology within consciousness. It has simply transferred the problem, and given to the functional idea of God the *same value* as the ontological formerly had. With all other ideas, even those of freedom and immortality, the transference of ontology from without to within consciousness does no great harm, but it is different with the idea of God. All other conceptions are justified by and realized in experience, the idea of God cannot so be explained: though born from experience, it also transcends experience. Refusal to admit its transcendence will destroy its immanence as well.

Moreover, God must be thought of as a Personal Spirit, not only because an absolute materialism, which evolves consciousness, is a contradiction in terms, and matter as object *of* consciousness cannot supplant that consciousness, but also because an infinite universe, both as to its temporal and spatial extent, of whatever it be composed, cannot be the object of religion. Religion, as the objective relation of man to God, cannot exist on the basis of pantheism. God must be like man, and likewise other than man. Man must not be a part of God Himself. Hence God must be a spirit, eternal and omnipresent purely spiritually. As such he must be distinguished from the universe as known to us under temporal and spatial forms. This is an objectification of experience, and any attempt to identify God with it must result in sheer pantheism. But now, all our personalities are *ideal* beings; they exist in the mind

only, and can influence us solely by our own thought which we ascribe to their clusters. As clusters of ideas we are to understand not simply ideas as such, but also all the intangible influences of feeling and will. These personalities whether they be contemporary, or historical, as Plato and Cæsar, are only in the mind as *contents* or objects of consciousness.[1]

Now, with direct revelation from God through a supernaturally inspired Scripture discredited, and only the immanent revelation as seen in the growth of the idea of God remaining, a revelation through persons and ideas, the only picture or content that we can make of God is analogous to that of a human personality, and this is, almost needless to say, not at all adequate to the reality of God. Hence it could easily be proved that all the so-called attributes of God are simply human virtues and qualities magnified, reversed and negated. And so it becomes clear that if we are to think of God at all, we must necessarily anthropomorphize him, even when we think him superpersonal rather than personal.[2] We may, indeed, to a certain extent use Mill's canon of residues, and say that as God cannot be matter, he must be spirit, and as he cannot be Cosmic Mind, he must be Personal Mind, thus differentiating between creation and creator, and guarding personal freedom from a deterministic pantheism, but even here we cannot escape experience, and consequently must depend on faith *in* rather than on knowledge *of* his existence.

Not only, then, it is evident, that we can never entertain any adequate idea of God, but it also appears that our only access to him is a metaphysico-normative one. Only through the normative factors do we have in some sense communion with him. For the idea of God, unique as its significance be, is only one among many personal ideas, and while we thus may associate with it, we must remember that this idea owes its whole existence to the traits of other ideas, that whereas we have met, either in actual life or in history or poetry, the objective counterparts of all other personal ideas, we have at no time had such direct vision of God. "No man hath seen God at any time," St. John declares. Hence it will readily be seen that whatever communion we may have, cannot be *conscious*, but metaphysical and normative. Whatever vision we may have, even of the infinite worth of personality, is conditioned by temporal relations. Our eternity, *pace* to Prof. Foster

[1] See Cooley in his book on personal ideas.

[2] *Cf.* The Monist for January, 1906, on The God Problem, by Dr. Carus.

in "The Finality of the Christian Religion," is *in* time and space, God's is above them. Therefore God's eternity and spacelessness absolutely prevent any conscious communion in the sense of objective content with man. We would have to transcend our being, were we to have conscious, objective communion with a personal God. That is, in short, God cannot be a person among persons, as we know them in our mind.

This view, that conscious communion with God is not to be sought after, is strikingly illustrated by many contemporary psychologists writing on the subject of prayer. To them prayer becomes simply an inner necessity of thought, which is interlocutory in its very nature, and needs no external reference for any salutary effects. Prof. Cooley says: "To pray, in a higher sense, is to confront our moral perplexities with the highest personal ideal we can form, and so to be unconsciously integrating the two, straightening out the one in accordance with the other. It would seem that social psychology strongly corroborates the idea that prayer is an essential aspect of the higher life; by showing, I mean, that thought, and especially vivid thought, is interlocutory in its very nature, and that aspiration almost necessarily takes, more or less distinctly, the form of intercourse with an ideal being."[1] Mr. S. Walter Ranson, in his "Studies in the Psychology of Prayer" says as to the ideal-God, the following: "The great religious Ideal-God, is strongly dynamic, representing, as it does, the sum total of human longings, unified and concretely expressed; under proper conditions this idea may so control the mental processes as to bring itself and related ideas into ascendency in consciousness, exerting this power more strongly than the ordinary idea because of its greater hold on the attention." And again, "the idea of God is the counterpart of man's aspirations after the ideal."[2] Here prayer is both subjective as to its nature and as to its object.

What shall we say as to these things? Obviously, that unless the idea of God is believed to have a real objective reference, prayer will be futile. Indeed, prayer to the one who prays, means just this that God is believed to exist, and that He can hear. The psychologist has fastened upon the machinery of prayer and has ignored the objective reference of it. However, we have declared against conscious communion

[1] Human Nature and the Social Order, p. 357.

[2] *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, November, 1904.

with God, and cannot grant this to prayer. Prayer does, indeed, bring us into contact with God, but *no more* than our other conscious activities do. All conscious life is communion with God. Prayer simply puts a definite ideal before us, ministers to certain specific wants, and is the child of faith. In so far as prayer rests upon the subjective nature of thought, it would probably remain, in so far as it is thought to be conscious communion, this view would destroy it. In fact, the question becomes very serious, when it is remembered that that objective reference determines the form and even the nature of prayer itself. The "interlocutory nature" of thought would have to find a different mode of expression than prayer as we now have it. Or it might simply lose that external reference and conscious communion idea, and become ordinary thought. Though formally prayer would then be abolished, practically all conscious life would be exalted. If no one part of consciousness has higher value religiously than the other, the theory that the reverse of every conscious act is the direct relation that we sustain toward God, and that we have as well the normative relation that comes out in every such act, will not lower the value of the whole of consciousness. The influence of dogmatic religion has hitherto been to exalt some parts of consciousness, some activities above others: in prayer, for instance, the theory has been held of miraculous divine communion, while the witness of the Holy Spirit has confirmed the "believer" of his divine sonship; moreover such attitudes as humility, faith, hope, charity, love, reverence, sympathy, etc., have been especially cultivated as being of more intrinsic religious worth than others.

Now, we do not wish to maintain that there is not a selective interest in consciousness, which makes one phase, some moment, stand out pre-eminent; what we do protest against, is the classification of conscious activities under religious and secular heads, the picking out of some acts as being especially pious. When the theory is once fully grasped that religion is *least of all* a conscious affair, although faith in God brings it to consciousness, but that it is pre-eminently a metaphysical and normative relation, the secularization of most of life from the religious sphere will end; everything will become alike religious, or non-religious, if you will. What we want to do is not to mutilate religion into an emotional state, as some psychologists do, but give it full recognition in all the phases of consciousness, so that it appear as the *meaning* of every state of consciousness, implied in all conscious life whatever, with reference

of the individual personality to the perfect Personality. Metaphysically, and still better, normatively, our consciousness has that relation to God which we ascribe to it. That is to say, our conscious life has not only the reverse relation of every concrete act, but also the normative relations which influence that act, to God.

It is even in these normative aspects that we are to see the more important relation that we sustain towards God. For, while the position of every concrete act with reference to God is decidedly a metaphysical affair, the normative aspects are imbedded in our consciousness, and assert their sway over every state. True, they never assume any form of content, because what is norm or law cannot at the same time be matter or content. We assume that every state of consciousness has three aspects, the willing, knowing, and feeling aspects. According to the nature of the stimulus and the interest of the individual one of these aspects or phases predominates. Thus arises a so-called emotional state, an intellectual state, or a volitional state. The emotional aspect is judged by the ideal of beauty, the intellectual phase by the ideal of truth, and the volitional side by the ideal of morality. When these three ideals agree, there results a perfect conscious state. Nothing further appears requisite to any state of consciousness. As a matter of fact, however, there are no perfect states, in which beauty, truth and goodness are united in harmonious proportion; there is always a contrast between the actual and the ideal, and this comes out especially in the conflict between right and wrong, so that we are forced to postulate a perfect Personality, in whom these ideals have their reality and harmony, but nevertheless, they still confront us and demand our fealty. Right here most persons, and not unjustly, see the need of religion, but they fail to observe that by desiring a perfect Personality their own particular state does in nowise change its character, as all that can be said about it is that it is a state of consciousness, with the three particular aspects. We are in no need of "religion" if we are true to our ideals of truth, beauty, and rightness; and again, the attempt to find religion outside these ideals subverts our whole conscious life, while from the psychological point of view a specific religious content (in the metaphysical sense) is impossible, since there is no occasion for its coming into existence. Only from the side of meaning, of norms, can we approach religion, and attach it to consciousnes, thereby declaring that true religion is a steadfast devotion to beauty, truth and justice. By

adhering to our ideals of moral, æsthetic and intellectual relations we would indeed make religion as broad as culture and as deep as character, recognize not only the universal *extension*, but also the universal *intension*, of it,[1] and show in practical life that we see in our consciousness a transcendent reality or mind, of which every act is at once religious and non-religious, according to the relation it is supposed to be in.

We have now reached the full explanation of "metaphysico-normative religion," and may redefine it as being both *normative* and *full of content*, as being on the one hand a reflexion of the normative factors in our thinking, willing and feeling, and on the other as the reverse of all the active content in our experience. The matter of this religion never enters consciousness, the form only by way of establishing norms, which do not themselves appear as content. It is evident that this religion, called "metaphysical" for want of a better word, is not a psychological affair, but is more properly a philosophic construct, based upon negative reasoning.

This metaphysical religion does not endanger Christianity, but confirms it. It recognizes that Christianity is a social religion, that its test is brotherly love, and that its success has been due to the perfectly definite ideal of Christ. Precisely because Christianity has complied with all the requirements of a functional and social religion, because it has taken up unto itself not only Hebraism, but Hellenism as well, with its science and philosophy, and also Roman law and German individuality, because it assimilated and transformed whatever good it came in contact with, did it grow and achieve such a tremendous success. And the authority it gave and the ideal it presented would in nowise be interfered with. In so far as Christianity is a life, and not a philosophical system, with far-reaching metaphysical assumptions, it would have nothing to fear from this new view. It would agree with James that "faith without works is dead" (James 2:17), and that by works faith is made perfect. And this, too, without impugning the truth of Paul's assertion: "The just shall live by faith." (Rom. 1:17.) Faith in God has been with all true believers far more than an intellectual belief, it is a life, which controls the ethical judgment, the æsthetic feeling, and the intellectual concept. Aside from some Greek

[1] Let the content of our life, our entire experience, if you will, stand for *extension*, and the forms of that content, for *intension*.

conceptions and Jewish legalism, which inevitably crept into it, Christianity has ever been a great practical force, which purifies the emotions, and sets before the will and the intellect such ideals of truth and goodness as have never been presented by any other religion. In fact, as Matthew Arnold so justly remarked, Christianity confirms the law. It confirms the law of our mental health, it imparts to our being a saving grace. Far from destroying the normative factors in our consciousness, it establishes them on firmer basis than ever by insisting that we serve the Lord with our whole heart, mind and strength, that we should walk as in his presence all our days. By placing before the mind of every believer the example of Christ, it teaches that human progress depends on moral principles, on zealous devotion to truth and impassioned love of beauty. If there is anything else in Christianity I should like to know it. What is it that has most influence on men's lives, the personal example and authority of Christ, or the notion of the Trinity? What is more important in life, the correct dogmatic conception of God, or the fellowship with our brethren? Has not St. John, the disciple whom the Master loved, declared that we shall know that we love God when we love our brother? Is not the whole Church of Christ one body, nourished by one doctrine, and moved by one Spirit? Can there, *summa summarum*, be conceived a more potent social force, a purer ethical religion, a higher spiritual discipline, than Christianity? Can its functional value be surpassed by any other agency of social character? I think not.

Jesus Christ confirms the normative side of religion, while he also lived fully conscious of the direct metaphysical relation with God. Hence he will remain the centre of functional religion, which must ever grow more normative and become more conscious of the metaphysical relation. He taught that God is a Spirit, a Personality, to whom we are as children, and this is in full accord with the normative view of personality, and represents the highest aspirations of mankind. On this account it is useless to expect a higher idea of God than Jesus has given: his uniqueness and originality are, as it were, the culmination of the subjective revelation of God, and present their power with instantaneous effect on every human mind that comes in contact with him. As Shailer Matthews says: "Jesus was greater than the men who interpreted him, even when they interpreted him aright, and it is he and his work, and the life with God he revealed, that formed the strength of historical Christianity.

The new life must needs be expressed in temporary vocabularies and concepts, but it could not be restrained by them. It conquered them—the mighty systems of an Augustine, an Origen, a Justin, even of a Paul. And thus inevitably, because it was the social expression of a life, the church became the parent of a Christian civilization; the Christian woman of a Græco-Roman civilization became the Christian woman of a Christian civilization; the Christian family of the first century grew into the Christian family of to-day; the Christian fraternity, loyal to an imperial tyranny, became the champion of a Christian democracy that, with all its revolutionary power, even as yet has not come to its own in either politics or economics."[1]

Functional religion, the higher it climbs, the more it must grow dependent upon the metaphysical religion. That is to say, greater insistence must be put on the direct or immediate relation that all acts sustain towards God. It is true, this metaphysical relation is principally one of the poets, the seers; when this relation is brought into consciousness, however, it straightway becomes functional as a content of mind, and allies itself with the predominating aspect. Although, then, the metaphysical relation *an sich* is purely a non-conscious affair, being the *reverse* of each *content* of consciousness, it is not a matter of indifference to us. On the contrary, a full realization of its meaning will have the greatest possible dynamic effect upon the mind, and energize its activities with vital power. But to function as such, it must be in full accord with the normative factors of consciousness, and this is just what the becoming conscious of its existence implies, for it means to compress more in single moments than ever before, which is not possible unless life as a whole be organized upon the highest principles of conduct. Hence functional religion must also grow ever more normative, and be less institutionalized, more humanized, less doctrinized; become more of a life of the spirit, less of habit. Thus *conscious* functional religion, in the sense of pious exercises or church activity, must become less, but must embody itself in principles of personality. Combining the metaphysical and normative views, we may say that the *fullness* of conscious states must be extended in breadth, at the same time that it gains in depth. Life must be fully realized in single moments more than ever before. As Prof. Coe remarks in his book on "Spiritual Life," "The Soul strives always

[1] The Messianic Hope in the New Testament, Shailer Matthews, p. 316.

to utter its whole self, and when perfect religion is attained it will be found to be the centre and unity and life energy of whatever is worthy to be called human.''

This view, then, puts religion on a wholly different plane from natural science, ethics, and other disciplines, instead of being merely an additional one, as theology is. It would not confuse the special ''religious'' acts and attitudes, which usually go with church life, with religion, but rather make this the totality of life, including every aspect of it. Indeed, from this standpoint, there would seem to be no difference, between culture, in Matthew Arnold's sense, and religion. Arnold thought religion as being chiefly moral, ''religion is morality touched with emotion,'' and he conceived culture to stand for a harmonious expansion of all the powers of human nature. ''Culture,'' he says, ''is a study of perfection.'' As he says: ''What we want is a fuller harmonious development of our humanity, a free play of thought upon our routine notions, spontaneity of consciousness, sweetness and light, and these are just what culture generates and fosters.''[1] Spontaneity of consciousness, that is just the thing this view of religion with its threefold aspect would welcome. As culture embraces the whole of man, so would religion embrace him, only culture is the human aspect of that which viewed from the side of God is religion. Both religion and culture are one and the same thing, it is according to the view we take that they are differentiated. Culture, therefore, has no superiority over religion by including all the activities of human nature, but is the reverse of religion, as this is the reverse of it. Life is a unity; culture is one phase of it, religion another.

This view is the combined consequence of the Calvinist principles of the absolute sovereignty of God and the full responsibility of man, and of modern psychology. The assumptions made are these: the evolution of the universe and of man, of ordinary functional religion as a social phenomenon, and the existence of God. Now, it may seem that I have reasoned from the idea of God to his existence, and committed that most unpardonable of offences against modern psychology, namely, to give ontological meaning to functional concepts. However, I wish to assure the hasty critic that the attempts of Anselm, Descartes, Locke, and so many others, have found no imitation by me, and that a demonstrated

[1] Culture and Anarchy, in Maynard's English Classics Series, p. 6.4

God would be no God to me. I *believe*, most assured, that God exists, and that He is Spirit, but of proofs scientifically grounded to demonstrate his existence I would be innocent. For, in that case, God would be brought within finite experience, and hence be finite himself. Our finite minds are not capable of grasping the Infinite Reality of God, no more than we can think of infinite space and time. It is not of the part to comprehend the whole, not of man to understand God. Even if we could grasp the significance of the existence of God, and of his relation to our universe, the "open secret," as Emerson terms it, had better be hidden from us, because once known and understood, its value would be gone. Still, our faith is not *contra rationem*, even if it be *super rationem*. "Ily a assez de lumière pour ceux, qui ne désirent qui de voir, et assez d'obsu rité pour ceux, qui ont une disposition contraire." (Pascal.) But does then that metaphysical relation depend on faith? Most certainly, and so does even the normative relation. I make the statement here, lest some one point out that metaphysics is simply a refinement of psychology, and tell me that I have been building a great metaphysical castle in the air. Faith is not therefore exalted, however, above other conscious activities. Indeed, the metaphysical assumption built upon faith destroys precisely the superiority of one act above another, even of faith as being more religious than any other conscious action. But why do I make faith so conspicuous, only to destroy it?

Because I saw ordinary religion defined as "a function of a developing experience," and its beginnings traced within the matrix of custom, and its binding power determined by the looseness or strictness of the social organization, so that provision can be made for the non-religious element in modern society, I came to doubt whether this social religion is really the only religion, whether its psychological validity and social character are sufficient reasons for its existence, or rather for its continuance. For, after anthropology has shown the rise of religion as a social phenomenon, and after psychology has demolished the ontological reality of religious concepts, religion has been shorn of its divine character, and is reduced to one of the ordinary manifestations of mental life. Prayer, the very essence of religion, according to Sabatier, becomes one of the phases of the higher conscious life, an aspect of the interlocutory nature of thought. In short, that connection with the divine, which religion meant and still means to all intense religious persons, is broken off entirely, at least so far as conscious appreciation of it goes. This

does not mean that the writer recognizes no divine thing in our life; no, he simply insists that that distinction between the divine and the merely human has been obliterated of late years, and that the efforts to find a specific religious content in our consciousness have signally failed. All that has been discovered is of social origin, and hence I wrote in the first article that religion is to be found in all expressions of the human mind whenever an ideal social world is recognized. Now, since the human being cannot endure the thought of being shut off from all intercourse with the divine, and since this intercourse cannot be a conscious one, as modern psychology has abundantly demonstrated, what other recourse have we but the metaphysical one, of assuming that *all* our acts have a direct reference toward God as well as to our fellow-men? In this way alone do I see an escape for the religious difficulty that confronts us.

Now, it will be evident that this conscious faith in this metaphysical and normative relation is not a mere vagary, but is simply a recognition of the facts of life themselves, on the one hand, of absolute dependence on the universe and hence on God, and on the other of the forms of consciousness itself. What distinguishes this faith, however, from the ordinary statement of such relation, as that given for instance by Joseph I. France, in his paper on "The Universal Belief and its Rationality," published in the March number of this *Journal*, is the fact that it distinctly stands for Theism, as opposed to Pantheism. The trouble with pantheism, as we have already remarked before, is that when everything is God, nothing is God, freedom is abolished, and the meaninglessness of the all floats over every supposed individual existence. Accordingly, the difference between this metaphysics of religion and ordinary metaphysics is very great: while the ordinary is a rationalization of experience, the metaphysics of religion, involving as it does the postulate of the existence of God, transcends experience, and cannot even be described in terms of experience. This fact was alluded to when I said, "this metaphysical religion can never become a conscious affair, can never enter into consciousness." Hence I have not attempted to describe it, for that were presumption magnified, as though we were able to see things from the standpoint of God. It is just on this account, too, that this metaphysical reverse relation of life to God is incapable of psychological criticism, although its functional corresponding notion, of course, may be analyzed. How our acts appear to God, both as to their

richness of content and precision of form, is a matter of utter indifference to us so far as any possible *knowledge* of it goes; what is of the greatest importance, however, is the shaping of our life in such a way as to show the richest possible content and the highest possible principles.

This general position, while its resemblance to Kant's Ideas of Pure Reason is not slight, nevertheless differs from them not less emphatically. The Ideas, as the culminating conceptions of Reason, in which the mere inter-relation of phenomena has been brought into systematic connection with a thinking subject, a thought object and their common cause or middle term, are, as Kant declares, necessary and unavoidable, yet must be regarded as illusory and futile, solely regulative principles of the mind in its search for an all-embracing unity. Because they transcend experience, Kant calls them illusory, and banishes them from the theoretical reason, only to introduce them surreptitiously back again by way of the practical reason. Of this divorce between reason and practice this view would not be obliged to take account, since it transcends the practical reason as well as the theoretical; and depends upon faith rather than upon any rules of thought. Kant gets back in the practical domain what he lost in the theoretical; this view goes beyond all experience, recognizing, as it does, that no unification of experience, even that of Dr. Edward Caird, which aims to achieve unity by rising above the distinction of subject and object, can be more than a unification *in* experience, and accordingly incomplete and unsatisfactory. To be sure, this metaphysical view does not care to offer a higher synthesis than that of Caird, the writer not being so anxious for a final adjustment of experience, and holding to the primacy of the will rather than of the intellect. With thought, then, as a phase of action, and action furnishing opportunities for an ever progressing unification of an unfolding experience, this general view does completely concur, while it postulates a God within experience as well as beyond it.

Finally, with the strongest possible insistence upon an increased content of life and better application of the normative factors, this view appears also in sympathy with the two most notable books on religion within recent days. The one book, coming from a scientific man of letters, called "Religious Reconstruction," by W. H. Mallock, London, 1905, while it has a pantheistic trend, nevertheless does great service by showing how our civilization is built up on the ideals of the Good, the True and the Beautiful, and how they imply the existence of a moral world-

order or God. The other book, of Dr. George B. Foster, on "The Finality of the Christian Religion," is strongly critical and shows how little theology is left, but insists with great ardor on the homely virtues of life, on purity of heart, vigor of intellect, and courage of soul. So then, from all sides the streams of thought run together to enlarge and ennoble our conception of God, whose face had become "blurred to the view, like the reflection of the sun in troubled waters." There bids fair to come a day when Christianity, rejuvenated by the signs of the near presence of God, will consist even less in doctrine than to-day, will be more and more a spiritual discipline, which shall insist with all the ardor of religious conviction that our only salvation lies in the normative factors of our thought, in the application of them to the fullness of practical life. By recognizing that all the universe is moved by divine impulse, and that in this short, earthly life the immortal destinies are forged of every human being, Christianity, freed from the fetters of human dogma, will confer a divine glory upon the lowliest and meanest of human beings, will radiate shafts of light and hope to all the world.

In conclusion, we might say that our object has not been to rob functional religion its holiness or value, but to extend its meaning to the exceeding complexity of life. What is transient, will doubtless depart in time; what is permanent, will persist and grow in significance. If, therefore, we have seized upon the metaphysical and normative implications of religion, we ascribe to them permanent value, and could easily see much of contemporary religion pass away, if we would only secure thereby a fuller and better life.

THE RELATION OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS TO PRAYER.

By ANNA LOUISE STRONG.

University of Chicago.

In discussing the relation of the subconscious to prayer, we must first of all be careful to avoid two rather prevalent errors in the use of the term subconscious,—that of making it an object of almost mystic veneration, and that of despising it as utterly irrational, or as Davenport calls it, "the slime of the subconscious." Probably the choice of name has had not a little to do with the last mentioned error. For the *sub*conscious is not something placed "beneath" consciousness; it is on every side of it. James' term "fringe" is much truer in this respect, but hardly suggests the vast extent of the subconscious. It is a sea, in which the "stream of consciousness" is a gulf-current, drawing its water from the main ocean, forming it, using it, and letting it slip back again into the main reservoir. But even this analogy breaks down, for the water returns to the ocean formless, but the reorganized forms of consciousness sink into the subconscious with shapes that are very well fixed, and which remain as habits and memories to give color to the more vividly conscious life.

Perhaps the simplest definition for our purposes of the subconscious would call it "that part of our possible self which we are not at the moment definitely controlling and attending to." Not that the subconscious lacks all control. It is the seat of those habitual actions which in the past time have been so thoroughly controlled that they no longer need conscious guidance, but "go of themselves." The movements used in walking, in the piano-playing of the expert, or in any well-practised act, are controlled by stimuli which operate in this subconscious realm and only rise into consciousness on the occasion of some disturbance and the focussing of attention resulting therefrom.

Since the subconscious is the seat of actions which are habitual and therefore unattended to, it follows that the individual who for the moment gives up the stress of conscious effort and rests back upon the subconscious activities, experiences a sense of relaxation. As

Jastrow puts it, "when we abandon the normal attitude and are faced dreamward,—what ensues in this letting go is the fading away of the outer world under a release of active tension, a dismissal of active responsibilities, a passive acceptance of what may come.—These negative dispositions release the mind for inner promptings."

It is evident that some things may be accomplished by the mind more easily in this state of relaxation than under the stress of more conscious thought. The recalling of a forgotten name is the stock instance of this kind. The subconscious execution of musical performances which cannot be carried through if interrupted by a sudden accession of attention, is another case in point. It would seem that an idea or a desire may set in motion a series of habitual activities which, in the absence of other inhibiting ideas, work themselves out quite regularly and mechanically to the desired end. The phenomenon of suggestibility in hypnotism is an instance of this.

The relation of the subconscious to prayer would then resolve itself into the question of how far the habit of prayer and the so-called answers to prayer are the result of the working of these laws and conditions of the subconscious part of ourselves. The first of these questions needs practically no discussion. The habitual nature of prayer is too well known to need comment. Yet it might be mentioned that in a questionnaire, the results of which were published by Frank O. Beck, 98% of the respondents said that they felt the need of prayer periodically, and the other 2% said that they prayed periodically without feeling the need. With all who pray, prayer is undoubtedly to a large extent a habit. This, of course, increases rather than diminishes its influence on the life of the individual. Even of those who pray most spontaneously and at all times, it may be said that they have the habitual attitude of prayer, that they pass easily from the strain of directed effort to the relaxation which comes by giving up conscious choosing. This relaxation means peace and an obliteration of the dualisms of reflection. "Prayer," says Malwida von Meysenbug, "means returning from the solitude of individuation into the consciousness of unity with all that is." Another of Prof. James' respondents says: "There was something in myself that made me feel myself a part of something bigger than I that was controlling." These are quotations from the religious rather than the psychological standpoint. They express admirably the release of tension in the presence

of the vast organized body of habit which underlies the more conscious life of the individual.

As far as the results of prayer are concerned, a more or less definite division of the subject must be made, for there are two kinds of prayer, the specific and the general. The latter division has received excellent treatment by Ranson and Beck in numbers of the *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*. But, as far as I am aware, no one has made any attempt to treat the more specific prayers which form a large part of the prayer-life of the individual. Prayers of a general kind are more easy to find. There are several manuals of them compiled by religious men and women of all times. They are more susceptible of classification and hence of psychological treatment. Furthermore there is a general feeling, and a well-justified one, that the higher forms of prayer are the less specific forms. Nevertheless, there are many people of whose prayer-life the definite asking for things and the more or less frequent receiving of them, forms a not insignificant part. And although it is impossible, in the present absence of material, to give this department of prayer an adequate treatment, and it might always remain impossible to do so, owing to difficulty of classification, yet it seems an unfair avoidance of difficulty to leave out all reference to the fact that it exists, especially as it is this class of prayers which form the stronghold of many very dogmatic assertions regarding prayer itself.

The more general form of prayer consist in a desire for oneness with God, for peace and happiness resulting therefrom, and the results consist in the attainment of that peace and happiness together with a moral uplift. This type is illustrated by the prayers of all ages. Maria Nare phrases it: "And because outward events have so much power in scattering my thoughts and disturbing the inward peace in which alone the voice of Thy spirit is heard, do Thou calm my soul." Phillips Brooks calls prayer "the complete resting of the life of man upon the life of God." The religious person desires "in place of clashing passions, one supreme passion." The attitude required in this kind of prayer is the giving up of the strain of conscious choice and the concentration of the mind on one idea, the idea of God. These are the characteristics of the subconscious as outlined above. And the result is peace of mind and the "manifestation of unusual power to accomplish ends." This latter fact is partly due to the recuperation of the mental faculties under

the relieved tension and partly to the removal by suggestion of all inhibiting ideas and the consequent ease of action along habitual lines in the carrying out of the one prevailing idea.

One writer remarks that the need of prayer is felt to be especially urgent after an exhausting series of duties when the body and mind are tired. At such times, the desire to fall back on the lesser tension of the subconscious, or, if you please, upon what the individual conceives as the higher and calmer unity of all life, is irresistible. The result of such relaxation, as we have above seen, is peace. Furthermore, as Ranson remarks, "the contemplation of the idea of God gives pleasure like the æsthetic pleasure in viewing a flower, or the moral pleasure in contemplating a noble action; but it gives a much greater pleasure, because it appeals not only in specific ways, but to all the aspirations of man."

The feeling of dependence and of the presence of a higher power is also to be expected in the face of this organized regulative collection of habit, which takes care of the greater part of the individual's action and determines the tone of his thinking. For the subconscious is not disorganized, far from it. In one sense it is more organized than fuller consciousness, in that it is more fixed. It is only not highly organ*izing;* it is not at the point of tension.

Turning to the more specific prayers, we will take up first those which still bear some resemblance to the general type, in that they are for spiritual benefits. Prayers for conversion and for definite virtues are of this type. As a prominent evangelist says: "I said unto the Lord: 'Thou hast said that they that ask shall receive; I have faith to believe it.'" The result was a sudden happiness; he wanted to "shout for joy." Such experiences are very numerous. They are due, psychologically speaking, to the relief of conscious tension and the falling back upon the subconscious organization. In this place might be mentioned the prayers of St. Francis for the "active virtues," prayers for the cure of a vicious temper, or for any moral quality. It is quite comparable as to methods and results, with the attempted cure of the drink habit by hypnotic suggestion. There is the same emphasis of desire in one direction, the same removal of all inhibiting ideas by suggestion, and the same result. For in both cases, long persistence is usually necessary before the evil habits are eradicated. One journey

into the subconscious is not enough to give a permanent "set" to the character.

The application of prayer in the cure of disease is another department of specific prayer. St. Augustine reports the cure of a toothache. Luther believed in prayer for the sick and says that it had in his experience saved three lives: his own, his wife's and a friend's, at a time when they were "nigh unto the very gates of death." In F. O. Beck's questionnaire, many examples of such answers to prayer were given. In fact, such events may be considered a very well established fact in religious experience, and one which is made use of constantly by many religious people. That these answers are not delusions, but rather facts of the subconscious life, is clearly implied by James. "If any medical fact may be considered firm, it is that in certain environments prayer may contribute to recovery." In considering this fact and its relation to the subconscious, it is well to bear in mind three things. First, that an attitude of confidence towards the universe, an absence of worry, is an element in all perfect health, and tends to *produce* health by a right functioning not only of the psychical, but also of the physical organism. Second, that the concentration of mind on an idea external to ourselves, particularly on a pleasurable idea, tends to remove the thought of disease. Third, that the power of suggestion in all kinds of diseases, and particularly in some kinds, is very great and is just beginning to be fully realized. All these considerations emphasize the close connection between the psychical and physiological, and bring the cure of physical diseases by psychical means well within the realm of law, if not as yet of wholly discovered law.

A third type of specific prayer and one still farther removed from the so-called "higher forms" of prayer, is that in which the demand for a definite object can be met by the rise of a thought in the mind of the individual, but a thought which he seems incapable of producing by himself. The influence of the subconscious here is very plain. Each case of this kind would have to be discussed by itself, but perhaps the general application is seen in the case of a certain girl in college, who relates this experience. She had lost her physics notebook, and the time of examination was approaching. She let it go till the last minute, hoping to find it. Then, being in some concern, she made it a matter of prayer, saying however: "If it is Your will that I try this without my book as a punishment for carelessness, all right;

I will do my best that way ; but it would make things easier if I could find it.'' She immediately felt an impulse to go to a certain store in the village. She reasoned with herself saying: "But I have n't been there for over a month. I remember distinctly the last time I was there, and that was before I lost the book.'' The impulse continued and she went. As she entered, a clerk approached her saying: "You left this here ten days ago, and I could not send it, not knowing your address.'' Then, and not till then, the memory of a special visit made to that store flashed across her mind. But that memory had been latent all the time in her subconscious self, potent enough to induce action, but not strong enough to come to consciousness in the shape of definite recollection. The fact that the impulse appeared with the relinquishment of conscious striving is also significant, as showing a characteristic of subconscious action. It has its correlate in the re-remembering of a name by giving up the strenuous attempt to find it, and in the attainment of sleep by ceasing the arduous pursuit of it. In the history of prayer there are probably many cases of this kind, in which reliance upon the laws of subconscious activity brings the desired result.

There still remains untouched the most difficult department of all, the cases in which answers to prayer come apparently from outside sources. In dealing with these, it must be noted that they form a very small part of prayer. Only 5% of F. O. Beck's respondents claimed that objective answers to prayer were possible. Prayers such as those of a child who asks for things in prayer and then lets his parents know that he has prayed for them, must of course be ruled out as far as any miraculous intervention is concerned, whatever may be the views of the child on the subject. This kind of answer would partly explain the remarkable case of George Muller, and others like him, who let the Christian world know their needs and then pray about them, making no specific human appeal. The very fact of their trust makes the strongest kind of an appeal. Another element in this case would be found in the fact that George Muller was willing to wait "till the last gasp,'' far beyond the point at which any other person would have given up in despair. And "all things come to him who waits.''

The fact of coincidence must not be overlooked. There is a tendency to forget the times when prayer was not answered and to remember the time when it was. This would reduce the per cent. of objective

answers. But it must also be remembered that prayer induces a subjective attitude well calculated to interpret objective phenomena in the desired way, and even to bring about objective results. We do not know yet to what extent our attitude towards life may determine the events which come to us. The selective nature of consciousness is very great, so much so that it might almost be said that we have to think a thing before it can come into our consciousness from without. Even without the belief in the fundamental unity of the universe of conscious life, and still more so with such a belief, we may find a very close connection between our subjective attitude and the things which happen to us. At any rate it can hardly be denied that when a person goes through the world, as does the character of a modern novel (The Dawn of a To-morrow), in the settled belief that "Good's coming, good's coming," and the firm purpose to interpret whatever happens *as* good, or as the result of her own impatience and lack of confidence, she is practically certain to find her prayer answered. He who can say with Marcus Aurelius: "O Universe, all that Thou wishest, I wish," is fairly certain to obtain his wishes. That one's attitude may be at times almost ludicrously effective in one's interpretation of events is shown by a short quotation from the statement of Robert Lyde, an Englishman who lived in the good old days when God was a god of battle and favored individual parties. He tells of an encounter with two Frenchmen in which one of them lifted a weapon against him. "Through God's wonderful providence it either fell out of his hand or he let it drop. And at this time the Almighty God gave me strength enough to take one man in one hand and throw him at the other's head," thus effectually disposing of both.

The laws of mental procedure are not all discovered yet. Until they are, the last word has, of course, not been said with regard to either "objective" or subjective "answers" to prayer. Yet the percentage of yet unexplained cases is so small that it seems fair to assume that in time all answers to prayer will be seen to come as the result of definite psychic laws and that many of these laws will be those which are peculiarly appropriate to subconscious activities. The prayer-attitude is a definite psychic state and has its natural psychic consequents. Its value for the higher life of the individual is rather increased than diminished by the discovery of its laws. And the psychologist would agree with the religious leader in holding that this value lies not in the

specific phases of prayer, but in its more general aspects as meditation and relaxation and in the peace and unification of aim resulting therefrom. "We have," to quote James, "in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and positively true, as far as it goes. The practical needs of religion are met by this belief." Least of all has the immanental view of theology any quarrel to make with psychology for finding the answer to prayer in our own wider self. And taken in connection with an idealistic view of philosophy, the conception of prayer and its relation to the subconscious assumes a meaning much more vitally religious and, perhaps, much more in accord with the common conception of prayer than appears from the bare discussion of its psychology.

PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPHECY.[1]

By RABBI JACOB H. KAPLAN, PH. D.

Denver, Colo.

(A.) *What Is a Prophet?*

The prophet was the national spokesman of Jahve. He uttered an abundance of words, through great mental and emotional excitement, often deep and profound truths, the import of which, because of ignorance of psychological laws, was often not known or intelligible to the prophet himself. These mysterious mind-phenomena of all description, from simple dreams to and through all the stages of psychological illusions, from clairvoyance and clair-audience, to convulsion, delirium, epilepsy, madness and insanity, in short all the mental phenomena deviating in the slightest degree from the everyday normal were considered, by agent and witness alike, as direct inspirations and revelations either mediately through spirits, good or evil, or immediately from God. The prophet was therefore always God-inspired and God-commissioned, and his words, whether profound wisdom as often was the case, or not, as was just as often true, were nevertheless considered messages from God through his agent the prophet. In later times as well as in earlier, the prophet was considered and considered himself, or rather was known to be and knew himself to be, the mouthpiece of God. Not in any figurative sense but literally, not only to the ancients but to us to-day, the prophet is the mouthpiece of God. Only it must be noted that the meaning of that phrase changes with growing intellect and study.

Secondly, it should be noted that the prophet was a loving child of his nation, a patriot in the sublimest sense, in a sense in which the fewest of us to-day are capable of understanding that term. Whenever in the great crises of his people the prophet saw inevitable ruin and

[1]This article is an extract of parts II and III of a thesis presented by the author to the faculty of the University of Denver in partial fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The complete work will be published by the author in the near future.

confusion, he soared aloft on prophetic pinions, comforting his own bleeding heart and the hearts of his people by the hope and message of peace that some day the ideal king, the Messiah, will bring order out of chaos and harmony out of confusion, that he will be a royal and loyal counsellor, a faithful servant of his God and his people. It is evident furthermore, that the prophet must have been a great student of nature and of his times, healing the sick and binding up wounds, doing great and wonderful things with a wise and loving heart, things that have always been and are yet to-day, when a great loving soul works among us for noble ends, wonderful and awe-inspiring. We should note also the wonderful prescience of the prophets, such as only the great souls of humanity have been gifted with, that enabled them to warn and to exhort, to lead and to guide, to preach and to teach, to announce and proclaim. Not ordained preachers and appointed teachers, serving in the pulpit or in the professor's chair were these prophets, but voluntarily, or rather involuntarily were they pressed into service by the great and mighty force of their soul, preaching because of an awakened righteous indignation against oppression and sin, and teaching because they could not help uttering their aspirations and longings, their deep insight and profound wisdom. Again, it should be observed that these patriotic sons of Israel flowered forth also into statesmen, not waiting to be asked or appointed to office, but each one ever ready to offer his services with his "Here I am, send me." Nay, not waiting to be sent but like as a hero instinctively and without thought dives into the mad stream to save some helpless one struggling against a watery grave, so did the prophets with heroic courage plunge into the great stream of the national life to save the sinking ship, or steer it out of harm's reach into safe harbor. The prophets were statesmen by virtue of their heroic patriotism, by authority of their divine, far-seeing and deep-seeing insight and foresight.

In all these activities, it can easily be seen, the prophet acted not through miracle or supernatural power, but in and along with natural laws, displaying all the beauty and power of the human heart under the favorable conditions of oppression, danger, confusion, poverty, imprisonment, love, hatred, ambition, and above all religious and patriotic enthusiasm.

Finally, it must be pointed out that the prophet is very closely related to the great minds of other peoples of all times who do not claim

to be prophets in the sense in which our European civilization has filled out the content of that word. Especially intimate do we find the relation of prophet to priest and diviner, the three being originally, perhaps even in Israel, one and the same person. While the poet was among all peoples the inspired of the muses and the gods, expressing his wisdom in that mysterious manner, of highly excited nervous states, and therefore designated by the vague terms inspiration, revelation and the like. The prophet was not only related to these poets but was himself in every sense a poet, using all the technique of expression, form and rhythm, and displaying as well the highly imaginative faculties of the poet. This leads to the conclusion that the prophet was a genius, bearing the stamp of genius wherever one is found, and in whatever field he is active. The prophet was a distinctly Hebrew genius, and be it distinctly understood, that this does not mean to convey the idea that the prophet is a species of genius that grew only in Israel; on the contrary, the prophet-genius was not even indigenous to Israel's soil, but was transplanted from foreign soil, but here as in many cases of transplanting the prophetic flower grew to a beauty and size that it never had in its original soil, and would perhaps never have attained but for the transplanting into the rich and fruitful soil of Israel.

And yet no clear definition can be given to the prophet-genius that would mark him off from the other species as we mark off a musical genius from a philosophical genius, for in ancient times no man and no genius devoted himself exclusively to one thing as is done to-day. The prophet, I should say, was a religio-poetic and philosophical-political genius all in one in the large and the rough. He felt the mighty stir of his soul as he lay there in the open fields, felt the mad storms of his nation's history ruffling his mighty spirit as the wind shakes the bosom of the ocean, and being unbounded by custom's river banks, but free like a vast restless ocean, his force and energy flowed in all directions instead of being channelled in one course. He was poet, preacher, teacher, scientist, healer, leader, statesman all in one.

(B) Conclusions from the History of Prophecy.

The results obtained from a study of the growth and development of Hebrew prophecy agree entirely with the results in this thesis obtained by a totally different method of procedure.

Were I to write a history of prophecy I should divide the subject into three periods: first, the Early Period, from the earliest times to Samuel; second, the Transition Period, from Samuel to Amos; and third, the Later Period, from Amos to the close of prophecy. It would then appear that the early Hebrew prophecy was not only similar to, but identical with, in every respect, to prophecy everywhere among all peoples. They used in Israel as among the Greeks, Romans, Persians, Indians and others, external means such as dance, music, wine, for bringing about subjective mental and emotional excitement such as ecstasy, delirium, vision, voices, trance, etc. These abnormal and highly excited, uncontrolled nervous states were considered the indwelling of the divine spirit. The Teraphim, the Lot, the Urim and Thummim were another kind of external means for inquiring into the future and obtaining an answer from God for private and national needs.

The second, the Transition Period, shows an advance in intellectuality and moral concepts and a decided advance in the interest displayed in behalf of the Jahve-religion. In this period such men as Gad, Nathan, Elijah and Elisha stand out pre-eminently as the national prophets who had risen above the level of the earlier natural prophets. These were zealous for Jahve, the national God of Israel, and were violent at times and even reckless in their opposition to everything that detracted from the superiority of Israel's religion and God. For this reason they bitterly opposed witchcraft, magic, necromancy and all forms of divination that were so plainly of foreign origin. Israel had brought into Canaan the seed of an ethical religion in that they had voluntarily, as no other nation had done, accepted Jahve at Mt. Sinai as their national God,[1] because he had brought them out of the land of slavery. It was this ethical seed that now took root and grew through the help of the prophets. These prophets, it could then be shown, were closely related to the prophets of the early period and as closely to those of the later period.

In the third period Hebrew prophecy becomes with Amos, as many writers have shown, a unique phenomenon. Amos flowered forth into a prophet-genius, and the genius is always in a sense unique. Israel's sons, prince and pauper alike, had become conscious, perhaps

[1] Karl Budde: "Relig. of Israel to the Exile." N. Y., Putnam, 1898. (Amer. Lect. on Religions.)

through the work of the former prophets, that they must serve Jahve, but this service was still a service of sacrifice and rite. Faults Israel had, but sacrifices would atone for them; besides Jahve could not be too severe and destroy totally, for he was Israel's God only, and by destroying Israel, he would destroy his own field of activity and hence be no God at all. For, thought Israel, as little as a king can be sovereign without subjects, so little can Jahve be God without worshippers. Amos, with true prophetic genius saw that Jahve was God of the whole earth who rules all nations with equal justice. Israel was no favorite in the sense of being permitted to disobey His laws. Jahve had punished Damascus and Gaza, Tyre and Edom, Ammon and Moab, each one for the trangression of some moral laws, therefore he will punish Judah and Israel for any transgression of moral law. In other words, a history of prophetism would show that with Amos, as the first of the prophetic geniuses, the prophet saw, what no one else as yet saw, that Jahve was a God of the whole earth, one who rules all alike in justice. The prophet seasoned this justice with other qualities of love and mercy, emphasizing always the universality and the ethical or moral nature of Jahve. Recognizing with all the power of their prophetic genius that Jahve is a being whose nature is moral, the prophets devoted themselves with all the heroic passions of their great souls to the various departments of human conduct, state, society and religion, to the end that all these departments of human life, especially in Israel, shall be lived in accordance with the laws of justice and righteousness, in harmony with Jahve's nature. God cannot be influenced through sacrifice to guard Israel from misfortune, rather must Israel change his mode of life that no misfortune befall him. Hence a history of prophecy would show that as these profound views of life had never before been uttered with such clearness, force and single-minded purpose, the prophets were in every sense unique; unique however, only in this sense that they excelled, as all genius excels, in what others vainly tried; unique in the sense in which the Indian jugglers and the Greek sculptors and philosophers are unique. It would appear that the Hebrew prophets were the perfected embodiments of the Hebrew genius, that is they were the political, economic, social and religious geniuses of Israel all in one.

(C) If now we gather up all the legitimate claims of the prophet's faculties, and then eliminate all those faculties which have been shown

to be possessed by other men and other geniuses in a degree greater, or at least equal to, those possessed by the prophet, there will remain all those faculties and powers that are peculiarly the possession of the prophet, and explaining them, we shall explain the Psychology of Prophecy. That this is all that is necessary, nay, that anything more than this would be unnecessary and superfluous, becomes evident as soon as we consider that in a psychology of the poet it were unnecessary to begin by examining how the poet eats, sleeps, drinks, and speaks, for these are characteristics of the bookkeeper and the lawyer as well.

Gathering up, therefore, and eliminating, I find the following peculiarly prophetic elements that require explanation in a Psychology of Prophecy: Prophetic Call; Premonition; Revelation; Dream; Vision; Audition; Ecstasy; and Inspiration. To an investigation of these Prophetic elements we shall now devote ourselves.

CHAPTER I. PROPHETIC CALL.

(a) Premonition the Starting Point.

Prediction, or rather Premonition is the starting point of prophecy. This theory held by Smend, and taught even more clearly and emphatically by Dr. Moses Buttenweiser of the Hebrew Union College, is one that seems to me to be the key note to the whole subject of the Psychology of Prophecy.

(b) The prophets are all conscious of a divine call. They "do not speak of a resolution or purpose framed by themselves, to devote themselves to their vocation; but they describe a moment in which they receive a *call*—*i. e.*, to speak from a human point of view, were conscious of a sudden intuition, impressing itself upon them with irresistible clearness and force, and, in certain instances, communicated to them in the form of a vision.''

Thus Moses (Ex. 3:4 ff.) is said to have heard the voice of God calling him to liberate the children of Israel. "When Jahve saw that he turned aside to see, He called him from out of the bush and said: Moses, Moses, and he answered, here am I." Samuel is described as hearing Jahve's voice at a time when the word of God was precious (1 Sam. 3:1 ff.). Amos (7:14-15) denies any relationship to those schools of prophets who learnt prophecy as an art, but emphasizes that

Jahve called him to the office of prophet, and the call had to be obeyed (3 : 8), as is the case with all geniuses. Jeremiah, too (1:4-10), describes how God made it known to him that He had appointed him a prophet even before birth. Jeremiah did not voluntarily choose the profession of prophet (20 : 7-9), in fact he tried hard not to heed the call, but God's will must be obeyed. "It was within me like a burning fire, I tried to withstand it, but could not." Ezekiel, too, in the first three chapters of his book, describes more elaborately than any other prophet a scene in heaven which he saw in a vision, and how the strong hand of God forced him into the prophetic office. So also Isaiah (Ch. 6) gives the date of his call and describes with majestic grandeur the scene in heaven which he saw in a vision at the time of the call.

Thus we see that the prophet describes a moment in which they become conscious of God's *call* to prophetic activity.

(c) Preparation for the "Call."

In Exodus 3 : 4 is given in a naïve way, as I believe, the psychology of the prophetic call. "When God saw that Moses *turned aside to see*, He called him." It is not chance, or caprice on the part of God to call a man to prophetic office, it is only after one *turns aside to see* that he *may* be called from on High. In other words, the "call" comes only when one is occupied with the subject to which he is called, when his mind has been thinking, planning, hoping, aspiring, fearing, that a solution, a revelation, a great light may flash in upon him, and that flash of light *is* the call. "Prophecy" says Maimonides, the Jewish philosopher of the eleventh century, "is impossible without study and training; when these have created the possibility, then it depends on the will of God whether the possibility is to be turned into reality."

(d) Prophetic Temperament.

We can readily understand this subject when we think of genius of another order, say a musician. It is certainly necessary that the musical genius prepare himself by studying technique and expression, and all things pertaining to music, but this study alone does not make him a musician; it depends upon the will of God or, as we should say, upon his genius, his temperament. Now the prophets received the divine "call" not only because they were prepared and educated, but because their minds were preoccupied with the profound mystery of life and were

by temperament and genius able to turn those experiences into the living channels of prophetic activity. We find these prophets expressly confessing that not only had they heard God's call to prophetic office, but by temperament from the very moment of their birth, nay even before born, were they dedicated to become prophets.

(e) My Own Experience.

Emerson in his essay on history says: "I have no expectation that any man will read history aright, who thinks that what was done in a remote age, by men whose names have resounded far, has any deeper sense than what he is doing to-day."

For my own part I must confess that I cannot conceive how else we can comprehend the psychology of prophecy unless it be in terms of our own consciousness. Hence the prophet, when speaking of the thoughts and words of God, speaks, and can speak, only in terms of his own consciousness. I find therefore in an experience of my own life, the beginning of an explanation of the prophetic call; and I mean this not in any figurative sense, but in a strictly literal way.

My mother belongs to a family of great learning and piety. My father too had been at school till the day of his marriage, and had been brought up with that respect and reverence for learning with which the Jew, who for centuries had no other fort and comfort than his Talmud, is more imbued perhaps than any other people. From the womb, therefore, I believe, I was dedicated to a student's life. When only five years old my ambition was to become a rabbi, and I stated this ambition to my father while we were both promenading near the river in our little city in Germany. A short time afterwards I visited my uncle who was then, and is still, teacher in a neighboring city. I saw him walking up and down his room studying some foreign language, evidently Latin. Immediately I was seized with the ambition of walking up and down the room also studying some foreign language; that seemed to me the highest ambition in life. In the course of events, however, we left Germany and came to the United States, and at the age of twelve I was taken from school, and devoted myself to a business career in my father's business. For six years I was in that business, occasionally "turning aside to see" longingly, without the slightest hope or idea, however, that I should ever be called to a student's life. No means and no opportunity presented themselves. One cold winter evening, I visited all alone the German theatre. The music made me sad. I felt oppressed, alone and miserable. All the inheritance of my ancestors was suddenly awakened into life, and in a very serious and sincere sense of the word I felt the call to the higher life. I cared not what it was but something it had to be, something that would unveil the mysteries of the world, prepare me to be a student, a helper and guide among people. That night I walked home several miles in deep snow and was assured, I felt certain, I was determined that I would become a student, though the opportunity and the means for obtaining that end were as

vague as are my opportunities at present for becoming King of Prussia. From that moment to this the ambition and the hope has never for a single moment left me that I would be a student, a teacher and a helper among men.

Now I believe with Emerson that we shall never understand the psychology of the Prophetic Mind, if we believe that the laws of their mind were in any wise different from the laws of our own mind. I am convinced that the psychological experience of the prophets which they describe as the "call" to prophetic activity is not only similar, but identical, in essence and principle to the psychological experience that awakened me into a student's life. What that psychological experience was that we designate by the term "Prophetic Call" will now be investigated.

(f) Smend and Buttenweiser.

What is the psychological experience which the prophet designates as the Call from Jahve to prophetic office? I believe with Smend and Buttenweiser, that it is a Premonition on the part of the prophet of the downfall of the nation. If we will but think that in ancient Israel some of the gravest sins were punishable by "cutting off that person from the midst of his people," that is by excommunication, and that such a punishment was evidently worse than death, for it meant the renouncement of nation and kin, of God and custom, it meant that outside of one's nation one had no right as a human being, we will understand vaguely what the prophets, the national geniuses of Israel, must have felt at the awful thought that Israel was doomed to destruction, the whole people to be cut off from their patrimony. The problem has, however, been reversed by most scholars. It has been thought that the prophet, seeing the many sins of which Israel was guilty, preached the destruction of the nation on the principle that God's rule is justice. This is in every sense, as I believe, an anachronism. To-day every schoolboy knows that a plant must acclimatize itself or die. He knows, too, that the universe is moral, and man must acclimatize himself to the moral nature of the universe, or the punishment is death. Philosophy of history teaches to-day that any nation that violates the laws of morality is doomed to destruction. No prophet need rise from the grave to tell us that. But that law had to be discovered, and Amos, the Hebrew prophet, was the first, as far as we know, to discover that law. The prophets never dreamed of reasoning from the sins to

the necessity, the absolute certainty, of Israel's destruction. Israel had sinned before, and God had always forgiven. But now the prophet Amos, an obscure genius, a herdsman and a gatherer of the sycamore fruit, is seized with the premonition, that evil forboding of the nation's destruction, and he rises to the situation with the true genius that makes him a prophet. As a true student of history he could probably have seen with the vision of a statesman the approach of Assyria, but that alone could never have awakened him to the certainty of Israel's downfall, could never have made a prophet of him. The premonition does not necessarily make a prophet of one. Others such as Queen Louise, Scipio, Leibnitz, Maid of Orleans, and many other persons reported as authentic by the Psychic Research Society of England and the United States, had premonitions and they were not prophets. Others before Newton had seen an apple fall to the ground, they were not scientific geniuses; it was the awakening of the soul, by the experience of the apple's fall that makes us call Newton a scientific genius. And so it was the awakening of the soul of the Hebrew genius into poet, statesman, preacher, teacher, adviser and exhorter, as a result of the premonition, that made prophets of the Hebrew geniuses.

Therefore, as a result of this testing of the premonition, there follows, for the first time in the history of human thought, the wonderful revelation of Amos and the other prophets, that God is just and moral, and to be on intimate terms with God means moral intimacy. It is only through some such overpowering experiences as a premonition of Israel's downfall that so vast a conception as that of Jahve's universality and justice is at all intelligible to any one who comprehends the vastness and grandeur of the religious conceptions of the prophets. It was a religious revelation of so unique a character that we can well comprehend how these men have been believed, and believed themselves, to stand in direct communion with God, speaking to him mouth to mouth.

Dr. Buttenwieser's article "Essence of Prophecy" reads: "It was not, then, the realization of Israel's guilt that underminded the prophets' peace of mind, shocked their moral consciousness and brought them to the conviction," long before the political skies were overcast, "that their people was doomed. On the contrary, the primary fact in the prophets' consciousness was their sudden inexplicable foreboding of the approaching catastrophe, and from this followed, as they inquired into

the cause of the judgment, their awakening to the absolute righteousness of God and the sinfulness of their people."

That the process could not have been reversed, namely, recognition of moral depravity, and the nation's downfall as a result, is to me still more evident from the fact that often the prophets are so overwhelmingly certain of the destruction they announce that neither repentance nor anything else can avert the catastrophe (Jer. 9 : 10), which could not have been the case had the idea of doom been the result of a cognition of Israel's sin, for then it would follow that when the sin is removed, the punishment would be removed.

It becomes evident, therefore, provisionally at least, that the prophetic call was nothing but the moment in which the prophet became conscious of that sudden, inexplicable and awful premonition of the nation's imminent fall.

As in most cases, however, the exception proves the rule, so here, the truth that the prophetic call is a psychological experience of so profound a nature that a new, awakened life is the result, is re-enforced by the exception that not all prophets receive their call in the form of a premonition.

In the case of Hosea, it seems, the prophetic call came at the moment when a light suddenly flashed across his soul, as a result of his love for his faithless wife. The awakened life, the bold thought that Jahve's relation to faithless Israel was but an intensified love which he bore his faithless wife was the psychological experience that assured Hosea that the very act of wedding such a wife was the express order of God, intending thus to teach him the prophetic message to his people. "It appears to him afterwards as a divine arrangement, that he had to marry just this particular wife, but it seems to him now that even then God had said to him ; 'Take unto thee the wife of Whoredom, and children of Whoredom.' (Hos. 1 : 2.)

Hence, to speak in general terms, the prophetic "call" is the psychological moment when the prophet becomes suddenly conscious of profound truths, on the occasion of the strange phenomenon of premonition, or some other equally strange and profound psychological experience.

CHAPTER II.

Premonition, Prescience and Prediction.

That the Old Testament writers believed in the phenomenon of prediction is evident from almost every page of the various books. Deuteronomy (18 : 22) takes the power of prediction as the true test of

the prophet's genuineness. Isaiah (48 : 6-7) seems to indicate that it was not calculation of future events but actual prediction that characterized the prophet. In fact the belief in the power of prediction is common to all peoples. Says Brinton : "The word from the gods is clothed under two forms, the Laws and the prophets,—in other terms, Precept and Prediction." In every religion, from the most primitive to the highest, we find these two modes of divine utterance."

"The second form of the 'Word from God' was when it was uttered as a prophecy, a prediction of the future. In this form it appears throughout the world under the innumerable aspects of divination, oracles, prophetic utterances, forecasts of time to come, second sight, clairvoyance and the like."

Cassandra is supposed to have had the power of prediction but no one believed her. Jesus Ananiæ "four years before the outbreak of the war, and at a time when as yet undisturbed peace and prosperity prevailed in Jerusalem, appeared there during the Feast of Tabernacles and began of a sudden to cry aloud ; A voice from sunrise, a voice from sunset, a voice from the four quarters of the earth ; a voice against Jerusalem and the temple, a voice against bridegroom and bride, a voice against the whole people. This was his cry as he went about by day and by night through all the streets in the city. He was arrested, beaten, and finally taken before Albinus, where he was flogged till his bones were laid bare ; all this torture he suffered without a groan, but crying out at every stroke of the scourge, "Woe to Jerusalem." He was thought to be a madman and dismissed. But for the remainder of his life he did not associate or converse with any one ; nor did he curse those who beat him, nor thank those who gave him food. His one reply to everybody was : "Woe to Jerusalem."

"Similarly, Scipio's foreboding of the later fate of Rome, and Leibnitz's utterance in 1703 to the effect that a great revolution was approaching, left no impression whatever on history; they were but the visions of wise men bearing no fruit in the sphere either of politics or religion, whereas the presentiments and predictions of the Israelitish prophets stirred up and went hand in hand with a movement which, for intensity and persistence and wide-reaching consequences, stands without parallel in the history of mankind." (Essence of Prophecy, Buttenwieser.)

Queen Louise's prediction in 1808, given at length by Schwartzkopff and compared in every detail with the prophetic predictions, that Prussia will not be destroyed but be finally victorious, is another example to the point. Yet another example of premonitory dream, well-known among all the hosts of Dr. I. M. Wise's pupils and admirers, may be read in *Reminiscences of I. M. Wise*, pages 14 to 15.

It might be said that this premonitory dream was the result of his feverish brain, of his agitated soul, which is fundamentally true, because only he could have dreamt that dream ; smaller minds with less thought of Jewish life, with less interest for the welfare of his people, with less of an indomitable spirit and conquering genius could never have dreamed that dream. Not only do I admit this, but I emphasize it again and again that all mind phenomena are subjective and indivi-

dual, and yet the point of interest here is the fact that occasionally, somehow and somewise, some minds can rise to the mountain tops of human history and behold events that are not seen in the vale of humdrum existence.

Not unconscious of the fact that premonition may be rejected as a psychological phenomenon by some scholars, I nevertheless am forced to accept it as a fact, and I hasten to say that it was just as difficult to accept these so-called mystical phenomena as it was to reject some of the most cherished orthodox views of my childhood. No scientist has much respect for the dogmatic certainty of hide-bound theologians and cock-sure thinkers, and yet it never dawns upon half the scientific world that it is equally dogmatic to reject the infinite varieties of mental experiences of countless men and women, and label all these experiences "Mystic Phenomena" and the like, simply because they have not all been sworn to before a notary public with college degrees. Now all consciousness is mysterious. Mystic beyond all power of description is to me the mind phenomenon of those who catch sounds and reproduce them on the piano or on the violin. Mystic to the blind are the quibblings about the beauty of the flower and the sublimity of the mountains. Mystic is the whole field of human feeling. Mystic is the supreme emotion of love, and had we not all experienced this mystic feeling of love, we should doubtless confine in the insane asylum all those who spoke of, and tried to make plain, their feelings of love. To deny, therefore, what thousands upon thousands assert as phenomena of their mental life is, to say the least, unscientific and dogmatic. From the volumes of evidence I have read, and from the countless greater number which are extant and vouched for by men and women of scientific training and good sense, and from the evidence of personal friends, relatives and acquaintances, whose evidence in all other matters I accept unconditionally, I must conclude, I cannot help but conclude, that premonition as well as many other so-called mystic phenomena are undisputed and indisputable facts of the human mind.

This explanation I offer for my acceptance of the fact of premonition as a mental experience, as well as for the other psychic phenomena with which the rest of this thesis will deal.

Psychology of Premonition.

The results of modern psychological studies show us that we are but now beginning to understand something of the infinite mystery of human

mind. No one has as yet been able to grasp, or in any way clearly perceive, "mind-substance," nor has any one been so presumptuous as to say what are the limits of mind phenomena. Even that greatest of all mind certainties, namely, "the ego," *I* think, therefore *I* am, is slipping away, as I believe, when we contemplate double and multiple personalities as presented with scholarly force by [1] Binet in his Alterations of Personality. We can no longer say *I* think *I* am, *I* perceive *I* am immortal; for well might we pause to ask, which is the *I* in the several equally real and potent egos of double, triple, or multiple personalities in physically one human being? Why is it my friend listens attentively to the sweet sounds of the distant music while I perceive nothing? Why is it that I see yonder mountain clearly and distinctly, while my friend wonders what there can be out yonder beyond the range of his vision that I see? It is simply that one mind may be better adjusted than another to catch the vibrations of the universe. Every one knows that the dog barks at the approach of a stranger long before a human being becomes conscious of such approach. One man says: "It will rain to-day because my corns hurt me." I laugh at him because I am conscious of no approaching rain, and yet his pain is real to him, and whenever the changes in atmospheric pressure are such as they are before approaching rain, he feels it in the pain of his corn. I say again there is an adjustment of the individual mind to the universal conditions which I possess not. A very excellent example of finer adjustment of individual consciousness to universal conditions I have culled from an article of Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, in the Literary Digest of March 17, 1906.

"A perfectly normal lad I once saw, possessed the power of distinguishing by smell the handkerchiefs of the family after they had been washed and ironed. I made a personal test of this lad's power to pick out by their odor from a heap of clean handkerchiefs mine and those of others, the latter belonging to his father and mother.

"I have seen a woman who can distinguish by mere odor the gloves worn by relatives or friend. This lady, who likes cats as pets, is able to detect by its odor the presence of a cat when I and others cannot."

"These remarks prepare us to consider the means by which certain persons are aware of the nearness of the unseen cats and are thus thrown into a state of agitation and general nervousness. They are usually not conscious of the unseen cat as odorous.

"It seems to me possible that either they smell the cat too slightly to be able

[1] Binet, Alfred: Alterations of Personality. N. Y., Appleton, 1896.

to define the odor or else receive an olfactory impression of which they are not conscious as an odor, but only in the form of such symptoms as the visible cat would also evoke.

"To be influenced by an olfactory impression, of which (as odor) the subject rests unconscious, may seem a hypothesis worthy of small respect and beyond power of proof. Nevertheless, it seems to me reasonable. There are sounds beyond the hearing of certain persons. If they ever cause effects we do not know. There are rays of which we are not conscious, as light or heat or except through the effects to which they give rise. There may be olfactory emanations distinguished by some as odors and by others felt, not as odors, but only in their influential results on nervous systems unusually susceptible. No other explanation seems to me available."

Premonition, therefore, as I conceive it, is simply an intuition, an instinctive cognition of future events. As everything happens by *law*, through cause and effect, premonition is simply the finer adjustment of the individual mind to the universal mind, or universal conditions, or universal cause and effect. The rudimentary form of premonition I find to be in all the simplest instinctive knowings and adjustment of present conditions to future conditions, as when the dog and the fox "exhibit a well-marked anticipation of future events, in hiding food to be eaten hereafter:"[1] more clearly even, and more intuitively and instinctively, when some animals, as is said, grow a heavier fur *before* the approach of a heavy winter. Call you this instinct, nature? I shall not deny it; I have no intention of calling a premonition of the highest kind, such as those of the prophets and others cited above, contra-natural, they are in every sense natural, the unexplained, yet vaguely comprehensible phenomena of the human mind. In view of the nescience of science as to the limits of mind phenomena, and in view of the knowledge of finer, more delicate adjustments of some minds to infinite mind, who will say what are the limits and the possibilities of human mind for catching the vibrations of infinite mind? As Brinton has well put it: "who dare measure the height and the depth of the sub-conscious intelligence? It draws its knowledge from sources which elude scientific search, from the strange powers which we perceive in insects and other animals, almost, but not wholly, obliterated in the human line of organic descent; and from others, now merely nascent or embryonic, new senses, destined in some far-off æon to endow our posterity with faculties as wondrous to us as would be sight to the sightless.

[1] Fiske, John: Outlines of cosmic philosophy. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1903. v. 2, p. 84.

"More than this: the teachings of the severest science tell us that Matter is, in its last analysis, Motion, and that motion is nought less than Mind; and who dare deny that in their unconscious functions our minds may catch some overtones, as it were, from the harmonies of the Universal Intelligence thus demonstrated by inductive research, and vibrate in unison therewith?"

I repeat, therefore, that Premonition is the delicate intuitive adjustment of human mind for catching the distance vibrations, or "overtones," of the operations of the universe.

CHAPTER III.

Revelation. The Word of God.

Revelation is a fact believed in by all peoples, from the lowest to the highest. The corner-stone of every creed on earth is the corollary, "to wit, the direct communion between the human and the divine mind, between man and God." Brinton continues: "Prophets and shamans, evangelists and Indian medicine-men, all claim, and all claim with honesty, to be moved by the god within, the *deus in nobis*, and to speak the word of the Lord!" "There is no other element in them in which all join with like unanimity. From the rudest to the ripest they echo the verse of the evangelist philosopher when he wrote: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word *is* God.'"

The highest teachings of them all are expressed in the formula: "And the word of the Lord came saying—"

We may go back to the earliest forms of the ancient Egyptian religion, and we find the doctrine that the man who had learned and could pronounce the divine words revealed the god Throth (Thought, Mind) by their utterance would be elevated to the god, and be blended with him, as one inseparable."

"The 'Word of God' as understood by the worshippers, is the kernel and core of every faith on earth. Every religion is, to its votaries, a revelation. None is so material, none so primitive, as to claim any other foundation than the expressed will of divinity. None is so devoid of ritual as to lack some means of ascertaining this will."

That the prophets themselves were firmly convinced they were

speaking Jahve's message, we have seen time and again. Jeremiah in the face of death (26 : 15) clings to the fact that the message he announces is not his own but from God. And the people accepted such utterances literally (26 : 16).

How, then, are we to understand the certainty of the prophets that their words were from God? Surely we cannot believe that God speaks as man. We should have to ascribe to Him a body with vocal organs, and speech modelled after ours, with our grammatical and rhetorical construction. This is the only logical way in which we can conceive God as speaking, if we mean it in the sense of human speech. If, on the other hand, we say that God speaks in a divine language, audibly or otherwise, we must not forget that man can understand nothing but human language, that is, speaking psychologically, the language of birds and flowers, of nature and God, to become intelligible to man, must be translated into, or conveyed in, terms of human consciousness. Maimonides (87) says: "When we are told that God addressed the prophets and spoke to them, our minds are merely to receive a notion that there is a Divine Knowledge to which the prophets attain; we are to be impressed with the idea that the things which the prophets communicate to us come from the Lord, and not altogether the products of their own conceptions and ideas."

Note that even Maimonides observed "not *altogether* the products of their own conceptions and ideas." We must not forget that no matter what we accept Revelation to have been, the fact is irrefutable that the form in which prophetic revelations have reached us is the peculiar product of each individual prophet. That is to say, the prophet received the revelation and then clothed it in his own words, in all the art of the poet and orator, interpreting the message according to the best of his ability. Thus it could easily be shown that the poetic imagery, the sonorous rhythm, the grandeur and sublimity of expression depends in each case upon the vigor of the individual prophet's mind, upon the peculiar genius of each one, while, as is natural, the figures of speech, similes, and illustrations, of each prophet are drawn from the scenes and experiences of his everyday life which are most familiar to him.

Revelation, as I conceive it, therefore, is a sudden mysterious awareness of an inflow of thought, an inundation of spirit, an awakening of mind, seemingly from unaccountable sources, and therefore be-

lieved to be from not natural channels through supernatural agency.

When we speak of thought flashing across our mind we experience the same phenomenon that the prophets experienced when receiving what we call a revelation: no thought will flash across our minds unless we are thinking people, and then the flashes will be along the lines of our thoughts and interests. The prophets could never have received revelations unless they had been busied with the subjects of their revelations. The psychology of the prophets' revelation is explicable on the theory of the prophetic call as outlined above. These prophets were shaken to the very depths of mind and soul by the terrible premonition of Israel's destruction. This was God's call to prophetic office. They then devoted themselves with all the powers of their genius to the call of God, and hence revelations followed as a result of profound thought. Once awakened to the highest pitch of mental activity, as those prophets must have been by the thought of the awful doom overhanging their people, contemplation wrought the profound results in religious, social and political matters which the mind of genius was capable of.

Perhaps the best way of getting at this subject of revelation is to contemplate a hypnotized subject to whom it was suggested that he do a certain thing in his normal state, days or weeks after the hypnotization. The subject awakes and nothing is said or done of what has been suggested, and the subject himself is not aware of any impression in his general stream of consciousness until the suggested time there is an "uprush" from the subliminal consciousness to consciousness itself, and the subject then does or says what has been all this time a suggestion in his mind of which, however, because below the threshold of consciousness, his mind was not aware.

Revelation is some such "uprush" of impressions from the subjective mind to the objective mind, or from below the threshold of consciousness to consciousness itself. And as in the evolution of the physical life each body is the effect of countless accumulations and modifications during infinite æons of time, and as there are in almost every individual special outcroppings of physical characteristics, such as shape of nose, fingers, diseased stomach, color of eyes and innumerable others from past generations, so in the evolution of the human mind or soul there are first the general accumulated and evolved or "a priori" faculties and conditions, and secondly,—and this is something which no psychologist so far as I know, except G. Stanley Hall, has ever hinted at,—there are often these "uprushes" of countless generations

of soul life. It is this occasional uprush into consciousness, I feel strongly inclined to believe, of ideas, predispositional view-points, impressions, characteristics, in general faculties of infinite æons in the past processes of evolution that has made philosophers and poets of all ages speak and sing of transmigration of soul, consciousness of past states, "trailing clouds of glory do we come," and all similar convictions that we have either been here before or have come from above with faint recollections of experiences in another state or other states. As Tennyson has beautifully said:

> "Moreover something is or seems,
> That touches me with mystic gleams,
> Like glimpses of forgotten dreams—
>
> Of something felt, like something here;
> Of something done, I know not where;
> Such as no language may declare."

Now, then, while it may not be possible for me to formulate at present any satisfactory definition of revelation, I am convinced that such a definition must be sought in this yet unexplained field of psychology.

Revelation, then, is profound thought, the result of deliberation after intense mental excitement, such as may cause an "uprush" of the soul's contents into consciousness, a psychological experience of extraordinary intensity similar to that described as "Prophetic Call." The intense psychological experience, coming with a force never before experienced makes it certain that it is the hand of God in visitation, and the clearness and profundity of thought make it equally certain that the result is a revelation from God. In the ultimate analysis our minds are impressed by infinite mind for "trailing clouds of glory do we come," and the contents of all mental experiences are therefore from God, the re-wording, however, is ours.

CHAPTER IV. DREAM; VISION AND AUDITION; ECSTASY.

(A.) Psychology of Dreams as Related to Prophecy.

The whole subject of dreams can be made clear in a few words. It has been shown by Ribot that all sensations can be resensed or refelt, not all by all people, however. Very few, for instance, can resense the sense of taste. Visual impressions are most easily reproduced. Be-

cause the sense of sight is the most highly developed, the one most active in filling the mind with psychological content in waking states, it is therefore the one most operative in sleeping states, in dreams. In spite of all hasty observations to the contrary, as when one affirms that his dreams contained elements that were never in his consciousness in waking states, it may be shown that the mind in sleep can dream, that is, reproduce only those impressions that have reached it in waking states, through regular channels of sense perceptions.

If there is any doubt of this, it must disappear when we consider the following facts discussed in [1] Joseph Jastrow's Fact and Fable in Psychology. One born without legs or arms, never dreams of them, while one who has lost either legs or arms, or both, continues to dream of them as before.

> Of 58 cases of total blindness, 32 of which have become blind before the fifth year, *not one* sees in dreams. Of six persons who became blind between the years of five and seven, four dream of seeing, two dream seldom and vaguely, and two never dream of seeing. Of twenty cases who became blind after the seventh year, *all* see in dreams. These cases show that when vision has become part of consciousness, and the impressions are strong enough, as they are after very early age, the dreams reproduce the impressions. Still more conclusive is the example of Laura Bridgeman quoted by Jastrow from an unpublished manuscript of G. Stanley Hall. Light and hearing are absent from her waking states, and hence they are always absent from her dreams. More than this as the actual motor sensations are the only ones through which she communicates with her fellow beings, these are the only ones operative in her dreams. This is proven by the fact that when she dreams of the approach of an enemy, say an animal, she awakens with suddenness and fright, because, while in the case of those endowed with sight and hearing such a dream does not often startle, since the approach of the animal or enemy is conveyed through those avenues of sight and hearing long before the enemy is near, in her case she is conscious of such approach only through the tactual sense, that is, when the enemy is actually upon her, and hence the awaking with a sudden start and fright in case of such dreams.[2]

Hence we note the first conclusion as regards prophetic dreams, namely, prophetic dreams as non-prophetic dreams, are conditioned absolutely by the content of the dreamer's consciousness,[3] which content in all cases is again conditioned by psychological experiences through

[1] Jastrow, Joseph: Fact and Fable in Psychology. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1900.

[2] For other examples proving the same thing see Sleep, by Manacéïne, M. de. London, Scott, 1897. p. 254.

[3] Bearing in mind, however, the full meaning, "the content of consciousness" as indicated in the last chapter on Revelation.

regular avenues of sense and perception. In other words, concepts in the waking as well as in the sleeping state depend upon percepts.

Note further that[1] "an injury done to any part of an organism is apt to give rise to appropriate dream-images. In this way very slight disturbances, which could hardly disturb waking consciousness, may make themselves felt during sleep. Thus for example, an incipient toothache has been known to suggest that the teeth are being extracted. . . . It is this fact which justifies writers in assigning a prognostic character to dreams."

Heraclitus has already observed that in waking states we have all a common world, while in sleep we have each a world of our own. While the prophets, therefore, move and live in the common world around them, in their sleep they move and live in the world that had been revealed to them through the prophetic call. This becomes still more clear when we consider that feeling, as some writers believe, is the great and even exclusive cause of dreams. "If feelings of distress occupy the mind, distressing images will have the advantage in the struggle for existence which goes on in the world of mind as well as in the world of matter." And since, furthermore, "the rays of the sun or the moon are answerable for many of the dreams of celestial glory which persons of highly religious temperament are said to experience," it becomes plain how these prophets in their own private world of dream, moved by the promptings of their intense feelings, saw the glorious splendor of the heavens and heard the things nearest their hearts, and how the incipient imagination, unobserved in waking life, intensified by their almost inconceivably intense patriotic and pious feelings, gave rise to those vivid prophetic dreams which were so realistic that they could be interpreted in only one way, namely, as Revelations, direct communications from God.

Spencer shows[2] how among all ancient peoples, with no explanation of psychological laws, with no words even to designate these phenomena, there could be and there was no other conclusion than that the individual soul in sleep left the body and visited the scenes, and encountered

[1] Illusions, a psychological study by James Sully, pp. 146-7. N. Y., Appleton, 1882.

[2] Spencer, Herbert: Principles of Sociology. N. Y., Appleton, 1904. Vol. 1, Chap. X.

the experiences, of his dreams.[1] Now while I am a great hero-worshipper, and am carried away with youthful enthusiasm by the grandeur and sublimity of the prophets' character and work, I cannot help observing that they were, in spite of their unmatched religious genius, after all, but children of their age, and their dreams, caused as above indicated, were to them as real as they were to all peoples. They could, therefore, say with all the sincerity of their sincere nature, and without even the slightest suspicion of doubt, that God hath showed them and hath spoken to them all that they saw and heard in their dreams.

The conclusion is therefore evident, in the second place, that the prophets' great mental agitation, primarily as a result of the prophetic call, and secondarily as a result of the awakened life that followed, gave rise to countless incipient fears and hopes which worked themselves out in more or less distinct and elaborate dreams, often of a prognostic character.

But, it may be objected, how is it that ordinary dreams contain no great revelation of truth, quite on the contrary, are often very foolish and far from any conception of truth, while the prophetic dreams recorded in their books reveal a mass of ethical, religious and sociological truth of the highest and profoundest nature?

Modern psychology has made it plain that cerebral activity is constantly going on beneath the threshold of consciousness. I may illustrate very simply as follows: I sit and read, suddenly I feel a shooting pain in my leg, that is, I become conscious of a pain and localize it in my leg. Now some process has been going on for sometime to cause the disorder that gave rise to the pain, and something has been recorded of that process in the central organ, but the record was beneath the threshold of consciousness, and I was unaware. When the impression became strong enough, I was made conscious of the disorder and felt the pain. Or, again, I hear the sound of approaching music; as the music draws nearer, or I draw nearer to it, the sounds become clearer and clearer. Now all this time the music has been playing the vibrations have made some kind of impression on my brain, but I was not aware of it until the intensity of the vibrations brought the impressions

[1] *Cf.* Rohde, E. Psyche. Freiburg, Molor, 1890. pp. 58 ff. where he shows the same phenomena among the Greeks.

above the subliminal consciousness to consciousness itself. These impressions on the brain that are below the threshold are as real as those registered above the line, but our directing activity in the waking state takes no notice of them in exactly the same way as it takes no notice of countless other impressions that are not in the immediate stream of conscious activity. In a hypnotized subject we see the same law exhibited. It is usually supposed that the hypnotized subject on awaking has no knowledge of any of the suggestions made to him during sleep, but it has been shown by many experimenters that although he is not aware of any impressions that may have been made on his subjective mind, his hand without his knowledge often writes those impressions on the Planchette table, thus showing that impressions may and do exist in the human mind even though consciousness itself in the waking state takes no notice of them. During sleep, however, when the reins of consciousness are loose, that is when the power of holding attention and directing is relaxed, all these impressions may rise and flow into the stream of the dream-image.

How association of ideas, even in dreams, from physical conditions or biological conditions, not yet known to the conscious mind, may take place, the following example will illustrate:

"A man who had spent some time in Egypt and there suffered severely from inflammation of the eyes, some ten years later after he had long been living in another country, began to dream every night of different places in Egypt and scenes of his old life in that country. He was absolutely unable to explain the strange frequency of these Egyptian dreams which continued persistently. At last inflammation of the eyes showed itself which served to explain the dream. It was evident that for some time the premonitory systems of the disease had existed although unperceived in the waking state, and hence by force of association the sensation of discomfort from the eyes produced dream-images of the old life in Egypt where the previous attack of inflammation had taken place."

Nearly everybody has had the experience, when working or thinking on some profound subject, or after some great nervous strain, that his subconscious mind, or subjective mind, as many call consciousness below the threshold, has worked out the problem or solved the difficulty more profoundly than he could have done in the waking state[1] because

[1] The opposite of this is also true and proves again the truth of the above conclusions. *Cf.* Manacéine, Sleep. p. 271. "The more uncultured and confined a man's mind is the more his dreams are marked by the illogical, uncouth and rudimentary character."

the subconscious mind can seize upon *all* the recorded knowledge as data for the solution.[1]

On this subject Brinton has the following to say: "By far the majority of the impressions on our senses leave no trace in conscious recollection, although they are stored in the records of the brain; that what seems lost to memory, still lingers in its recesses; and that mental action is constantly going on and reaching results, wholly without our knowledge.

"The psychologist calls this process by the terms 'unconscious celebration,' or 'psychic automatism.' It is the function of the 'subliminal consciousness,' or, for short, the 'sub-consciousness.' Not only is it common, it is constant, and the results of this unperceived labor of our minds is often far more valuable than those of our intelligent efforts. The most complex mechanical inventions, the most impressive art-work of the world, even the most difficult mathematical solutions, have been attained through this unknown mechanism of mind. They seem real inspirations, but we may be sure that the mind through long *conscious* effort had been storing the material and laying the foundation for the perfect edifice which sprang so magically into existence."

A third conclusion, therefore, concerning prophetic dreams becomes evident, it is this: The prophets considered their dreams as direct revelations from Jahve, and well might they so consider them, for in them, through wide knowledge, overpowering experience, concentrated passion and undivided attention, they became conscious of truths so profound, of solutions of religion, of state and society so far-reaching and sublime, that they themselves were startled at the results and felt with sincere piety: Not unto me, O Lord, but unto Thee, belongs all glory.[2]

[1] Numerous examples of this kind of profound results obtained during sleep may be found in Hudson's *The Law of Psychic Phenomina*. Chicago, McClurg, 1893, and still more numerous are the examples of the Psychological Res. Soc.

[2] James, William: Principles of Psychology, N. Y., Holt, 1902. Vol. 2, p. 367. "If focalization of brain activity be the fundamental fact of reasonable thought, we see why intense interest or concentrated passion makes us think so much more truly and profoundly."

(B) Psychology of Vision and Audition in Relation to Prophecy.

Vision has sometimes been classified with dreams, sometimes with the waking states, in reality, however, vision is a phenomenon of the human mind in the waking state, just before falling asleep. These waking visions are by no means as rare occurrences as many seem to believe. I have discussed the subject of vision with two prominent physicians, students of psychology both, one from San Francisco and one from Albuquerque, and both assured me that they had often seen most realistic visions just before falling asleep.

External means are often used to bring about those coveted visions, especially among primitive people, where they were considerd the sure gift of the gods. Speaking of this phenomena among the Greeks Rohde says (Vol. 2, pp. 16-17):

"Die Schauer der Nacht, die Musik, namentlich jene phrygischen Floeten, derem Klangen die Griechen die Kraft zuschrieben, die Hoerer 'des Gotten voll' zu machen, der wirbelnde Tanz: dies alles konnte in geeigneten Naturen wirklich einen Zustand visionaerer Ueberreizung hervorbringen, in dem die Begeisterten alles *ausser sich sahen was sie in sich dachten und vorstellten.* Berauschende Getraenke, deren Genusse die Thraker sehr ergeben waren, mochten die Erregung erhoehen, vielleicht auch der Rauch gewisser Samenkoreer, durch den sie, wie die Skythen und Massagenten, sich zu beraushen wussten. Man weiss ja, wie noch jetzt im Orient der Haschischrausch Visionaere macht und Verzueckungen erregt. Die ganze Natur ist dem Verzueckten verwandelt."

In New Mexico there are Indians of whose practice of inducing these wonderful visions by means of drugs called mesquito beans or mescal button (anhalonium Lewinii) I have read several accounts. "With wide open eyes they (all primitive peoples) see spectres and apparitions such as are not unknown, but are ever growing scarcer, in civilized lands. These waking visions are assiduously cultivated, and become, as I have already said, the chief bond between man and divinity."

In this connection James says: "Nitrous oxide and ether, especially nitrous oxide, when sufficiently diluted with air, stimulate the the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree. Depth beyond depth of truth seem revealed to the inhaler. This truth fades out, however, or escapes at the moment of coming to; and if any words remain over in which it seems to clothe itself, they prove to be the veriest nonsense. Nevertheless, the sense of profound meaning having been there persists; and I know more than one person who is persuaded that in the nitrous oxide trance we have a genuine metaphysical revelation."

There is another kind of vision of which numerous examples are cited by the psychic research societies, and of which I have heard many cases seen by friends, acquaintances and by my own father, namely, a vision of events or scenes about to happen or just passed, as when a child was run over by a team of horses and killed and the scene was seen by the child's sick mother in a vision, or when some one about to die was seen dead in a vision by some one else.

Since, then, vision is so common an occurrence, there is no reason to doubt that the prophets occasionally had visions in the real sense as they themselves described them, not in any figurative or poetic sense as some scholars believe.

That these visions so vivid and full of mystery should have been taken by the prophets in a literal sense as induced by God, and described by "thus Jahve showed me," was not at all surprising; in fact we should have been more surprised had they not been so taken, for even to-day, men of more than ordinary education find no other satisfactory explanation for these and other mind phenomena than that they are caused by spirits. Witness all the great hosts of spiritualists and the countless intelligent men and women who daily believe to hold intercourse with, or believe themselves influenced by, invisible spirits. A very remarkable case is recorded by Spencer (Sociology, Vol. 1, p. 787 ff.) of F. G. Flea, the Shakespearean scholar, surely of more than average intelligence, who finds such visions induced by spirits.

Of the first kind of vision named above, Ezekiel gives us the finest example with most elaborate coloring in the first three chapters of his book; and his vision was due, as Klostermann's thorough investigations show to a pathological condition of his mind caused by catalepsy. Nor is it in any wise degrading to the prophet to say that so grand a vision was due to catalepsy. The fact remains nevertheless, according to Ezekiel's own description of his symptoms, and from a religious standpoint we can but say with Orelli: "auch so ist dann natuerlich die Krankheit als ein gottgeordenetes Mittel zum Zweck der Weissagung anzusehen."

Here belong also the visions of the other prophets. When Zachariah, for example continually repeats the expression "I lifted my eyes and saw," he evidently means nothing more than that with his mind's eye he saw the visions he described, and which were unquesably of a highly realistic and vivid nature.

The second class of visions, those in which one sees as actually present future and distant scenes and events, is also mentioned by the prophets, and here, too, there is no need of considering those visions in any but a literal sense. When Jeremiah for example (14: 18) says: "If I go into the field, then behold the slain with the sword. And if I enter into the city, then behold them that are sick with famine," he evidently means that literally, and there is no reason, from what we

have seen of the possibility of prognostic visions and dreams, to take it in any other sense.

I am convinced, therefore, that the prophetic visions like other visions are a species of mental illusion, due sometimes to the high mental activity and profound interest of the prophet, sometimes, perhaps, to external stimulus, and again to pathological conditions of mind as in the cataleptic state of Ezekiel, but always, it must be emphasized, built up from the elements already existing in the prophet's consciousness. As little as the born blind can dream of visions of light, and as little as the born deaf can dream auditory dreams, so little can any man, whether prophet or poet, see visions that contain aught that is not compounded of the elements that have reached the mind through the regular avenues of sense and perception.

It must be emphasized again that impressions may exist in the mind without the person's recollection or knowledge even of having received those impressions, but nothing which is not part of the contents of the mind can combine in dream or vision images, unless as stated before the person has the power, to me as yet imperfectly comprehensible, of seeing distant scenes, and if he has such power, his vision discloses to him only what each can see for himself if he goes nearer within the radius of vision.

Now as to prophetic audition, the case is similar to that of vision. The auditory nerves are less employed in conveying impressions to consciousness than the optic nerves, and, therefore, the impressions being fewer, the cases of self-excited, or centrally excited audition impressions are naturally fewer than the cases of self-excited vision centres. I again reject the theory of poetic phraseology in cases of prophetic audition, but take it literally when the prophet says he heard the voice of God, for every one has had similar audition experiences, or at least knows of others who have had such experiences.

We all know these phenomena more or less. We have sometimes heard melodies or sometimes a voice calling us by name in the absence of any exterior sound. All such phenomena are the results of the subjective activity of the audition apparatus, while the same phenomena are observed in all the other sensory spheres.[1]

[1] "Sleep." Manacéine.

Now then in the cases where a person hears the voice of a friend or relative in distress or about to die, the explanation may be something like this: Just as in wireless telegraphy one instrument will catch at a great distance the vibrations sent by another, which is attuned to the same pitch, so from a physiological standpoint it may be that the instrument of one brain is so attuned to that of another, especially among nearest kin, that the vibrations sent out by the one will be caught by the other even when a great distance apart. I offer this simply as a suggestion, not as a scientific explanation of the matter. While in the case of prophetic audition, I believe an explanation must be sought in the centrally excited cerebral cells. The prophet, it must be remembered, was the national *preacher*. He spoke aloud to himself and to others the message nearest his heart. His mind was agitated and thoroughly impressed with his subject, and under these circumstances it is easily seen how the brain-cells most repeatedly and passionately exercised would, on the slightest provocation, become centrally stimulated, and the prophet would *hear*, and this very literally, or perhaps re-hear the words impressed on his mind, and thus believe them, he could not help but believe them to be the words of God. Add to this the fact that these words were often the best and noblest of what the prophet thought, felt or spoke, and we can understand how the thoughts nearest his heart, when coming to him in audible words, could assure him and reassure him in only one thing; that these words are not the reflex of his own consciousness, but come direct from God.

Prophetic vision, therefore, as well as prophetic audition, are subjective phenomena, usually the result of centrally stimulated cerebral impressions, indirectly the result of profound interest and thought, and directly, again, the wellspring whence flowed the life-giving waters of deep and profound thought.

(C) Psychology of Ecstasy in Relation to Prophecy.

Ecstasy is a phenomenon known to all peoples and believed by all to be a state of the human mind in which the human communes with the divine. So Rohde: "In der Ekstasis, der Berfreiung der Seele aus der Beengenden Haft des Leibes, ihrer Gemeinschaft mit dem Gotte, wachsen ihr Kraefte zu, von denen sie in Tagesleben und durch den Leib gehemmt nichts weiss. Wie sie jetzt frei als Geist mit Geisten verkehrt, so vermag sie auch, von der Zeitlichkeit befreit, zu sehn, was nur Geisteraugem erkennen, das zeitlich und oertlich Enfernte."

As definite examples of persons who were especially gifted with deep insight through ecstatic vision, Rohde mentions Aristias (p. 92); Epimenides of Crete (p. 96-97) and others.

A most striking example of ecstasy, with vision and illumination and all the rest, is one experienced by Dr. Bucke who has, after the experience, made a great study of the phenomenon of ecstasy among others. I quote from a number of other experiences cited by James in his chapter on Mysticism. "I had spent the evening in a great city, with two friends, reading and discussing poetry and philosophy. We parted at midnight. I had a long drive in a hansom to my lodging. My mind, deeply under the influence of the ideas, images, and emotions called up by the reading and talk, was calm and peaceful. I was in a state of quiet, almost passive enjoyment, not actually thinking, but letting ideas, images, and emotions flow of themselves, as it were, through my mind. All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself wrapped in a flame-colored cloud. For an instant I thought of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that great city; the next, I knew the fire was within myself. Directly afterward there came upon me a sense of exultation, of immense joyousness, accompanied or immediately followed by an intellectual illumination impossible to describe. Among other things, I did not merely come to believe, but I saw that the universe is not composed of dead matter, but is, on the contrary, a living Presence; I became conscious in myself of eternal life. It was not a conviction that I would have eternal life, but a consciousness that I possessed eternal life then; I saw that all men are immortal; that the cosmic order is such that without any peradventure all things work together for the good of each and all; that the foundation principle of the world, of all the worlds, is what we call love, and that the happiness of each and all is, in the long run, absolutely certain. The vision lasted a few seconds and was gone; but the memory of it and the sense of the reality of what it taught has remained during the quarter of a century which has since elapsed. I knew that what the vision showed was true. I had attained to a point of view from which I saw that it must be true. That view, that conviction, I may say that consciousness, has never, even during periods of deepest depression, been lost."

We conclude, therefore, that whenever the subject becomes oblivious of the surrounding world and devotes himself with 'long-sustained contemplation' to any one subject the result is ecstasy, the same phenomenon which many people to-day are practicing as a result of the importation of Indian philosophy under various names, especially under the name Yogi philosophy. Most of the so-called 'higher thought' writers of whom the number is legion have absolutely nothing to offer by way of getting at truth, health, insight, inspiration, and all the rest of it, except this relaxation of all thought and action and the contemplation of one subject, until the result attained shall be divine union of individual mind with universal mind, the highest attainment of truth and well being. If this is believed and practiced to-day, to an extent that one, who has not been among people of untrained scientific habits but of more than ordinary intelligence, can hardly imagine, how can we

wonder, especially since it is an importation from the east and practiced by most orientalists, that the Hebrew prophets too, children of their age and time, gifted with the highest powers of mind and soul and with the secrets of attaining to that highest, should have indulged in ecstasy and seen visions and heard voices, and believed them, nay knew absolutely and unmistakably that these were the means of God to reveal truth. There could be no other explanation; there is, at bottom, no other explanation yet.

There is, therefore, no necessity for supposing, as many scholars do, as most scholars do,[1] that ecstasy is not a characteristic of the Hebrew prophets, or at any rate, a phenomenon of rare occurrence. It seems to me such accounts of the prophetic activity are the results of an overzealous religious piety and an under zealous respect for psychological laws. Vision and audition are not possible without some degree of ecstasy, nay revelation, the direct intuition of truth of a high order, such as the prophets under any or all theories must be credited with is actually impossible without some degree of ecstasy.[2]

Why then make the distinction between the Hebrew prophets and other prophets? All things natural are divine, and all things divine are natural. True it is that ecstasy of the wild and mad kind was seen only in the early stages of Hebrew prophecy when wine and dance and music and other external means were used for bringing about this state, but the subdued elevated ecstasy due to religious temperament and patriotic fervor, due to constant and profound contemplation, was certainly the characteristic of the later prophets.

I conclude, therefore, with Algazali, the Arabian philosopher[3] against most of the scholars I have read, that 'whoso knows not ecstasy knows prophetism only by name.' Without ecstasy, revelation, vision, audition, dream, are impossible, and *vice versa*, all these in turn produce ecstasy. Ecstasy is usually the spring whence all the other prophetic streams flow. 'The hand of the Lord is upon me' is an ex-

[1] Prof. S. H. Butcher in the Lit. Dig., Feb. 4, 1905, says: "The Delphic priestess seized and subdued by an apparently divine possession lifted out of herself in transport, presents a contrast to the Hebrew prophet whose reason and senses remain undisturbed under the stress of inspiration." Delitsch, System of Biblical Psy., p. 404, also tries to make this same distinction.

[2] See very excellent book by Flagg, W. J.: Yoga. N. Y., Bouton, 1898.

[3] Lewis. G. H.: Biog. Hist. of Phil. N. Y., Appleton, 1880. p. 368 ff.

pression of the prophet's ecstatic state and, therefore, with Morgan[1] I take ecstasy to be "a religious exhortation of spirit in which the free activity of the mind is not suppressed but heightened. Such a state is behind vision as a psychological condition."

CHAPTER V.

Inspiration.

We found the prophetic call to be the psychological moment in which the prophet became conscious of his life's mission, and we saw that this was a psychological experience of so profound a nature as to awaken the prophet into a new spiritual life and fit him as national preacher, teacher, statesman, saviour. We found Premonition to be that psychological experience, and we investigated the psychology of Premonition. We then found Revelation to be the result of deep, profound contemplation, and found that all religious teachers received revelations as a result of silent contemplation, usually in retirement from all surrounding disturbing influences. As a result of silent contemplation came ecstasy, an experience of all religious recluses of which ancient civilizations, as well as mediæval Europe, furnish countless examples. As a result of contemplation or revelation came the Prophetic Dream with all its wonderful results in soul life;[2] and as a result of Ecstasy came vision and audition with their mysterious effects on the spiritual life.

We now ask what is the psychological experience called inspiration, or divine inspiration?

From the lowest savage to the highest philosophers of ancient Greece the conception of inspiration was that God or some higher powers occasionally used some men as their instruments through whom they worked, or as the mouth-piece through whom they spoke, that is, the inspired person did things and uttered thoughts not his own, but God's.

Josephus makes Balaam excuse himself to Balak in these words: When the spirit of God seizes us, it utters whatsoever sounds and words it pleases without

[1] Article, Trance.

[2] *Cf.* "Sleep," by M. D. Manacéïne, p. 323, where he gives two excellent examples of wonderful results of dreams and shows these to be the "stuff" that prophetic dreams are made of.

any knowledge on our part, for when it has come into us, there is nothing in us which remains our own.[1]

Of Socrates it is said that he was a profoundly religious man, "A man of that bilious, melancholic temperament which has in all times been observed in persons of unusual religious fervor, such as is implied in those momentary exaltations of the mind which are mistaken for divine visits; and when the rush of thought came upon him with strange warning voices, he believed it was the gods who spoke directly to him."[2]

Thus Philo says of himself: "Sometimes, when I have come to my work empty, I have suddenly become full; ideas being in an invisible manner showered upon me, and implanted in me from on high; so that through the influence of divine inspiration, I have become greatly excited, and have known neither the place in which I was, nor those who were present, nor myself, nor what I was saying, nor what I was writing, for then I have been conscious of a richness of interpretation, an enjoyment of light, a most penetratiug insight, a most manifest energy in all that was to be done; having such effect on my mind as the clearest ocular demonstration would have on the eyes."[3]

To be inspired, then, meant to have the gods breathe their spirit into the human being so that he might act more wisely or speak more profoundly than at other times. "We are now so remote from this doctrine of inspiration,"[4] says Spencer, "as to have difficulty in thinking of it as once accepted literally. Some existing races, as the Tahitians, do indeed show us, in its original form, the belief that the priest, when inspired, 'ceased to act or speak as a voluntary agent, but moved and spoke as entirely under supernatural influence;' and so they make real to us the ancient belief that prophets were channels for divine utterances.

So Brinton tells us: "Prophets and Shamans, evangelists and Indian medicine men, all claim, and claim with honesty, to be moved by the God within, the *deus in nobis*, and to speak the words of the Lord."

And that this is not meant in any figurative sense we are further assured by Brinton that in these inspired seers and priests of all nations missionaries of higher faiths have ever found their most resolute foes and successful opponents, "and this because the shaman has himself been face to face with God, has heard his voice, and felt his presence. His faith therefore is real, and cannot be shaken by any argument."

Apollo also inspires his priests and priestesses by speaking his words

[1] Smith, Sir W.: Bible Dictionary, Hartford, Burr, 18—.
[2] Lewes's Biog. Hist., p. 167.
[3] James, W.: Varieties of relig. experience, p. 481. N. Y., Longmans, 1902.
[4] Soc.: Vol. 1, 237 ff.

through their mouth,[1] or allows them to see the hidden things of the future which, in this inspired state they were able to do. "Der Gott, so war der Glaube,[2] faehrt in den irdischen Leib oder die seele der Priesterin, von ihren Leibe geloest, vernimmt mit Geistersinn die goettliche Offenbarungen. Was sie dann mit 'rasendem Munde' verkuendigt, das spricht aus ihr der Gott; wo sie 'ich' sagt, da redet Apollo von sich und dem was inn betrifft. Was in ihr lebt, denkt und redet, so lange sie rast, das ist der Gott selbst."

We see, then, that inspiration was among all peoples taken to mean a process by which God used man as his instrument for doing his work, for speaking his words.

Among the Hebrews, also, the idea of inspiration was that of a divine force emanating from God and entering the human being, making him thus more skillful in his work, more heroic in action, and more eloquent in speech. Thus Israel can speak of skilled workmen as men in whom is "the spirit of God."

The fact is that certain people in certain pathological conditions of mind become so violent and physically powerful that they have always been thought to be 'possessed' by evil spirits, and men are not wanting to-day who can cast out devils and the like. In like manner, in certain other pathological conditions, the human mind becomes more active, stronger, more penetrating, and in every way more powerful than in normal conditions, and at such times the person is also considered inspired, that is taken hold of by spirits, this time by beneficent spirits, by the divine spirit, by God.[3]

Most Biblical writers make the distinction that non-Israelitish prophets delivered their message, as already mentioned, in a state of unconsciousness, while the Isaelitish prophets delivered theirs in the full possession of their mental powers. This distinction is entirely gratuitous. Inspiration is the same mental process wherever manifested. The distinction, however, that should be made is this: in all early stages of mental development, among all nations, and of course among the Hebrews as well, inspiration meant the unconscious utterances, in a state

[1] *Cf.* Rohde, Vol. 2, 58 ff.

[2] *Ibid.*, 60-61.

[3] Alf. Binet in Alt., of Pers., p. 72, tells of a hypnotized subject, who, similar to the possessed or inspired subject, wrote twelve pages of a novel in one hour in the hypnotized state.

of trance or similar mental state, or sometimes the mad, violent utterances and actions in certain diseased states of mind; while in higher civilizations, as among the higher prophets of Israel, higher in the sense of more intellectual and moral, inspiration ceased to be connected with those former phenomena, and was taken to mean the no less mysterious but the more profund utterances, the more eloquent products of the highest activities of the deeply moved, stirred, passionate human soul.

From what has been said it will easily be seen that divine inspiration can never mean that the human ceases at any point to operate and becomes passive in the power of some non-ego, but rather that the human rises with all the splendor and pristine glory of its native forces to the highest pinnacle of its own power. Were the Infinite One to speak through any finite being it were of no avail to Him or to us, we should still insist that He speak to us in terms of our own consciousness, in our own language, lest it be like the distant roar of the cannon, mighty and fearful, but not as intelligible or translatable as the tiniest voice of the human babe. Were inspiration a literal speaking of the Infinite One through the mouth-piece of the prophets, then all inspired books are dictated by the same author, and should bear the same characteristics of style, rhetoric and language throughout, which, needless to say, is not the case; to say nothing of the necessity of presenting us with unmistakable ultimate truth, and not with a progression or development of truth, as we find. Furthermore, such inspiration should have presented predictions literally true in every detail, which, again, is not the case with any prophet, of any people, time or clime; neither of Moses nor Buddha, neither of Jeremiah nor of Jesus, neither of Swedenborg nor of Joan of Arc can it be said that all the inspired utterances, predictions and the like are literally true.

Inspiration, it must therefore be granted, is the highest eloquence of thought, speech, or action, a result of the temperament, power, inheritance, energy of genius, under the exhilaration and stimulation of some great enthusiasm and mental excitement, an eloquence so far above what genius himself is ordinarily capable of that it is easily believed to be not his own work, thought or action, but the result of some higher power than self. Therefore we shall define inspiration as that state of the human mind in which mental activity, accelerated it may be externally by means of drugs, wine, music, dance, and the like, or subjectively by strong emotion and passionate feeling and interest, is so

rapid that in this state of mental energy the mind's reaction time is practically nil, and the subject finds at his command all the conscious and unconscious impressions of his mind, and occasionally or often the trailing clouds of glorious thoughts from countless generations of soul evolution, all of which rises suddenly in majesty to meet the occasion, and the result, whether in art, in sculpture, in music or in religion, is so profound and beyond the subject's normal ability as to carry the conviction that some mysterious power, the spirit of God, has wrought the result through him; and in the ultimate analysis this is literally true; for there is no distinction of kind in mind. Human mind and divine mind are one mind. Mind is in essence one. If the genius of the prophet has channelled a larger stream of mind to turn the machinery of his being he has been helped in his work by divine mind, by a larger stream of divine mind than other men find possible to utilize.

Conclusion.

Prophecy, as I have shown in the foregoing pages, is a human and subjective phenomenon of the mind; divine it is, not only in the narrow sense of superinduced by God, but in the larger and truer sense that all phenomena, and, certainly above all conceivable possibility of doubt, mind phenomena are divine phenomena, are the manifestations of the Infinite One in a literal sense of the word. The subject of prophecy to be intelligible to us must be analyzed as a psychological process, as has been attempted in this thesis, and since this subject, so far as I am aware, has never before been handled entirely from a psychological standpoint, the preceding pages have in most cases dared only to indicate the direction in which a solution of the problem is to be sought, and a comprehensive study begun. It cannot be emphasized too often that prophecy is a human process, a mind process, and must be studied from a human point of view as a branch of psychology, just as philosophy, poetry and music are human phenomena and are studied as psychological processes.

The reason why prophecy alone of all phenomena has usually been excluded from the field of psychology as a branch worthy of the same serious investigation as other branches is simply because on the interpretation of prophecy depend the interpretation of religion, for which a supernatural origin has always been sought. Especially sad and bitter is

the opposition to this psychological investigation of prophecy from orthodox Christian sources, because of the many involved dogmas as to the divinity of Jesus, and the predictions of His coming by the Hebrew prophets, The time is coming, however, when it will be seen, through a new adjustment of finite mind to infinite mind, that the highest ideal is to be natural, and not supernatural, for to be natural is to be at one with the divine; therefore the highest being is a human being, a man, for to be a man is to partake in the highest sense of God.

This Thesis, then, far from destroying or detracting aught from the glory and sublimity of the prophetic life, thoughts and earnest devotion to a life of oneness with God, simply explains how such a life grows and operates, and adds glory and divinity to all human life by showing that prophetic life is natural life, and natural life is divine life. Scholars are beginning to accept the theory of the omnipresence of consciousness. To me it is the only conceivable theory of these orderly and mathematically exact operations of every particle of the universe. In the same identical sense, therefore, in which the flowers and the stars reveal themselves to our mind without voice or word, so does the infinite mind reveal his essence and his thoughts to finite mind without words or voice but through the inaudible, intangible and invisible modes of mind.

THE EDUCATION AND PROBLEMS OF THE PROTESTANT MINISTRY.

By DAVID SPENCE HILL.

Fellow in Clark University.

I.

Introduction.

If one may judge by the amount of discussion recently appearing in the press upon many of the topics of these pages, our general subject is one of paramount interest. The purpose of the undertaking is to bring into light and to synthesize facts and theories which thus presented may help others to clear up the present religious situation in America. Since he indulges in some criticism from the standpoint of a layman, the writer may be permitted in the outset to assert his deep respect for and his profound sympathy with the men of the ministry who are upholding, as best they can, the standard of righteousness. In attempting to deal candidly and searchingly with aspects of the subject that are far-reaching and that penetrate into so many related fields, it is hopeless to avoid oversights and crudities in a work that may be, in some respects, pioneer. And not the least difficult task has been to avoid conventional modes of expression upon these topics by which it is easy to convey unintentional insults to precious sentiments. The writer would rather be allied with the rank and file of the ministry than with the cynical, hypercritical classes, whether of the ignorant or the erudite type, who, immersed in selfishness, lift no hand to lessen the burden of struggling humanity.

The pastors are the men doing the effective work of the churches and constitute the majority of the ministers. They are not usually seminary professors, are not always found in church conferences, and seldom are of the class that hang around universities to utilize a desultory ministerial service for support while they dabble in metaphysics to seek a basis for their attenuated faith. The confidence and hope in-

volved in this undertaking is addressed to the honest pastors who are accomplishing daily, under adverse conditions, work of value to the race. And, it may be added, even my most intimate ministerial friends are innocent of participation in, or responsibility for, the defects of this book. The following pages are condensed from seven chapters that I have prepared in investigating the status, problems, life and education of the Protestant ministry in the United States. The subject was suggested to me by President G. Stanley Hall to whom I am indebted for constant stimulation. To him and to many others I am under obligation, particularly to Dr. W. H. Burnham, for suggestive criticism, and to Mrs. Julia Payne Hill for help in preparing manuscript.

The world looks to the ministry for leadership in morals and religion. The term minister has various meanings; in the Bible the words minister and ministry are used to translate several different words, *e. g.*, in the Old Testament (Heb.), *shērēth*, *priestly ministration*; in the New Testament (Gr.), διακονεῖν, *ministration and lowliness*; also *servant*, ὑπηρέτης. Prof. March has arranged more than 100 offices under the title. Some of these are: abbot, acolyte, archdeacon, beadle, bishop, canon, clerk, clergyman, confessor, curate, dean, deacon, elder, divine, father, friar, priest, revivalist, rabbi, scribe. A catalogue of the offices pertaining to the service of religion among primitive, ancient and foreign peoples would be interminable and there is necessity of confining arbitrarily the meaning to a specific application. We agree to designate usually by the word minister, a person in charge of a Protestant church in the United States, a pastor, and particularly of the denominations mentioned in another paragraph.

Religion is at the basis of the ministerial profession but it is not incumbent upon us to inquire into the origin of religion, whether it be found in ancestor worship, the social instinct, fear, sense of dependence, the suggestibility of objects, the unattainable or in supernatural revelation. We need not agree with the dictum of Herbert Spencer that the ministry, as a profession, is a uniform outgrowth of the ancient politico-ecclesiastical agency, and with his ghost theory, but it is necessary to recognize in all peoples the tendency towards specialization of occupation, and we may assume that any convention, law or orthodoxy that over-reaches protective and healthful specialization to the complete repression of individual variation and growth is repugnant to funda-

mental instincts, productive of one-sided development and hostile to progress of the race. The Rev. H. G. Weston remarks: "The first temptation of the resident of the temple is to suppose that he holds so special a relation to God that the laws to which all other human beings are subject have no control over him." (40.) The ministry as a profession is not a fixed entity and finds development only when not arrested or perverted, and its keynote should be adaptation to the largest possibilities of the race.

The external aspects and present status of the religious organizations of the United States are revealed in statistics and in published opinions. For example, in the *Arena* (27), a Unitarian clergyman asks the question: "*Will the Churches Survive?*" A lawyer asks: "*Ought not the Churches to Pass?*" since, says he, they are clannish, church charity brings loss of self respect and the pulpit fails to keep in touch with living things. (25.) A Catholic writer attributes to religious indifference the alleged tolerance and harmony of the sects. In opposition to such adverse comments thousands of ministers and church members are optimistic. For example, we note a symposium of hopeful, enthusiastic predictions by representative clergymen, predictions of stirring progress and increased religious power during the next ninety years. And the two illustrated volumes, *Christendom*, edited by Rev. William D. Grant, Ph. D., contain glowing presentations of Christian activities in every country of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century, by sixty competent contributors. Again in *Social Unrest*, a late book of studies in labor movements, there is contained a sorrowful complaint of the decay of authority in religion, and that religion has been systematically, if unconsciously, used to quiet the masses and reconcile them to their lot. (7.) A popular magazine chronicles sarcastically the passing of the old time revival, and, in the guise of liberalism, the same writer deplores the bad morals of the South where "Orthodoxy" reigns as in a casual relation, while he fails to explain the unprecedented immorality of New York and of Boston, as revealed in graft, insurance, murder, divorce, assault and abortion cases, thriving under the noses of professed radicals in religion. (42.) According to a startling estimate by the chaplain of the Prison Evangelistic Society of New York the known cost of crime yearly in the United States is 1,100 millions of dollars; and he declares over 500 millions more are spent on crime than in humanitarian, educational,

religious and ecclesiastical agencies. No satisfactory compilation of statistics of the churches has been made since the valuable government report (10) of 1890. Formerly the *Independent* of New York published tables, and of late years Dr. H. K. Carroll, in charge of Census of Churches in 1890, has published annually tables in the *New York Christian Advocate*, and these tables are usually copied into popular compends. The larger denominations issue yearly accurate statistical reports. (43.) Agreeably accurate and complete are the *Congregational Year Book*, *The American Baptist Year Book*, *The Minutes of the Methodist Churches, North and South, and the Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church.* The words member, communicant and adherent are not clearly defined in use. The annual of the Episcopal church is confessedly uncertain in the use of the word communicant. The Roman Catholic statistics are based on estimates little better than guesses. There are difficulties inseparable from religous statistics, such as imperfect co-ordination of dates, reorganizations, revisions, confederations and obstinacy of the leaders of certain small sects.

According to Dr. Carroll's latest summary, January, 1907, the grand total of all communicants in the United States is 32,283,658. There are nine Catholic sects of which the Roman Catholic is the largest. Its numbers are being greatly augmented by immigration. They claim a total of 11,143,455. The larger Protestant groups are as follows: Methodist 6,551,891; Baptist 5,140,770; Lutheran 1,957,433; Presbyterian 1,771,877; Episcopal 846,492; Congregational 694,923; Reformed 422,359; United Brethren 286,238; Evangelical 179,339; Unitarian 71,000; Universalist 55,831. These figures do not include missionary forces in foreign lands, affiliated societies, as the Young Men's Christian Association, Christian Endeavor Society, Epworth Leagues, etc., or the Sunday schools, which reported in 1905, 11,329,253 scholars, 1,451,855 officers and 140,510 schools. In 1905 there were slight gains reported for the Sunday schools; there were heavy losses in Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Wisconsin. (13.) There are increasing demands for the infusion of new blood into the International Committee, as *e. g.*, that of Arthur S. Peake from the standpoint of a minister. (30.)

Josiah Strong concludes that the membership of leading Protestant denominations is not keeping pace with the population and that the percentage of barren churches is increasing. (37.) There were 5,000,000 more unchurched persons in the United States in 1906 than in 1890, and there are fully 30,000,000 non-church members to-day. Because of the different principals involved, statements of comparative

percentages regarding the growth of population and of the churches are misleading. If we subtract the abnormal report of the Salvation Army from the total, the gains in ministers and in communicants in 1905 were the smallest in five years. (9.) The estimates of Carroll just issued show some apparent improvement during the year 1906, in the matter of gains. The writer is authoritatively informed that the Census Department of the Government will issue shortly another report upon the churches. This report should furnish a sound basis for comparison with that of 1890, and until its appearance further inferences may be withheld.

Methods too numerous for description are being utilized by different churches, and eastern seminaries have called conferences of Christian students to present the attractions of the ministry. Not only heresy trials, but also remarkable federations of denominations formerly hostile have occurred, the most notable being the Inter-Council of Churches, founded in New York in 1905 and representing ninety per cent. of American Protestants. The Unitarians and Universalists, statedly for the practical purpose of harmony, were excluded. Much ridicule was therefore brought upon the conference; and there are evidences that Sectarianism is not dead, as, for example, the Episcopal church continues to debar from its pulpit clergymen of all other denominations. The race question and agitationists complicate the problems of union. But the movement is significant; even the *Christian Register* (Unitarian) says: "Thanksgiving may properly be rendered for the federation in any form of the principal Protestant churches of America. The exclusion of Unitarians is of small moment compared with the union of Arminians and Calvinists, Methodists and Presbyterians. The Federation marks an advance as great as that of Japan." It seems that men are becoming convinced that they can be both moral and religious and yet not believe the same dogma. Not a leaf nor a flower is a duplicate and we are coming to know that spiritual natures bloom in the atmosphere of freedom and light; nevertheless the period is now distinctly one of unrest and uncertainty in the religious world.

As to the dearth of ministers, the decrease is evidently not due to excessive withdrawal of undergraduate students during the seminary course, for the average ratios of the number in the graduating classes to the total number of students in the theological, law and medical schools, for four years, including 1904, are respectively 21.6%, 24.3%

and 20.3%, which do not show marked disproportion. The question has been suggested to the writer, "How many seminary graduates actually enter the ministry?" In order to secure first-hand information the writer sent the following inquiries to every Protestant seminary in the United States:

(a) Total number of graduates, 1901-1905 inclusive?

(b) How many of the graduates are in the ministry to-day?

(c) Reason for withdrawal and present occupation of those graduates not in the ministry?

Sixty-three institutions furnished information sufficiently prompt and explicit, and these included the leading seminaries of America as: Harvard, Yale, Andover, Hartford, Bangor, Berkeley, Seabury, Sewanee, Cobb, Newton, Rochester, Va. Union, Augsburg, Concordia, Red Wing, Augustana, Chicago, Eugene, Standfordville, McCormick, Auburn, Theol. Sem. of Ky., Xenia, Lane, Garrett, Boston, Vanderbilt, Meadville, Tufts, St. Lawrence, etc. In brief, the recapitulation shows that of 3,401 theological students graduating in the five years, 1901-1905, the percentage of these engaged in ministerial work in March, 1906, is 94.3%. Of the remainder, 1.4% are deceased or in ill health, 1.2% are teaching (some in church schools), 1.1% are pursuing post-graduate work, 1.1% occupation unknown, .3% in special religious work, .4% in business, .2% were deposed or dropped. It seems, therefore, quite certain that most theological graduates enter and remain a reaonable time at least in the ministry, and this probably evinces a demand for young men. Observation indicates a tendency in the churches to put aside the old men for the young. In dissatisfaction with the ministry as it is the people turn to the seminary products and by them are often illy satisfied.

Many persons have expressed opinions upon the problem, "Why men do not enter the ministry," as witness Dr. Harper's conclusions (19) and more recently the report of the special commission appointed to investigate the subject by the Alliance of the Presbyterian Churches. (43.) Perhaps we cannot know the actual forces in the making of the minister, for they are the factors in heredity, infancy, childhood and youth, as well as the more obvious motives that prompt men to action. Again to obtain information at first hand the writer sought, by personal solicitation, the confessions of men who had deliberately rejected the vocation. One of the questions asked was: "Did you ever seri-

ously contemplate entering the ministry? If so, why, and at what age?'' Though the task seemed delicate it was not difficult to collect nearly fifty testimonies from men, most of whom were college graduates, above the average in social standing, and representing legal, medical, business, scientific and educational pursuits. No summary can take the place of these contributions, which, it is hoped, will be presented elsewhere. Suffice it to note two points: 1, The ages of decision of our correspondents in regard to the ministry, as stated, averaged about 20 years, which is somewhat suggestive in view of Starbuck's study of 235 cases of conversion, which occurred at about 17 years (36), and Coe's study of the time of decisive awakening of 1,784 men, which he found to be 16.4 years (12). 2, The responses illustrate the extreme variation in the motives influencing men and the difficulty of generalizing an answer to the problem. There appears, however, a common undercurrent of recognition of the altered relative status of the ministerial office and a protest against its limitations of freedom, intellectual, financial and social.

In contrast to the words of men who rejected the ministry are the published testimonies of successful ministers who tell why they are in the work. (1.) Again there appear great individual differences, but it is notable that the moral and spirited emoluments are magnified. The meagre financial rewards, the friendships, the sense of leadership, the immunities from business strife, the intellectual enjoyments are counted by some—but ''the opportunity to do men good,'' ''the moral victories,'' ''complete altruism,'' ''response to the mystic call,'' ''sacred and helpful intimacy with men,'' ''the harmonizing of the world's discord,'' ''the gratitude and love of souls,'' ''partnership with Jesus Christ''—are the things counted best by these individuals.

II.

Ministerial Life and Work.

''What must the minister of to-day be and do?'' To answer this question necessity is laid upon us to seek information directly from the people. A distinguished professor in the Harvard Divinity School wrote in response to an inquiry as to the practical duties of a pastor: ''Of these things I have no knowledge,'' and Dr. Shailer Matthews re-

cords a seminary president who confessed that he did not know what the people want in the way of a minister. The exact type demanded varies with the denomination, the congregation and the member. In nearly every sect there are rich and poor churches, conservative and radical, fanatical and intelligent, good and bad members. Sometimes the kind of preacher called depends upon the man who contributes the most money and bosses the church affairs, which is not saying that he may not be a fairly good man. Influences from the world may reach the minister, his education may impel him and his zeal sustain him, but unless the minister be a strong man who can control, he is, by nature of his position, dominated by those who employ him or by the organization with which he is affiliated. Responsive to the demands of his people the minister is somewhat analogous to the organic cell adapting itself to changed activity or habitat either to its own detriment or development. With ecclesiasticism in full sway and authority the dominant note, the type of minister is more arbitrarily prescribed by the church, but revolt against ecclesiasticism observed in the neglect of formal creeds and the assertion of individual belief, renders the social consciousness the controlling factor, and the minister approximates an objectification of the common mind as he and the people interact.

"Custom, that monster, custom, who all sense doth eat," feeds the minister; when unkind custom cannot be ignored, it must be rebuked or conciliated. The whims of the populace, the unwritten code which places the minister at the service of the people day and night, the conventions regarding his habits, the conversation, amusements, dress, sermons, as well as the formal vows and creed, offer formidable influences for the lover of spiritual freedom to meet. Whether in the atmosphere of a self-assured radicalism or of iron-clad orthodoxy the minister must suffer where these factors exist; spontaneity crushed in him leaves little power to stimulate those who hear, and there results in the field of organized religion arid wastes of uniformity. Ezra reversed the process and ordered the people to conform to his ideas of religion under penalty of excommunication and forfeiture of property. Judaism, the impositions of the scribes, formalism, the inquisitorial spirit, repeated recrudescences of mechanical and literal interpretation of religious writings, fear to transgress accumulated precedent, at various times have been the Nemesis of the church and its ministers. It is true that never before have priest and people

enjoyed so fully the legal right of freedom to believe as they do in our country. Slavery to religious authority is not a matter of law, but it is a matter of custom and, in the case of the suggestible, a psychological fact. The absolute right to believe or to disbelieve affords opportunity for those who differ and for those possessed of imperative ideas to establish organizations of their own, and there results the mixed complexion of the religious situation, where numerous organizations are the expression of cranks and adventurers. But we might expect to find some expression of the deeper, wholesome religious life of the sanely pious rising above the chaos of sectarianism; as Ross states the thesis of his book: "From the interactions of individuals and generations there emerges a kind of collective mind evincing itself in living ideals, dogmas, institutions and religious sentiments which are more or less happily adapted to the task of safeguarding the popular welfare from the ravages of egoism." There is forming in this transition period of uneasiness, church federation and of scientific enlightenment, and of crying moral need, a new consciousness toward religion and its ministers. This new social consciousness is broader than the formulæ of the sects and is essentially hopeful. Like salt structures crystallizing out of a solution of mixed ingredients the outlines of this new attitude are not clearly discernible. A composite picture of the mental content of a large number of persons might reveal a few of the bolder outlines of the ideal minister, his activities and his religion, Our attempt to obtain a rude cross-section of the minds of even a small group for the purpose of illustration and suggestion will be met probably with the usual stock objections against the questionnaire method. This is not the place for a defense of it, and we need only assert that liability to error in its use depends largely upon the subject and the preparation of the questions. The questionnaire has been abused by misuse, and uses of the method which have never been claimed for it have been criticised, but surviving the torrent of criticism it remains as a scientific means within its own sphere, in the study of pedagogical problems, of adolescence, of criminology and in the psychology of religion as well as of some social problems. If an objector holds up his own ideal in contradiction to the content of this chapter, let him remember until he can bring to bear upon the problem more numerous testimonies than are presented in our small group, that the voices of more than a hundred persons, informed upon this subject, remain more instructive than the voice of but one man.

It is desirable to ascertain the individual experiences, ideas and the conventional attitude of church-goers regarding the minister and the church, for these are the mental factors with which he actually deals. We cannot cipher out all this *a priori*, and must collect it in burdensome, inductive fashion from persons to whom the problems are matters of living interest. Says President Hall: "The psychic activities of childhood and youth and of the common average man, often the horror of previous philosophy, and the actually as distinct from the theoretically practical, are worthy of all scientific honor."

A list of seventeen questions was printed and several hundred copies were sent to individuals in widely different spheres of life, including business men, lawyers, physicians, ministers, labor leaders, congressmen, stage people, army and navy officers, teachers, clerks, wives, students and others. Through the courtesy of the *New York World* and of the *St. Louis Christian Advocate*, the request was printed with full explanation. The questionnaire is as follows:

The Minister and His Work.

The person who receives this circular is asked earnestly to aid us in an important study. Our object is to obtain ideas and facts from many individuals regarding the conditions and work that concern the pastor, minister, or clergyman, as well as opinions of what he should *be* and *do*.

Your occupation.....Approximate age.....Sex.....

Nationality.....Church relation.....

Name.....(Name is not essential.)

Please write upon the back of this sheet a *full* and *frank* expression of the results of your experience, and any definite facts you can give, concerning some of the following topics. Consider as many of the topics as possible, using more paper if necessary.

1. The minister's value to you personally. Describe your ideal minister.

2. Can you suggest any changes in the theological schools? Education and training of a minister. If you are a minister do you wish that you had been trained differently, and how?

3. The minister and his creed. What liberty in belief may he have? If he grows to doubt honestly a part of his creed, what should he do?

4. Your ideal funeral discourse; its contents and aim. What kind would you have of yourself? Service at grave?

5. Communion service. Would you modify? Please describe your feelings and thoughts at the last service that you attended.

6. The sermon; its length, kind and aim. Doctrinal, expository, revival, charity, and missionary sermons. Written or extemporaneous? How should it affect will, feelings or intellect? To whom addressed?

7. Best age, stature, voice, manner, complexion, gesture, oratory for the preacher.

8. Kind of public prayer most edifying. States of mind desired. Prayers for what, for whom? Written or extemporaneous. Prayer meetings.

9. Pastoral duties. Visiting his members, and the sick, and strangers; sociables, receptions. Reclaiming the abandoned. Skeptics. The young people. What about confessions? Peacemaking in family quarrels. Finding work for the unemployed. Persuading to conversion. Most important?

10. Collecting money for missions, widows and orphans, education, charity, church purposes; his own salary.

11. Scholarship; Hebrew, Greek, sociology, psychology, criminology, literature, physics, chemistry, biology, history, theology,—which should he know? Most important? Should he write for publication, address conventions, etc.?

12. May he seek reputation as an author, lecturer, be rich? Long or short pastorates preferred, and why?

13. Recreation; golf, bicycling, tennis, boating, walking, novel reading, music, the theatre, wine at home, billiards, smoking, fasting. Which are the best for him?

14. In Sunday school should he teach or supervise? Most useful relation to the Sunday school.

15. Should he fight the saloon, etc., and how? Be active in politics?

16. Announcements at the Sunday services. Control of musical programme, of sexton.

17. Marriage ceremonies. Baptism. Preaching to insane or to convicts.

Please send reply promptly to

DAVID SPENCE HILL.

CLARK UNIVERSITY,
Worcester, Mass., October 28, 1905.

A logical order in the questions was avoided in attempting to lessen the error of suggestion. The topics were designed to direct the attention and to arouse dormant feelings, and it was hoped that the irregular order would require more serious consideration than a series which could be answered in a smoothly flowing paragraph, a device adopted in the endeavor to secure accurate pictures of individual mental content. Repugnance to revealing one's cherished ideals in religion or one's private experiences increases the difficulty where material of this kind is sought for scrunity and analysis; there are those who indignantly resent an intrusion into the precincts of the human mind who do not hesitate to undertake an explanation of God's mind and purpose.

The material obtained in response was voluminous, and rich in illustration and suggestion. 145 persons wrote, representing widely diverse localities, New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, South Carolina, Missouri, Ohio, Colorado, Pennsylvania and two from Canada. Most of the replies came from

the eastern states and from New York. All but two or three of the correspondents were Americans.

The average age of the writers was 29 years. There were 62 persons 20 years of age or under, 32 between 20 and 30 years of age, 22 between 30 and 40, 23 between 40 and 60, and 6 persons between 60 and 72 years. The youngest person was 16 years old (one). 41 persons were over 25 years of age.

There were 92 females and 52 males.

The occupations reported were: Teachers 9, ministers 7, theological student 1, university students 5, university professor 1, theological professor 1, lawyers 5, coal merchant 1, broker 1, bond salesman 1, librarian 1, workman 1, wigmaker 1, weaver 1, railroad chief clerk 1, insurance agents 2, proof-reader 1, business manager 1, organist 1, salesman 1, hospital orderly 1, physicians 3, scientist 1, capitalist 1, eminent soldier 1, editor cosmopolitan daily 1, college president 1, wives 4, housekeepers 2, normal school students 84, not specified 2. The normal school pupils (78 women and 6 men) represent a wide variation of home environment.

One hundred and thirty-two persons were church members; 13 claimed no church relation. 41 were Methodists, 33 Presbyterians, 15 Baptists, 10 Congregationalists, 13 Catholics, 12 Episcopalians, 3 Disciples, 3 Unitarians, 1 Swedenborgian, 1 Jew.

As constituted in age, sex, nationality, occupation and religious preference, the group is fairly representative of American churchgoers. A more than average type of intelligence is represented; numerous highly representative men, strangers to the author, responded with surprising promptness and care. Only one answer apparently came from an insane crank; he desired to supplement 25 pages of poor penmanship with explanations "which he would willingly go 1,000 miles to give in person upon receipt of a telegram." A frequent note, especially in the responses of Catholics, was the preliminary avowal of broad-mindedness, followed after a few pages by intensely biased declarations, as: "All ministers and seminaries should be abolished except those of Catholicism." More than one ardent Protestant came to the writer privately and urged him to look carefully into the merits of his or her particular denomination in order to observe "the wonderful progress and superior enlightenment."

Some correspondents ignored specific questions and replied in let-

ters of which a few specimens follow. The first is from a well known corporation lawyer of Missouri:

"Assuming a possible value to you in the frank utterance of a layman's convictions, I write in reply to your letter. I am a lawyer, 50 years of age, male, American, a member of the Episcopal church, although without a trace of faith in any of its religious doctrines.

"A minister should be humble, spiritual, sympathetic, sincere, strong, learned and wise. He must understand in order to forgive, suffer in order to be patient, learn in order to grow. He should know more of history and philosophy and less of a sect's doctrine. His mind should be trained to enterprise, his convictions framed for enlargement, his aspirations chained to humility. He should have the capacity of profiting by experience. Sermons should be brief, clear and to a purpose. Any fact, emotion, thought or experience, will answer for a purpose. Life is one thing always, under every aspect, at every moment. Ministers should tell the truth, if they know it, at the grave. Judgment should be reserved. An honest, natural manner is best. Every age is good, as there will always be younger and older to listen. Scholarship is knowledge without profit, learning is less good than wisdom. All knowledge is meat to a right mind. Ambition to be or to seem anything is foolishness; aspiration is wasted in the attainment. Recreation is profitable and just; a man is a man first and a preacher afterwards; to become a preacher without becoming a man is a fool's enterprise."

A Connecticut workman, American, aged 50, wrote:

"I will give you my view of what a minister ought to be and do. To me the minister is of no value personally only as man to man; I have got a little commonsense and can read and think and reason as well as he can and obey the law, try to help those worse off than myself; those better off don't need my help. I think that the minister should be a clean cut man. When he starts in his life work he should take up the teachings of Christ and follow them without any deviation whatever; let any young minister that is ordained this year take Christ's life, from childhood to the crucifixion, and practice it and preach it. Every young minister, I say, for I am afraid that one alone would have a pretty hard time of it, and see what the result would be in ten years. Don't wonder why the masses do not go to church, look to the classes to find the cause."

The next letter is suggestive of the religious dyspeptic type, too potent in church circles. It is from a Massachusetts lady, age 31, a mother. The letter is too long to print in full:

"These views about ministers are not the opinions of my husband or parents but mine. My father has three times been elected a delegate to the General Conference. Always accustomed to the clergy unexpectedly, as well as frequently arriving, I did not study them as closely as I wish I had done, but my impressions of them are not as delightful as they ought to be, the fault of the clergymen. They who visited our home, to beg of my father or to preach, were a dissatisfied lot, looking for secretaryships, bishoprics or churches where salaries were higher. They were religious politicians. There was one minister deeply spiritual, one presiding elder and one bishop very devout; that is not many. The ministers I have known have

been, if successful, conceited because of their erudition, methods of work or big churches. Their influence, applause and amens were purchasable commodities. They never talked about God, faith or the Bible. I was a Radcliffe student, have been taken everywhere travelling and sightseeing, but the ministers never talked about history or art or great men, but thought I must, of course, be interested in basket-ball, gymnasium work and Harvard men. . . . . Sermons; I should like to have them short and of great variety, some historical, some doctrinal, some about the great church fathers. Thomas à Kempis, Faber, Fenelon, Francis of Sales, and, in later times, Luther, Knox, Calvin (Faber, of course, is not ancient). I should like to hear the philosophers seriously referred to; Hobbes, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Kant, and, shall I not add, Renan and Ingersoll. Some of the ministers smoked, some adored fine horses, some admired and acted silly toward well dressed women, and had very bad colds and took on retiring a good dose of water, sugar and hot Kentucky. The minister's wife ought to be the kind of worker a deaconess is; she has no business to marry a minister unless she expects to be a pastor's assistant. I know at least three ministers who have wives smarter than they are, in fact the women keep the husbands in the places the men nominally fill." Here the Radcliffe alumna was diverted into a dissertation upon the minister's healthy appetite for cream, eggs, fruits, steaks and "expensive foods" and upon the great dangers and effects of indigestion.

To extract and present in orderly form the results of the vast amount of material received in response to the questions, it is convenient to follow a different grouping from that of the questionnaire. The aim is to objectify the experiences and opinions of the correspondents, to portray some of the usual conventions affecting the minister, and at the same time to discriminate from the standpoint of psychology between essential and non-essential activities illustrated. In the first place we consider:

Experimental Value of the Minister.

One hundred and eighteen persons wrote upon the topic and only 7 persons said that the minister was of no value to them. 111 persons testified that they had been helped in some way by the minister; some of the terms used by them in describing his helpfulness are: Important, great, encouraged me, counsellor, spiritual leader, religious expert, restraining power for honesty and morality, good example, helped to better life, in practical duties, for power over sin, inspiring, uplifting, calming influence, an interpreter and Bible expositor, congenial, a friend, companionable, sympathetic, consoling and comforting in sickness or death, social help, maintains the church, opened his library for me, helped to educate me, strengthens faith, sermons and preaching valuable. One individual acknowledged the minister to be an aid

to social preferment. This single acknowledgment seems significant, as observation shows that not a few aspirants for social and business advancement — occasionally teachers, lawyers, physicians, real estate and insurance agents, even the grocers, benefit greatly by their assiduously cultivated ministerial and church acquaintance. In some city churches these Machiavellians are a thorn in the flesh of the minister.

The majority were helped by the minister in his capacity of sympathetic advisor, counsellor, religious expert, spiritual leader and upholder of ideals. We infer that he has relieved fear, the sense of sin, doubt, perturbation, disappointment; he has assuaged grief and anguish; he has, in many cases, helped to solve the problems of youth, to meet the crises of adolescent aspiration, of conversion, and that the struggles of temptation and of sexual passion have been brought before the physician of souls. The consciousness of need prominent in these testimonies implies realized weakness, a feeling of the impending inevitable; where this sense becomes anxiety, apprehension, dread, with the keen desire to avoid evil, the state involves some form of the emotion of fear. The feeling of helplessness finding expression in religious experience is often allied with fear, which plays so great part in every phase of life. The 1,701 persons of President Hall's study confessed to 6,456 fears. In her summary Miss Tanner declares: "None of the emotions of children have been so carefully studied as that of fear, for there is none which gives more anxiety to parents or is more difficult to overcome, especially with little children."

Again, "It cannot be doubted that fear has played and still plays in the religions of all people, a rôle second to that of any other emotion, and therefore merits the greatest importance attached to it," remarks Josiah Moses (24 a), who also notes that some have held that fear is the source of all religions, that primitive and ancient peoples have had their kakodaimona as well as their eudaimona, that the Jews and the Christians have had their demons as well as their divinities; that there are more than 500 references in the Bible to fear. As the beginning of prudence and wisdom, as spurs to knowledge and as a restraint from evil, certain fears are wholesome and to eliminate fear totally would be disastrous. If the entire absence of fear is deplorable the excess of it is still more deplorable. To the long list of morbid fears, such as *panophobia*, *monophobia*, *astrophobia*, *misophobia*, Moses adds *theophobia* and *peccatiphobia*, "the fear of God and the fear of sinning," which become genuine obsessions with some religionists. The problem of religious pedagogy is to regulate fear to its proper proportion. Aristotle said: "The terrible is not to all persons the same; . . . . it is possible for these things to be feared much and too little; the brave man suffers and acts just as the case demands and right reason warrants."

To the minister whose frequent function seems to be in meeting men, women and children at the point of religious disturbance, full knowledge and skill in the prevention, recognition, analysis, and therapeutics of fear are indispensable that he may free the people from its bondage and destruction. The legal counsellor and the medical man view human nature at close range, but the true pastor views it in the peculiar and culminating experiences bound up in religion. There are dangers in well intended but blundering advice and instruction which may deepen neuroses and increase mental ills at the crises when there is extreme suggestibility and plasticity of mind. Imperfect as were the services rendered, nevertheless the returns evince the value of the minister to present day society, and the possibility of increased usefulness through intelligent preparation and enlarged capacity.

The Ideal Minister.

1. Moral and Temperamental Qualifications.

One hundred and thirty persons contribute their ideas; 80 of these use some of the following words in their descriptions: sympathetic, benevolent, charitable, helpful, patient, fatherly, kind, forgiving, loves God and fellowmen, one permeated with the spirit of unselfishness. 57 portray him as honest, conscientious, true, sincere, reliable, of deep convictions, earnest, not deceitful, possessing simplicity, a good man. 52 say manly, strong, able, courageous, broad-minded, executive, understands business, thoroughly trained, wise, noble, a leader. 34 emphasize social traits, a friend, mixer, sociable, good-tempered, jolly, cheery, magnetic, home should be open to all. 19 emphasize tact, adaptability, humility. 18 loyalty to church, adherence to doctrine, fealty to vows. 14 want him to be always full of hope, never depressing, "tells of good in us." 13 specify eloquence, good preaching. 9 want him to have special ability to explain the Scriptures, to understand the Bible. 8 persons define him simply as gentle, clean, dignified, pure, a modest gentleman. Miscellaneous demands: a minister who does not smoke or chew; one friendly and not too reserved; loves children, flowers and birds; one who censures and condemns. Since one or a few persons often dominate the affairs of a church and dictate to the preacher, the views of the minority and of the isolated individual must be weighed in considering the things to which a minister may be sub-

jected. In proportion to the triviality of some of these ideas, where the possessor is of controlling influence, this difficulty increases. If we regard only the higher percentages showing some agreement concerning the ideal minister, it appears that he must be morally upright, strong, courageous, capable, dominated by the spirit of sympathy, unselfishness and the desire to benefit his fellow men. He is sociable, a man amongst men, endowed with common sense and tact, having more of hope than of pessimism; pure, sincere in action and in friendship, a thoroughly good man, loving God and man.

2. *Mental Equipment.*

The content of this question is suggestive: the subjects do not comprise the gamut of knowledge, nevertheless considerable latitude is afforded to preference. Some persons prescribe for the minister all of these studies and additional ones. Here are a few specimen answers:

M., 38. I have no information that Christ knew more than one language. M., 53. In these times when many of the congregation are as well educated as the minister he should be a broad scholar in all lines of interest. F., 60. Sociology, psychology, literature, history, little theology. F., 19. A minister should be a graduate of some theological seminary and should have studied theology, literature, history, sociology, psychology, Hebrew, Greek. F., 19. Should know all of these because the Bible is a storehouse of knowledge which must be interpreted.

The answers from persons of mature years generally laid emphasis upon broad general training without precise reference to particular studies. Two confessed frankly, "I do not know."

One hundred and twelve answers were specific enough for classification. Persons were asked to indorse the studies suitable for ministerial education, and afterward, as a check upon the selection, were asked to indicate the most important. A careful accounting of the two tests proves in both cases a coincidence of choices, judging by the studies named in both instances among the first six in order of frequency of mention. These six are, theology, Hebrew, Greek, literature, sociology and psychology. This course of study includes the conventional prescription for ministerial education in vogue for a century past—but there is also present a persistent insistence upon a broader training, indicated in the demand for the last three studies and in generalizations, such as:

Must know much of some and a little of all; should be grounded in all; no field of knowledge useless; a well-rounded man; everything.

The responses well illustrate attitudes of church goers, some wedded to convention, precedent and authority, others emerging from the domination of ecclesiastical influence, still devoted to the church but craving more light and liberty, while a few see a solution for the problems of the ministry to be found in the utilization of scientific knowledge and methods. Nearly all agree that the best culture and wisdom are essential to the minister of religion.

3. Physical and External Characteristics.

Imposing physique is desired in the minister almost unanimously by the younger correspondents. He must be tall, stately, six feet, strong to look at, well proportioned, etc. Many women designate the kind of hair or complexion; he should be a blonde, a brunette, have gray hair, be an oldish man. A young man demands that complexion show the proper amount of fresh air. Concerning age of the minister, and other particulars, we note:

M., 53. If minister has been progressive the best age is over fifty, so far as preaching is concerned. A younger man may be more useful in other work of the ministry. A speaker should not ape others. F., 20. Anywhere from 25-50 years. A natural born leader will be an orator. M., 25. An old man, speaking from the depths of experience. Voice sympathetic, gesture simple, eloquence natural. M., 60. External factors are soon forgot when genuine interest in his people animates the preacher. M., 61. I would have manner simple, style unstudied, gesture not florid. I want to forget a man's age, stature, voice, complexion, and either be instructed or stirred emotionally or given volitional impulsion. M., 33. Avoid exaggeration of voice and gesture; should be neat in dress and cleanly in personal habits. M., 40. It seems like a joke to have a young man preach to me. M., 35. The preacher is not an actor. M., 47. Should be modest, clean of speech and person; no coarse jokes. M., 61. Individuality important; affectation, abominable. M., 72. The mind is the measure of the man.

The average age favored for the minister is exactly 40 years and 6 months. In all but three cases an age greater than that of the writers was prescribed for the minister.

A majority of the writers, especially adolescent women, laid stress upon voice, as seen in the use of the following expressions: bass, well modulated, expressive, winning, deep, musical, forceful, deep-ringing, pleasing, penetrating, cultivated, strong mellow, pleading pitch and refined pronunciation, orator, should not yell, only voice counts much, voice affects me. The professional voice culturist might find here some ground for advertisement of his business, but there is probably a deeper

significance in the spontaneous and naïve emphasis placed upon the voice than a plea for mere elocutionary art, for in this unanimity there is corroboration of the fundamental racial significance of the voice. Our limited organs of sound perception are attuned only to hear vibrations varying from about 16 to 50,000 per second. We are able to observe the almost universal possession of voice in the animal kingdom. The sounds of fishes, the vocal efforts of frogs, the bellowing of cattle, the barking of dogs, the bleating of sheep, the chattering of monkeys, the hissing of serpents, the cackle of poultry, the roar of the lion, the singing of birds, suggest the distinctive voices of animals and to some extent the moods that cry may express. Man has ascribed voice, or purposeful sound, to inanimate creation, as: "The twilight voice of distant bells" (Whittier, the Merrimac), and in the Psalms, "The floods have lifted up their voice." Literature abounds in references to the effects and significance of the voice. In the English Bible we read of the "voice of joy," "the voice of supplication," "voice of singing," "voice of a multitude at ease," "a still, small voice," "voice of my beloved," "the sheep know his voice," "sweet is his voice," "did ever people hear the voice of God and live?" "the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God." In man there is a manifold development of voice consonant with his complex being, as: crying, speaking, shouting, calling, yelling, whispering, sobbing, screaming, sighing, talking. A beautiful and cultivated voice commands high monetary compensation. The voice is first affected by disease or age; by it we not only find expression but we are able to read more into it than anything else; it is of constant utilitarian value; it is of immense import in the development of civilization. "The voice is the index of the soul," declares a blind physician. James places speech, or "sound significant" among the instincts. We read in *Adolescence* that the profound vocal modifications accompanying increase of age, puberty, adolescence and old age, and those caused by abnormalities of the *vita sexualis* as well as the great individual differences "prove the significance of voice as a personal index." Since the voice is the index of the soul, what is craved is not bare elocution, mechanical production of sweet tones, but the qualities of strength and virtue of which the unperverted human voice at its best should be the expression. This and the strength, grace, good complexion, natural gesture and other external particulars named indicate by a naïve mode of demand that only a

well-rounded physical man, of health and manhood, is to-day the proper representative of Christianity, the ideal minister. The words, healthy, holy, hale, and whole, come from the same Anglo-Saxon root, and physiological psychology is restoring the deep philosophy embedded in the words, says President Hall, who goes further to suggest that we retranslate some texts, as:

"Worship the Lord in the beauty of healthfulness;" "healthfulness becometh Thy house, O Lord;" "serve Him in healthfulness;" "preserve my soul for I am healthful;" "this is a healthful man of God; the healthful Scriptures, the healthful day, spirit, people, etc."

The verdict of the group, according to the larger consensuses, is that the ideal minister is superlatively helpful in many of the deep experiences of life; he is a moral paragon, sincere, pious, social and sympathetic; physically he is superb, and like the philosopher's perfect man "speaks slowly with a deep voice." Whatever may be asserted of the decline of ministerial prestige or of disrespect for individuals, we discern in the background of the common mind superlative respect and admiration for the man who can approximate this magnificent standard.

What the Minister Must Do.

In contrast with the theoretical ideal, the actual minister demanded in practical life is revealed in the exorbitant service imposed upon the professional representatives of religion by the world and by church members. The obligations and the limitations relegated by common consent to the "perfect man" portrayed in the preceding pages, are illustrated in the remainder of our returns, and some idea is afforded of the effect of these conventions upon minister and people as well as of their pedagogical aspect.

1. Creed and Belief.

Illustrative opinions upon the minister's relation to matters of belief, are as follows:

M., 45. Organist. Have yet to hear of a clergyman who knows exactly what his creed means. F., 29. Wife (Meth.) A minister who is doing good should continue to do so even though he doubts part of his creed. M., 60. Army officer (Unitarian) He should hold fast to the spirit of his creed rather than to the letter; large liberty of belief. M., 65. Salesman (Episc.) It is impossible for an honest thinker not to have doubts as his thought is enlarged by study and reflection.

The essential thing is good life. F., 31. Wife (Meth.) I do not see how a creed can count for anything; God does not change but our views as history develops are ever changing, and no two people believe alike. M., 24. Broker (Cong.) So long as he believes in the Fatherhood of God and obeys the teachings of Jesus he should not be limited as to details of creed. F., 20. (Episc.) A doubting minister should be removed from the ministry. M., 28. Lawyer(Presb.) Should have no creed beyond to-day. M., 65. Salesman (Episc.) Should disregard creed except in essentials. F., 20. Student (Presb.) Should not let others know that he doubts. M., 38. Minister (Meth.) Should have perfect freedom of investigation. M., 60. Minister (Swedenborgian) Should have every possible liberty to change creed; creeds are man-made formulas. F., 21. May preach his doubts so long as they do not endanger spiritual life. F., 22. Student (Bapt.) The Bible is the standard. M., 38. Lawyer. Should have no creed. M., 53. Librarian (Episc.) Should have perfect liberty in matters of creed. M., 38. Manager (Presb.) For every minister to have his own creed would bring chaos. M., 30. Theol. Student (Presb.) His creed should be based upon his conscience, experience and the Bible. M., 23. Lawyer (Meth.) Should base his creed on general truths of Bible. F., 47. People not always ready for some new thought which the minister may have reached. M., 42. Minister (Meth.) All liberty within the Apostles', the Nicene and the Athanasian creeds, barring damnatory clauses, otherwise he is not historically a Christian, and should give up the ministry if he differs from these. He may doubt details that do not involve principle. F., 21. Student (Bapt.) If he cannot conform, should change creed. F., 17. Student (Catholic) Priest must withdraw and relinquish duties if he doubts; no one has a right to doubt the creed. F., 20. A doubting minister can cause great disorder in people's minds, especially those too ignorant to think out things for themselves. M., 37. Minister (Meth.) My Christianity should be broader than my Methodism or my Calvinism. F., 20. Student (Cath.) Minister of the Catholic church is not liable to change his belief for it is on a firm basis. M., 61. Eminent scientist. The minister's liberty to believe should be absolute. If he honestly doubts nine-tenths of his creed and believes one-tenth he will find that enough to do saving work with. Negative destructive criticism is in bad taste and anti-pedagogic because positive things should be taught. Therefore, when he finds scepticism growing upon him, be silent on his negative and preach the good that is in him. F., 20. Preach with all his might what he can believe.

The most obvious fact is the wide difference of opinion; bigotry, intolerance, blind faith, advancing conservatism, fairness of spirit, fear of the havoc working of scepticism, and proffered solutions of the problem of what a minister should do who honestly doubts, are all in evidence. The minister is in contact with these differing elements in his congregation and in church councils, elements that may be roughly grouped into types common to many churches; the extremely conservative, unprogressive type, whose confession is that of automatic repetition of what they have heard; next, they who relish freedom of belief but who shrink from the danger to themselves and others of swinging

away from the usual standards of authority; and a minority class, about 10% of all, who believe in perfect freedom of thought and speech for the minister, who would place the doctrines of religion in direct competition with other claims to truth, who crave no esoteric policy and welcome light from any source. Of the 130 persons contributing, 52 declared for "large liberty" but with reservations upon "fundamentals" not always clearly defined, and hence there are few of them who would not place some fetters upon the minister's intellect. The reluctance to changing one's point of view, to making new generalizations is manifest, and 29 persons fear the results "of disseminated doubt." It is quite remarkable that only two Protestants specify orthodoxy as a ministerial requisite; this may be an evidence of the relaxing attitude toward iron-clad standards, of a silence and indifference toward the pious formulas and of a growing recognition of the necessity for new interpretations of Christianity, but there is recommended by the majority of our church members no definite course for the minister who finds himself surrendering old views when face to face with broader areas of knowledge. For instance, even in educated New England more than one brilliant and pure minister has been driven to ruin and to suicide by the inquisitorial exactions of deacons.

2. Sermons.

The preparation and delivery of sermons is the regular duty of the minister in charge of a church. Our responses contain interesting comments from persons of many kinds, a variation, however, that does not fully illustrate the mixed nature of a large congregation.

Examples: M., 32. (Meth.) Need preaching on cardinal doctrines, especially on justice, judgment, hell and the awful darkness of sin. F., 61. Extemporaneous, from heart experience and with the Holy Ghost. M., 51. (Episc.) Should deal with man's opportunities for good and the inevitable effects of sin. M., 47. (Disciple.) Short strong devotional, sane. M., 60. (Swedenborgian.) Revivals help to make bigots. M., 61. Would drop old doctrines and literal interpretations and teach the tremendous and sweeping affirmations behind the new criticism and psychology, of which nobody realizes the possibilities. F., 20. (Bapt.) Should appeal to better nature, limit about one hour. M., 21. (Presb.) Every variety, appealing to all classes and ages; about 25 minutes. M., 23. (Meth.) Sermon based on the general truths of the Bible, extemporaneous and appealing to the intellect. M., 22. (Jew.) Church is not the place for display of scholarship. F., 27. (Bapt.) Practical, not theoretical. Jesus did not preach a millionaire

sermon to a fisherman. Although a Protestant and subject to creeds, believe our religion would be bettered were creeds forgotten and charity practiced, not preached. F., 21. (Presb.) Should not deal with doctrines of one particular church. M., 24. Never doctrinal, expository, missionary or revival in crude sense of terms, but from simple human depths of feeling. M., 34. (Cath.) If missionary sermon means collection, then it should be short. Most of us in our hearts think the missionary should try and reform the heathen in our country first. M., 38. (Episc.) A minister who cannot make himself interesting has heard the wrong noise. F., 32. (Meth.) Let the minister sometimes preach to the married men while the women stay at home. M., 65. (Unitarian.) Sermon as near early Christianity as possible. M., 35. (Cong.) Cannot afford to be dogmatic. M., 60. (Unitarian.) Young and middle-aged are the most important parts of church and their intellect and feeling should be approached. M., 46. (Presb.) Wholly eliminate doctrinal. M., 37. (Cong.) According to needs of people, no lectures on topics of time with lantern slides. M., 42. (Meth.) Doctrinal sermons may be interesting if presented with animation and freshness. Staple of the pulpit is exposition of the Scriptures, though dreary and commonplace comments sometimes pass under the name. M., 37. (Cong.) The preacher should be a prophet speaking in his own fashion. Miscellaneous: Should help in every day affairs; arouse to noble ideals and actions; tell straight what to do; make plain the way of salvation; not too emotional; strike straight home; delivered to congregation in general; addressed to particular individual; lead people into right relation with God; few illustrations; with plain understanding; not over heads of people; make people think; somewhat emotional; scholarly discourse; instructive; adapted to circumstances; never in form of lecture; plain preaching of Gospel; what a minister gathers from his contact with men.

Considerable attention was centered on length of sermon; the average length favored by 103 persons was 30.6 minutes. A large majority of 130 persons preferred extemporaneous delivery, there being almost unanimous protest against the read sermon. 72 persons favor expository, 26 doctrinal, and less than 5 persons specify charity, revival and missionary sermons. Appeals to the mental aspects were preferred in the following order: will, (72); intellect, (52); feelings, (32). "No graveyard stories," "not excitable," "not overdramatic," are characteristic phrases.

These opinions illustrate the heterogeneous nature of the congregation, an audience far different from that of the teacher or professor. The burden and the responsibility and the opportunity of the able preacher are momentous. He can instruct, persuade, encourage, comfort, inspire, and after the manner of Aristotle's functions of the orator he should know the great emotions and command in his hearers mercy or anger, love or hate, confidence or fear, honor or shame, benevolence or selfishness, compassion or indignation, emulation or contempt, and envy — and this the minister must do, week after week and year after year, for old and young.

3. Prayer.

"Men who pass judgment upon prayer may be grouped into two very distinct categories: they who pray and they who do not pray," we quote from Armand Sabatier. All men who pray and all prayers have for an indispensable condition belief in a God who hears the supplication and is capable of responding. Prayer has the two elements, a subjective relating to him who prays, and an objective, the divinity who is moved in behalf of the suppliant. Atheism and prayer are two terms contradictory and irreconcilable. Sabatier exalts the subjective effects, the exaltation of soul seeking to approach God, a view which he thinks offers a great simplification of the conception of the relation between Creator and creature. In opposition to this doctrine is that which holds it is not inconsistent with the principles of evolution for God to intervene in the processes of Nature at the cry of his children; the cry of the raven brings its food from afar; the bleat of the lamb brings its dam to its side. "The weak theology that professes to believe that prayer has merely a subjective benefit is infinitely less scientific than the action of a child who confidently appeals to a Father in heaven," declares one writer. The fact that prayer has held an important place in the souls of great men such as Newton, Pascal, Vincent de Paul and of millions of persons, the seeming universality of it in the human species in inferior and superior types in prehistoric and contemporaneous times, indicates that one can only treat the subject with seriousness and respect. The impersonal Deity of Pantheism, the indifferent and cold God of Deism cannot be the God of prayer, who is par excellence the God of Christianity, that is to say, the Creator, the Father, the God who loves his creatures. There is a vast literature upon this subject in Christian books and papers, but the theological problem of the efficacy of prayer is out of place in these pages, and besides, the writer cannot make the least claim to being a theologian. We must observe, however, with Prof. James, "We hear in these days of scientific enlightenment a great deal of discussion about the efficacy of prayer, and many reasons are given to us why men should not pray, whilst othere are given us why we should. But in all of this very little is said of the reason why we *do* pray, which is simply that we cannot *help* praying."

In a recent comparative classification of five religions, Moham-

medism, Confucianism, The Religion of Jesus, Buddhism, The Vedanta Philosophy, it is asserted that while prayer in the first is a duty, only in Christianity is it a voluntary communion with a Divine Father; strict Buddhism and the Vedanta philosophy substitute meditation. It is certain that prayer is both a duty and a voluntary practice in all Protestantism.

In our returns but one person questions the use of public prayer. Two general observations are suggested by the returns. Public and private prayer to many persons is of special subjective significance and value, a phase which is too apt to be overlooked by those who believe only in the intervening efficacy of prayer. Only one of our correspondents explicitly says "chief value of prayer is subjective," yet most of them give evidence of its deep subjective import, for there are profound exercises of mind implied in the expressions used in answer to the question, "States of mind desired?" as for instance: placid, receptive, introspective, devotional, in faith, thought centered upon Him, out-reach, worshipful frame of mind, desirous of assistance and knowledge, trustful, commmunion with God, soul and heart close to God. These phrases portray states of emotional intensity and of suggestibility, which in view of the all-pervading good motives and the focus of attention upon aspirations and lofty ideals, are of extreme moral significance. Other phrases such as, mind receptive, depends on mood, spontaneous, with eyes closed, suggest that the subjective phase of prayer includes possibilities of danger, where overwrought nerves, abused emotions, morbid introspection and hypnoid conditions are encouraged at exciting revival and experience meetings. This fact that profound and unusual states of consciousness are sometimes generated in the minds of old and young, the well and the feeble, by the exercise of supplication to God, cannot be ignored by the man who leads in and exhorts to prayer, both that he may make full pedagogic use of their value and yet avoid the danger that may lurk in a sacred exercise.

The second consideration, is that the minister is regularly expected and compelled to offer prayer in the presence of the congregation. The Catholics demand prayers for the dead, prayers to the saints, to the Blessed Virgin. Non-catholics desire prayers for forgiveness, evincing the consciousness of sin, or desire only written prayers, or only the Lord's Prayer. Several declare that the day of the old-

fashioned prayer and experience meetings is gone, or that they do not believe in or sympathize with the weekly prayer-meeting, or that "something is wrong somewhere since it is going out of fashion." But many more believe in the prayer-meeting, saying, it is essential, a very good thing, helpful, "brings us closer to God and to each other." Or it should be bright, social, with music, "spiritual."

125 persons distinctly prefer the extemporaneous or the recited prayer. They demand that the man engaged in the delicate task of standing before the people as their spokesman to God should be earnest, give a natural expression from an honest heart, be thankful, humble, confessional, simple, not familiar, that he offer a petition for help, "voice and reflect the needs of the congregation in the presence of God." The regular, effective and safe performance of the obligations recapitulated in these paragraphs would weigh heavily upon the strongest and wisest of men, but it is an office always required of every minister.

4. Communion Service.

Of 120 persons about one-half preferred the communion service of their own denomination; a fourth, representing many denominations, desired alterations, the one modification most desired being the use of individual cups instead of the traditional, disease-transmitting, common drinking cup in use in the majority of churches. A few Baptists would abolish "close communion" which excludes all but Baptists; four individuals would omit elements and make it a meditation, as, "eliminate the concrete and seek the abstract," "omit the Sacrament and conform to the great liturgies." Some comment on "the affected display of repentance on part of preachers and people" or object to undue length of service or to use of wine. One Catholic, one Methodist, one Presbyterian, a Unitarian and a non-church member do not like the communion, would abolish it. One man wrote: "I desire to preserve the old youthful sense of sacredness and sacrament, but my mind tells me that it is a development of a cannibal feast and that it also commemorates some of the grossest and most mistaken doctrines of the church." A few persons frankly stated reluctance to submitting to inspection their feelings and thoughts of their last service. The returns show clearly that it is for many persons a time of tension, varying from depression to euphoria. Some speak of joy, love for Christ, realization of joy to live,

of faith; others confess: depression, repentance, feelings of unworthiness, consciousness of sin, humiliation, sadness. A man of 35 writes: "Thoughts never pleasant; always feel unworthy of His presence; yet have tried and hope he will accept my good intention. My whole body seems different at such a time and something like chills run all over me." A few mention fear, especially fear of the priest. Some are moved to pity by the contemplation of the death and sufferings of Christ. Mental states of exaltation, ecstasy and of extreme suggestibility are not infrequent; some contemplate the Last Supper in the upper room; one, "felt my mother's presence;" another, "highest devotion to God and love to my fellow-men;" some, "a chastening influence." A few confessed to frivolous thoughts or to resentment against hypocrites present, or to perturbation and mixed feelings, or "to ugly thoughts of germs." A large number were stirred to desire and resolve to do better, or "to grasp the hand of my fellow-men and forgive."

The spirit of forgiveness inculcated and urged at the communion service is of superlative ethical value. To quote Rosenkranz: "The forgiveness of the wicked is the breaking through of religion, for it is the mind's act of majesty to make what has been done as though it were not done. In the act the mind becomes conscious of its sovereignty over nature and history; the wicked which I repent of is as though it had not occurred." And long before the revelations of modern psychology Jesus of Nazareth strongly emphasized the beauty and majesty of the forgiving spirit.

Many points are suggested by our responses regarding the influence of certain religious rites, which lately have been discussed by Starbuck, Coe, Moses and Hall. The last author writes in his study of the Passion vs. the Resurrection, that the sentiment of pity has played a rôle of tremendous importance in the spread of Christianity, that our age has forgotten the power of pathos and of fear; the profoundest religious experiences centre round the Cross, the supreme pathos-instilling theme.

In passing from this subject the observations may be thus summarized. As it exists, the communion service tends to keep religion in the sphere of the feelings, where is part of its proper habitation. To many persons it is a means of sounding the depths and heights of human experience. To the youthful and healthful soul endowed with normal power of resilience to react from emotional extremes, the service pre-

sents potent means of arousing humanizing feelings, decision and philanthropic action. The necessity for modification is just as strongly suggested. The danger of the transmission of tuberculosis and of other diseases through the common drinking cup is probably considerable and clearly demands ordinary sanitary precautions and at least the adoption of individual cups. Of great psychological import is the mental aspect of the communicant. Tradition should not be permitted to interfere with the elimination of that which unwisely stimulates emotional reaction, whether it be in ritual, music, posture, or ministerial methods. Possibly a too frequent repetition of the communion service blunts its effect upon many persons who grow callous, and plays unwisely upon the nerves of others. Children often participate in the ceremony and may there develop morbid habits of mind, undue self-consciousness and a certain pious precocity. Mental susceptibility of children, as demonstrated beyond peradventure by Binet and Small, and the deficient power of mental reaction often found in the old and in the neurasthenic, a deficiency that may cause permanence of melancholic or exalted habits that are characteristic of the border-line and deeper mental disturbances—augment the great responsibility of those who have this rite in charge, and denote the need of scientific preparation of the minister. A man may be a fine preacher, an accomplished theologian, and be utterly incompetent to discharge this office. A knowledge of the deep emotional meaning of sacramental acts as seen in the general practice of them by primitive peoples would emphasize new value in such rites as well as bring about the elimination of that which is gross or injurious. Our illustrations suggest that the Sacrament as administered to-day is of certain value and to thousands a sacred and holy symbol to which we would offer no violence; nevertheless from the standpoint of mental and physical hygiene it is a serious undertaking and may become a dangerous factor in the hands of fanatics, bunglers or those ignorant of well known psychological law, in promoting pathological conditions.

5. *Funerals.*

If regard were paid to the different rites and ceremonies preceding and accompanying the formal disposal of a dead body, in ancient and in modern times, and regard to their origin, variety and relative significance, we should require many voluminous chapters. Numerous

motives are operative in the elaborate funerals seen in our own times, such as desire to honor the memory of the deceased, and in the vulgar love of ostentation and morbid enthusiasm. There is the psychological necessity for doing something when grief and pain have reached the explosive point. The black pall, flowers, music, mourners, the tolling of bells and the dirge, the slow moving procession, the oration, or the sermon, characterize modern funerals, and we have to add, sometimes there is the mass for the dead, and even the brass band. The minister is the usual leader in the modern funeral, a leadership that has been his from olden time, perhaps because of his ancient priestly and ghostly office, and partly because he is the bearer of the hope of immortality, and because in his peculiar relations of confidence to the bereaved and to the community he can administer consolation and relief where the physician of the body has done his uttermost and failed.

It is in sorrow and in absolute helplessness that there is flight to the consolations of religion. I have been informed by a clergyman of experience that non-church members, even those who have ridiculed the church, often seek in bereavement the minister's services and are most exacting in what they demand of him, yet seldom offer any recompense. Another minister of 40 years' experience confided that not a half dozen times in his life had he been paid for officiating at funerals. On one occasion aroused from a sick bed by the importunity of a wealthy man's relatives he arose when the thermometer registered 18° below zero, conducted a service in a cold room, over the body of the rich man, rode ten miles in an unheated carriage to the cemetry where he read the ritual in a freezing wind—and for this labor never received a word, or a line, or a penny in gratitude. Ministers of long experience can relate similar treatment in the discharge of a duty that custom has laid heavily upon them. It is usually a thankless and always a delicate and important task. Our questionnaire answers are simply illustrative of the variety of demands and preferences which the minister meets here. 124 persons wrote upon the subject. Catholics demand solemn blessing of the corpse, or prayer and services for the deceased. Protestants and others omit these demands but specify others. By far the greater number prefer a short, simple discourse of consolation and sympathy or comfort, and a brief prayer at the grave. For the latter purpose many prefer the Lord's Prayer or the simpler ritualistic forms. Some desire no discourse at all, or merely a Scripture reading, while

about an equal number, 18, think the funeral discourse should be an occasion of moralizing, warning, aiming at conviction and conversion. An equal number would have him extol the merits of the deceased, or refer but gently to his faults. Still others would have the minister speak of the rewards after death, the hope of meeting, of the Resurrection, or upon immortality, eternal life, or "to remove the fear of eternal death."

The affirmation of life after death has been of tremendous effect upon the morals of the race and is to-day a precious consolation to millions of people, while science can make neither positive affirmation nor denial concerning immortality. Scientific dogmatists who presume to deny the possibility of immortality, however, find it difficult to justify their attempt, and are mightily opposed; for example, Prof. James in his little book on "Immortality" has shown the unphilosophic position of those who deny to men of science, even to physological psychologists, the right to cherish faith in an immortal mind. The obvious danger is that little souls will over-exert themselves striving to escape future punishment while they neglect the good and the duties of the present life teeming with possibilities.

A few persons emphasize the importance of songs and music at funerals. The supersensitive soul is revealed also: "these things work on feelings too much," or, "no one should be asked to view corpse," and there are a few who, like Aristotle, remind us that it is only proper for relatives and intimate friends to be present at a funeral. In marked contrast with the egotistic correspondent who neglected the other questions to explain in many closely written pages her ideas about what her own funeral should be like, or the wish of another, "should be open to all who care to attend," or those who desire flowers, or "no flowers," or "everything in white," or beautiful and expressive, a few persons of practical minds make poignant suggestions, such as: services have no possible influence upon dead; wrong to burden relatives with unnecessary expenses; strangers should be excluded; standing with dead uncovered at grave in cold weather is abominable; cremation is better than the grave.

The funeral customs of the day are very closely bound up in the conventions of the past. Men are naturally conservative and hesitate to modify that which so concerns the utmost human sorrow. There is evident need, however, of tactful, decisive reforms in our funeral ser-

vices and as a chief actor and a sufferer in the abuses the minister might take the lead in the improvement. The plain principle to be followed seems to be that funerals should have respect for shattered hearts, but at the same time should conform to the necessities of physical and mental health, to ideals of simplicity and good taste. In the psychological moment of mental anguish all morbidity should be removed so far as possible and opportunity only should be taken advantage of to dispense comfort, assuage grief and dissipate fear of death—the King of Terrors.

6. *Baptism.*

There was a surprising absence of discussion or evidently of interest about the mode of administering baptism or its value. In view of the bitter controversies that have swept this country when the Baptists and the followers of Alexander Campbell insisted on immersion under water as a means of salvation, and other Protestant sects either refused to exalt the efficacy of any particular mode, or else advocated sprinkling or pouring. The writer has not heard of the abrogation of a line of the sectarian requirements and Baptists and Disciples are still being immersed in streams, ponds, or in artificial bodies of water or tanks elaborately constructed for this purpose in churches. Except in remote sections of the country the acrimony of public disputations on this subject has passed, but it should be remembered that regulations and precedents perpetuate the old controversies; if our returns are representative the people have lost interest in these points of doctrinal issue with the passing of literal interpretation of the Scriptures. A few specimen remarks are:

F., 19. (Episc.) Should baptize children by sprinking, not immersion, in a private house always. M., 61. (Baptist.) Should have special care from the minister. F., 46. (Meth.) Should not baptize infants. M., 39. (Bapt.) Baptism is probably a useful rite. F., 19. (Cath.) Priests should always baptize except in cases of extreme danger when any one may do it. M., 35. (Cath.) The meaning and the whole truth ought to be told here, all mystery ought to be removed. M., 60. (Swedenborgian.) Minister should encourage all of the sacred rites to be performed in the church, and seek to impart to them the spirit of holiness, not as a form, but because the church is the noblest institution on earth. M., 38. In most churches the ceremony is prescribed.

The majority of the writers seem to recognize in baptism a ritualistic form beneficial in its impressive or subjective effect rather

than because of any mysterious or saving efficacy. It perhaps is difficult for an outsider to receive any edification at seeing a frail woman or man held and submerged under water by a stalwart preacher in rubber boots, or when an infant screams in rebellion for having his tender scalp moistened with cold water by a strange man. This rude attitude of the outsider who does not comprehend the religious meaning of the rite, and the more urgent demand for healthful precaution against shock and cold, and the revulsion against whatever may be gross in the rite, might be met by an elimination so far as possible of the water symbol and a revision of the mode of baptism to the form of a beautiful service, symbolic of cleansing and of dedication. Such a service, for instance, offers a rich opportunity for impressing upon parents the obligations of parenthood, as well as to mark turning points in the lives of old and young.

7. *Marriage.*

Hume defined marriage simply as an engagement entered into by mutual consent and having for its ends the propagation of the species. For centuries it has been a natural, civil and religious contract and has long been regarded as a Sacrament in the English and in the Catholic churches. Custom makes the minister the usual officiant at weddings. In order to enhance the solemnity of marriage some would remove the legality of common law marriages, or those in which an officer of the law officiates, and would place the matter entirely in the hands of the ministers of religion. It should be noted that in countries where marriage is sealed by the priests only, that so expensive has the ceremony become that sometimes informal marriage and concubinage have flourished.

A few typical replies are here reproduced: F., 20. Marriages are less effective when performed by a Justice of the Peace. M., 34. Marriage ceremony could be much improved. F., 61. Marriage was ordained by God and should be performed by one of his servants and not by one who often has no conception of its sacredness. M., 61. Let the church service or ritual be used. F., 33. Minister should never marry unfit people whether unfit physically, mentally or morally. M., 35. Weddings should be quiet, simple affairs. To-day the practice is to display clothes, presents etc. The minister should discourage these barbarous customs. M., 51. All ceremonies are matters of form and those that please the people should be used.

G. Frank Lydston, M. D., writing upon the diseases of modern society declares: "Society begins its self-contamination at the marriage

license window. Here is the fountain head of the stream of degeneracy that sweeps through all social systems. . . . The license window is a place where the honest citizen and the criminal, the sane and the insane, the diseased and the healthy, the pauper and the millionaire, the learned and the ignorant, the intelligent and the weak minded, may meet upon common ground, always provided the important consideration of the license fee is forthcoming. The criminal, the insane the epipleptic, the syphilitic, and the drunkard are here authorized by law to begin the procreation of their kind," and another says, "No thought is taken for the unfortunate offspring or for the body politic or social, and the irreparable evils that must fall upon all. The church adds its sanction and its ministers aid in making these civil contracts by performing a ceremony with prayers and benedictions."

Some important points are suggested. The recognized duty of the minister is to discourage prevalent fads for fashionable nuptials, where prolonged excitement, mental and physical exhaustion and vulgar extravagance unfit the bride and groom at a critical period for beginning proper marital relations. There is the obligation and opportunity for ministers to prevent marriages that tend to degeneracy. Some ministers refrain from close questioning or investigation of parties on the eve of marriage, and perform the ceremony forwith. The writer knows a widely known and reputable physician who diagnosed as syphilitic a sore upon the lip of a man about to marry, and he did not prevent the marriage which occured three weeks afterward. The writer also knows a courageous minister who, spurning a princely fee, tore up the marriage license, cast it into the face of the intending groom and took adequate steps to prevent the marriage, on discovering at the last moment the man's unfitness to marry an innocent girl.

No one of the 108 persons replying said that the minister should not perform the wedding ceremony, illustrating the fact that by common consent he is endowed with the responsibility of being a controlling factor in a contract of racial import, and the need of special training, intelligence and of courage for the discharge of this obligation is apparent.

8. Convicts and Insane.

Modern biological science demonstrates that the young, the healthy

and the good, afford the most profitable field for the uplifting of the race, both by development and the prevention of degeneracy. Some religionists have delighted in carrying the Gospel exclusively to the depraved, the erring and to the unfortunate in order to demonstrate its saving power. This kind of philanthropic zeal is manifest in the following:

M., 35. The different churches should be very zealous that the convicts get just treatment. All through your questions I find this is the only one calling for tremendous zeal. F., 19. Preaching to convicts may change their views and lead them nearer to God; it should not bear upon their previous conduct.

Surely of mercy in the world there is little enough, and of sagacious and vigilant insight into the workings of our public and penal institutions,—but enthusiasm for the salvation of the hoplessly depraved, and mawkish sentiment, is no justification for the neglect of the young and healthy, popularly and erroneously supposed not to be in need of moral support. A story holds that in ancient times persons in perfumed boxes would witness with pleasure the tortures of men and women slain in the amphitheatre for their amusement, and yet the spectators would protest against the lashing of horses employed to drag away the torn corpses of maidens and old men. So to-day there are persons who send bouquets and candy to atrocious murderers and ignore the fate of toiling innocents on every hand.

Other specimens are as follows:

M., 61. Minister should be willing to give time and strength to the public institutions of his country. F., 46. If he happens to be a man of tact, let him preach to the insane. M., 30. Should preach to convicts and insane in order that he may touch and see life at as many points as possible. M., 35. Deeds of kindness do much for such people. M., 21. Minister should preach to convicts and insane in order to gain an understanding of degenerate life. A minister of ability writes, "I would not know how to preach to insane ; I enjoy preaching to convicts."

These duties are usually thrust upon the minister as functions to be executed chiefly in their missionary phase, and the other rich possibilities in such service are often overlooked. State penitentiaries have usually a regular paid chaplain, while our jails, houses of detention and asylums have not. The possibility of a certain supervision of unfortunates in the dragnet of the police and the law, is open to the clergyman intelligent and prepared for the philanthropic service, and opportunity for new investigations into the causes of sin and crime is presented. A great educator testifies: "What can be more essential for practical

and theoretical morals than a knowledge of perversions and aberrations? Visits to jails, houses of detention and reformatories, which I have conducted, and ethical classes in prisons, have, I believe, increased my effectiveness as a teacher and they cannot fail to enlarge and deepen moral perceptions and quicken conscience.'' Lydston writes: ''The most essential feature in prison reform is the appointment of proper officers. The responsibility of reformation should be divided between the warden, chaplain and physician. Men of the broadest experience and most liberal education only should be selected for these positions. The man who knows nothing of sociology, and especially of criminal sociology, has no place in the management of criminals. . . . . The prison chaplain is obviously an important official in a prison but his value as an expounder of morals is likely to be inversely to his obtrusiveness as a preacher. . . . . His religion must be broad and humane, and he must thoroughly appreciate the obstacles that the criminal organism presents to his labors as a reformer.''

The common sense dicta of our correspondents largely agree with that of specialists regarding preaching to the insane. Many think that the minister should and many think that he should not undertake this service. There is agreement that it can be done only ''by men of tact,'' ''by ministers especially prepared for this work,'' or, ''if he is soothing and winning,'' otherwise it will be useless and unnecessary. 50 persons declare that it is the proper work of the minister however difficult it may be; half as many that it is not. The reports of the American Psycho-Medical Assn. contain discussions by alienists upon the value of rational conversation in the treatment of melancholia and functional disorders. ''I am sure,'' said Dr. Hurd in 1902, ''that while our fathers and grandfathers perhaps overestimated the value of so-called moral measures for the relief of the insane, we have underestimated the value of moral measures.'' In 1901 Dr. Runge emphasized the value of religious services as means for psychic treatment and related his great difficulties in securing proper persons to officiate. A young Catholic priest intrusted with the confessional service in the hospital caused the relapse of a convalescent patient into a former state of agitation. Some untrained Protestant mission workers who were repeatedly told that the services should be utterly devoid of either sensational or depressing elements, but should breathe hope and peace, were soon sounding exhortations through the building. ''The undeniable fact that thousands

of human minds throughout this broad land of ours are permitted to starve and die for lack of proper psychic stimulation is faced without a murmur or protest.''

9. Other Pastoral Duties.

A few illustrative replies are:

M., 34. Should visit the sick and they should let him know that they want him. He should be at home to strangers in distress and to urgent calls at all times and should have certain hours when any one could see him. Socials and receptions are a place to show off and are expensive to people that can hardly afford to be there; in raffles and bazaars the church is going in for tainted money; in these things the minister is making some solid enemies. A minister should convince sceptics and should spend time in doing it. F., 17. He should be a confidante of young people. M., 60. Minister's life in the community speaks the most effective sermons. Should never persuade any one to join the church. M., 47. These pastoral duties are the really valuable activities of the minister M., 40. Some of the best preachers who are tactless in pastoral work should have an assistant to help him in attending to these duties. It is better for a tactless man to see little of his people. F., 18. In attending social affairs he need not wear a funeral face. F., 55. He should look after the shut-ins. F., 17. Should visit the afflicted as his words comfort them. M., 38. Pastoral duties are numerous and too exacting. We are inclined to look upon a minister as a perfect man and when we see his faults we are apt to lose faith. Visiting members is a commendable old custom. No one should be so low as to be abandoned; persons should often receive friendly aid before spiritual. A minister should have a certain amount of proof but should not be what is generally termed a sceptic, he should convince to conversion rather than persuade. A peacemaker to families should be a man of exceptional tact and know his subjects thoroughly before hazarding so difficult an undertaking. Finding work for unemployed commendable as they usually seem unable to find it for themselves. In the young people lies the destiny of our nation, and if the minister is worth keeping on earth he should have influence with the young people. F., 32. I hope the minister will not call on me but will give his time to non-church going people. How can a man do all these things? M., 60. Confession may be good at times but should be discouraged. F., 20. There should be no confessions except for advice. F., 21. A Christian should be willing to confess sins before men. F., 33. Confession to God and to person wronged always proper. M., 62. Revive, but informally, the habit of confession.

Pastoral duties in city and in country churches are so numerous and varied that the responses merely suggest the character of some of them and their great number. In order to satisfy the people the pastor must do a great deal of pastoral visiting. A few ministers in peculiar surroundings ignore altogether the pastoral and other demands and their work consists in some cases in delivering two sermons per Sunday and cashing their salary check. This is the pastor of the small, rich church;

his type is not numerous, and he is usually despised by the workers in the ministry. A workman writes as follows describing this kind of prophet from the view point of a Roman Catholic:

"Church half empty on Sunday, surpliced choir, choral service, the rich in pews, the poor where? A well-fed married clergyman preaches about tainted money, what for? (All money is tainted), and about resignation to the inevitable. Good collection, handshakes, and the sermon in the paper next day. The minister don't know much about his people, people don't like him much, don't know what to make of him or he of them. Has his own troubles. Church closed three or four months during summer, pew-holders in country, occupants of main body and side aisles in city, or at Coney Island for Sunday—and the pastor, well, in Europe or mountains. If in mountains, sermon in Sunday papers, if in Europe, his travels are in papers also. Poor beggars of side aisles are in parks, drives or on stoops, the church is closed. Pastor comes back in the fall; after a while preaching again, church empty, newspaper revival, lecture meetings, song service, etc., how to get the people in the street to come to church."

The pastor's visits may be perfunctory professional calls, gossipy social calls, or pious visitations where he is expected to read the Bible and pray, or simply a friendly "dropping in." The warm friendships and the intimate, holy confidences he gains where he is an honored family guest give him strong influence in the home. In this relation the minister finds both the deserts and the oases of his career. An over-worked pastor writes, "Much of this pastoral visiting is unnecessary." Another, who ministers to 1,500 members, that he manages to call on every family of his church at least once a year—a wearing business that totally prevents attention to weightier matters. The custom that exacts of the pastor regular visits to all alike, gives occasion to the church-crank to make his life a burden by an officious activity in asking him to visit certain erring ones, or the sick, or strangers "who might join the church," and the pastor's alacrity in responding to such demands is the measure of his popularity in some churches. 126 persons discussed the topics in question number 9, and of these 96 thought the minister should visit members, 106 that he should visit the sick, aged or needy, 93 that he should visit strangers, 85 that he should attend sociables and receptions, and but two persons said that he ought not do these things. 61 persons declared it is his duty to find work for the unemployed, and but 16 that he should not. A pastor related a dozen instances in which he secured business positions for men and women of the church who appealed to him, most of whom in prosperity displayed base ingratitude. Agents, imposters, and blackmailers had

frequently imposed upon him; in fact, observation shows that prominent ministers are a mark for scoundrels who prey upon philanthropic impulses.

Only 21 persons demanded that a minister must persuade to conversion. The apparent lack of interest in this subject may be indicative of neglect of what has been urged in revival services as an important ministerial and Christian obligation. 44 persons prescribed that the minister should make peace in family quarrels, if only with care or caution, or if requested, and nearly as many think it inexpedient for him to interfere in domestic difficulties. There are instances where the minister has reconciled people when the divorce lawyer has failed. 40 persons of many different denominations favored confession in some form; a few say confession shows weakness, or encourages hypocrisy, or there should be no confession. Omitting five Catholics who speak for the priestly confessional, there were several kinds of confession proposed: (a) confession to the persons injured, (b) confession of sins in public, (c) confession to God only, (d) confession to the minister for advice. The returns show recognition of the necessity and value to many persons of some kind of confession. The well known abuses of the confessional of priestcraft may have obscured from us the psychological fact that in sincere confession "what is detrimentally a part of our psychic life may be brought into the focus of consciousness" and by confession so far expelled, ejected, that it becomes less a part of us. We can find in this no adequate plea for an institution that ministers mainly to church policy, whether it be in the Roman Church or in the High Church, but there is suggested the consideration that since the Protestant clergyman is frequently called upon to listen sympathetically to the burdened and perplexed who seek either advice or rest for their souls that there is needed adequate preparation of the ministry both in character and in psychological knowledge that they may render intelligent as well as sympathetic service. Perturbed young men and women, harassed by temptation, grief, or succumbing to the utter loneliness of the city, persons who do not need medicine or legal advice but the counsel of a disinterested, big-hearted, religious expert, may be deterred by such a sympathetic listener from folly and the downward path. This need makes possible the prosperity of the quacks, fortune tellers and other parasites who can afford to flood some of our largest newspapers with advertisements inviting the troubled to come unto them.

One or more Sunday schools are connected with each church and the minister is expected to busy himself about these with all their increasing problems and difficulties. 115 persons contributing to this paragraph were divided in opinion as to whether the minister should teach or supervise, while a considerable number thought that he should do both. There is practical agreement that some kind of activity in the Sunday school is regularly incumbent upon the pastor.

The sexton, who in olden times was the pastor's assistant in teaching the catechism and in other religious offices, finds his occupation now to be the practical care of buildings, lawns, heating plants and ventilation. Where the church is able to employ a sexton he is controlled by the officers of the church and sometimes by the pastor himself. There are a few more of our correspondents who say that he should have control of the sexton than there are who say that this matter should be taken in charge by others.

Fifty persons write that the minister should control or supervise the music, and about as many say that he should not interfere with the musical programme; as:

> Music is often a source of trouble, pastor should have final decision with regard to music, musical programme should be submitted to him so that it will not be out of harmony with thought. An organist of 25 years experience writes: "Average Protestant service is a musical Hungarian Goolosh. An attempt to get a two hour programme in one causes endless friction between organist and pastor. Choir and organ numbers should produce an uplifting atmosphere, and this organists are prepared for. The elaboration of music should be discussed in each worshipping body. Pastor should not have charge or musical programme."

This writer brings to light the traditional self-assurance of choir masters, and there are hints of the numerous troubles which arise in many churches owing to the irrepressible vanity of many singers and musicians. As a part of public worship, music is capable of powerful effect. The investigation of Coe regarding hymns and tunes demonstrates the need and tendency to call in question the content and form of the musical religious service. There are publishers who foist upon Sunday schools and church societies song-books containing alleged music and poetry that have occasioned much ridicule. Yet any one familiar with the sublime music in some of our churches, free to be enjoyed by all comers, appreciates the value and uplift of a musical service harmonized in execution, melody and sentiment.

Vast improvement has been made in many churches in the method of

making announcements during the services. A few ministers become veritable advertising agents in the pulpit in their endeavor to satisfy requests and to promote good enterprises. A contributor writes, "Announcements of cake sales, minstrel shows, ice cream gluttonies, invariably tend to spoil the service." Well regulated churches print necessary announcements upon a bulletin or circular.

The majority of our writers claim that the minister should make all necessary or needful announcements; others, "only when bearing upon the moral welfare of the people, and then as rarely as possible." This divergence of opinion reflects the difficulties he meets when he refuses to act as announcer of the pet schemes of his workers.

A good majority agree that a minister had better keep out of politics, although a score urge that he should enter active, political life. He should keep clear of partisan movements, or he should be active alone in reform movements is the verdict of most. Writes one: "A preacher in politics is useless to the male members of his congregation in this country. When men have lost respect for the spiritual adviser —and he surrenders it when he spouts at a meeting with the other paid orators—he is of no further use as a minister."

Only 16 persons declared that the minister should not fight the saloon, while nearly 100 said it was a distinct duty for him to combat the saloon and all public and private evils. The methods to be employed by him, are:

> Teaching and preaching righteousness, speaking of it as an evil to be discouraged, by doing what he can, by fighting the saloon directly and perseveringly, by temperance sermons, by advising not fighting, as a voter and by private and social intercourse with the people and from the pulpit, should struggle energetically and tactfully against all forces which stand for or cater to immorality. A business man writes: "We are after the wrong end of the trouble. Make our public officers see that the child is getting proper training not only in books that teach science, reading, writing, etc., but in how to govern himself. Parents are compelled to devote practically all of their time to getting bread and butter for their families. The children are then sure to 'grow up,' as it is a mathematical impossibility for such parents to devote necessary time to their children, hence they are hard to control at maturity. I believe the true solution is through the children."

This man shows that the ministry can find a new field by seeking out the true roots of the drink habit, in the early perversion of tastes by improper or by insufficient food, whether in the homes of luxury or poverty, and in the adulteration of milk and in the substitutes for

mother's milk which in young life create a yearning for abnormal things, and in the host of suggestive factors neglected on every hand—all of which give vice an easy victory in the receptive minds of all those whose inhibitory powers are undeveloped, whose bodies are starved, overworked, ignored. The hundred voices here recorded represent thousands who cry out to the ministry of religion and morals that it is largely the industrial and social situation and the pathogenic conditions which are the actual factors of degeneration and at the bottom of increasing dissipation, rather than chiefly the neglect of dogma.

One hundred and twenty-five persons wrote concerning the collection of money; a majority of them thought that the minister should get money for missions, foreign and domestic, for widows and orphans, for education, for charity, and for other purposes. Very many, however, protest against the use of the minister as a financial agent: "these matters belong rather to church officials," "the minister should have nothing to do with the financial affairs of the church," "these things devolve upon the congregation or committee, or vestry, or board, or treasurer." The minority probably represent the better organized and wealthier churches. The fact remains that the minister is usually expected both by people and by ecclesiastical authorities to have a hand in the raising of money for many purposes. Charity, or the spontaneous liberality upon which the churches depend, naturally turns to religious leaders as vehicles for subscriptions and gifts. In this way the wealth of the churches and the endowment of great universities, such as Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and in the South, Vanderbilt and Trinity, were established through ministerial influence. In some denominations the stated duty of every minister is to collect sums of money or assessments each year for benevolent purposes, and in this way the tremendous enterprises of the Methodist church, for example, are maintained. This work is an affliction to men who shrink from constant solicitation of money, however worthy may be the motive, and the work consumes much time and thought. The system is a consequence of an elaborate organization and of missionary enterprises.

The largest consensus of all declares that the minister should not exert himself to get his salary. This may be an evidence of regard for the minister's feeling of delicacy, but undoubtedly is often due to an unreasonable sentiment that he is not entitled to pay for his services, as

a lawyer or doctor would be, notwithstanding the onerous duties required of him. About his salary they say:

> He should not be urgent; should let the members give of their own free will, etc. One person argues that he should not collect but give, and several say he should set the example of giving liberally. Voluntary subscriptions only should be required. A proper training of people will educate them in giving as the Lord prospers them; (the minister is expected to give the training). An experienced worker in a church, writes: "The collecting work of the church ought not to be done by the pastor; he has enough of other duties."

The inconsistent mingling of charitable impulses, philanthropy and of niggardliness and human meanness which the pastor meets in his struggle for existence can be understood from these returns.

Personal Welfare.

The minister is compelled to be very circumspect in his recreations lest he offend the notions of his people, or attract the attention of a cruel yellow press, or transgress the moral law. Of the 111 persons writing on this subject, 78 named walking and music as the fit ministerial diversions. 67 prescribed for him tennis, golf or boating, "but these must not be indulged in too far." Concerning the theatre 45 said that he might attend good plays, with discretion, bad ones for purposes of study, and nearly as many declare positively he should never attend the theatre. 34 say it is wrong for him to use tobacco, and as many would deter him from the use of wine at home or elsewhere. Less than 10% would allow him tobacco or "cigars." A dozen specify the reading of good or the best novels. A few would permit him to play billiards, chiefly at home, and an equal number say that is questionable conduct and not permissible. Individual prescriptions are: no cards, anything he wishes, wine abroad is foolishness, books that pertain to religion are suitable for his recreation, history and philosophic reading, buggy riding the best and most dignified pleasure for minister, fishing, let his sports be for recreation and not for sportsmanship. 25 persons, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Disciples and Roman Catholics, say that the minister ought to practice fasting, a survival of the ancient belief that spiritual purification is attained through mortification of the body. A man of 42 writes: "Fasting should be used when it accords with one's mood on special occasions. It may be good as a discipline. It is a great aid in obtain-

ing the mastery over the passions." Another man writes: "Nothing to be gained by fasting but much to be lost."

It can hardly be inferred from these data that the average person allows as much personal liberty to the minister as is permitted to any moral man, but it would seem that different standards are maintained for minister and for church members. Fear of offence, of becoming a stumbling block, of misinterpretation of conduct, together with the mass of accumulated unreasonable restrictions which are extended to the minister's kindred and would discipline even his family life, circumscribe the minister in a way which only sycophancy on the one hand or the patient, enduring self-sacrifice of a great soul on the other, can endure. The constant surveillance of his affairs by busybodies, gossips and cranks brings rebellion into his strong heart. The sacrifices of the minister's wife in monotonous contact with piously morbid and selfish men and women, whom she endures for God and her husband's sake, are unknown to the world which owes her an unpaid debt for her gentle, unobtrusive and unfailing support of its moral and religious leaders.

Reputation as an author or lecturer, or riches must not be sought by the minister.

If he seeks reputation it must be incidentally, must not interfere with pulpit preparation and pastoral duties. F., 28. He then will not seek the kingdom of God. M., 61. If he works for these things he mistakes his calling. A writer who favors Catholic priests says, "His pastorate should be a spontaneous avocation rather than a vocation, hence he may do anything." M., 43. Better depend upon his stipend for a living. F., 17. If rich, should give to poor. F., 21. May be rich in order to help in charitable deeds. F., 20. Rich pastor should not dress extravagantly. M., 33. Great wealth positive hindrance to minister, whether by inheritance, marriage or investment; inheritance the least objectionable. Rich pastor if he is willing to give always is a standing excuse for a certain element to curtail its generosity.

The length of the minister's engagement was discussed by one hundred persons. About one-third of them favor short pastorates for such reasons as:

New field gives pastor renewed inspiration. Some members are always dissatisfied, and if minister goes they would return for a time at least. People should get new ideas all the time. There are powerful preachers who had better not settle down as pastors. Minister has more chance of advancement in a frequent change. More enthusiasm for a new man. People tire of a pastor. Long pastorate becomes wearisome to people and more so to pastor. Good builder of churches

should not be held down. Minister and people get into a rut during a long pastorate. People prefer a young man. Ministers wear out. As many more prefer long term of service: Takes a long time to gain the confidence of young people. Minister comes to know each individual better. Long terms in cities where it requires much time to understand demands and conditions, etc.

But four or five persons discuss the question from the minister's point of preference or for his advantage. Many make the term of office "dependent on the man," or subject to the appreciation of the congregation, as: "If he does not suit the people, the sooner he goes the better. Depends on success and sympathetic relation with people. Not long if any dissatisfaction exists. Pastorates should be governed by adaptability." A positive suggestion comes from one familiar with church work: "Once in a while a minister starts a great undertaking. When his task is done, continue to honor him; don't kick him out and tell him of his shabby clothes, or that he was a man of one idea."

The uncertainty of his term of office and of his income, whether dependent upon ability to adapt himself, upon the whims of his members or upon the "Godly judgment" of bishops, affects the minister's peace of mind, tends to dampen his ardor, handicaps him in effective undertakings and produces early disqualification. Henry Ward Beecher remarked when asked what was the reason for short pastorates, "The mercy of God."

The Most Important Duty.

Of all the pastoral duties which are esteemed the most important? The valuation varies with the church and the individual.

It is variously estimated to be: visiting sick and bereaved families, to get people to attend church, to build up kingdom of God on earth, to strengthen the Church, to inspire people with religion, to lead people to better lives and to seek God, to guide and instruct, to win souls, to persuade to conversion, to do spiritual work, to save sinners by bringing them to Christ, to impress future salvation of souls, to convert sinners, to warn men from the wrath to come. Others think it is to show goodness of God, to preach helpful sermons, to influence men to work in harmony, to learn the moral needs of his people, to be a true shepherd of the flock.

The note sounds clearly enough in the above generalizations to prove the existence of the old-fashioned type of piety evinced in the conventional phrases by which men are urged to seek salvation, yet it seems that in the minds of the group the moral betterment of the congregation is the pressing need. With emphasis it is urged, the most important work of the minister is for the young, or "he should pay at-

tention to young people,'' to whom he should be friend, adviser and leader. More effort is demanded in behalf of those preparing for life than those near death.

Remedies and Changes.

A hint of the remoteness of the theological seminary from common life is had in the small number and the contents of the replies in answer to the question: ''Can you suggest any changes in the theological schools?'' Only thirty-five persons attempted any answer to the problem, a less number than responded to any other question, although this one had a conspicuous place in the syllabus. The editor of a metropolitan daily writes: ''Know very little about such schools;'' a Massachusetts lawyer, a church-member, says: ''Do not know enough about theological schools to suggest;'' an educator of a score of years experience in normal work gives the same testimony. Most of the responses can be condensed into a paragraph. As the seminaries will be discussed in another chapter these contributions are here recorded without comment.

M., 46. Teacher (Presb.) Minister should have a full call and then super-add special training in theology and in modes of efficient pastoral service. F., 31. Wife (Meth.) More time ought to be spent among men who are not theologs. M., 53. Life Insurance (Presb.) One undertaking ministry should be educated in literary, theological and practical lines. I do not believe theological schools give practical education at this time. He should obtain the education of college and seminary and after graduation he should be compelled for at least one year after his graduation to engage in business, such business as will enable him to get upon the plane of the people—something that will bring him in close contact with business methods. F., 60. Drop out most of the hell-fire business. F., 20. Student (Bapt.) Let authorities take some of the time devoted to subject matter and obtain a keener insight into the character of the theological students in order to find who is really qualified for ordination. M., 28. Lawyer (Presb.) Ministers should receive their education as other people in a university. Theological schools bring about nothing but the most contemptible narrow-minded orthodoxy. F., 22. Student (Bapt.) The work of the pastor does not demand a knowledge of Hebrew or Greek but he should know psychology, literature, history and theology and have at least an elementary knowledge of sociology, criminology, physics, chemistry and biology. M., 40. Organist. An effort to make a clergyman whom God never called will be useless no matter how scientific is the school which prepares him. F., 26. Wife (Meth.) Many ministers do great good with little education, but to do the greatest good they should have a perfect education. F., 22. Student (Jew) Greatest criticism of all theological schools alike is persistent teaching of dogma that have little bearing on subject and the holding on to exploded and impossible beliefs. M., 70. Millionaire Philanthropist (Presb.) I am a layman and the change in the

theological schools that I would recommend would be to get out of ruts and prepare for human work, rather than studies in astronomy. M., 58. Proof reader (Cong.) Change needed in the direction of practical application of spiritual truth to everyday life. M., 72. Merchant (Cong.) Teach less theology, which does not save the world. M., 65. Salesman (Epis.) Would add greatly to efficiency of the ministry to give them strong physical training so that the 'Rev. Cream Cheese' would disappear. M., 38. Minister (Meth.) Work of seminary should be less mechanical and more vital; more attention should be given to the social aspect of Christianity, to the practical side of religion and less to the theological. M., 45. Minister (Cong.) More literary and less scholastic training; more philosophy and less dogmatic theology; more ethics, sociology and less Hebrew. M., 32. Minister (Meth.) Discharge all higher critics at once; stick to the Bible, do not explain it away. Nothing else but the Holy Ghost power will enable us to stand. M., 45. Minister (Bapt.) I wish I had enjoyed more training in effective public speaking, and in practical dealings with the unconverted and various classes of men. Harvard Theological Prof. In theological schools it is desirable to have perfect libertas docendi and discendi. The curriculum should embrace all scholarly and practical matters bearing on religion with sufficient variety to permit a student to follow his own bent. The school should seek particularly to cultivate spirituality, that is, the conception of the world as a moral organism. M., 39. Minister (Meth.) I should greatly modify the curriculum of theological schools in the interest of the practical, the worshipful, the scientific, as subject of instruction. Greek and Hebrew and historical theology are good in their way, but not at all needful to a successful minister. If he have a bent for scholarship, let him pursue these lines, if not, let him develop in the direction indicated by his own mental idiosyncrasies. It is folly to put the same stamp upon every one who is to be a minister. Theological education seems to follow lines adapted to making of scholastics rather than men of the gospel ministry. In the present state of theological science the biblical method should have the greatest prominence, systematics or the philosophical the least. Homiletics are of little use. The best way for a man to learn to preach, given the message, is to study how to express himself clearly and to use his voice. Homiletics are, as a rule, designed to give the man something to say who has no message. It sometimes deprives a man of his message who has one or would have if let alone. I cannot say what effect different training would have had on me. I believe that I have got more out of literature than any branch of study. I believe that more technical theology would be of questionable use to me as a preacher though I have some use for what I have. M., 30. (Presb.) Seminaries should give a greater opportunity for thorough work on the life and problems of the world as it is to-day. M., 61. Minister (Meth.) I would be glad to see theological seminaries better organized for practical work. As a minister who is coming to life's evening time I regret that in youth I could not enjoy the benefits of regular training. The early training, however, especially in the way of extemporaneous speaking was valuable to me. A scientist and author of reputation writes: "I would have theological schools lay great stress on the new psychology, also on the higher evo lution of the soul, on morals, on altruism, for there is an immense uplift in these things for the young. Nothing so broadens the horizon. Darwin was only John the Baptist to the new evolution. Every minister should know something about science. First he should have some general course, touching up the whole field with the results of the sciences in proper order, from astronomy to sociology and

psychology. He should be full to the brim of the new higher criticism. I would pension or chloroform all the stick-in-the-mud professors of theological schools. Trivial exegesis, tremendous stress on a few doctrinal and sectarian points of differences dwarf and scar the mind and soul. The theological needs the most radical reconstruction of any department of education in the world to-day in personnel, and in pedagogic method, and the professional minister will decline till these changes are made."

Special Ministerial Activities.

The topics brought to light heretofore do not include all of the details in the life of every pastor, nor are those enumerated a part of the daily life of each minister. The results are illustrative and suggestive of what occurs in the career of the average American minister, although no quantitative value is claimed for them; they concern the vast majority of ministers and these are pastors. The men whom the public view on star occasions and through the press are commonly men of little actual experience in the pastorate, whom peculiar fitness and frequently church politics have placed in conspicuous and paying positions, while the pastor of the average church is the man who raises the funds for maintenance of these officials and are really the men behind the guns. The public are prone to judge ministerial work by the men in the glare of publicity.

Again, ministers with only general training occasionally may be called to duties even more numerous and diverse than those of the pastor. For example, the specified activities of the Missionary Secretaries of the Methodist Episcopal Church in New York City, are as follows, according to the Rev. George Adams.

A. Correspondence. 1. Concerning finances, property interests, and evangelistic, educational, medical, and publication work of the several foreign missions. 2. Concerning affairs personal to missionaries and their families. 3. Concerning home missions. 4. Concerning collections in churches, special gifts, supplies, etc. 5. With candidates and missionaries returning to the field. 6. Concerning annuities, lands, legacies, etc. 7. Concerning sermons, addresses, etc. *B. Finances.* 1. Auditing all bills. 2. Examining detailed annual reports of mission treasurers and ordering accounts corrected, closed, etc. 3. Examining detailed estimates for each mission. 4. Examining redistribution for the several missions. 5. Paying bills by drafts and remitting appropriations, special grants, special gifts, and other moneys by bills on exchange, drafts, etc. 5. Examining and approving accounts of outgoing and home-coming missionaries. *C. Business for Board and General Missionary Committee.* This includes preparation and presentation of business to committees, preparation of their recommendations and reports, and presentation to the Board. 1. Requests from Mission Finance Committees, from missionaries and others. 2. Questions concerning annuities, lands and legacies, loans,

investments, etc. 3. Communications from other societies involving co-operation in enterprises and movements. 4. Purchase and sale of property, erection, repairs, improvements of buildings. 5. Allowances of retired missionaries' widows, orphans. 6. Deficits, unexpended balances, debts, etc. 7. Sickness, death of missionaries or members of families. *D. Superintendence of Business of Office.* 1. Appointments of stenographers, clerks and other employees. 2. Regulation of their hours, duties, etc. 3. Publication and circulation of World-Wide Missions, booklets, tracts, maps, and supplies. 4. Supervision of all accounts of the offices. 5. Management of the society's one-third interest in the Book Concern and Mission House, 150 Fifth Ave., New York City, including supervision of employees, repairs, alteration, rent of rooms, etc. *E. Addresses, Articles, Reports.* 1. Addresses at conventions, Conference anniversaries, to churches. Sunday schools, Epworth Leagues. 2. Editorials for World-Wide Missions, articles for the press, tracts, etc. 3. Reports for the Board of Managers and to the General Conference. "Some idea of the extent of the official correspondence in this office can be realized by the following statement. The writer has ascertained from the assistant missionary secretary, Dr. H. K. Carroll, that on twelve consecutive business days he dictated in addition to other daily duties, 361 letters; 331 contained one page, 25 two pages, 3 three pages and 2 four pages. The foregoing facts are thus tabulated in order to give an intelligent understanding of the labors required of the officials referred to." (N. Y. Christian Advocate, Jan. 5, 1906.)

The Institutional church also demands complex activities of the ministers for which the average seminary graduate is unprepared. There are about a half hundred purely institutional churches in this country although there are very many city churches, especially in New York city, that maintain some kind of institutional work. In some of the pure type there appears an excess of organizations, of machinery, of beating upon the surface of things. A very brief summary of the departments of parish work in the Church of the Ascension, New York city, shows the following:

1. Missionary. Ascension Mission Association, Women's Missionary League, Junior Auxiliary, King's Daughters, (Earnest Workers). *2. Charitable.* St. Agnes's Nursery, Society for the Relief of the Industrious Poor, St. Elizabeth Guild, Fresh Air Work, Deaconess, Parish Physician, Sewing Room, Rector's Fund, Communion Alms, Burial Fund. *3. Educational.* Sunday schools, Kindergartens, Parish Library, Class in Art, Class in Elocution, Class in Dancing, Class in Histrionics, Class in Literature, Class in History, Class in Current Topics, Class in Calisthenics, Eastburn Scholarship. *4. Social.* Parish Reception, Mother's Meeting (3), Reading and Amusement Room (boys), Students' Club, Young Married Women's Club, Girls' Club, Junior Girls' Club, Ascension Band, Men's Club. *5. Industrial.* Cooking School (3 classes), Sewing Schools (3), Kitchen Garden (5 classes), Class in Embroidery, Class in Dressmaking, Class in Millinery. *6. Athletic.* Calisthenics, Gymnasium, Junior Boys' Club, Senior Boys' Club.

The Year Book, 1905, of this typical, endowed church shows an

annual expenditure of $61,158.91. The parochial staff includes three clergymen, a deaconess, a sexton, an assistant and a secretary, besides a small army of workers and musician. 3,710 calls were made during the year, 1,086 services were held and five buildings were maintained. With all this machinery and means there was apparently a net loss of communicants for the year, there being but 54 persons confirmed and 59 burials—and this in the inexhaustible mission field of New York City.

The type of church most common is the one in which one man does practically all the work, occasionally with an assistant. The comparison of our returns with the following letter from the former pastor of the Centenary Church of St. Louis will indicate how closely they follow the activities of the general pastor. He writes as follows in response to my inquiry regarding his activities:

"The duties of a practical pastor, as far as my experience goes, are about as follows:—First, two sermons and one prayer meeting address each week. Secondly, an average of about two addresses upon the outside. Thirdly, a general oversight and direction of the various missionary and young people's societies of the church. Fourth, a close study of and continuous interest in the work of the Sunday school. Fifth, ministering to the sick as a pastor, and the burial of the dead. Sixth, a lively and intelligent interest in everything that goes toward good citizenship and the well-being of the community. Seventh, the visitation of the people at home as often as possible. Eighth, calling upon strangers, and showing them attention and interest as a leader in the church should show. Ninth, giving advice to those who seek it in matters of business, education, books, marriage and else. Tenth, interesting himself in members and friends of the flock, and their children who are in need of work. Eleventh, conducting an extensive correspondence with people throughout the length and breadth of the land, who feel free to write to a pastor for information on every imaginable subject. Twelfth, supplying facts and figures, historical and otherwise, to those who apply for them, to be used in making books, preparing addresses, writing newspaper articles, etc. Thirteenth, the pastor is the standing medium between every denominational board and the congregation, as well as between every inter-denominational and non-sectarian movement and the church. Fourteenth, directing and leading in the work of caring for the poor. Fifteenth, responding to the calls of weak churches, and other needy places, to raise money and otherwise assist them. Sixteenth, hearing the story of the sorrows and disappointments and the troubles of many people, and officiating frequently in the adjustment of personal difficulties between members of the same family and the members of the community. I think what I have suggested pretty well covers the weekly grind of the pastor."

This chapter does not attempt to elaborate the formal constraints placed upon ministers by synods, diocesan authorities, conventions, conferences, bishops or deacons, as well as by creed, which are quite well known.

Discussion and Conclusions.

The ministry at its best exercises in peculiar relations of confidence helpful functions of individual and social value. Operating in moments of pedagogical opportunity the influence of an honest, capable minister is distinct from the offices of other professions and is capable of wide development in maintaining the perpetuity of the home and healthful social conditions, in the betterment of morals, the increase of pure religion and of human happiness. The demonstrated value of the ministry justifies its existence as a professional group, but men are needed in it who can bring to its labors the ardor and love of a vocation rather than a business. It is as visionary to propose the elimination of the ministry in favor of a spontaneous avocation as it would be to turn over the work of other specialists, architects, physicians, educators, lawyers, to enthusiastic volunteers without specific training or aptitude.

The demand for a perfect man to be the leader in religion perhaps has its origin in the racial tendency to incarnate the highest religious ideals which is a psychological basis for the incarnations of Deity common to many religions. The conceptions of the ideal minister appearing in the minds of our correspondents is that of the incarnation of moral, intellectual and physical superiority.

In marked contrast with this being, is the person the minister would be if altogether comformable to the actual demands of current customs. A normal youth attracted to the ministry by the lofty ideal associated with it, may start with heart aflame with the love of God and fellowman; too often he finds his energy soon exhausted, disappointment and a crushing sense of the littleness of men whom he meets in his restricted sphere, when he has passed from the enthusiastic into the storm and stress period of service. It is difficult for him to discriminate between essential and non-essential activities when faithful performance of stipulated perfunctory services is the price of influence and success. The exactions of church members and of outsiders, the conservatism of deacons, the necessity of entertaining, of dressing well, of taking the lead in contributions of money while he is prohibited from earning wealth, the shackles of ecclesiasticism, solemn and formal vows, perhaps the autocracy of bishops, felt all the more keenly because this is a free country, the multitudinous pastoral duties involving physical and mental labor and grave responsibilities, enforced and harassing con-

formity to conventions, sentiments and whims—all these factors handicap him, oppress him, while he may comprehend vaguely that this is all wrong and if he could do it for conscience sake he would seek boldly freedom and light. He is often tormented by lack of money for necessities, for books and for necessary recreation and travel, and for time for study, although he feels sorely the pressing demand for more effective methods of attacking sin and misery, and in vain he would inquire into science, which he is almost persuaded is not hostile to religion, but the grind of routine binds him; the sails are torn and the masts are shattered but he abides bravely with the ship.

Perhaps the best people of earth are within the churches, but the selfishness and inconsistency of some church members is evinced in the restrictions placed upon the minister. Much is demanded of him, he is driven to great labor, prohibited from enjoying many of the prerogatives and pleasures of other moral men and from providing against the poverty of old age, and thus disqualified for business competition he is often found "without charge" at middle age.

To the men of small calibre, some of whom are in the ministry only because of the easy intellectual requirements for admission, the incessant ant-like activity that means little is a delight; they love to be the chief actors in small affairs, and resent any proposed alteration of ministerial routine, a position which finds support in ignorance, convention and ecclesiasticism. They belong psychologically with a certain class of proud small merchants, opinionated pedagogues and cocksure lawyers and doctors. On the other hand, to many ministers readjustment of the unwritten and written code of pastoral obligations seems imperative; there must be intelligent and protective specialization to meet deep human need, instead of slavish conformity to crystallized precedents. For the proper training of religious specialists radical changes are required in the present method of training ministers. This need is voiced in the popular demand for more practical preparation and in the inability of the average minister to grapple with urgent social issues or to utilize the situations of ministerial life. The tension between the ideal and the real in the ministry approaches the breaking point.

The popularity of young preachers and the early decline of some ministers who apparently are dead intellectually at forty, may be due to two causes: (1) the artificial, whimsical and fashionable standards of

ministerial eligibility in vogue in churches which do not desire or recognize intellectual and spiritual strength; (2) the premature mental senescence induced by over fatigue and worry of the brain condemned to monotonous phases of activity. Eminent preachers have prevented the fossilizing tendency by a broad and varied mental life incessantly propelling nourishing blood-currents through the brain to the end of their days. Mental arrest is not incompatible with long life, as proved in the aged insane. Coupled to improper mental habits, the didactic and sermonizing practice, is the fatigue of pastoral drudgery. Hodge's (19) experiments show that there is great similarity between utterly fatigued young brain-cells and the brain-cells of extreme senescence. His work includes plates of the cells of the spinal ganglia of an old man of 92 years, and also those of a human fœtus, the nucleus and nucleoli of the former much shrunken and the protoplasm pigmented; the latter not so. Experiments on young and old bees showed marked differences in brain cells of old and young, varying with age. He also shows brain cells of birds and bees killed in the morning after a night of rest and they resemble those of the infant. Brain cells of birds and bees fatigued after a long day of flight or work resemble those of the old bees and of the aged man. There is similarity in this case between the anatomical basis of fatigue and of senescence; there is ground for the supposition "that age is of the nature of final fatigue." The experiments are not conclusive, but there is reason for our suspecting that where fatigue is excessive and continuous something like premature senescence will result. One condemned to revolve in a tiresome rut, expending energy unceasingly cannot maintain the varied interests that alienists say are necessary for healthy mental states. To realize that "there is a host of exciting phenomena besides those that have been chosen," Janet declares, is a keynote to be followed in overcoming abnormal impulsions. There is good reason to believe that with scientific mental habits inculcated at the beginning of their careers, instead of the cramming and deadening processes of the modern theological course, actual premature disqualification of ministers would cease, and the ripeness of experience would render them most effective intellectually in past middle and in old age.

Amid the chaotic status of religious affairs there are rich opportunities of valuable and even heroic service for the minister who has scientific preparation combined with greatness of heart. He must choose on

to-morrow routine, an easy berth, ecclesiastical politics, acquiescence to convention, intellectual atrophy and a shrivelling moral nature, or he will define his position, choose the method that attacks evil at its roots, covet and revel in the unfettered mental life which finds in science inexhaustible stimulus and in the Scriptures new lessons, in the human soul new possibilities, and develop a religion of the head and of the heart, exalted above the tenets of any sect, full of inspiration, preventive and saving power.

Abstracting and repeating the conclusions suggested by the material in this chapter we recapitulate in a few words:

(a) The ministerial profession has high present value and possibilities as a social group.

(b) The minister theoretically embodies the highest human ideals.

(c) In practice, he is forced to drudgery and humiliating restrictions.

(d) Abandonment of trivial, exacting and of poverty-breeding labors imposed solely by custom and organizations should be undertaken by pastors but with assumption of the burdens of new issues laid bare by science.

(e) Educational methods to promote intellectual longevity are demanded. Continued varied interests are equally important for efficiency and happiness.

(f) Admission to the ranks of religious and moral specialists should be made impossible to weaklings and parasites. The newly revealed responsibilities of the ministry require the best of men and better methods than now exist for their training.

[In a second chapter the writer will suggest constructively some modern opportunities for the ministry, but chiefly will investigate theological education and seminaries in the United States.]

CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION.

By JAMES BISSETT PRATT.

Williams College.

The question of the historical origin of religion is, of course, one that can never be definitely and certainly settled. The data necessary for a definitive and final answer are simply not to be had. Yet so perennially fascinating is the subject, that nearly every one occupied in any way with the history of religion, feels his fingers itching, now and then, with a strong desire to add his speculations on this question to those of his predecessors. Hence we have a long list of theories of the origin of religion, propounded by leading anthropologists, philosophers, and philologists, each with his school of followers, and each having considerable influence on thought in various fields.

As was pointed out above, the data in our possession are not sufficient to furnish any one doctrine with absolute demonstration; hence all the theories in question must remain forever in the world of hypothesis. Yet there is a difference between a good hypothesis and a poor one; and while it is impossible to prove any one hypothesis true, it may be quite possible to show several of them improbable, and thus help clear the ground and make future progress toward a more satisfactory hypothesis easier. The aim of this paper will be to pass in review some of the leading theories of the origin of religion and to add here and there a few words of criticism and suggestion which, it is hoped, may prove helpful at least by barring up blind alleys and pointing the general direction.

The problem on our hands involves two questions: the first as to the origin of the belief in psychical beings superior to man; the second, as to the adoption of some of these as gods. Men might have believed from the earliest ages down to the present in beings superior to themselves,—as many believe to-day in angels; but had there been no attempt to get into communication with these beings, no adoption of some of them as objects of worship, there would have been no such thing as religion, nor any belief in a god.

We must, therefore, address ourselves first of all to the question:

Why did primitive men—or shall we say highly evolved animals?—come to believe that they were not alone in the world, that besides themselves there were other intelligent beings, greater in power or wisdom than they? In other words, what was the origin of "animism"?

To this question we have three general answers: one that of De Brosse, Comte, and among contemporary writers, Réville, another that of Tylor and Spencer, the third that of Frazer.

I class DeBrosses, Comte, and Réville together, on the question of the origin of animism, because they are at one in seeking no origin for it at all. They take it as their starting point, and do not try to go behind it and explain it. DeBrosses, who unites what we know as animism, fetichism, and zoolotry, under the one name fetichism, considers that it needs no further explanation than the extreme and universal "stupidité" of primitive man; "son cœur perpétuellement ouvert à la crainte, son âme sans cesse avide d'espérances, qui donnent un libre cours au déréglement de ses idées, le porte à mille actions dénuées de sens."[1]

Auguste Comte[2] followed in the footsteps of DeBrosses, accepting from him the term fetichism, as descriptive of the earliest form of religious belief. Primitive man interpreted all external things on the analogy of his own nature. Even the higher animals, he thinks, have reached the stage of fetichism, "supposing external bodies even the most inert, to be animated by passion and will." Every object which attracted the attention of nascent humanity was naturally interpreted as a centre of will, thus personified.

Owing, apparently, to the lack of empirical evidence on the subject, Réville does not discuss the question whether or not we should go back of animism—or, as he calls it, "Naturalism"—but takes it as a matter of course that man should regard certain objects and forces as possessing consciousness and will.[3]

Opposed to these authors who consider the personification of nature powers so simple and inevitable a thing as to require no explanation, are Tylor and Spencer, who raise the question: How did the animis-

[1] "Du Culte des Dieux Fetiches."

[2] "Course de Philosophie Positive."

[3] "Prolégomènes de l'Histoire des Religions"—esp. pp. 97 and 98.

tic hypothesis ever enter into the mind of primitive man? They maintain that the personification of the forces of nature and the confusion between the animate and inanimate is not at all a natural thing. Spencer puts the argument forcibly in Chapter IX of his Principles of Sociology. Even the lowest animals seem to make some distinction between the animate and inanimate, and as we go higher in the scale of intelligence we find increasingly complex and exact tests used to distinguish the two. Thus *motion*, *spontaneous motion*, and the *adaptation of motions to ends* are used by successively higher animals as criteria of the animate. Spencer continues: "Shall we say that the primitive man is less intelligent than the lower mammals, less intelligent than birds and reptiles, less intelligent even than insects? Unless we say this we must say that the primitive man distinguishes the living from the non-living; and if we credit him with intelligence higher than that of brutes, we must infer that he distinguishes the living from the non-living better than brutes do."[1] The fact that there is a stage of human development in which men actually do attribute life and consciousness to the non-living must be explained on the supposition that this animistic belief is a secondary belief "into which the primitive man is betrayed during his early attempts to understand the surrounding world." The animistic interpretation of nature is therefore a result of speculation based on certain experiences of man's own, which mislead him into a "germinal error." This germinal error is the belief in his double or soul, as a being distinguished from his body and capable of separating itself from it. This notion both Tylor and (following him) Spencer maintain arose from the phenomena of death and dreams. When the idea of soul as distinguished from body was once formed, it was transferred from human beings to all natural objects that affected man. It proved a good working hypothesis and very productive of results; and became a key to most of the problems of early philosophy. "As men's ordinary life and actions were held to be caused by souls," says Tylor, "so the happy or disastrous events which affect mankind as well as the manifold physical operations of the outer world were accounted for as caused by soul-like beings, spirits whose essential similarity of origin is evident through all their wondrous variety of power and function." "If it be admit-

[1] "Principles of Sociology," Vol. 1, p. 129.

ted that souls and other spiritual beings are conceived of as essentially similar in their nature, it may be reasonably argued that the class of conception based on evidence most direct and accessible to ancient men is the earlier and fundamental class. To grant this is in effect to agree that the doctrine of souls founded on the natural perceptions of primitive man gave rise to the doctrine of spirits. It seems as though the conception of a human soul, when once attained to by man, served as a type or model on which he framed not only his ideas of other souls of lower grade, but also his ideas of spiritual beings in general, from the tiniest elf that sports in the long grass up to the heavenly Creator and Ruler of the world, the great Spirit."[1]

Frazer regards the belief that the course of nature is determined by conscious agents far too complex and too advanced for primitive man, just emerged from the animal state, to attain. A much simpler belief, and one much more suited to his humble intellectual powers, Frazer considers to be magic—both imitative and sympathetic. This, as based directly on the association of ideas, requires no greater imagination nor reasoning power than is possessed by the very lowest human intelligence. In Australia, where dwells the race of men most similar to primitive man, magic flourishes and religion is scarcely to be found. Frazer continues: "May we not reasonably conjecture that the civilized races of the world have also at some period of their history passed through a similar intellectual phase, that they attempted to force the great powers of nature to do their pleasure before they thought of courting their favor by offerings and prayer?"[2] In other words, Frazer's conclusion is that everywhere an age of magic preceded a belief in the forces of nature as animate beings. This latter belief arose as the more advanced thinkers gradually perceived that magic did not produce the effects expected of it; that what had been taken for causes were no causes; that in their magical rites they "had been pulling strings to which nothing was attached." The same effects, to be sure, were still produced—rain fell, the sun went on his course, men were born and died, but man now saw that these things were not of his own making. "He could no longer cherish the pleasing illusion that it was he who guided the earth and the heaven in their courses, and that they would cease to perform their great revolutions were he to take his feeble hands from the wheel." A new and satisfactory solu-

[1] "Primitive Culture," Vol. II, p. 100.

[2] "The Golden Bough."

tion for the problem as to how all these natural events happened, he now found in the idea that it was not himself and his fellows, but "other beings, like himself, but stronger," who directed the course of things and brought about the events which he had hitherto believed to be dependent on his own magic.

Frazer's theory, then, of the origin of the belief in nature-spirits, is that it was neither the first and the obvious interpretation of natural forces, nor an application of the ghost-theory, but rather a reasoned hypothesis which "the deeper minds," perhaps only half-consciously, constructed when the primitive and natural explanation failed;—in other words, that it was "the despair of magic."

Any theory as to the origin of animism must rest almost entirely on its *a priori* merits; empirical evidence is practically out of the question. Frazer's argument from the beliefs of the Australian natives is of very little weight; for these natives, low as they are in the scale of intelligence, are removed by countless generations from the really primitive man. Moreover, according to Frazer's own, possibly inadvertent, admissions they do believe in spirits of many sorts, and according to Andrew Lang's authorities in a great God as well.[1]

If Frazer's theory, therefore, is to be adopted it must be because of its inherent reasonableness. And inherent reasonableness, in my opinion, it certainly does not possess. Instead of being simpler and more likely to appeal to the savage mind than animism, the belief in the absolute uniformity of nature and in the power of magic seems much more complex and difficult of attainment. That all things are subject to law, and that he who knows the law holds the sun and moon, the waters, and life and death in his power, is a conception which, on the ground of simplicity at least, can hardly be considered prior to the interpretation of striking external force as volitional force. It certainly is improbable that man, in his state of helpless dependence on the elements, before he attained sufficient intellectual power to class the wind and the thunder among animate beings, felt confident "that it was he who guided the earth and the heaven in their courses, and that they would cease to perform their great revolutions were he to take his feeble hands from the wheel."[2]

[1] Andrew Lang: "Magic and Religion." Chap. 3.

[2] *Cf.* a criticism of Frazer's theory from a somewhat different point of view in Folk-lore for June, 1904, by R. R. Marett; also Lang's "Myth, Ritual, and Religion," p. 45 ff.

In making up our minds as to the origin of animism we must, therefore, in my opinion, leave Frazer's hypothesis out of consideration, and confine our attention to the two views first mentioned, which for brevity I shall call the theory of spontaneous growth, and the ghost theory.

For the discussion of this question we have of course no first-hand data. A late form of animism is the earliest stage of belief we can get at. Whether the ghost theory must be pre-supposed as a condition leading to animism is therefore a question of reasoning rather than of research. For my part, I cannot see that the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive; and in fact the probability seems to me to be that some of the objects of nature were spontaneously personified, while others were at first regarded as inanimate until the notion of souls or spirits, already well started, was carried over to them.

In all this discussion we must of course remember that there was no *first* man, no *first* men. Man was not suddenly made—out of either mud or monkeys; he did not open his eyes and find himself a man and perceive nature around him. For an indefinite period he was neither beast nor man, but both; he was the evolving beast, the incipient man, and he carried into his new state his animal heritage. Now while animals do, in a general way, distinguish between the living and the non-living, they doubtless often draw the line in the wrong place; their "tests" at best are rough and often misleading. Their distinctions, too, are probably better classed as vague feelings than as clear ideas. To them most moving things probably seem in a general way alive. The dog barking at the moving wheelbarrow probably has a vague notion that it hears and feels when bitten. In like manner we may assume the horse regards the automobile and the trolley car as living things.[1] When the animal developed into the man, and these vague feelings of classification became articulate, it seems probable man found himself acting toward various things, which we now know are inanimate, as if they were alive, and so found himself thinking them alive. As he had risen in the scale of intelligence the scope of his interests had broadened, and many objects—such for instance, as the wind, the sun and moon,—had attracted his attention, which animals lower in the

[1] When trolley cars were first introduced into Bangkok the natives, taking them for gods, fell down on their knees and worshipped them.—See Robert E. Speer, "Missions and Modern History."

scale seem to ignore. These and many other objects, such as fire and flood, lightning and storm, man saw had the power of independent motion, and obviously also had much power over him. Toward them he had the same general feelings and gave the same general type of reaction as toward animals and other men. They were all vaguely classed together as different from the obviously inanimate earth. There was probably no reasoning in this belief of his; he *found* himself believing. The vague feelings and instinctive reactions of the brute developed into beliefs without his noticing the process.

Another cause that may have led to man's personification of certain objects was the resistance which they offered to his will, the force they exerted, which was naturally interpreted in his chief, perhaps his only, category of force—namely, volitional effort. I cannot therefore think that man waited till he had formed a definite concept of his own soul before he began explaining nature in terms of will. The two processes went on together. No more in primitive than in modern science are we to suppose that psychology preceded physics.

But there are many cases of personification by early races which cannot be accounted for in either of the ways suggested,—such, for instance, as the personification of rocks, fallen trees, "stocks and stones," etc. Such things as these,—things which the animals probably class in a vague way as inanimate (if I may speak of animals classing things at all)—can hardly have been considered living by the earliest men, and for the personification of these the theory of Tylor and Spencer offers a sufficient explanation.

If I am right, then, in my hypothesis, animism had no single source; but each case of personification sprang from its own particular cause.

But whatever was the origin of animism, we must remember that animism is not primitive religion, but primitive science or philosophy. It is a theory of the universe, and is no more religion or theology than pan-psychism is. What then was the origin of religion? Why did men try to get into communication with some of these spirits, in whom they now believed, and how did they come to adopt and worship them as their gods?

The obvious answer to this question is that given by all the writers thus far discussed, with the exception of Spencer. Believing as they did that the forces of nature were really living beings, many of whom

obviously had considerable power over human welfare—as, for instance, the storm, the sun, the tree,—and regarding the souls of the powerful dead as still powerful, what more natural than that an attempt should be made to win the favor of all these spirits, or ward off their ill-will?

But this simple hypothesis has proved too simple for many anthropologists. Spencer and Lippert,[1] who, to be sure, adopt part of it, insist that the worship of the spirits of nature is secondary, and is merely an extension of ghost worship. The soul of the departed relative appeared to the sleeper in his dreams, and it was this that put it into the head of primitive man to worship at all. Religion thus originated in the worship of the dead, and from them it was by analogy extended to all spirits.

That the worship of the dead goes back further than our earliest data is certain; but so does the worship of nature-spirits. Empirical evidence for the decision of the priority of ghost or nature worship is therefore lacking; and in want of all such data there is no good reason for supposing that men worshipped the spirits of the dead earlier than the spirits of nature-forces. Certainly the storm which destroys a man's hut, the mysterious wind which, though invisible, breaks down great trees, the flood which carries all before it, are much more striking to the imagination and much more obviously have power over the man's welfare, than the soul of the dead man which appears to him in a dream. Doubtless the custom of providing for the needs of the beloved friend whose soul has quitted his body, goes back to the earliest times, and may have influenced the form of worship paid to natural objects; but this provision of food, etc., for the ghost was not worship, any more than was the act of feeding a living parent or child. It is possible that with some races, living in regions where there are but few striking natural phenomena, the worship of the departed may have sprung up as early as that of nature-forces. But that ghost worship is everywhere the primitive form of religion seems most improbable.

A theory of the origin of religion that deserves much more attention than it has received is that of Andrew Lang, as propounded in his two books, "The Making of Religion," and "Magic and Religion." It is, namely, the decidedly striking hypothesis that the earliest gods of many

[1]To these Grant Allen should be added, who upholds practically the same view in his book "The Evolution of the Idea of God."

peoples—and, by implication of all peoples—were in no way connected with the spirits of animistic worship, but were truly great gods and even moral Creators. Religion originated as theism and was later corrupted by animism. To substantiate his theory Mr. Lang lays before us a great number of instances, drawn from both Old and New Worlds, of very "low races" believing in a very "high god." This god they never worship, but they regard him as the Maker of all things, and they commonly refer to him as "Our Father." "The Savage Supreme Being, with added power, omniscience and morality, is the idealization of the savage, as conceived by himself, *minus* fleshly body (as a rule) and *minus* death." Typical is the "great black man" among the Fuegians, who is always wandering about, who knows everything, and punishes bad actions by influencing the weather. Typical also is Mungan-ngaur among the Kurnai tribe in Australia, who dwells in the sky, whose lessons "soften the heart," and whose name signifies Our Father. Moreover "it is among the 'lowest savages' that the Supreme Beings are most regarded as eternal, moral (as the morality of the tribe goes, or above their average practice), and powerful." In none of these "higher gods" is there any resemblance to spirits of the dead; in fact in some places the natives distinguish between "two orders of intelligent beings different from men, (1) ghosts of the dead, (2) beings who are not and never have been human."

Mr. Lang admits, "It is impossible to prove historically which of the two main elements in belief—the idea of an eternal Being or Beings, or the idea of surviving ghosts—come first into the minds of men." But, he insists, the former at any rate does not require the latter; and moreover, if the idea of an eternal Being came last it ought to be the most fashionable and potent, whereas the reverse is the case—the host of subordinate spirits being worshipped to the neglect of the great god.

Just how this elevated idea arose of course we can only guess, but Mr. Lang thinks it was probably through the use of the design argument. "As St. Paul writes: 'That which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath showed it unto them . . . . being understood by the things which are made . . . . but they became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.'"[1]

[1] "The Making of Religion," pp. 198–200.

After this belief in a moral Creator had arisen, according to Mr. Lang's theory, the worship of the souls of the dead and of other spirits who were bribable and unscrupulous became more popular and the people neglected the great God who was so lofty as to seem very distant, and who could not be bought by offerings. The amalgamation of several tribes into one would also have the effect of changing the original monotheism into polytheism. Thus the course of religion was for a long time not progress but degeneration.

Startling as Mr. Lang's theory is, I believe much of it must be accepted. The existence of "high gods of low races" cannot be doubted;[1] neither can they be explained on the theory that they were "borrowed" from monotheistic religions, such as Christianity and Islam.[2] That they were developed out of ghost-gods seems also most unlikely. Even Mr. Lang's hypothesis as to their origin—or something very like it—I am inclined to accept. But that they were the first gods of their peoples, and that ghost worship and nature worship sprang up after them is most improbable. The suggestion has been made that these gods—which are to-day hardly more than great names—were never any more substantial than now, and that they did not arise until, far along in the animistic stage, people came to ask the question Who made the world? This question was answered as most early questions about Nature are answered—with a simple myth—consisting in this case of hardly more than a name of a personal Creator, and perhaps some very short story to explain why this Creator was not worshipped. This great god therefore was probably never a religious object at all, but a philosophical one merely. As this hypothesis is consistent with all the facts, it is not necessary to accept Mr. Lang's theory of an original theism and a subsequent degeneration, unless it can be shown to be more consistent with what we know of the general development of religion and of the human mind than the hypothesis above suggested. This it certainly is not. The formation of the idea of a Creator, such as Mr. Lang describes, requires a considerable power

[1] They are, however, not so "high" as Mr. Lang would have us believe. *Cf.* Mr. E. S. Hartland's article "High Gods of Australia," in Folk-lore IX, 290–329, and Dr. Wood's "The Supreme God of the Lowest Races," in the New World, IX, 441–450.

[2] Tylor's theory; answered in Lang's Chapter on "Loan Gods" in "Magic and Religion," pp. 15–46.

of generalization and of reasoning. The very question, Who made us and all things? which is presupposed in the idea, is one which could hardly present itself to the mind until a stage had been reached much in advance of that required for the belief in ghost-gods. That man just evolving from the animal, and still too low in the intellectual scale to class the lightning and the cloud among living things to be propitiated, should generalize all things into a single whole, conclude that they all had a common source, and that that source was a wise and moral Creator, is only one step less incomprehensible than Frazer's theory, that primitive man took himself for the great god.

The last theory of the origin of religion which I shall discuss is that of Max Müller and C. P. Tiele, which is also adopted by Prof. Jastrow in his book "The Study of Religion." All three of these writers insist that animism of itself can never account for religion, that there can be no religion without a "sense for the Infinite," and that this sense for the Infinite man finds himself already possessed of as soon as he becomes man at all. The senses, says Max Müller, supply the savage with a "first impression of infinite things," with "an intimation of the infinite."[1] "Everything of which his senses cannot perceive a limit is to the primitive savage—unlimited or infinite." Living, as he did, on high mountains or on coral islands, and surrounded by an endless expanse of sky and of plane or sea, he would receive an idea of the infinite even earlier than the concept of the finite. The perception of the infinite is always the concomitant of the perception of the finite, and is the seed of every religion no matter how low.

After substituting the word "apprehension" for "perception" (of the Infinite) and insisting that it is the "Infinite within man," rather than the external Infinite which man apprehends, Tiele practically adopts Max Müller's view. Why, he asks, is man discontented with his environment? Why is he not like the dumb beast "which never wearies itself with seeking for what the earth does not produce, or what earthly existence does not offer?" The reason is, Tiele tells us, because man "feels he has an inward impulse which constrains him to overstep the boundaries of the finite, and to strive after an infinite perfection, though he knows it to be unattainable for him as an earthly being. The Infinite, the Absolute, very Being, as opposed to continual becoming and

[1] "Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion."

perishing—or call it as you will—that is the principle which gives him constant unrest, because it dwells within him."[1]

Both Müller and Tiele admit that the apprehension of the Infinite in the savage is most vague; Tiele even calls it unconscious, though innate. "The origin of Religion consists in the fact that man *has* the Infinite within him, even before he is himself conscious of it, and whether he recognizes it or not." "It is man's original, unconscious, innate sense of infinity, that gives rise to his first stammering utterances of that sense."

Just what an "unconscious sense of the Infinite" can be, Tiele does not tell us. If he means that it is absolutely unconscious, and exists in primitive man as a potentiality only—as all later human developments may be said to exist in him—and that only after religion is well started on its course does it appear as an actuality, then it is hard to see how it has anything to do with the origin of religion, and Tiele's theory ceases to be even a bad theory. If, on the other hand,—as is probably the case,—Tiele does not mean that this "sense of the Infinite within man" is absolutely unconscious, but only vague, it lies open to all the obvious criticisms to which Max Müller's theory is so plain a mark. It is *himself*, not the primitive savage, whom Max Müller has imagined on his lofty mountain or his coral island, "perceiving" the Infinite. It is *himself*, the modern philosopher, whom Tiele describes as "seeking for what earthly existence does not offer," and as feeling constrained "to strive after an infinite perfection."

Where is the savage to be found who "wearies himself with seeking for what earthly existence does not offer?" Consider, for instance, the American Indian. What are his religious wants? They have been classed as four: food, protection, power, the gratification of sex. When these are satisfied he seeks nothing more,—not even "infinite perfection." There is nothing other-worldly about the American Indian. Had Professor Tiele given us instances of savage races in whose case the Infinite within them called unto the Infinite without—as deep unto deep—his theory might have been as persuasive as it is beautiful. But until some such instances are forthcoming we must consider the whole description at variance with the facts of savage religion. It is a natural result of a tendency to see in early religion all that is to be

[1] "Elements of the Science of Religion."

found in the fully developed form. And this in turn is due to a false conception of evolution. Evolution does not imply that all that is to be found in the final state is already present in the primary one. If there is to be real progress this cannot be the case. If "with the first clay He did the last man make," there is no true evolution. The oak *is* not in the acorn. To be sure part of it is; but much of it is in the ocean of air, in the ground, in the clouds and the distant sea, and in the heat and light of the great sun. Growth is a process of constant addition. The acorn does not explain the oak. So it is with religion. It has a real growth in which real additions are made,—not all is there at the start. It is because some of us have this notion that the end must be explained by the beginning that we insist upon reading into the beginning more than can possibly be found there.

Having been unable to accept the views of Spencer, Lang, Müller and Tiele as to the origin of religion, we would seem to be forced to return to Tylor's theory, and to develop religion directly out of animism. And Tylor's view is in fact, the one I shall adopt, with, however, a very considerable modification, suggested in part by Jevons.[1] In his clear and logical description of the origin of religion Tylor has laid too much stress on the ideational powers of early man and altogether too little on the emotional side of his psychical make-up. At the stage of the race with which we are dealing, when man was mentally not so very different from his brute brothers, clear-cut ideation, we must suppose, formed but a small part of his conscious life, while much of the greater part of his mental content was made up of the emotional, impulsive, instinctive background of consciousness.[2] Especially were his ideas limited because of the paucity of words by which to express them. The inadequacy of his embryonic language would in fact prevent him from having any but exceedingly simple ideas. His life would then be one ruled chiefly by feeling—taken in the broad sense. This was his condition, we must suppose, while animism, his primitive philosophy, was forming. But there is no reason to think that he waited till his animistic philosophy was complete and definite before anything like religion began to grow. Rather must we believe that religion started germinating in the early emotional, sub-

[1] *Cf.* his "Introduction to the History of Religion."

[2] *Cf.* Chapter 1 of my "Psychology of Religious Belief."

jective stage, and that it grew side by side with animism, being all along more or less closely connected with it. The terror of the thunder and the lightning-flash, the mad rush of the storm, carrying all before it and unaffected by all man's pitiful attempts to stay its strength, the resistless avalanche and the wild sea—these and a hundred other things like them would rouse the great emotional background of the savage's consciousness into furious activity. The sudden breaking in of the unexpected—the disappointment of his well-laid plans by some event out of the course of nature,—the shock of surprise when the unaccountable happened—would have the same emotional effect upon him. These experiences, possibly in connection with his growing animistic theory, would bring with them a vague sense for powers—perhaps for a power—greater than his own, which he would of course conceive in terms of will, though not necessarily as a personality like himself. Possibly Brinton may be right in thinking this first vague superhuman is represented to-day by the *wakan* of the Dakotas, and the *mana* of the Pacific islanders. "These words," says Brinton, "do not convey any idea of personality. They and all like them are vague, indefinite terms for the supernatural, that which was inexplicable by the limited knowledge of the most ignorant of our species."[1] As man's mind developed, and as his animistic explanation of things became wider and more definitely conscious, we may suppose the emotional and the ideational products—never clearly separated—became fused, and the vague feeling for the superhuman-in-general got definitely located in the nature spirits and ghost spirits which were now becoming real and individual beings to him. Thus the dim superhuman-in-general would be supplanted by particular superhuman beings. As these manifestly have great power over human welfare, and as they are conceived of on the analogy of human beings, who love and hate and may be pleased or angered, all sorts of simple devices are resorted to, to propitiate them. Thus at length, by a combination of the emotional and ideational elements we have a belief in real though primitive gods.

If the origin of religion be sought in this general direction, I think we shall be on the right track. But, as was said at the beginning of this paper, our data are not sufficient to make any answer to this question absolutely demonstrable. The utmost we can do is to guess and

[1] "Religions of Primitive Peoples."

to improve on each other's guesses as best we may. In the words of Xenophanes, "There never was nor ever will be a man who has clear certainty . . . . about the gods; for even if he does chance to say what is right yet he himself does not know that it is so. But all are free to guess. . . . . These are guesses something like the truth."[1]

[1] Fragments 14 and 15.

THE TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE.

By PERCY HUGHES, PH. D.

Tulane University.

I. The Religious Attitude.

Religious education, so far as it acquires a scientific character, or becomes a method to be taught, is grounded on the psychology of religion. But since psychology, in dealing with ideas, opinions and actions, treats only of their *general* characteristics, a psychology of religion, like any other psychology of specific content, is concerned in the first place, not with ideas and actions, but with feelings, emotions and attitudes of a *specific* character.

Religion is not, like anger or shame, a matter of mere present emotion; but, like love or modesty, it is a disposition, *i. e.*, a more or less permanent tendency to a certain type of emotional activity. But religious emotion cannot be separated from belief or from action. The study of religion, therefore, must centre on feeling in its relation to cognition and action; that is, upon the *mode* of belief or action, the *way in which* we believe and act. It is, after all, in virtue of the *way in which* they are held or performed that creeds and actions possess a religious or non-religious character. This may be summed up by saying that the study of religion centres upon attitudes of mind. For an attitude is a disposition, not a mere present feeling; and it is a *way in which* we recognize and respond to objects.

I define the religious attitude thus: *the recognition of the infinite and a response to it, in which the individual feels himself to be, in one way or another, in less or greater measure, in union with the infinite.* It seems to me that every religious attitude that I have encountered, in personal experience, in literature,—whether confessions or autobiographies, whether psalms, or hymns or poems,— in public utterances, in the collections that psychologists have made, all may be placed without

forcing, distortion or dismemberment within the limits this definition marks. In note 1, I offer a defense and derivation of the definition, that is, a defense of this use of the term religious. After all, it is more important to note that the attitudes I shall describe fall, all of them, under this definition, and that they constitute a distinct and important type of attitudes. Whatever name be given to these attitudes, it will be admitted, I believe, that to extend and deepen our experience of them is an important aspect of religious education. This is the purpose I have in view in the following classification.

II. Classification.

This classification has, I think, the following characteristics: The order of at least the first four is *genetic*, corresponding to the ages of infancy, childhood, youth and maturity, respectively, in the way I shall later describe. And all six types seem to succeed each other with a necessity that is almost logical. Further, this sequence is not without resemblance to the sequence of religious development in the world's history, when that development is studied, as it should be, not in terms of creed and ritual, but in terms of changing attitude toward the infinite aspect of the world. And, finally, the succession seems to be from a lower to a higher form of religious life, throughout the series.

I am forced to extreme brevity in my account of these attitudes. In each case I offer a formal description, almost a definition, of the

[1] The psychology of religion is forced to adopt the widest possible definition of the term religion. The infinite is the essential and common element, I think, in such terms as divine, absolute, eternal, and ultimate, which, as well the term infinite, often are used to denote the object of the religious attitude. The term divine, which James employs in his first delimitation of religious phenomena, seems to me very unsatisfactory. Is not a circularity in definition implied? for surely objects take on or lose the divine character according as they are the objects of religious attention.

In the latter part of his book, "The Varieties of Religious Experience" (pp. 508-9) James finds the essential element of religion to be a sense of union between the self and a boundless power to save from wrong, with a consequent feeling of security and joy. But the autobiographic documents that he quotes as illustrative of religious experience, while they do indeed all speak of a *sense of union between the self and something boundless, infinite*, yet in many cases refer to that infinite as a presence or as an ideal, not as a power (pp. 70, 79, etc.); nor does this boundless in all cases imply salvation from wrong (pp. 82, 84, 71, 80).

class, and then illustrate the variety of experience that it includes. In all these definitions it must be noted that, in an important sense, the class that is defined earlier is an element of every subsequent type of attitude. Thus peace is an important element of "play," and both peace and play are essential elements of genuine enthusiasm. One has to distinguish, therefore, between peace and "*mere*" peace; play, and *mere* play.

I. PEACE. IN PEACE THE INFINITE IS PRESENT; RELIGIOUS PEACE IS A KIND OF CONTENTMENT, IN WHICH IS FELT AN INFINITE PRESENCE, WHICH FORBIDS EVEN A SENSE OF WANT OR OF DOUBTFUL EXPECTATION.

a. He looked—Ocean and earth, the solid frame of earth, And oceans's liquid mass, in gladness lay Beneath him. . . . Sound needed none, Nor any voice of joy; his spirit drank The spectacle: sensation soul and form, All melted into him; they swallowed up His animal being; in them did he live And by them did he live; they were his life. Thought was not; in enjoyment it expired. No thanks he breathed, he proffered no request; Rapt into still communion. . . . Wordsworth, Excursion, lines 200 ff.

b. "I stood alone with him who had made me, and all the beauty of the world. I did not seek him, but felt the perfect unison of my spirit with his. For the moment, nothing but ineffable joy and exultation remained." Quoted in "The Varieties of Religious Experience" (William James), p. 66.

c. "I mind how once we lay, such a transparent summer morning. Swiftly arose and spread around me the peace and knowledge that pass all the argument of the earth." "There is in the make up of every superior human identity an intuition, a soul-sight of that divine clue and unseen thread which holds the whole congeries of things like a leashed dog in the hand of the hunter." Abbreviated quotations from Walt Whitman cited by William James, o. c., p. 396.

This attitude of PEACE is seldom expressed in hymns, because it is little suited to congregational expression. It must be distinguished carefully from the attitude of resignation. In the latter there is a sense of sorrow or pain in some sense overcome; it is a religion of the second birth. While PEACE, "mere" PEACE is the possession of those upon whom the evils of the world either have made no deep impress or one not too deep to be for the time forgotten. It is expressed

in Addison's hymn, "The spacious firmament on high," paraphrasing the first part of Psalm XIX; but Schopenhauer's esthetic contemplation, on the other hand, is resignation, not mere peace, because the present infinite, the "adequate objectification of the world-will" is symbol also of the sorrow of the world from which the beauty of the present object gives deliverance.

The first place in religious education must be given to establishing the habit of PEACE. The infant cannot *recognize* the infinite, and cannot therefore be religious. But instinctively the infant delights in his times of peace. "Glide the hours uncounted; the sun is its toy; shines the peace of all being, without cloud, in its eyes; and the sum of the world in soft miniature lies." To forget its wants in such moments of satisfaction in the *present* is happiness to the infant. And through the exercise of this instinctive love of peace, we may confirm the habit of peace in the child.[1] Whoever possesses this habit, this delight in peace will not cease to demand that the world, multiple and varying, reveal to him an object of peace.

This first attitude is present in all religious experience, an immediate result of the sense of union with the infinite. We may regard it as a universal test of the presence of religious experience, and of the efficiency of religious education. Only he that knows peace understands the function of religion.

II. PLAY. IN "PLAY" THE INFINITE IS THE SOURCE OF GLADNESS AND JOY. THE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE OF PLAY IS A KIND OF JOY, IN WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL FEELS THAT HE IS ON THE SIDE OF A BOUNDLESS FORCE PRODUCING ALWAYS LIGHT AND GLADNESS.

a. The Lord is my shepherd; therefore shall I not want. . . . Psalm XXIII. Compare also Psalms LXVII and CXIX.

b. "All of my thoughts and cogitations have been of a healthy and cheerful kind, for instead of doubts and fears I see things as they are, for I endeavor to adjust myself to my environment. This I regard as the deepest law." James, o. c., p. 93.

c. "Disease can no longer attack one whose feet are planted on this rock, who feels hourly, momently, the influx of the deific breath." *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[2] Platon Karatayef, in Tolstoi's "War and Peace," is a perfect illustration of this habit of peace. See especially Vol. V, Chap. 13, the last paragraph.

d. The well-known hymn, "Come, my soul, thou must be waking. . . ."

e. "To be religious is to believe that a certain correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative, and that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain type of living." Professor Perry, Int. Jour. of Ethics, XV, p. 73.

Play is delight in activity for its own sake, and in its higher forms is a conflict of parties for victory, subject to rules. The game gives delight, on whichever side victory may rest. The life-game, however, if it is to bring delight, must be played on the side of the stronger, whose end also is gladness. The religion of "PLAY" asserts this to be our condition. But still it is not the end that gives delight, but the contest, the effort. Most of the morning hymns of our churches express exquisitely this attitude. It is indeed the spirit of sun-worship. Its philosophy is well expressed in the definition that I have quoted from Professor Perry. It embraces the religion of the "healthy-minded," and is apparently the attitude of most Christian Scientists.

Religion is often confused with the antithesis of play, the bargain-counter attitude:—"He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." This verse expresses or excites no religious attitude, no union with the infinite. "I have rejoiced in the way of thy testimonies; they are my delight and my counsellors." This expresses the religion of PLAY, because the service of God is presented as a delight in itself.

There is an instinct in the child to play, both to delight in activities for their own sake, and later to co-operate under rules, to merge his activities in a purpose larger than his own. The child does not look upon himself as independent of law, or as the end of his own existence, but expects to find a cause in which to enlist. Sports that develop this instinct of play into a habit have a religious function. In home and school parent and teacher, by example as well as by precept, may preserve, and also extend this spirit of joyous union in a life greater than that of the individual, whether that of the family, the school, of the club, the city, the nation or the world.

This training in the spirit of play should, and in large part does, underlie all that instruction in creed and sacrament and ritual with which we commonly identify the religious education of the boy or girl. It seems to be an essential ingredient of the religious attitudes that

follow; and in proportion as it is absent, does the religion of the individual assume that morbidity and sentimentality with which Christians as a class are, not without reason, reproached by such people as the Parsees and the Japanese, in whom the religion of Play is more commonly present.

III. ENTHUSIASM. HERE THE INFINITE IS AN IDEAL. ENTHUSIASM IS THE STRIVING AFTER AN IDEAL INSPIRED BY A SENSE OF UNITY WITH IT. THE IDEAL IS OF BOUNDLESS EXCELLENCE, AND SPEAKS WITH BOUNDLESS AUTHORITY.

a. "Everything I meet with seems to carry this voice with it,— 'go thou and preach the gospel, be a pilgrim on the earth.'" Whitfield, quoted by James, o. c., p. 318.

b. This then is what I mean by civic religion. It is a recognition of the fact that for every society there is an ideal, that is to say, a divine and social order; it is the attempt to discern and realize that: to bring the life of the city below into harmony with the law of the perfect city not made with hands which hangs above it in the sky. Washington Gladden, in The Homiletic Review.

c. Browning's description of the grammarian, in "A Grammarian's Funeral." The "high man," who, "with a great thing to pursue, dies ere he knows it," and "aiming at a million, misses a unit:" who "throws himself on God, and unperplexed, seeking, shall find him."

d. Isaiah, Chap. XLIX. To preach a new life in Israel Isaiah feels he was called "by the Lord" "from the womb."

e. "This readiness for great things, and this sense that the world by its importance, wonderfulness, etc., is apt for their production would seem to be the undifferentiated germ of all the higher religious faiths." James, o. c., p. 506, n.

Enthusiasm is not mere excitement; it always means peace because it is not the individual that calls himself to the pursuit; rather he feels himself summoned thereto by the infinite,—God or nature. And ENTHUSIASM forbids pride, even in anticipation; for the infinite perfection of the ideal makes all realization, whether present or merely pictured, pale in comparison with it. Therefore it is not selfish. Often we speak of enthusiastic utterance, where there clearly is present no pursuit of such an ideal as I have described. It is better to call such outpourings or manifestations by a name that will distinguish them from evidence of religious enthusiasm, *and reserve the higher name for*

the better thing. Sometimes, however, as in many of the psalms, and indeed in a large proportion of all literature and of art generally, while the subject of description is perhaps peace, or sadness, yet the artist is fired in his efforts by an enthusiasm for a perfect expression of that subject.

We may easily recognize a religious element in the pursuit of truth or beauty, or in the attempt to serve mankind. But I would go further, and say that, wherever the ideal has for the man that pursues it an *infinite excellence* that forbids pride, and an *infinite authority* that give peace even to his utmost effort, in such enthusiasm the man is at one with the infinite, and is truly religious. Therefore, even where the love of man is conspicuously absent, where, *e. g.*, an individual feels himself called to promote some industrial activity as the use of structural steel in buildings, merely by the boundless openings for such use that are revealed to him and to no one else, it seems to me that his work is in a high sense religious, provided his enthusiasm has the characteristics I have given above. To recognize this would ennoble our conception of industrial activity.

Consecration is thus essential to enthusiasm. Adolescence is the age of consecration based apparently on the awakening of a multitude of instincts. The youth's body thrills unexpectedly, unaccountably, to melodies and visions, and through the cumulative effect of such instinctive responses, he may enter on a new life consecrated to definite pursuits. The basis of all religious education at this time is the excitation of such enthusiasms. This period is, however, already receiving plenty of emphasis. It is of greatest importance to speak also of the transformation of enthusiasm into what I term resignation. Without that transformation it seems to me that enthusiasm either dies out, and is replaced by an irreligious, exclusively finite life, or else it is modified and degraded into an intoxication of self-importance.

IV. RESIGNATION. THE INFINITE, NOW, IS POWER AND GOODNESS. TO BE RESIGNED IS TO ACCEPT UNRESERVEDLY THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING; ASSENTING, AND FOLLOWING.

a. "Indeed, the special marking of the man is prone submission to the heavenly will,—seeing it, what it is, and why it is. He will live, nay, it pleaseth him to live so long as God please, and just how God please. He even seeketh not to please God more, which meaneth otherwise, than as God please." Browning. An Epistle.

b. Be passionate hopes not ill resigned For quiet and a fearless mind. . . They who await No gifts from chance have conquered fate. Through clouds of individual strife, Draw homeward to the general life. Matthew Arnold. Resignation.

c. "Sitting down in my own nothingness, I give glory to the eternal being, and will nothing of myself, that so God may will all in me." Behman, quoted in James, o. c., p. 418.

d. "My soul cleaveth unto the dust; quicken thou me according to thy word." "Teach me O Lord the way of thy statutes; and I shall keep it unto the end." Psalm CXIX, 25 and 33.

e. "Not my will but thine be done." Luke XXII, 42.

Whereas in play we *demand* and expect that life bring gladness, and in enthusiasm we are consecrated to this or that ideal in the world, to which we are summoned, in RESIGNATION neither do we make a demand nor is there a limitation in the direction of our response to the demand of the infinite. It is the religion of play such as the ball might be supposed to feel; it is a universal enthusiasm.

Resignation is of many types; in every type it is marked by its adequacy, its sincerity, its recognition of the fact of pain and evil, and by its conquest of that fact. Thus in the story of Job, we see the strong and happy man instructed in the fact of weakness and misery until the pettiness of the individual is clear to him. Then God reveals to Job (Chapters 38 ff.) that pain and terror is an element everywhere in the splendor and power of nature: until Job for the first time feels the majesty of the world and of God, and rejoices in it, asking no longer either for justice or for gladness from a universe that offers constantly more than we can ask or think. This is the resignation of *awe*. In the Stoic, ancient or modern,—Marcus Aurelius or Matthew Arnold,—this response of awe to the infinite is accompanied by a comprehension of that spiritual kinship of man with God which gives dignity even to the humblest individual. Here resignation rises to *sublimity*.

The teachings of Jesus start from the basis of man's meekness, mourning and oppression, the "universal sorrow of mankind." Tolstoi has shown us that community of sorrow is a stronger bond than common joys or fellowship in effect, and that from it springs the resignation of *love*, which is, like all resignation, a joyous enfranchisement, a new liberty arising from this discipline of pain.

Resignation is the first type of the religions of the "second birth."

Through the universal sympathy which it gives, it makes possible the religion of HOPE. By that term I do not of course mean mere joyous expectation or anticipation of something that is coming to us whether in this world or another. The term hope should be reserved to its highest meaning, which I shall try to define.

V. HOPE. IN HOPE THE INFINITE IS THE IRRESISTIBLE POWER THAT WORKS FOR THE BETTER. TO HOPE IS TO ACCEPT AS ONE'S OWN THE PERFECTION THAT THE MOST DISTANT AGES SHALL ATTAIN.

a. Ring bells in unreared steeples
The joy of unborn peoples.
Sound trumpets, far-off blown,
Your triumph is my own.
Parcel and part of all
I keep the festival.
I feel the earth move sunward,
I join the great march onward,
And take by faith while living,
My freehold of thanksgiving.

Whittier. My Triumph.

Hope differs from mere enthusiasm in that it accepts a universal, world ideal, which would be attained even without our efforts. To participate is our privilege. HOPE differs from mere resignation in recognizing not only universal life in which to join, but also a universal progress in which to assist. The religion of Hope does not expect anything; and expectations of immortality, for example, may even interfere with the depth and sincerity of true Hope, attained as that is only through resignation. Bacon, More, Spencer and Comte, all were inspired with true Hope, and they have inspired the modern world.

VI. BEATITUDE. THE INFINITE IS THE PRESENT, UNIVERSAL, PERFECT LIFE. TO BE BLESSED IS TO RECOGNIZE "THAT THE FINAL PRINCIPLE OF THINGS IS ACCOMPLISHED NO LESS THAN IT IS EVER ACCOMPLISHING ITSELF.[1]

a. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue; it is virtue itself. For it is not because we subdue our passions that we enjoy blessedness.

[1] Hegel: Logic, No. 234. Wallace's translation.

On the contrary, because we rejoice in blessedness, on that account we can control our passions. Spinoza: Ethics, Part V, Prop. XLII.

b. When he comes to the end he will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty, the final cause of all our former toils,—beauty absolute, separate, everlasting, which without change is imparted to the ever growing and perishing beauties of all other things. . . . Thither looking and beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities. Plato, Symposium, 210-1. (Jowett.)

c. Waring's hymn, "In heavenly love abiding."

d. Psalm CIII, "Bless the Lord, O my soul. . . ."

By the term beatitude I would denote the climax of religious life, having regard to the religious attitude only, not the fruit in action. It may be taken to imply the universal sympathy from which the peace of resignation arises, the sense of the life and upward spring of the world that is felt in hope, and also the assurance that in what is can be found what ought to be, that in the truest sense perfection is, that the movement toward the better is essentially a phase of present perfection; that there is no magic in the future to cure our ills that the present does not equally contain.

III. Conclusion.

Under these six types of religious attitude I believe all the religious experience I have encountered, however expressed, in psalms or hymns, in prayers or philosophies or poems or confessions, may with much advantage be classified. I believe the science of religious education must concern itself primarily with the development of attitudes, and not with the inculcation of creeds, or of ethical maxims. While dogmatic religion is excluded from our public schools, the inspiration of such attitudes as those of peace, of play and of enthusiasm is not only possible in those schools; it is necessary. Especially it is important that we do not in our school work and school atmosphere help to kill in the child its instinctive tendencies to such attitudes. The close association, at least, of such attitudes with the religious life must be held closely before the teacher's mind.

MAGIC AND MORALS IN BORNEO.

By MARGARETTA MORRIS.

In this practical age of common sense few things seem wider apart than magic and morals. Magic—it belongs to the imaginary realm in which children delight, to memories of our one-time joy in Aladdin and his lamp, in wishing carpets, and enchanted forests. When such things claim attention of the grown up consciousness it is because of our poetic appreciation of the picturesqueness of make-believe. While morals belong to the most serious business of life. Magic to-day is nothing. Morality is everything. Not so very long ago, however, before the current phrase of "universal law" was on everybody's lips, our own Puritan ancestors took magic very seriously. Magic and morals were for them, not imagination and reality, but two equally real antagonistic forces. When witches were burnt, and black art anathematized and sorcerers held at bay by the protection of holy religion, magic was not as with us unmoral, it was immoral. If we take a leap now from these two civilized views to the mental attitude of savages, we find a third relation of our two subjects. Magic, instead of being a matter of unconcern to morality, as to-day, or the bitter foe of honest living, as once to our predecessors, becomes the mainstay and prop of society. It takes the place in the savage community of judge and jury, of prison and pillory. It protects property and punishes crime, induces courage and loyalty. It serves as detective of wrong-doers, as a teacher of handicraft, as stimulus to deeds of hardihood, and as a persuasion to industry and economy. How these excellent results have been effected by a mass of seemingly ridiculous superstition, may be shown by a study of the uncivilized peoples of the islands of the Malay Archipelago, among whom magic practices surround every detail of life. And to illustrate the principle I shall try to give some impression of the supernatural powers attributed to natural objects by the jungle tribes of Borneo, and of the social effect of this belief.

One may find in Borneo many of the spells that make up the familiar occult art of tradition. There, as elsewhere, one finds charms to ward

off evil spirits; the curing of sickness by powerful relics, by incantations and ceremonies; rites of screaming and beating gongs to avert disease and misfortune; firm faith in the lucky or unlucky influence of names; and discovery of guilt by ordeals of fire and water and by drawing lots. Besides these more general types of mystic lore, the wild men of Borneo have a method of divination by the entrails of animals, not unlike that of the Greeks and Romans. Then they have the curious supernatural use of the skulls of their enemies, characteristic of head-hunters, and an elaborate system of taking omens from the cries and flight of birds, which influences every action of their lives. And lastly, they have the institution typical of the Eastern Seas of a complex and rigorous taboo, an institution the essence of which consists in the belief that the touching of certain objects, or the profanation of certain ceremonial rules, brings inevitable disaster, just as misfortune is caused by the unlucky name, the evil omen, or the curse or incantation.

The use of the trophy skull, the omens, and the system of taboo, may seem at first to be part of the general Bornean religious observances, and not specifically magic. It is true that these things are not usually associated in our minds with what we think of as occult lore. But that is, I believe, only because they are of less world wide familiarity than the common imitative spells and charms. As a matter of fact the Borneo belief in the supernatural power of skulls differs little from belief in any other charm; the omens of the flight of birds correspond to many magic portents; and the terror of taboo is but a local application of superstitious fear of things unlucky.

Here we have included so much in the magic that it may seem almost that we are dealing with the entire religious ritual of Borneo, and then if we succeed in showing as we go on that these things tend to support morality, we shall seem to have done no more than give additional evidence in favor of an old proposition, that religion makes for righteousness. Our contention at present, however, is not for religion but for magic. It may be well, then, to stop for a moment and mark out our limits definitely. Magic, according to a widely accepted current definition, is "the art of putting into action the power of spirits."[1] Some spiritual power, other than the ordinary workings of nature,

[1] *Cf.* Century Dictionary.

is used or feared. If we look at the method by which this spiritual power is controlled we find that it is in all magic by means of specific objects, words, or formal actions. In other words, the theory on which all magic usages are based is that certain objects, words, or actions have an inherent supernatural power, more far-reaching than their ordinary properties. This efficacy may be by virtue of the control the object has over a spirit, like the genius who was slave to Aladdin's lamp, or it may be, less often, a direct effect, as of a curse. In any case, through spirits or immediately, it is the object or word that does the work. The effect is invariable, automatic, and irresistible. Magic is based on belief in the supernatural power of things. It is then this belief, and the customs that result from it, whose moral effect we are to investigate.

Many lengthy dissertations have been written to account for the origin of magic, and to trace the history of certain types from one country to another. Philologists, ethnologists, students of the history of religion, students of literature and of art, have dived deep into the archives of nations to relate the facts, and have formulated various theories to answer the questions, why did people believe in magic? how did they begin to practice such rites? and why did they continue? It is not my purpose to discuss current theories on these subjects, nor to attempt to explain completely the forms of magic which are found in Borneo. My purpose is simply to call attention to one aspect of the system as seen among the native tribes, viz.: its relation to the social order and to the development of character.

For a clear understanding of the situation, it will be necessary to say something about the people themselves, and the conditions of living in the jungle.

It is as difficult to define the term "natives of Borneo," as it is to define the term "natives of America." In speaking of Americans do we mean the aboriginal red men, or the descendants of European colonists who came and usurped their place? In the same way in speaking of the natives of Borneo we may refer to the head-hunters, or we may designate the descendants of Mohammedan Malays from Asia, who settled the coasts some hundreds of years ago and have successfully subjugated or driven to the mountains the simple barbarous people of the same Malay race whom they found already there. It is likely that successive waves of migration in the course of centuries have planted

various layers of peoples in Borneo. If so, they have amalgamated somewhat, and one recognizes to-day two chief types, the so-called Malays of towns and trading-vessels, and the so-called aborigines who live in small village communities in jungle clearings, where they hunt and plant.

The semi-civilized coast dwellers, for all their Islamism, have not progressed beyond a belief in magic. And one might profitably search out their relics of paganism and analyze the effects upon their lives. But I must confess that my interest is greater in the simple wild men of the woods, with whom every action has reference to the unseen powers.

Explorers who have penetrated to their distant villages write with astonishment of the gentle home life of these people. It is a source of unceasing wonder that head-hunting savages live amicably in close-crowded communities, such as would sorely try the good nature of civilized Christians. Their village, for purposes of defense and economy, usually consists of a single long house, occupied by from fifty to a hundred families. In its structure it is a sort of rude prototype of an American summer hotel. There is a common verandah, back of this a lobby running the whole length of the house, from which doors in a row, as in a hotel corridor, lead to cramped family apartments. Here live chiefs, citizens, and slaves, with mutual respect, and notably without the quarrels of the tenement.

How is it accomplished? There is little or no external authority. For the chiefs, who have the right to impose fines for misdemeanors, are not fond of thus risking their tenure of office, which depends largely upon popularity.[1]

The community is controlled by sentiment. A wholesome public opinion, of which individuals are heartily afraid; a regard by some of the more intelligent for the rewards and punishments of the gods; and above all the strongly dominant influence of magic rites, produce an inward control of motives far more effectual than any outward force.

If we analyze the magic rites closely we shall find in many of them a tendency to foster good social sentiments. Take for example the luck charms prepared by the priests for the New Year's feast. It is the custom for each man to go about with one of these blowing good luck from

[1] *Cf.* Nieuwenhuis, *In Central Borneo*, I, pp. 83, 172, 174.

it on to the head of his neighbor. Could anything be better adapted to encourage friendly feeling? Then take the charms and incantations and taboos to ward off evil spirits from children. The sedulous care of these on the part of both parents cannot help but heighten natural family affection. Respect for age is secured by a variety of magic devices. For instance, children are taught to believe that they will suffer from terrible diseases if they touch weapons, or come near elderly strangers or their own chiefs. And the same fate will come upon young men or women who trespass upon the peculiar occupations of age. As for the chief, he relies for his authority largely upon the reverence produced by the supernatural power of the things with which he is surrounded. The power of magic brings terrible fate upon any one who would usurp any of the chief's prerogatives. Only the chief can wear certain ornaments. They would be deadly to any one else. He alone may have a carved wooden figure of the mythical tiger placed upon his coffin,—a custom of which men do not even dare to speak. Once when a woman was chief, and perhaps the rigor of respect relaxed a little, a man ventured for a large consideration to carve one of these images for Dr. Nieuwenhuis. The man's family insisted that he should do so far away from the house, and the villagers would not even allow Dr. Nieuwenhuis to keep it in his tent, which was on their land. But even with all these precautions the man was later stricken with a chronic fever as the result of his temerity. The influence of magic is to foster in the tribe sentiments of good will, affection, and respect for authority, and these go far toward easing the ways of community life.[1]

Let us see how the supernatural power of things serves also to uphold the moral law. Perhaps the crime to which there is greatest temptation in a community which has advanced far enough to understand personal property, but not locks and keys, is theft. There is no hope, however, that the thief can get away with his booty undetected. The magic properties of things take care of that. Insects of omen may serve to point out whence the theft has been committed. Or one may curse the thief, with a solemn invocation of death and calamity upon his head. The Dyaks are much afraid of curses, and a curse is likely to result in confession and return of the stolen property. Or again, one may try divination by bamboos. Partly fill these with

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 62-65, 78, 80, 82.

water, name one for each of the suspected persons and place them around the fire. The first to boil over is the most guilty, the second is an accomplice, and those which do not boil are innocent. The favorite mode, however, of detecting guilt of any sort is ordeal by diving. And this may be used also to settle any dispute of ownership. The parties concerned may take part themselves, or they may hire skilled substitutes. I quote Hose's description of the ordeal: "The two men take up their position in about four feet of water, and each holds forth eloquently to the effect that he is the rightful owner, and prays that the water may trouble and enter the mouth and nostrils of his opponent, calling on the birds and animals to witness his testimony . . . . on a given signal each of the disputants places his head under the cross-sticks . . . . A friend holds the legs of each, and is by this method able to tell if his principal is going to faint, in which case he immediately pulls him to the surface. Sometimes, however, the two men faint simultaneously, and then the man who first recovers consciousness takes the prize." During the whole performance the rest of the populace stand on the bank, and add to the solemnity of the occasion by keeping up a mystic chant. The justice of the magic decision is never doubted.[1]

What need of lock and keys when a curse will do as well? A man who has planted fruit trees protects them by placing some round stones in cleft sticks near the trees, and then proceeds to curse any one who may venture to steal his fruit, calling these stones to witness the anathema, "May whoever steals my fruit suffer from stones in the stomach as large as these stones, and if necessary become a figure of stone." Thus he makes his trees "taboo" or prohibited, a common magic means of protecting property and preventing theft.[2]

If one does wrong the belief in magic makes sure that calamity will follow. And right action is moreover raised above the level of mere personal prudence to a public responsibility, by the belief that calamity

[1] Sir James Brooke in Mundy's *Narrative of Events in Borneo*, London 1848, I, p. 234; F. W. Leggatt, quoted by Roth, *Natives of Sarawak*, I, p. 86; Perham, *Jour. Straits Asiatic Soc.* No. 8, No. 10, quoted by Roth, I, pp. 179, 187; Deshorn, *Sarawak Gazette*, No. 189, p. 55, and Chalmers and St. John, quoted by Roth, I, pp. 235, 236; Sir Spencer St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, I, p. 89; Andrew Horsburgh, *Sketches in Borneo*, pp. 17-19; Hose, *Jour. Anth. Inst.*, XXIII, p. 163.

[2] Hose, *J. A. I.*, XXIII, p. 1611.

following a man's trespass, comes not upon himself alone, but upon the whole community. Before going on the war-path the chief calls together all the men and women of the tribe, and any who has transgressed confesses and gives an expiatory pig or fowl, that his breaking the unwritten law of generations of custom may not bring defeat and death. Some tribes are sure that the whole rice crop would be blasted should first cousins, or relatives of any prohibited degrees marry. In the fear of a public ill, following a private wrong, is developed the sentiment of solidarity, a strong *esprit de corps*, which in itself is a power for right.[1]

It is much to be said for magic as a regulating force that it fans to a flame the first glimmering spark of social responsibility, keeps alive affection and respect for authority, and detects and punishes crime. Looking into the meaning of the Borneo charms still further we shall find that much training in ordinary economy and prudence must also be placed to their credit. The housewife is reminded not to take more rice from the granary than is required by the family needs by a little charm which she must place there, and use in a ceremony apologetic to the rice-soul for taking any at all. It is unlucky for a man to eat his neighbor's rice before his own be ripe. It is unlucky to eat new rice before the appointed harvest time. One should use the old so sparingly as to make that unnecessary. In the same way that fruit trees are protected by charms, the rice fields are tabooed to strangers, that no strangers may cross them during harvest time, and the village itself is tabooed after the grain is stored, lest the new crop prove tempting to a raid. To protect further from attack, the villagers undergo a taboo which keeps them at home during the long days of the harvest festival. This, you may say, is an ordinary prudent law enforced by religion, no magic. But look at the magic terrors that follow breach of taboo. There is no escaping the disasters. They come automatically by the supernatural power of things.[2]

As in the home life of the community, and on the rice-fields, the

[1] C. Bock: *Head Hunters of Borneo*, London 1881, p. 218; Roth I, p. 123, quoting Crossland and Brooke Low; *Ibid.*, p. 180, quoting Perham, Jour. Straits Asiatic Soc., No. 8.

[2] Hose and McDougall, J. A. I., 1901, p. 191; Nieuwenhuis, *In Central Borneo*, I, p. 22; *Ibid.*, *Quer durch Borneo*, I, p. 120; Wm. Furness, *Home Life of the Head Hunters*, p. 164; Sir Hugh Low, *Sarawak*, p. 302.

occult powers are ever in mind and the charms and portents regulate conduct according to the social need; so too in the jungle, when the men go off on long expeditions, each detail of their doings is fraught with supernatural consequences, and the belief in magic supplies the immediate motive for action on the part of each individual that will insure a well-ordered company.

Thus they keep the law of the jungle. It demands first caution and secrecy when about to attack a foe. For this is their method of warfare. A small party creeping stealthily through the thicket, lie in wait for the doomed villagers to pass on the way to the rice-fields. Or just before dawn, when the tribe is sleeping heavily, they rush upon the house itself with swords and firebrands. The attacking force must usually take a journey of some days to reach the enemy, and during that time great care is needful to give no warning of approach. Perhaps to their childlike minds the wisdom of caution is a flagging memory. Yet they can at least firmly grasp this precept, that it is vaguely unlucky to leave a camp-fire burning, and so to avoid ill luck they hide each morning the traces of their passing.[1]

The law of the jungle demands, no less than wariness, good faith among themselves. They are a people with little idea of truth. But to swear on a tiger's tooth means accurate statement and perfect fulfillment of a pledge, so deep-rooted is their fear of the ghostly power of the terrible beast.

On occasions when the jungle expedition is for work and not for war, the magic law protects forest rights of collectors of rattans and camphor. A rope across a stream from which dangle symbolic objects, serves with its threat of dire disaster to the intruder, to "taboo" the preserve; just as near the villages stones protect private fruit trees. Caution, reliability, and respect of others' rights, the magic powers thus secure,—three mental qualities needed for regulating successful jungle enterprise.[2]

Lastly, and most important of all, in the wild wood where hidden dangers press on every side and the chances of death over-balance those of success, where the vague horror of the unknown has peopled

[1] Furness, p. 84.

[2] Sir R. Alcock, *Handbook of British North Borneo*, 1886, p. 80; Furness, pp. 115, 133, 168; Hose, *J. A. I.*, XXIII, p. 165; Brooke Low, Quoted by Roth, I, p. 240.

the hills with demons, one needs faith and courage to overcome difficulties. Does magic lore provide for this? For nothing more completely. Power to master difficulties. Admittedly it depends largely upon self-confidence, for when a man feels sure that he will succeed, obstacles vanish before the courageous determination that overleaps them. The head-hunters are really timid people beneath their ferocious bluster, except when their spirits are roused by the assurance of victory that charms and good omens afford, and without these they never venture upon any expedition. First, before starting out, the men are called together, while an elder, skilled in interpretation of portents, observes the flight and cries of the birds. Should these be unfavorable, they postpone their undertaking, and when at last they do start, it is with full confidence that the spirits are on their side and success will reward their efforts. As an extra precaution charms are tied to the sword handles, making them sure to deal death at a single blow, charms are tied to the canoes, if they are going by water, and charms hang around each man's neck to protect him from manifold ills. On the war-path they may have some trouble in finding the enemy, and that, too, is provided for. It is the magic prerogative of the heads which they have taken from enemies in former battles, and carefully preserved in their houses, to attract by some subtle influence other enemies to come and be killed. The skull of the beheaded enemy becomes henceforth the friendly guardian of its captor and his tribe. The honors that this horrid trophy will bring him rouses many a man to deeds of high enterprise.[1]

Fear is the ever-present nightmare of jungle life, as well at home as on the distant journey. If we are inclined to laugh at the bogies with which the savage imagination has peopled the woods and hills, we must remember, too, the real dangers of which these are but the symbols. Death, disease, and disaster lurk everywhere in waiting. One-half the native children in Borneo die before they are a year old. Nearly every man, woman, and child has an infection of malaria that brings on serious

[1] St. John, I, 202; Sir Charles Brooke, *Ten Years in Sarawak*, pp. 189, 287, 317; Sir Hugh Low p. 324; Furness, *Home Life of the Head Hunters*, pp. 59, 61, 74-76; *Ibid.*, *Folk Lore in Borneo*, p. 28; A. C. Haddon, *Head Hunters, Black, White and Brown*, p. 391; Brooke Low, Dalrymple, Chambers, *Miss. Life*, 1868, p. 222, and Crossland, *Miss. Life*, 1864, p. 653, and 1867, p. 70, quoted by Roth, I, pp. 224, 269, II, pp. 110, 141; Hose and McDougall, *J. A. I.*, 1901, p. 186.

illness with cold or improper food. If small-pox or other epidemic appears, it sweeps through the crowded community, unused to sanitation. The inland people are constantly oppressed by the Malays, and in constant expectation of a head-hunting raid. There are poisonous snakes in all the jungles, crocodiles with a man-eating record in the rivers, and the perils are all lurking and insidious. They give no warning of their coming. One knows not whether to-morrow he will not be the next victim. There is an all-pervasive and ever-present terror. It would sap life and enterprise were there nothing to counteract it.

When one sees the frail house, solitary in a clearing of the dense forest, it is easy to realize that at home, no less than on distant enterprise, there is need for strong faith to give a sense of security. About the houses are usually found protective carved posts, or rude images, that give a bristling appearance to the exterior,—a circle of stakes as a barrier to keep out evil spirits, perhaps images of fierce tigers facing two ways to frighten away enemies, or rude wooden figures of men with sword and shield in defiant attitude to ward off the spirits of disease. During a cholera epidemic in Central Borneo, the priestesses made a rope of rattan which they stretched across the river with solemn pomp to bar the way of the cholera spirit, while the men erected a guardian wooden image. Frequently they beat gongs to drive away the demons.[1]

There is a sort of naïve symbolism in these actions. They represent in visible form a spiritual power the Dyaks hope to exert over the unseen threatening forces. The form is imitative of the desired influence, in the barrier, and the sword and spear. Of the same imitative symbolism, too, are many of their personal charms that they carry about with them, for instance, the hooks to gather in riches and good fortune, the teeth of wildcats, bears and panthers to keep off evil spirits (I suppose by biting them). We are very close, in these charms, to what is called sympathetic magic, or securing the desired effect by imitating it. Especially is this true of the hook and ladder which priestesses use to cure disease by hooking the wandering soul of the patient and bringing it back down the ladder into the top of his head where it belongs. It seems that the power over spirits is supposed to be best exerted by symbolic objects. Or is it that these form a sign-language to persuade or

[1] Haddon, p. 333, 360, 375; Furness, *Home Life of the Head Hunters*, pp. 99, 123; S. Mueller, quoted by Roth, I, p. 215; Hose, *J. A. I.*, XXIII, p. 165; Nieuwenhuis, *In Central Borneo*, I, p. 41; *Ibid.*, *Quer durch Borneo* I, pp. 101-102; Bock, p. 213.

terrify the demons who might not understand the speech of men? Whether the spirits comprehend or not, the symbols, at any rate, make a powerful impression upon the human spectators, who thus protected, go about their daily avocations free from worry, in the confident belief that danger has been averted. In this impression made upon the spectators, by objects and incantations supposed to affect the action of spiritual powers, is the source of the moral control which we have found so surprisingly exerted by the charms, portents, and taboos.

Natural as it may seem for the savage, by association of ideas, to attribute the power of bringing about the desired result to symbolic mimicry, one can hardly help wondering, on further thought, why the false reasoning is not corrected by experience. Why is it that they do not see in years of practice what is so evident to us, that the supposed results of these imitative incantations seldom occur? The course of human events is a complex tangle, the thread of causation not easy to unravel. One is rather apt to find what one is looking for in that respect, and naturally all the instances in which the expected result did follow are treasured and adduced as proofs, the others dropped into the limbo of things forgotten. Even with our modern intellectualism it is some times difficult to disprove a popular superstition. Did you ever sit down with thirteen at table that somebody, somewhere, did n't die soon afterwards, or know two disasters to come without a third? And in Borneo the critical spirit has never been heard of, much less begun its colossal task of testing all things. In fact, the implicit belief in magic belongs to their grade of intellectual development. Magic is found everywhere coextensive with animism, that is, the attitude of mind that attributes everything that happens to the action of some of the multitudinous spirits with which the imagination has peopled all nature. The purpose of magic is to control, cajole, and entice these spirits into acting as pleases the sorcerer. And the whole system is based upon the belief that certain objects and ceremonies have a supernatural influence over the spirits. In Borneo one finds animism at its height, and hence magic playing so large a part in the religion as to seem almost coextensive with their ritual. For the credibility of the particular forms that the magic has taken, there is the additional argument of their moral value. In the mass of naïve beliefs which have resulted from reasoning in ignorance of the laws of nature, there is a saving remnant of practical sense, and this is enough to make one accept a multitude of errors.

We have seen that there is a moral use in all the kinds of magic practised among them, both in those of world-wide familiarity, and those of more peculiar stamp. The common belief in charms has been utilized to protect property, to secure truth, to cultivate neighborly and family affection, and to rouse self-confidence in the midst of danger. The taking of omens from the flight of birds serves the same purposes of brightening their courage, serves, too, to give the regulation of tribal affairs into the hands of the oldest and wisest, who alone have the skill in reading omens; the supernatural regard for the skulls of their enemies stirs energy and bravery; the taboo, like the belief in charms, is used for a dozen purposes, among which we have noticed economy in the use of stored grain, the regulation of seed time and harvest, the protection of property, maintenance of reverence for authority, and a welding of social solidarity by the belief that preservation from disaster of the whole tribe depends upon the right conduct of the individual.

Does the system of magic, on the whole, make for what we should judge as highly moral? In the main, yes. For the fundamental needs of social life in every environment are the same. Certain cardinal virtues are as necessary to human well-being in the forests of Borneo as in the crowded metropolis. On the other hand, many of their scruples, hedged about with magic preventives, seem to us who do not need them, silly; and other traits of character, abhorrent to our sensibilities, are permitted or even encouraged. The ruthless cruelty of head-hunters to rivals beyond the pale of tribal alliance, the disregard beyond certain limits for veracity, the readiness to cheat the gods if they can, as well as the foreigners, we are quick to condemn. These qualities, however, and the, to us unnecessary and absurd, complexity of ceremonial laws, as well as the broad human virtues, respected by them as by us, were necessary in their conditions for tribal preservation. And all alike were protected by magic, a system of many years' growth, which served to make the character that was needed for adaptability to the environment.

It happened in some instances that outward circumstances changed, and the natives had to face the problem that has often confronted the civilized nations, to adapt old customs to new conditions. The problem is to drop the former usages no longer suited to the manner of life, without discarding what may be still valuable, and without losing faith altogether in the authority of religion. Some of the Borneo methods of readjustment are as amusing as they are ingenious,—perhaps a little sophistical.

When the white men made it very much to the interests of the natives to enter hitherto prohibited regions, they consoled themselves with the theory that no spirit could compete in power with the white man, and if they were doing his bidding it was all right. They habitually act conscientiously on their dreams, but should these be inconvenient, evil consequences may be averted by sacrificing a pig. The magic lore of the Kyans demands that a young couple should undergo a rigorous taboo, forbidding all ordinary occupations from the time of marriage until the next annual harvest feast. The obvious inconveniences of this are usually avoided without violating respect for the law, by celebrating the wedding just before harvest. A naïve way of averting prohibiting omens is beating gongs so as not to hear them. But some times, when the bird-song is inevitably recognized, one can even then in case of necessity build a fire, which will show the omen spirits that one really has the best intentions after all.[1]

In all this I have treated magic almost as if it were synonymous with religion, and indeed, among the people with whom we are dealing a large part of their everyday practice of religion is concerned with this spirit cult rather than relationship with their higher gods. Our own total disregard for magic is a comparatively recent achievement. When the intellectual horizon broadens to a conception of the law of nature, spirits are driven to the childish world of fairy tales, and magic is called superstition. A moral antagonism to magic came somewhat earlier than this intellectual emancipation. In the history of many nations one may find a time when the development of human relationships demanded new virtues, and the more progressive part of the community feared the drag of old habits and tried to conquer them by condemning the ancient lore, or black art. In Borneo, however, the conditions, moral or intellectual, which have brought our forefathers out of the leading-strings of superstition are lacking. Whatever may, in the future, be the effect of the yet slender European colonization, at present the native belief in magic, unhampered by intellectual criticism, inculcates the virtues for which, with their manner of life, there is urgent need, and morally leads to self-control and social well-being.

[1] Nieuwenhuis, *Central Borneo*, I, p. 77; *Ibid.*, *Quer durch Borneo*, I, pp. 101, 127; Molengraaf, *Geological Expedition to Borneo*, London, 1902, pp. 176, 218, 338; Hose, *J. A. I.*, XXIII, p. 161; Furness, *Head Hunters*, pp. 37, 115; *Ibid.*, *Folk Lore*, pp. 8, 10, 23; Sir Charles Brooke, II, p. 233; Brooke Low, and Crossland, quoted by Roth, I, pp. 126, 225, 406.

A MESSAGE FROM AFRICA.

By DIHDWO TWE.

Introductory Note. The writer of this article is a member of the Kroo or Kru Tribe which inhabits the seacoast of Liberia. Physically, the Kroo are the strongest race on the West Coast of Africa; they are very industrious, never shirking work under the most trying circumstances.

The Kroos have distinguished themselves from the surrounding tribes by the fact they cannot be enslaved. There is not a single case on record where a Krooman has ever been sold in slavery. The story is told that at one time 500 Kroo were captured in a bloody battle by the combined forces of a group of Mohammedan tribes and that it was agreed to take them to the Arabic territories and sell them into slavery; after hearing this news, by a preconcerted plan, the 500 Kroo prisoners killed themselves in less than four nights. In speaking of this tragic feat, a Moslem writer says, "With death as his refuge, the enslavement of the Kroo is an impossible task."

In his book on Liberia, Sir Harry Johnston says, "During the last decades of the nineteenth century, Liberia acquired an added importance in the eyes of Europe as being the home of the Kru. This race had for nearly a century been the seamen of West Africa. Refusing ever to be enslaved, though quite willing to assist in the enslavement of other tribes, they were the first free laborers to engage themselves voluntarily for employment with Europeans on the West Coast of Africa."

The Kroo, as a whole, are divided into five principalities, which are ruled by kings instead of chiefs.

The tribal status of the writer of the following article, is best stated in his own words quoted from a personal letter:

"On my mother's side, my grandmother is a descendant of the royal family of the largest principality. As our custom or law permits no one to marry his fifth, seventh, or even his tenth cousin, the members of the royal family very often marry outside their circle.

Furthermore, it is only the descendants of the male members of the royal family that are eligible to princely titles and to the throne, not the descendants of the female members. The reason for this is clearly evident; if the descendants of the female members of the royal family were permitted to rule, sons of foreign fathers would claim the throne, and instead of being held by one family, the throne would keep passing from family to family, and finally from tribe to tribe. For this reason I am not eligible to a princely title; all I do get for my grandmother's lineage is a bit of consideration in the court, and an awful lot of flattering courtesies when travelling at home.

My mother is a direct descendant of the family of Priesthood. This family,—because of its knowledge of fetichism, medical science, etc., all of which it is heredity,—is respected very highly and holds the position as 'advisor to the king.' All sacred ceremonies, such as the anointing of a king, etc., are performed by the chosen Priesthood.

European travellers who have seen the Kroo at home, and have witnessed exhibitions given by the Priests, generally speak of this family as "the family of witch-doctors." The following paragraph from Sir Harry Johnston's Liberia is a good illustration:

'As regards the Kru people, the Rev. Mr. McConnell reported some years ago, that their witch-doctors (who make a great deal of money out of the sale of amulets) are a distinct class of men, who came into the profession hereditarily, each witch-doctor teaching the business to one or more of his children. The children whom he destines to follow him in his profession begin their studies as early as seven or eight years old, and are marked off from the rest of the community by wearing a peculiar dress, made of straw or reeds. The Kru witch-doctors profess a knowledge of herbs and roots and certainly have the means of healing diseases, but their greatest reputation is derived from their supposed supernatural knowledge.'

The history of my father's family is more interesting, as it is interwoven with distant royalties, with heroes, poets and philosophers, but I will not undertake to tell it here since it would be too long."

In the last part of 1899 Dihdwo Twe started for America with twenty-five cents in his pocket, worked his way from Africa to England, and thence to America, which he reached in March, 1900. His training has been received in the public schools of St. Johnsbury,

Vermont, the St. Johnsbury Academy and the Burdett Business College, where he is still studying.

ED.

The bobtail rabbit of North America cannot thrive in the burning sand of Sahara any more than the lion can thrive in the icy mountains of Switzerland. It was never intended that the African race should become Anglo-Saxon; any movement—whether religious or philanthropic—which tends to bring about this unnatural artificiality, is manifestly wrong and deplorable. You cannot tear the African away from his traditions, his legends, his laws, and his natural nutriment, without producing the inevitable moral confusion and physical decay. The right way to uplift the African is to help him to be a better African, but not to Anglo-Saxonize him.

In this we shall have a comprehensive view of that regrettable side of foreign missions, which has hitherto remained unseen. The splendid spirit of American Christians in giving their sympathy and money for the uplifting of the backward races, is without parallel. The missionary enterprise has made Christianity an important factor in transferring Western ideas from one country to another, and will be more fruitful and beneficial, if only conducted rightly. But instead of studying the problems arising out of native conditions and adapting their method to the needs of the aborigine, or, instead of helping him to develop his native arts, his sweet legends, his lofty traditions, his interesting laws, and thus instilling in him a profound respect for his race and himself, the promoters of Christianity have been busily at work trying to Anglo-Saxonize the African. This method has caused no end of confusion and sad consequences, as we shall notice immediately.

The African names his son after some departed member of his family or of his wife's family, or in memory of something mysterious which happened before or after the child's birth. If he is named in memory of something phenomenal, as very often happens, then to his parents, his name is no less sacred than the spirits of their fathers. And generally he is the focus of their observation, the belief being that the child's life is connected with the significance of the phenomenon with which his name is associated.

With their eyes fixed upon his life, they send the boy to a mission school to receive a training that shall act as an agent to fulfill their

pleasant dreams, but alas! their hopes vanish as a vapor. For immediately after the boy's arrival, the missionary, without any conference with his parents as to the origin or significance of their son's name, changes it; and substitutes in its place some English name which sounds agreeable to him. As the boy remains in the mission for three or four years, or for a longer period, the imported Anglo-Saxon name becomes predominant, while the name given to the child by his parents,—a name dear to their hearts, beautiful in significance, sacred in embodiment of moral and spiritual truths,—perishes and sinks into oblivion. To the primitive African, the child's name is a secret diary; in it he reads the past, and reflects upon the future; its destruction, therefore, cannot but produce serious consequences.

Let me illustrate this by means of two stories. Some years ago one of the most influential natives on the West Coast of Africa named his son after his departed brother, who was a man of marked distinction. The boy was not only a true picture of his uncle, but he had a good many of his characteristics,—a fact which centered the interest of the whole tribe in him. As his father was a merchant and was continually doing business with British traders, he wanted his son to be educated in English. Accordingly the boy was sent to the missionary school, but in less than a week the missionary changed his name, saying that the boy's native name was rather difficult to pronounce. When his mother heard the news she rushed to the school and took the boy out. But the father, who was anxious that the boy should be educated, sent him back the next day. Again the mother went to the mission and took her son out. This resulted in a quarrel between the father and the mother. And this difference of opinion finally led to a regrettable episode which divided the family into two parts.

Here is another story: About twenty years ago, an African girl was brought to America by a missionary. The child (I have been told that she was under fourteen at the time) was brought to this country under a new name given to her by the missionary; but her mother could not speak English, and therefore did not understand the name. This immediately cut off all connection between the child and her mother. Letter after letter was written to America to ascertain her whereabouts, but as these letters evidently gave her native name which was not known here, everything was in vain. As time went on the mother lost all trace of her daughter. In training, no effort was

made to make her a respectable African girl; but everything was done to make her Anglo-Saxon.

Now where is this young woman, and what has her education amounted to? I say 'young woman,' because she is no longer a girl.

Sometime ago I met her in the northern part of Germany, where she was working as a *bar-tender!* The story of her downfall, as she related it to me in a personal conversation, is the saddest thing I ever heard. This goes to prove that a branch severed from the mother tree will inevitably wither and decay.

In cases where the white man has tried to force his morals upon the African, much harm has resulted. For instance, in the West Indies, England tried to convert the polygamous African into Anglo-Saxon by means of procrustean methods. The following extract from an English paper is a significant account of the inevitable:

"Illegitimacy in the West Indies."

"Our West Indian correspondent writes from Kingston, Jamaica: 'The high rate of illegitimacy which prevails in the West Indies has often been the subject of discussion in the various legislative assemblies and the press. Probably no other social question has excited so widespread an interest or called forth such diversity of opinion. During the past twenty years continuous efforts have been made in Jamaica by a small but interesting band of reformers to secure the compulsory registration of the fathers of illegitimate children, but so far without success, the government always maintaining that such a system would be contrary to all established precedent. Last year the rate in that colony passed all previous records, the number of illegitimate births being 64 per cent.'"

Christians of broad intellectual outlook are greatly surprised at this shocking condition of affairs, because, from the Anglo-Saxon point of view, they do not see the cause of this moral chaos. They cannot clearly discern why, after the establishment of churches and schools, the Negro in the West Indies, living directly under Christian influence, should sink into a debased immorality rarely known to the pagan in the jungles of Africa; but it never occurs to them, in the least, that an injudicious interference with the established customs of any people will produce a reaction of serious consequences. This has recently happened in the Fiji Islands. Sometime ago the ruling power undertook to convert the Islanders into Anglo-Saxons by means of hasty methods, by interfering with their permanently established customs and by forcing European morals upon them. It is said that in a

single decade, this unscientific procedure caused a decrease of more than 13,000 Fijians.

In America we have a more pitiable result of the same experiment. Among the Grecians, the pedagogue, or companion of the children, was a slave from a distant clan; but the master never interfered with the customs of racial idiosyncracies of the servants. The slave was generally a scholar who knew the traditions, the legends, and the charming lullabies of his tribe; and very often, with anxious eyes and open mouths, philosophers sat at the fireside and listened in captivated credulity while he related the sweet tales of his native land. It was this exotic individuality, this marvellously susceptible imagination, this profound respect for his separate personality, that made the Grecian slave a subject of admiration and linked his name with the great philosophers of ancient and mediæval Greece.

But after the importation of the African to this country, instead of permitting him to retain or develop his racial qualities—his instinct of unique handicrafts, his passionate attachment to those who treat him well, his Christlike willingness to forgive his oppressors, his rich imagination, and native originality, and thus making him a useful African—the American immediately began to Anglo-Saxonize him. The master began the performance of this blind experiment by changing the African names of his slaves and giving them his own name. Perhaps to keep them from being homesick, or perhaps to make them "more loyal," he began to teach his servants that it was unfortunate for a man to be born an African, and that the sooner they began to become Anglo-Saxons the better it would be. As a result of this teaching, the Negro in exile lost all respect for his African nationality.

One of the most interesting things I have seen in France is a collection of the weapons described by Cæsar in the Gallic war. The French boy in the high school, after reading about these interesting weapons used by his savage ancestors, goes to the museum and sees the real articles. I believe—when he looks at the sling of the slinger, the spears of the horseman, the pikes of the sailor, and then reflects upon the achievements of modern France—his heart is filled with inexplicable ecstasies. Indeed, when the French youth glances at the picture of his naked ancestors and then looks at himself, he reads not only the unwritten history of the genius of his race, but takes a comprehensive view of the vast ocean of possibilities which spreads before him.

But in what Negro institution in America is there a collection of African arts? Is there a collection of this kind at Tuskegee, or has any attempt ever been made to start one? Have any of the Negro's friends ever realized that this is more essential than libraries? No, not a bit of it. There is not a Negro in America who is educated enough to carry on an hour's intelligent and well connected conversation on any of the African races. The pagan youth in Abyssinia knows more about America than the young American Negro, with Harvard diploma in his hand, knows about Africa. Bishop Turner, one of the leading spokesmen of the race, tells us that, as result of self-disrespect, to the Negro in exile, "White is God, and black is the Devil!" Yet no effort has ever been made, either by himself or by his friends, to regain the respect which he has lost for his African nationality; but no end of energy has been put forth in trying to Anglo-Saxonize him. Thus the teachers of the African in exile have blindly led him to look into all mirrors with the exception of the one in which he can see himself and his destiny.

Natura omnis non communis est; ergo, naturae sequitur semina quisque suae. No degree of inborn aptitude will convert the African into Anglo-Saxon; and no process of unnatural artificiality will change the white man to African. The two races are not *identical*, but *disparate; separatedly distinct*, but *essentially co-equal.* Their destinies lie at the opposite extremities of the same plane, but the lines which lead to their respective goals are parallel and will never meet, even if produced beyond the limit of infinity. There is no such thing as permanency in the workings of the universe. We are surrounded by mysteries that are only explicable by experience. Four years ago, if you had predicted that the dwarf-like Japanese would down the monster who for centuries terrorized "the imperial giants" of Europe, the world would have laughed at you. Perhaps the African has a work to perform, but he can never fulfill his destiny, if he follow the line mapped for another race.

Yet regardless of this fact—because of their unmindfulness of our racial idiosyncrasies, and because of their incapability of penetrating the mysteries of African life—men of other races generally begin to *civilize* us by tearing down our laws, the best guide of our moral and spiritual vagrancy; our traditions, the sweet and lofty tales of the past; our proverbs, the wisdom of our forefathers transmitted in their

last breath; indeed, they begin to tear down all that is most sacred and vital to us and without which we cannot stand,—a sad spectacle which cannot but kindle an alarming sense of uneasiness in the mind of the thoughtful African. A tree cannot be deprived of its natural nutriment and survive any more than the African can maintain his strength, if deracinated from his natural source of life and vitality. Unless some attention is given to this matter, and a due alteration made in the present method of civilizing the African, we shall find ourselves in the inevitable—a state of moral confusion and physical decrepitude.

Missionaries upon missionaries have been sent to Africa to teach the natives how to pray and how to get into Heaven, but the mere preaching of sermons has done very little in the past and will not accomplish much in the future. The primitive African does not appreciate sermons; they mean very little or nothing to him. You cannot get people into Heaven without the necessary preparation.

(What follows is reprinted from an article by the writer published in the New York Age.)

In its original sense, to redeem a man means to remove him from whatever obstacles in which he may have been entangled; to develop his mind and body to a state of vigorous manhood, to think and to act for himself, in other words,—to make him a free man. Thus Christ speaks of the redemption of the world, that is, the emancipation of mankind from the destructive influences of evil.

It is evidently clear, therefore, that a race so heartless, so unsympathetic, and so imperious as the white race, can never in the true sense of the word, elevate the backward races to the stage of independent manhood. It is not the practice of imperialism to free men, but to keep them in subjection; not to raise independent thinkers, but to crush genius whenever it attempts to rise among the ruled. In its dealing with a backward race, the most "creditable work" of an imperial race is always on the material side, and never on the spiritual. Great Britain went to South Africa to preach Christianity, but as soon as the diamond mines were discovered she converted the population of that territory into virtual servitude. King Leopold was sent to Congo to start a work for the "moral and material regeneration of the natives, and to eradicate slavery," but he has labelled all the forests of that region and placed the natives under inexplicable *legis-faction*.

Germany, too, has a hand in this game of discreditable despoliation; the deplorable condition of affairs in her African colonies is the inevitable result of commercialistic imperialism.

I must admit, however, that there are persons among the white race whose hearts are so large, views so catholic, sympathy so delicate, insight so comprehensive, that above the frenzy of Aryan individualism, above inborn temperamental perversities, above the passionate cults of "racial prepotency," their attitude towards the less favored races is always praiseworthy and commendable. Nevertheless the fact that imperialism is more material than spiritual still remains.

Among the Africans it takes a man of profound self-respect, racial originality and separate personality, to become a leader. If the American Negro has these qualities, he will be able to help us in working out the destiny of Africa; if he has not, he will remain what he has been in the past.

During the American slave traffic, the master devised all sorts of schemes to keep his slaves in a state of moral weakness, by teaching them to hate one another, by putting various incompatible elements together, and by separating children from their parents in their infancy, a practice which made it impossible for the mother to impart her knowledge of African traditions to the child. Because of this practice, in the course of a few generations, the African lost not only all traces of the lofty traditions and sweet legends of his native land, but even his mother tongue. Anything that his master thought would remove him far and farther was a fitting subject. The Negro was taught that Africa was covered with lions, elephants, tigers, crocodiles, and all sorts of destructive reptiles; that the people of Africa were all naked savages and cannibals. He was taught that white was the chosen color and that his sable color and features were indications of curse and disgrace; by misrepresentations and the use of unkind terms, the white man painted his race before him in the darkest colors possible. As a result of this, the Negro in exile gradually lost self-respect and finally became ashamed, not only of his racial identity, but even of his own personality.

Thus in America, the Negro has tabooed and is ashamed of anything that is African; indeed, he employs all the vague terms that he thinks will remove him from the "Anthropophagi, and the cannibals that each other eat." But the counter reaction of this sad spectacle

is more deplorable. It is said that the Negro in Boston feels far removed from the Negro in Alabama; the Negro in Washington feels removed from the Negro in Georgia; the Negro in New York feels removed from the Negro in Virginia; the Negro in Virginia feels removed from the Negro in Tennessee, and so forth. Perhaps the "Afro-American" is not responsible for the inevitable result of his former training, but the fact is that, while in this state of moral confusion, he has never been able to lead himself; he is, therefore, incompetent to lead others.

The American Negro has no racial originality. Deracinated from his natural source of life and vitality, he is in a state of moral confusion and physical decrepitude. It is easy to make him believe that he is this or that person when in reality he is not; but in letting go the indigenous and groping after the shadow of the exotic, he sadly seizes the casual for the requisite, the adventitious for the essential.

He has no separate personality. After the importation of the African to this country, the American Christians thought that they could up-root the sturdy indigenous palm of tropical Africa and transplant it to the icy soil of Lapland, and that they could obtain from it, apples, peaches, and chestnuts for the fruit market. Imbued with this idea, they tore the African from his natural source of life and sustenance and grafted him to the Anglo-Saxon tree. As a result of this debased artificiality, this disreputable bastardy, this diabolical usurpation of the natural, the life of the American Negro becomes a suspended animation. He is not wholly African, he is not wholly Anglo-Saxon, he is not wholly French, he is not wholly Spanish. What is he? "A colored man."

However desirous he may be, this state of affairs is a hindrance to his usefulness in the future development of Africa. It is true that in this country the race has produced great men of national reputation, but if you were to place the leader of the American Negro in Africa to try to lead the Fantee or the Zulu, the Mandingo or the Kroo, he would be at a loss. There are Negro bishops and ministers from this country in Africa trying to lead the natives, but if you tie the North-American robin to the powerful wings of the African eagle and let it lead him through the intricacies of the dense forest, you will have a picture of how the American Negro appears when he tries to lead the indigenous African. In other words, when the hybridized suspended

animation comes in contact with the deeply rooted life of the native born African, we have the inevitable degravitation of the former to the latter.

Again, the "Afro-American" church is not in condition to take Christianity to Africa. The reasons for this deficiency are many and regrettable as we shall notice immediately.

In the first place, the neurotic religion of the American Negro is but a recrudesence of the paganism of Central Africa in different form. His worship is characterized by great eloquence and little logic, excessive emotionality, physical contortion, and useless screams. In these days of alteration and augmentation, social upheaval and intellectual unrest, his theology is like the law of the Medes. His idea of Heaven and hell is sadly fixed in the wrong place. Indeed, his paganized Christianity has been more harmful to him than beneficial.

In the second place, the "Afro-American" ministry is in a deplorable state of intellectual poverty. This may sound like a firecracker, nevertheless it is a fact—the nucleus of many a discreditable episode. In America, the minister is really the leader of the masses of the people. Such great thinkers as Miller, DuBois, and others do not reach the people so closely as does the preacher. This is particularly true of their influences. Dr. DuBois' passionate plea for the training of "the talented tenth" may be looked upon by the masses as theoretical and useless, but they will accept the same suggestion without any criticism if made by the man behind the Bible. In fact, with the exception of Booker T. Washington, perhaps there is no other member of the race who influences the masses more than the minister who conducts the camp-meetings, or the man who presides over the great religious conferences. The preacher is considered a chosen being and his view is looked upon as a quasi infallibility. I know of cases in Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo and Philadelphia, where the home life of many a family is shaped according to the theology of their pastors.

For this reason the minister should be of the best type, both morally and intellectually, but with few exceptions the very opposite has been the case. The pulpit is crowded with men who are inexcusably ignorant, not only of the Bible, but of the tremendous world in which they live. While in this condition if the "Afro-American" church goes to Africa to Christianize the natives, I am afraid the church and the natives will sink deeper in paganism.

Again, let us turn to the vital question as to whether "the African people are capable of developing a Christian religion adapted to their genius, and evolving systems of government out of the present tribal governments." But you ask, "Can it come from within?"

For an apparent reason, I cannot express myself freely or go deeper into this important question as I should like to do, but I must say that you have touched a fact too frequently overlooked by outsiders who attempt to write about Africa. It is very true that the development of Africa will be done through Christianity, but Anglo-Saxon Christianity, with its evils of vampire individualism, race prejudices, destructive imperialism, liquor traffic, and ethical intolerance, is certainly deficient. As contemporary Christianity developed from the silly and dogmatic prescriptions of Judaism, as Protestantism developed from Papal imperialism of Rome, as Puritanism developed from the creedal aristocracy of England, so will a new form of Christianity for the African race develop from the present commercialism. The initiative of this great change will come from men of pure African blood —Africans in appearance, Africans in body, Africans in spirit, Africans in pride, Africans in thought.

Give the natives hospitals and other things that they need, and men of medical and other useful knowledge to teach them the elementary laws of sanitation and the simple ways of Christian life, how to build better houses and how to take care of their bodies. This is really what the masses of the natives need. But above all, let the African stretch his right hand and grasp the beautiful elements of Christianity, while his left hand is fastened firmly to his laws and traditions. It is only in this way that he can become a strong and true Christian, and in no other.

This is the gist of the message from Africa.

RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE.

By JAMES H. LEUBA.

Bryn Mawr College.

It is natural that man in his struggle for physical and spiritual life should make use of every kind of power available to him. If forces of two different natures appear to him to be active in the world,—the forces that have come to be called respectively physical and psychical or spiritual,— it is to be expected that both will be eagerly and uncritically pressed into service; eagerly, because greed is of the very essence of life; uncritically, because the "will to live" brooks little delay and because a critically minded person is an exception. Thus, for instance, beside making use of the ordinary physical means of cultivation, the land Dyaks of Borneo invoke, at certain great agricultural festivals, Tuppa, the highest and most god-like of their gods; a Malay potentate; and a powerful and benevolent Englishman, Sir James Brooke—all three mysterious, awe-inspiring, beings, greater than themselves.[1]

Religion has its source in desires. It comes to expression in the efforts made to draw upon a superhuman, psychic power, usually but not necessarily personal, in order to maintain, increase, and perfect, life. In its objective manifestation, religion appears as actions, attitudes, creeds and institutions; in its subjective expression, it consists of impulses, desires, purposes, feelings, emotions, and ideas, connected as cause and as effect, or otherwise, with the religious reactions and attitudes. Thus, like the rest of life, religion is concerned with the gratification of human needs, physical as well as spiritual. It includes the prayer of the Kansa Indian, "I wish to kill a Pawnee! I desire to bring horses when I return. I long to pull down an enemy! I promise you a calico shirt and a robe. I will give you a blanket also, O Wakanda, if you allow me to return in safety after killing a

[1] *Harvest Gods of the land Dyaks of Borneo*, Jr. of the Amer. Oriental Soc., Vol. 26, p. 166.

Pawnee,"[1] and that of Jacob when he vowed a vow, saying, "If God will be with me and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat and raiment to put on, so that I come again to my father's house in peace, then shall the Lord be my God. And this stone, which I have set for a pillar, shall be God's house; and of all that thou shalt give me, I will surely give the tenth unto Thee,"[2] as well as that of Jesus, addressed to the All Father, "not my will, but thine, be done."[3]

Religion may, therefore, properly be looked upon as that portion of the struggle for life, in which use is made of the power that we have provisorily characterized as psychic and superhuman, and for which other adjectives, 'spiritual,' 'divine,' for instance, are commonly used. Any one fond of the expression "spiritual order" may say, without indicating thereby disagreement with us, that the religious life is the body of practical relations maintained with the spiritual order. In this biological view of religion, the necessary and natural spring, alike of religious and of non-religious life, is the "will to live," in its multiform appearances. The ground of differentiation between the religious and the secular is found neither in specific feelings or emotions, nor in distinctive impulses, desires or purposes, but in the nature of the force which it is attempted to press into service. The current terms, "religious feelings," "religious desires," "religious purpose" are deceptive if they are intended to designate specific affective experiences or distinctive desires and purposes.

In this paper my task will be to develop and justify the conception of religion roughly outlined above, especially to describe more fully the necessary nature of the religious agent as it appears in consciousness and, finally, to indicate the function of religion in human life.

The Intellect and the desire for knowledge in Religion. Philosophy vs. Religion.

In view of the unfortunate teaching of a throng of authors—theologians, metaphysicians, historians, ignorant in matters psychological,—who have spoken as if with authority on the psychological aspect of

[1] *A Study of Siouan Cults*, J. Owen Dorsey, 11th Am. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1889-90, p. 376.

[2] Gen. XXVIII, 20-22.

[3] Luke XXII, 42.

religion, I may be pardoned for devoting a little space to an untechnical statement of the fundamental relation now generally admitted to exist among the three classical elements of psychic life: will, idea, and feeling. Aristotle characterized man as *thinking-desire*. In swinging back from Intellectualism to Voluntarism, modern psychology has accepted the fundamental truth excellently expressed by the Greek philosopher. Will, without intelligence, may be possible; but intelligence without will is not, not even in the case of so-called disinterested, theoretical, thinking. There is, there can be, no thinking without desire, intention, or purpose. "The one thing that stands out," says, for instance, Professor Dewey, "is that thinking is inquiry, and that knowledge as science is the outcome of systematically directed inquiry."[1] Thought absolutely undirected would be not even a dream—mere meaningless, chaotic, atoms of thought. It is the intention, the purpose, which makes thought what it is; that is to say, significant. We think because we will. Thought does not exist for itself; it is the instrument of desire. To discover ways and means of gratifying proximate or distant desires, needs, cravings, is the function of intelligence. The psychologist, therefore, speaks of the *instrumental* character of thought, and considers cognition to be a function of conduct. The mastery of desire over thought is abundantly illustrated in the history of belief, and nowhere so strikingly as in religion. The Christian creeds, for instance, are professedly statements of what man is to believe, not for truth's sake, but "in order to be saved." Deliverance from evil, physical and moral, is the goal that guided, or misguided, the thinking of the Church Fathers. But even though the belief had been enjoined because of its logical truth—a secondary concern with the makers of religion—the determining motive would still have been a desire: the love of understanding, of logical consistency. He who would convince himself of the derived nature of intelligence, should observe how in moments of passion, when the "will to live" is at its highest intensity, all pretences of regard for knowledge which does not serve an immediate purpose, and for logical and metaphysical truth, are, without the slightest hesitation, thrown to the winds.

There remains to consider the relation of feeling to the intellect and the will. Whether the pleasant and the unpleasant be considered

[1] Belief and Realities, Phil. Rev., XV, 1906. p. 122.

as attributes of sensation, or as independent elements, it remains of course true that they are in some way dependent upon the psycho-physiological processes. Where there is desire for an object, there liking is present; and, conversely, where there is liking, there desire is felt. As to sentiments and emotions, they include ideas and conative elements in addition to sensations and feelings. An emotion is a reaction, the response of an organism to a situation. It is a form of action. Aristotle's characterization of man is thus seen to be adequate. It does not leave out as it might seem at first, one of the three aspects of psychic life. Thinking-desire includes the affection. Every pulse of consciousness is psychically compounded of will, feeling, and thought. Successive moments can differ one from the other neither in the absence of one or two of these three constituents, nor in the essential relation they bear to one another—that is fixed and unchangeable—but only in their respective intensity and vividness. As extreme cases in each of the possible directions of variation, we have the experiences currently designated as (1) speculative, abstract, thinking (feeling and will are more or less in abeyance); (2) feelings, sentiments, moods, emotions (the affective life is paramount); (3) volitions, impulses, thoughtless actions (the conative aspect is predominant). Instinctive action is not to be considered here, since instinct excludes the consciousness of purpose. That will, feeling, and thought enter in some degree into every moment of consciousness which can be looked upon as an actuality and not merely as an abstraction; that they are necessary constituents of consciousness, and that the will is primal, has become a well-nigh axiomatic truth in contemporary psychology.[1] Thought, feeling, will, designate three interdependent functions of psychic life, having no separate existence except in the artificial worlds of science and of speculation.

Taking this conception of the correlation obtaining among the several aspects of psychic life as a guide, we can profitably submit to a critical examination certain classic, typical, but faulty definitions of

[1] For semi-popular expositions of this and of a related standpoint, see *Reflex Arc* and *Theism* in William James, "The Will to Believe and Other Essays;" Munsterberg's "Psychology and Life," p. 91-99, or the fuller treatment of the same question in this author's "Grundzüge der Psychologie." The present vitalizing movement known as Pragmatism, or Functionalism, or Reactionism, is rooted in the belief in the primacy of the will.

religion, still potent for evil in certain quarters. I take it for granted in this discussion that the psycho-physiological organism performs in religion the same functions as in the rest of life, *i. e.*, will, feeling, and intellect have in religion the place which belongs to them in the general economy of animal and human existence.

Most of the notable definitions of religion fall into two groups according as the intellect or the feeling is supposed to be the essential factor.[1] Thus, for instance, Spencer, Martineau, Max Muller, Romanes, Goblet d'Alviella, adhere to what may be called the intellectualistic point of view. For them religion is essentially "the recognition of a mystery pressing for interpretation," or "a department of thought," or "a belief in superhuman beings." Höffding may be classed here when he characterizes religion as "belief in the preservation of values." In this first group desire for a certain kind of knowledge, or knowledge in the form of specific beliefs, is regarded as the "essence" or "vital element" of religion. The inadequacy of the definitions of this class has become so evident that criticism of them is now superfluous. We shall instead take this opportunity of setting forth the distinction which is implied in the common use of the terms religion and philosophy, a distinction threatened with obliteration by Intellectualism. Let us first compare a few instances of the religious and of the philosophical attitudes that we may clearly realize the radical difference existing between them. At the beginning of his Gifford lectures, Prof. Alexander Campbell Fraser puts the question before him thus: "Is the miserable reality in which I find myself living and moving and having my being, rooted in Active, Moral Reason, and therefore absolutely worthy of faith; or is it hollow and hopeless, because at last without meaning?" (The Philosophy of Theism, p. 22.) This question opens the metaphysical discussion filling the volume. But the author's speculative activity has been aroused, and is being stimulated, by what may be called his religious disposition. "Reflecting men," he tells us, "have been moved to the final inquiry because they wanted to find reasonable security that the commonly supposed Cosmos is not finally chaos, so that the world

[1] For a fuller exposition and discussion of a large number of definitions see *Introduction to a Psychological study of Religion*, Monist, XI (1901), pp. 195, ff. and the appendix.

may be trusted in . . . ." And again elsewhere, "According to the answer practically given to this question, our surroundings and our future are viewed with an ineradicable expectation and hope, or with literally unutterable doubt and despair. It is this question which Natural Theology in the widest sense of the term has to determine." (*Ibid.*, p. 23.) The motive of the metaphysical activity of this writer is, then, clearly stated. His thoughts turn to the ultimate problem because he cannot live contented without the assurance that Moral Reason rules. Suppose, now, that at some point in his meditations he became impressed with the strength of his arguments, and suddenly felt the intangible presence about him of the Great Spirit, and that for a moment he entered into dynamic relation with it, was attuned to the universal harmonies, and that out of this experience proceeded a sense of peace, of confidence, of strength. An experience such as this is a common one with the religiously inclined; it is, in fact, the essence of the religious life of the large portion of humanity who practise mystical communion. This attitude would, of course, be clearly and radically different from the one in which the book was thought out and written. The latter is characterized by the presence of a desire to solve a problem and the consequent starting of the mental machinery by which knowledge is gathered and dealt with according to logical canons, while in the former, the solution is already found, albeit temporarily. The religious experience consists not in seeking to understand God, but in feeding upon Him, in finding refreshment and strength in Him, in rejoicing in Him. Not only the intellectually gifted, but also, and as well, the commonplace person passes more or less frequently from the religious to the philosophical attitude. Tom, Dick and Harry may rise from begging knees to become metaphysicians and declare that they see plainly "the logical necessity of the more producing the less; the capacity of the more to produce the less, and therefore the eternal pre-existence of the Perfect, of the Omnipotent, of the Absolute, of God."[1] My contention is for the recognition of the radical difference of these two attitudes and for the admission that we have in this difference the true ground of separation between philosophy and religion. The first is a search for explanations or for intellectual unification; the second assumes knowledge and seeks the

[1] L. Arreat, Le Sentiment Religieux in France, Observation G.

establishment of a dynamic relation with a psychic power greater than man. The distinction may be expressed thus: the religious consciousness wants to be, the philosophical consciousness wants to know. Considered merely from its intellectual side, the religious attitude posttulates, the other inquires. Both are normal forms of consciousness. For a moment the soul yearns, desires, supplicates; for another moment it speculates, and asks why and wherefore. In the twinkling of an eye it passes from one to the other attitude, now religious and now philosophic in rapid alternation. God is not understood by the religious consciousness; He is used. As long as He proves Himself useful, His right to remain in the service of man is unquestioned. The religious consciousness asks for no more. Does God really exist? How does He exist? What is He? are as many irrelevant questions. Or, if one prefers to turn the matter otherwise, they are questions which, for the time being, transform the religious into a philosophic consciousness. The religious consciousness as such refuses to deal with intellectual problems. It will not make religious life wait upon rational solutions, instead, it adopts working hypotheses. The fact that in both attitudes God may, in a sense, be the goal of man's desire and effort, and that people pass with ease and frequency from one attitude to the other, account for much of the difficulty experienced in separating the philosophy of religion from religion itself. In some persons, the two are so inextricably involved together that it seems as if every moment of their existence were both religious and speculative.

The desire for knowledge is, however, not excluded by my definition from participation in religious life, since, according to it, all desires, all needs, may be springs of religious life. But there is this condition: the gratification of desire must be achieved with the assistance of a psychic superhuman, power. Then, and only then, will the desire for knowledge make part of a religious moment. Philosophers of the type of Prof. Fraser and of Maine de Biran, from whom we have not space to quote, thirst for that knowledge which will open to them the resources of religious power. And so they set about to discover and prove to their satisfaction the existence of a religious object. In accomplishing this task they perform the work of philosophers, although the outcome of their labors may be the establishment of a belief making religious life possible. The value of their work

to religion is, of course, not a legitimate ground for identifying religion with their search after God.

The Emotions and Sentiments in Religion.

In another class of definitions, a particular emotion or sentiment, usually termed feeling, is seized upon as the religious differentia. The affective experiences most frequently singled out for this purpose are fear, awe, reverence, adoration, piety, dependence, love, "cosmic feeling." Höffding, whom we have already quoted as possibly belonging with the intellectualists, writes, in another place, that the essence of religious experience is "the religious feeling," "a feeling determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence." For Herbart "sympathy with the universal dependence of man is the essential, natural principle of all religion." (Science of Education.) What is the "essential, natural principle of all religion" for Herbart, becomes religion itself in the mind of Schleiermacher whose conception of religion is expressed in the well known words "religion is a feeling of absolute dependence upon God." Dependence is conspicuous in many other definitions; in that of Tiele, for instance, who describes the essence of religion as "that pure and reverential disposition or frame of mind which we call piety." "The essence of piety, and therefore the essence of religion itself, is adoration." . . . . adoration necessarily involves the elements of holy awe, humble reverence, grateful acknowledgment of every token of love, hopeful confidence, lowly self-abasement, a deep sense of one's own unworthiness and shortcomings, total self-abnegation and unconditional consecration of one's whole life, of one's whole faculties. . . . But at the same time —therein consists its other phase—adoration includes a desire to possess the adored object, to call it entirely one's own.'"[1] In the *Discourses* Schleiermacher protested vigorously against the intellectualistic conception. "What you may know or believe about the nature of things is far beneath the sphere of religion. . . . Any effort to penetrate into the nature or the substance of things is no longer religion but seeks to be a science of some sort." (p. 49.) "If religion does not belong to the world of action, neither does it belong

[1] *Elements of the Science of Religion*, II, pp. 198-199.

to the world of thought." "Religion can not and will not originate in the pure impulse to know. What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotions is the operation of things upon us, not our reactions to the received impressions." Whatever belongs to religion is "either feeling or immediate consciousness." "If you could imagine it implanted in man quite alone, it would produce neither these nor any other deed. The man . . would not act, he would only feel." (p. 57.)

Two criticisms, each one of them fatal, can be directed against this class of definitions. (1) "Feeling" is a word of many meanings. A psychologist would use the terms "emotion" or "sentiment" to designate what is meant by "feeling" in the above quotations. In their technical sense emotion and sentiment involve sensations, ideas, and conations, as well as affective elements (pain and pleasure). They imply the apprehension of a situation and a response to it. A being unable to act would not be able to feel, he would not exist. Yet it is not in this sense that the above quoted authors use the term feeling. What they intend to name is an artificially disconnected portion of experience without independent reality. No such abstraction can truly be said to be the essence of religion. It could at most designate a prominent, or a dominant, component of the total experience. A feeling, in the sense in which Schleiermacher, for instance, uses the term, cannot play the part ascribed to it in his writings, in those of Tiele, and of many others.

(2) The feeling, or to speak with more technical precision, the emotions and sentiments which have been used to differentiate religion are also met with outside religious life. So that they cannot be a means of unequivocal discrimination between the religious and the non-religious experience. That this is true of fear, of awe, of reverence, cannot be denied. The feeling of dependence cannot serve any more effectively than fear to diagnosticate religion. A feeling of dependence is the ever present background of human and, I suppose, of higher animal life. No beings express a more pathetic sense of dependence than certain of our domestic animals. In all human relations, be they business, social, or religious, the consciousness of dependence lurks in the background, when it does not obtrude itself upon us. How could then religion be made to cover every experience dominated by a feeling of dependence? But the meaning of Schleiermacher, it may be urged, is that only a variety of the feeling of

dependence constitutes religion, to wit, the variety arising, as he puts it, when any part of the universe is experienced or felt as a part of the whole, "not as limited and in opposition to other things, but as an exhibition of the infinite in our life." (p. 49.) Every realization of dependence implies the recognition—the feeling, if you prefer—of one's dynamic connection with that upon which one is dependent. To say that this larger power is, in the case of religion, infinite, is to misinterpret ordinary experience. In his religious moments man is not, as we shall see in another section, usually conscious of dealing with the unlimited. His transactions take place between himself and a *greater* power, the dimensions of which he does not usually consider. He may be ready to admit, if not the inferiority of his deity, at least the existence by his side of other deities, each ruling in their particular spheres. We meet here the philosopher's fallacy in which his own experiences are introduced in the place of those he intends to describe. But even though the object of the emotion of dependence were in religion always the Whole, the Infinite (terms which, by the way, are incompatible), it would still be futile to try to use the feeling of dependence arising out of that situation as a means of differentiating religious from non-religious life. No sufficient introspective difference exists between the feeling of dependence upon the Whole and the feeling of dependence upon the Larger, the Greater, to make discrimination possible. If, as a matter of fact, we discriminate without hesitation between the feeling of dependence upon Wall Street, upon a father, upon Yahve, upon a mistress, and upon the Absolute, it is not because the feeling-experience is qualitatively different, but only because their objects are not the same. It would be difficult to confuse together Wall Street, a father, a woman, Yahve, and the Absolute. Hence these experiences appear clearly different one from the others, although their affective parts proper are the same. Difference in the object, or in the determining cause, is what makes discrimination possible as well in the case of fear and of love as in that of dependence. And when, as it happened to Madame Guyon in her relations with her Confessor, Father LaCombe, external perceptions are slighted, confusion is apt to take place. She came to the point where Father LaCombe and God fused together as it were. She admits with some naïveté that "ce n'était plus qu'une entière unité, cela de manière que je ne pouvais plus le distinguer de Dieu." (Autobiography.) The Christian mystics fre-

quently use God and Christ interchangeably. Even the Virgin Mary may lose her identity and be assimilated to Christ and God. This vagary does not matter to them since what they want is the affective experience. The idea matters little. I am not to be understood, however, as affirming that the emotion or sentiment remains necessarily absolutely the same when the object changes, but only that the affective experiences characteristic of our relations with religious objects are not, on affective ground, usually introspectively separable from others of the same sort, and cannot, therefore, provide the needed ground of differentiation.

Concerning adoration as a means of differentiation, it must be said that it is not the name of a single emotion or sentiment. The expression "feeling of adoration," as commonly used, designates a complex combination of successive emotions and sentiments. Fear, awe, reverence, respect, admiration, dependence, love, etc., may all enter, mixed and in sequence, into the affective experience accompanying the act or attitude called adoration.

The failure on the part of philosophers to agree upon a particular emotion as being the characteristic feature of religion might be taken as a token of the insufficiency of emotion for this task. Any and every human emotion and sentiment may appear in religion, and no affective experiences as such is characteristic of religious life. The temperament of the worshipper, his habits, the nature he attributes to his God, and the circumstances in which he finds himself, determine the affective character of his religious experiences. It may be dominantly fear, or awe, or reverence, or love, or dependence. The differentiation is made possible, not by the affective experience itself, but by the idea, or group of ideas, constituting its object. The expression "religious feeling" should thus either be discarded or, if retained, be definitely understood to mean simply some one or several of the common emotions or sentiments present when man enters into relation with a religious source of power.

The identification of religion with feeling is becoming less and less frequent, for it is more and more widely admitted that, in the words of Pfleiderer, "in religious consciousness all sides of the whole personality participates." 'Will, feeling, and intelligence are necessary and inseparable constituents of religion.' The strength of the tendency to single out one of these constituents as the vital or fundamental one is,

however, well illustrated by the case of Pfleiderer himself, of Max Muller, of Guyau, and of many lesser lights. Max Muller, for instance, was compelled by direct criticism, to admit that a simple "perception of the Infinite" could not be called a religion. In the lectures on *Natural Religion* he pleaded guilty to not having laid sufficient emphasis on 'the practical side of religion,' and added to his definition the words "under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man." But his subsequent writings made it quite clear that he did not apprehend the full meaning of his admission. The same is true of Guyau. He begins promisingly with a criticism of the one-sided formulas of Schleiermacher and of Feuerbach and declares that they should be combined. "The religious sentiment," says he, "is primarily no doubt a feeling of dependence. But this feeling of dependence really to give birth to religion must provoke in one a reaction—a desire for deliverance." Very good indeed! But, on proceeding, the reader discovers that the opinion the book defends is that "religion is the outcome of an effort to explain all things—physical, metaphysical, and moral—by analogies drawn from human society, imaginatively and symbolically considered. In short it is a universal, sociological hypothesis, mythical in form."[1] We are back again at the intellectualistic position. Religion arising from an effort to *explain;* religion an *hypothesis!* It is Herbert Spencer over again with an additional statement concerning the way in which man attempts to explain the mystery. As to Pfleiderer, he hastens to add to the sentence we have quoted, "of course we must recognize that knowing and willing are here [in religion], not ends in themselves, as in science and in morality, but rather subordinate to feeling as the real centre of religious consciousness." Thus feeling reappears as *the real centre* of religious consciousness. What the author may well have meant here by "centre" I do not know. It must be said, however, that many of the more recent definitions have completely broken with the bad psychology denounced.[2]

[1] *The Non-religion of the Future*, p. 2.

[2] It is now frequently defined as "the consciousness of our practical relation to an invisible spiritual order."

Bosanquet remarks that "only those convictions which are called religious *par excellence* in the normal sense are capable of affording in the fullest degree that

The end or purpose of Religion.

If its affective quality does not differentiate religious from non-religious life, cannot its purpose do so? The purpose of a physician's activity is the healing of disease, that of a merchant the buying and selling of goods; what is the end of religious life? Were we to consider separately particular forms of religion, a distinctive purpose could probably be assigned. Deliverance from rebirth would, for instance, characterize sufficiently certain forms of Buddhism, and the attainment of salvation in another world, the Christian life in the Middle Ages. But these specific purposes are not characteristic of every one of the historical phases of these religions, still less of all religion. Salvation in another life is, for instance, not the real religious goal of the contemporary, liberal Christian. They are increasingly numerous the truly pious souls who have never been actuated, or who have ceased to be determined, by the thought of paradise and of personal immortality.

support and that sense of triumphant unity which seem to be the central part of religious experience." Baldwin's Dictionary, Art. *Religion.*

In the *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Wm. James expresses his mind thus: "In broadest and most general terms possible, one might say that religious life consists of the belief that there is an unseen order and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto. This belief and this adjustment are the religious attitude of the soul." (p. 53.) In the ordinary sense of the word, however, no attitude is accounted religious unless it be grave and serious; the trifling, sneering attitude of a Voltaire must be thrown out if we would not strain too much the ordinary use of language. Moreover, there must be something solemn, serious, and tender about any attitude which we denominate religion. If glad, it must not grin or snicker; if sad, it must not scream or curse (p. 38). The sallies of a Schopenhauer and of a Nietsche "lack the purgatorial note which religious sadness gives forth." And finally, we must exclude also the chilling reflections of Marcus Aurelius on the eternal reason as well as the passionate outcry of Job.

For A. Sabatier, religion "is a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend." *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 27.

Siebeck defines religion as "die verstandes und gefühlsmässige, praktisch wirksame Ueberzeugung von dem Dasein Gottes und des Ueberweltlichen und in Verbindung hiermit von der Möglichkeit einer Erlösung. Sie Kennzeichnet sich nach der the oretischen Seite als die Weltanschauung, welche die Allgenugsamkeit des Weltlichen als solchen verneint und die existenz des Ueberweltlichen im Sinne sowohl eines höchsten Seins, wie eines höchsten Werthes behauptet; nach der praktischen aber als den innerhalb der Persönlichkeit stattfindenden Uebergang aus dem Aufgehen im Weltlichen zum Erfassen und Erleben der überweltlichen Wirklichkeit und damit zur Erlösung von der Welt." Dr. Hermann Siebeck, Lehrbuch der *Religionsphilosophie*, 1893, p. 442.

Religion is to them a matter of this life. The old Hebrews did not take into account a supraterrestrial world, and it could not be said of the American Indian, or of other semi-savage peoples, that the goal of their religious life is the Happy Hunting Grounds. The hunter's, or warrior's paradise is, for these people, merely an occasional thought. It has not yet been made, as paradise at certain stage of Christianity, and in Mohammedanism, and as Nirvana in Buddhism, the unified goal of multiple desires. The gods of the barbarians are general utility gods, serviceable in all the ordinary business of life, hunting, fighting, sowing, reaping, etc. The Happy Hunting Grounds, Paradise, Heaven, cannot be reached by another than a religious route. These goals are, therefore, peculiar to religious life, but, as already observed, they are not necessary to the existence of religion.

Communion, or union with God, is often mentioned as the end of religious life. This is certainly not true of every one of its phases. But, leaving this objection aside, we should not allow ourselves to be deceived into thinking that union with God is ever, in itself, the real end of religion. It is a means, not an end. Just as the fellowship of friends is sought for the various benefits accruing from it to ourselves and to them, communion with God is desired as a way of dismissing the worrying complications of this world, of forgetting and surmounting evil, of escaping from the dreaded sense of isolation, of entering into a circle of solacing and elevating thoughts and feelings. Union with God may even mean, as is well known, the raptures of love. These, and other blessings, are the goal to which communion with God leads. Surely religion does not have a monopoly of these necessities and superfluities of life?

The religion cannot, then, be differentiated from the secular by its purpose. The less artificial religion becomes, the more it deals with the mundane, the more completely does it lose whatever distinctiveness might belong to it on the score of purpose. The American Indian who seeks the assistance of his divinity before going hunting is also aware of the dynamic relation existing between the bending of his bow, aiming, the direction and strength of the wind, and the spot reached by his arrow. In Christian lands, when the deity is relied upon for protection from bodily harm, secular means to the same intent are not on that account neglected. Deliverance from an evil inclination may be sought for religiously or secularly. The mother who prays for her son

may also assist his struggles in divers non-religious ways. In Christian mysticism God is used to secure the gratification of several cravings which can be, and are, gratified through natural means: the need for sympathy, for moral support, for mental peace, for moral perfection. In his efforts to avail himself of the idea of Humanity as a source of moral power, the Comtist does not forego the ordinary better-understood natural forces within his reach. If the Christian Scientist refuses to make use of physical therapeutics, and the matter-benighted scientist scoffs at psychic therapeutics, the larger number of people stand ready to draw upon these two kinds of agents and upon as many other as they may discover, both thus striving secularly and religiously towards the realization of the *same* purposes.

Our double conclusion in this matter is then that there is not any purpose, or goal, characteristic of all and every form of religiosity, and that every need, desire, craving, aspiration, may be the spring of a religious moment. It is, however, evident that, if in lower religions every desire enters into the religious life, in the higher varieties a selection has taken place.

We may, in this connection, and without pretending to enter upon a sketch of the development of religious motives, make two remarks. (1) A unification of the originally multiple purposes of religious life may, and under certain circumstances does, take place. Paradise and Nirvana are two such unifying conceptions standing for all-round, complete, but deferred blessedness. In persons of great intellectual and moral refinement, religion centres around unifying conceptions much more subtle. It may be, for instance, identified with a 'feeling for values,' or with an appreciation of the perfect. Religious life need not, on that account, cease to concern itself, in addition, with the discrete occurrences of daily life. (2) With the increase of knowledge gained by daily experience, certain classes of needs, cravings, and aspirations, have come to be singled out and selected as more easily, or more likely to be gratified through the one or through the other of these agents. Certain purposes may even pass entirely out of the reach of the religious power. In the leading Christian lands, for instance, God is less and less frequently importuned touching the details of physical existence. Many are of the opinion that it is useless to seek God's intervention in physical events. When God's power, or willingness to modify the course of physical events has come to be doubted or denied, religious

life tends to be limited to the so-called 'spiritual' realm. The causes of this purification by elimination are not far to seek. On the one hand, the triumphant efficiency of the known physical agents has compelled general recognition. Antitoxin has, for instance, shown itself more to be relied upon than God in the cure of certain diseases. On the other hand, the frequency with which the religious power fails to accomplish what has been hoped for works to its discredit. The cumulative effect of these positive and negative experiences has forced upon the thoughtful minds the conclusion that, within the physical realm, physical agents are either of superior efficiency, or even the only potent ones. The spread of scientific knowledge has, of course, exerted a profound influence upon philosophical speculation. In their turn, metaphysical doctrines have reacted upon common opinion in the very direction in which they had themselves been modified by experience, that is to say against the belief in the intervention of the divinity in the physical universe. Under these circumstances, religion is relegated and elevated to that more obscure and mysterious realm in which quantitative relations of cause and effect have not been so convincingly traced. This is the explanation of the fact, often wrongly interpreted, that, in the higher civilizations, religion is identified with the purer desires and the nobler aspirations. This "spiritualization" has proceeded so far that in many contemporary religious circles it has ceased to have anything to do with the details of physical existence. Perfect prayer is, we are told, "simply submission to and confidence in the Father's will."

The Nature of the Power used in Religion or the Concept of the Divine.

We have shown in the preceding pages that the search for ultimate principles or reality cannot be the spring of religion and that there is no specific emotion and no specific purpose which can be used to differentiate religious from non-religious experience. Every human emotion and every human purpose may appear in religion. The ground of differentiation—I do not say the *essence* of religion—must therefore be looked for in the nature of the power with which man believes himself to be in dynamic relation in what he calls his religious life.

The religious source of power already roughly characterized as psychic and superhuman must now be subjected to a closer scrutiny. Let the psychologist whose task it is to discover what is common to

all religious consciousness be on his guard lest he let himself be entangled in the speculative network woven by philosophers and theologians. It may be that God is Uncreated, Eternal, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Absolute, Immutable, Infinite, the Creator and Sustainer of the universe, and other amazing 'unknowable,' things beside, but it should be clear to any one that the existence of religion is not conditioned by the ascription to its object of these attributes. The great religious geniuses care not for subtleties, while the philosophers, who do care for them, have neither contributed to the spread of religion nor to the increase of its fervor. Remember Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant. The clarification of the God-concept, strange as it may seem to many, does not of itself promote religious life, though it may improve its quality. The intensity of one's religious life is not proportional to the lucidity and definiteness of one's understanding of God. It depends upon other factors. The makers of religion are men of masterful desires and aspirations, in whom the "will to live" (which may at times seem to seek its own destruction) holds in subjection the thirst for theoretical knowledge. To be consumed with a passion for existence more intense, or more perfect, or both, is the first requisite of the religious prophet. The two greatest religious personalities known to the human race, Christ and Gautama, would have nothing to do with metaphysics. Christ spoke of God as a loving Father, able and ready to succor to the uttermost those who approached him as a child approaches his father. He knew God, not as a philosopher, but as a child does. He was content with the ascription to God of those attributes necessary to the gratification of the deepest and dearest cravings of the heart. The total absence of metaphysical teaching or discussion from the records of Christ's life, as well as the nature of these records, countenance the opinion that he was on this point of one mind with the Hindoo sage. When the venerable Malunkyaputta, displeased because the Blessed One had not elucidated certain great problems, summons him to give the answers if he knows them, Gautama answers "The religious life, Malunkyaputta, does not depend on the dogma that the world is eternal; nor on the dogma that the world is not eternal. The religious life does not depend on the dogma that the soul and the body are identical. The religious life does not depend on the dogma that the saint exists after death; nor does religious life depend on the dogma that the saint neither exists nor does not exist after death.

Whether these dogma obtain, there still remains birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair, for the extinction of which in the present life I am prescribing. And why have I not elucidated this? Because, Malunkyaputta, this profits not, nor has to do with the fundamentals of religion, nor tends to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, the supernatural faculties, supreme wisdom, and Nirvana. Accordingly, Malunkyaputta, bear always in mind what it is that I have not elucidated and what it is that I have elucidated.''[1]

The most striking observation open to the investigator of the conception of God as it is in the mind of Christian people, is its amazing vagueness, even in the case of the better informed and more reflective persons of our civilized communities. Time and again one is startled at the colossal indifference shown by the religiously inclined to the speculative questions so dear to the theologian. I have before me in tabulated form about 800 answers from college students to four questions on the conception of God. They were answered on the whole in an earnest spirit, and yet crudity and profound intellectual indifference to the attributes to which the philosophy of religion gives so much prominence are the most evident characteristics. Here are three illustrations:

College Student, Male. "The very uncertainty and indefiniteness of one's conception of God is what makes the daily life worth doing, and puts meaning into every-day happenings."

College Student, Female. "A personal God is a God to whom every individual matters, who knows every individual and whom every individual is conscious of as existing. This consciousness can be more or less definite, depending on the individual. I cannot say whether I believe that any one can know the personal God (as most people seem to believe), but for myself I do not think any consciousness can ever be so clear as to make definite statements about God's nature."

Student and Teacher, age 27, Female. "I have a vague feeling of something which I think is the basis of a religious conception of God. It is not personal or even a being in the ordinary sense, it is a feeling, an impression made by something that I cannot examine or analyze. It disappears when I try to formulate it. I have no image of God. I realize that I cannot think without some image, but I do not care about it. However, I will admit that when I am "feeling" about it, I have a vague impression of darkness and questioning which I think typifies not my God but my attitude towards something. I open my eyes and part my lips and

[1] H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translation*, Sermon on the Questions which tend not to Edification, pp. 121, 123, abbreviated.

hold back every nerve waiting as I do in a strange place in the dark. My mind is blank till I come back and realize my position."

It appears from this, and other data, some of which will be presented in the sequel, that God has not been to these believers an object of critical thought. The prevalent, and almost irresistible tendency, of ascribing to the religious consciousness in general that degree of lucid complexity attained only by the few who have given oft-renewed and protracted attention to the problem of God, makes it advisable for us to insist upon the indeterminateness of the God-concept of the average person. God's existence is known in the same way as physical forces. What do ordinary persons know, for instance, about electricity? Are they disturbed by the vagueness, or even the total absence of ideas concerning its ultimate nature? Not in the least, for that which they know is sufficient for the business of life. Their knowledge consists in the ability to start the dynamo, to light the electric lamp, to apply the electrodes, etc., and in the anticipation of the effects which follow. God is known similarly by the effects ascribed to Him and by the means used to secure these effects: offerings, sacrifices, praises, supplications, repentance, meditation, communion, etc. A knowledge of the manner in which power can be released, and of its effects, is all that ordinary persons insist upon; and in this, Gautama and Christ agreed with them.

The indifference and indefiniteness to which I have drawn the reader's attention should not, however, be thought to preclude firmness and definiteness of belief in the existence of a religious agent. Nothing could be more absolute than the assurance, at least during the religious moments, of the existence of a Being able and willing, under certain circumstances, to hearken to man's cry of distress, or of a Force with which one can enter into sympathetic, helpful relation. The belief at those times is absolute, because no contradicting idea can be entertained. The confidence with which a Wall Street plunger addresses the God he may seek in moments of panic is equalled by the assurance with which Roland, dying on the rock of Roncevaux, offers his glove to his God precisely as he would were he doing homage to a Lord of this world.

There are but three necessary attributes to a religious source of power. It must be a psychic, not a physical power; it must be accessible to man; it must be superhuman.

I. *It must be a psychic, not a physical power.* The distinction need not be made, indeed it is not made, explicitly by all who have a religion. It is, however, tacitly recognized in the behavior of even the lowest savage. The strength of his bow when bent, the power of a stone rolling down the mountain side, are of a nature which he discriminates from that of the energy exerted by the spirits which may have taken possession of these things. Our claim, then, is simply that when religion appears, two different modes of behavior, or two reactive attitudes, have already been differentiated: that toward things inert and that toward things alive with spirit. We may be permitted to repeat that nothing more need be implied in this 'recognition' of a dualism of forces than a different mode of behavior. If, at any stage of human development, a thorough going animism makes impossible non-religious reactions, it is because every form of activity is referred to the agency of spirits. This would imply that the separation of the religious from the secular has not yet taken place. Although one is ready to admit that the first *philosophy* is animistic, he is unwilling to believe that the most barbaric of human beings has not practically realized the dualism in question, especially when he finds that the higher animals adapt their behavior successfully to these two kinds of forces. A dog does not beg from a dish of meat placed beyond its reach as he begs from his master holding the dish.

Irregularity, unforseeableness of results, making for mysteriousness, and the property of being subject to the influence of desire, emotion, and volition, roughly marks off, in primitive consciousness, the psychical from the physical kind of power. It is, of course, well established in the opinion of non-civilized, and also in that of most civilized persons, that psychic power may appear anywhere, at any moment, and overcome or supplant physical force.

The religious power may assume in the mind of man any conceivable shape. It may dwell in stone or plant, have the appearance of beast or man, or be devoid of any sensible form. When conceived as pure, formless, spirit, it may be thought of as either personal or impersonal.

Here we may pause to consider the generally accredited opinion that religion cannot exist without a belief in a genuinely personal spirit, that is to say an agent, acting purposively, under the guidance of intelligence and feeling. It must be admitted, on the one hand, that every *organized* religion that has played any considerable part in the his-

tory of humanity, has been built up upon a belief in a personal source of energy. Buddhism could be considered an exception only by disregarding the significant fact that Gautama was deified as soon as he was dead. The personification of force is a natural tendency from which neither the uncivilized, nor most of the civilized can free themselves. On the other hand it must also be granted that there are religions—at least that there are what seems to be religions in the making—are free from the belief in a personal God, and that the trend of religious life in the civilized world is not only away from an anthropomorphic God, but even away from a definitely personal God.

Let us briefly consider these two assertions, beginning with the contemporary trend in the development of the concept of God. Among the many who are seriously anxious over the alleged decline of Religion and who strive to repair the damage they think it has suffered at the hands of Naturalism, there are those who define God as "an infinite power in the universe, immanent in all life and all nature, but working through law, not under the action of human-like motives and purposes."[1] Can a power such as this be called, stretch the meaning of the term to its utmost capacity, a *personal* power? And if not, shall we have to conclude that these well-intentioned persons deceive themselves, either in that they unwittingly misrepresent the God in whom they trust or in that they have no religion? Are they in fact completing the destruction which they wish to avert? The powerful present movement in our churches towards the Immanence of God involves incontestably in the minds of many a practical rejection of the personal characteristic of the religious source of power, and, for all, at least an obscuration of the personal attributes. Yet that tendency is usually looked upon by those devoted to the interest of religion as its only hope in this critical age. The writings of the modern apostles of Immanence are full of instruction to the person interested in the irrationality of religious thinking. Their chief difficulty arises from the purpose not to allow a Transcendent God and nevertheless to retain the personal attributes. The difficulties inherent in this task lead them into strangely illogical situations.[2]

[1] *What is Religion?* Henry S. Pritchett, Pres. of the Institute of Technology, Boston, p. 86.

[2] Here is the clearest and most comprehensive passage I find on Immanence in the works of one of the leaders of this movement. If I quote from popular

More interesting than these feeble efforts at substituting an immanent personal God for the transcendent divinity of traditional Christianity, without theoretically giving up the personal attributes, is the attempt of August Comte and of his disciples to institute an atheistic religion. It is a religion, although godless, because it admits the existence of a "Superior Power," as a source of increased and improved activity. The following quotation taken fron the *Catéchisme Positiviste*

accounts, it is because I am concerned with the God of the ordinary Christian consciousness, not the one of theological, philosophical, literature.

"The thought of mere energy residing in the universe is a conception which may be early, though not fully, grasped; but the conception of the Personal Deity as thus immanent is too vast and complicated to be fully comprehended.

"The infinite personality does not exist apart from and beyond the universe, but actually inhabits it, as a man dwells in his house, as magnetism inheres in metals. . . . We know that this must be so, because otherwise there would be some place or state outside the universe where God dwells, which would be the negation of the universe. Therefore, if God is, He must be in the universe, because it has no outside. The Deity, in some real and vital sense, is in all men, in all spaces, in all places, and He has been so in all times. The qualification of these statements will appear as this study progresses."

"The divine immanence is accepted by us not because it can be demonstrated, but because it best satisfies our intellectual necessities. [He should rather say 'affective necessities.'] . . . But faith has no very heavy burden to carry in this instance. When I remember that I am a thinking, feeling, and willing being—in short, that I am a personality—I cannot help inferring that the limited implies the absolute, and that personality in man is the sure prophecy of the perfect personality, which is God." *The Inner Light*, Armory Bradford (1905), pp. 34 and 45.

One of the English champions of the doctrine of Immanence, the Rev. R. J. Campbell, declares that "the starting point of the New Theology is the belief in the immanence of God and the essential oneness of God and man." "We believe man to be a revelation of God, and the universe one means to the self-manifestation of God. The word 'God' stands for the infinite reality whence all things proceed. Every one, even the most uncompromising materialist, believes in this reality. The new theology in common with the whole scientific world believes that the finite universe is one aspect or expression of that reality; but it thinks of it or him as consciousness rather than a blind force, thereby differing from some scientists. Believing this, we believe that there is thus no real distinction between humanity and the Deity. Our being is the same as God's, although our consciousness of it is limited. We see the revelation of God in everything around us." From the *Daily Mail*, London, as quoted by the *Literary Digest*, Feb. 16, 1907.

Minds of the type of Bradford and Campbell are easily contented in the matter of logical truth. They do not see, or refuse to be seriously embarrassed by, intellectual difficulties. Campbell's adversaries find it easy to expose the weakness of his theological training and of his thinking. They deplore the presumption and arrogance of his utterances.

justifies this statement. In the course of the dialogue between the priest and the woman, the latter has come to understand the two ways in which moral discipline is provided by the fundamental dogma of the Universal religion: It requires the subordination of our individual inclinations to an external power, and excites our sympathetic instincts so as to enable us to bow before, or to modify, common destiny. Nevertheless she does not yet find in Positivisme a sufficiently direct inspiration. The priest strives to make his neophyte see clearly that the system of Positive Philosophy provides a Unity, in the form of the concept of Humanity, which may advantageously replace the chimerical beings of the existing religions. "Around this Real, Great Being, immediate instigator of each individual and collective existence, our feelings and desires centre as spontaneously as do our ideas and our actions. . . The growing conflict of humanity against the sum of all the fatalities which dominate it, offer to the heart as well as to the mind, a better spectacle than did the necessarily capricious omnipotence of its theological precursor. *More readily accessible to our feelings as well as to our thinking*, because of an identity of nature which does not preclude its superiority over all its servants, *a Supreme Being such as this excites deeply an activity destined to preserve and to improve it.*"[1] Comte's disciples have always so far repudiated the allegation that they have only substituted one kind of God for another. "The service of Man does not mean the Adoration of Man, nor the substitution of a human God for a celestial God," says Frederick Harrison.[2] The small degree of success of this movement bears witness both to the practical difficulty in the way of a would-be religion which discards the personal element in its source of power, and, on the other hand, to the at least potential sufficiency of an impersonal God-conception.

In this connection reference should be made to the noteworthy, though still obscurely indicated, search on the part of certain leaders of the Ethical Culture Societies, for an impersonal spiritual power from which man might draw assistance in his efforts for moral betterment. From these earnest persons come lectures and essays upon "the Relig-

[1] *Catéchisme Positiviste*, Edition Apostolique, 1891, pp. 53 and 55. [The italics are mine.]

[2] *Moral and Religious Socialism*, New Year's Address, 1891.

ion of the Spirit,'' ''the Religion of Democracy,'' ''the Prerequisite of a Religion,'' etc., in which it appears clearly that nothing short of a religion will satisfy them. The precondition of religion is, according to Professor Adler, the belief in the existence of spirit ''neither ghosts, nor one universal ghost,'' but ''that which is not material.''[1]

Primitive Buddhism believed in spirit, but not in a personal God. It made use of ''four principles of psychical power.'' Whether Tiele and others are right in holding that Buddhism became a religion only when the founder was deified, is the very question at stake. The Yogi doctrine does not, as far as I know, refer definitely to personal divinities the increased power and improved mastery over one's body and one's mind which follows the practices. The power proceeds, in the mind of the devotee, from an unlocated, undetermined region—from Spirit-at-large. The European friend of Professor James who submitted himself to the trying ordeal of Hatha Yoga discipline did not appeal to a personal spirit. Yet he found moral and bodily power.[2] The man who believes that there are in him, or outside of him, unused depths of psychic power which he could turn to his own immeasurable benefit if he only knew how, is on the way to a religion, whether the power is looked upon as personal or not. The strikingly vital Christian Science movement might also be instanced as a religion not necessarily dependent upon a personal spirit-power for, although most Christian Scientists believe in a personal God, the spirit upon which they rely in the cure of disease and other evils does not necessarily involve personality; it is again Spirit-at-large. The personal attributes may be, and in many instances are, superadded.

The number of those who to-day in and out of our churches attempt gropingly to convert a no longer tenable belief in a personal, transcendent God into an impersonal power, adequate to the task heretofore fulfilled by the traditional Christian God, is far beyond the common estimation and is daily increasing. To find an impersonal, efficient substitute for the traditional personal source of religious power, belief in which will not mean disloyalty to science, is the great problem of our times. The future of religion appears to me to depend upon its successful solution. The difficulty it offers constitutes the deeper, the ultimate religious crisis.

[1] *The Prerequisite of a Religion*, Ethical Address, XI, 1.
[2] *The Energies of Man*, Phil. Rev., Jan., 1907, pp. 9-13.

It should be remarked that religious practices involving the belief in a personal God do not necessarily mean either a rational belief in the personality of the power appealed to or insincerity. The instances are many of persons who reject God on logical ground and who, in moments of emotional stress or of reduced mental activity, as between sleep and waking, lapse into attitudes and behaviors implying the tacit recognition of a personal God. The following statements from two college students are interesting in this connection, "In an agitated or excited state of mind, I think of God as a personal Father who is ready to reward or punish. But generally I think of God as a mass of forces having certain effects follow from certain causes; the force that causes us to do good will bring with it its own reward and *vice versa*. If I thought that God did not exist, it would affect me only in moments of distress." "I think of God sometimes as a personal being and at times as an impersonal one. The conception differs according to the state of my feelings. For instance, when I am perplexed by some distressing occurrence and feel the need of some kind of counsel, my conception of God and my appeal to Him is as to a personal being. On the other hand, when I am out in the woods and see a beautiful landscape, or an unusual sunset, my conception of God is impersonal. I think of God then as a great power, of no definite shape or size, with none of the attributes of a being." The case of the German scientist given a little further on would be to the point here. Best of all is the following instance of an absolute and fully realized divorce between the intellect on the one side and the feelings and the will on the other. When the person in question found that she had lost for good and all the belief in the personal God of her youth, she at first determined to get rid of the need of Him. As this proved beyond her power, it occurred to her that she might possibly "use the concept of a personal God without belief in its objective existence!" "Therefore, I deliberately set to work to acquire a sense of God's presence which I had not had for nearly twenty years. I reinforced my reason by reiterating my reasons for assuming such a personality, and I prayed constantly after the fashion of the old skeptic; 'O God, if there be a God, save my soul if I have a soul.'

"Then one night after a week of this sort of thing, the old sense of God's presence came upon me with overpowering fullness. I cannot express the sense of personal intimacy, understanding and sympathy that it gave to me. I felt the thing—whatever it was—so close to me,

so a part of me, that words and even thoughts were unnecessary, that my part was only to sink back into this personality—if such it were—and drop all worries and temptations, all the straining and striving that had been so prominent in my life for years and years. Then, as I felt consolation and strength pouring in upon me, there came a great upwelling of love and gratitude toward their source, even though I was all the time conscious that that source might not be either personal or objective. It *felt* personal, I said to myself, and no harm would be done by acting as if it were so.''

''On the practical side its value up to now—after a period of three months—has been permanent. I find my thoughts falling back upon the idea of this presence as soon as I get into any sort of trouble or perplexity, and the invariable effect is to calm me and to enable me to take a wider outlook. I am so curiously conscious of it as a person that I find myself checking certain thoughts and acts just as I would check words if some one else were here, and I break out into conversation with it in the same incidental fashion as I do with a friend who happens to sit in the room where I am working.

''So far as the theoretical question is concerned, I cannot say that I am any nearer a solution than before, nor do I see any possibility of a solution. But I am daily demonstrating that the assumption of God as a reality is of no use to me, and *I care less and less whether He exists outside my own consciousness or not.* [Italics are mine.] If He is indeed, a mental creation alone, I only marvel the more at the power of the human mind, and still find the idea one of the most valuable in living.''[1]

In the light of these instances it will be readily admitted as possible for the ordinary person—the person not gifted with the remarkably clear self-consciousness of the last illustration—to be both practically religious and theoretically irreligious, without ever clearly realizing his condition. The development of such a person is dubious. He may either come to disregard his rational mood and identify himself more and more completely with his active and feeling self. Or he may do the reverse and gradually eliminate his religious moments.

II. *The religious Agent must be a psychic power accessible to man.*

[1] *An Illustration of the Psychology of Belief*, Amy E. Tanner, Psy. Bull., Feb. 15, 1907, pp. 35 and 36.

The *modus operandi* matters little provided energy, in some form or other, be obtainable. No one would be inclined to deny that in religion power is secured, but many will need the compulsion of arguments to admit the supremacy of results over logical truth in religion. And yet if there is a sphere of human activity in which the pragmatic test of truth obtains, that sphere is religion. The indifference of religion to theoretical knowledge and logic is masked when its beliefs are firmly established. It is when, as in the Christian religion of to-day, dogmas are on every hand doubted that religion, threatened in its very existence, grows bold and proclaims fearlessly that logical or objective truths are among its concern only in so far as they assist it toward its goal: life, more abundant and perfect life—and that, if logically tenable conceptions cannot be had, then it will defy logic and prove that one may live by rationally untenable concepts. The preceding section has already brought to the attention of the reader valuable instances of this, the genuinely religious temperament. Here is one more illustration to the same effect. It is taken from a letter of a German scientist well known by his psychological works. "Fortunately, to know and to understand God, which is impossible, is not essential; but to feel and to 'live Him' is the crucial, necessary thing. To realize that entirely practical ideal, we must, in my opinion, believe in a personal God. For it seems to me impossible for man to be able to enter into ethical relations with an impersonal being. Is not this the most profound meaning of Christianity; the Divine One took flesh, He became man to reveal Himself to men, not in order to be understood, but that He might be loved? I feel, therefore, that we have not only the right, but perhaps even the duty to represent to ourselves the Divine as a personal God. But, at the same time, we must never forget that this idea corresponds not to the nature of the Divine, but only to the nature of man. It is only an expedient but, it seems to me, an indispensable expedient."[1] The predominance of efficiency over logical truth or, in philosophical terms, of the practical over the theoretical reason, appears just as forcibly when the source of religious power is not personal. For then there arises the difficulty of understanding how one may enter into prayerful communion with an impersonal power. To some it seems an impossibility. "To speak, says Romanes, of the religion of the Un-

[1] *Le Divin, Expériences et Hypothéses*, Marcel Hébert, p. 130.

knowable, the religion of Cosmism, the religion of Humanity, etc., where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the rationality of the equator.'' It may be true that, in good logic, an impersonal force cannot be expected to respond to human yearnings. If so, logical consistency should restrain an Absolute Idealist, a Pantheist, an Immanentist, a devotee of the Great Being, from seeking spiritual assistance in communion with the Impersonal Force in which these sectarians believe. My immediate task is to show that as a matter of fact *disbelievers in a personal God have nevertheless established successful dynamic relations with an impersonal source of power.* Let us return first to the American physical scientist[1] who conceives of God as 'an infinite power, immanent in all life but working through law, not under the action of human-like motives and purposes.' This man will be thought by the logically minded to be cut off from the blessings secured through prayer by the worshippers of Christ's Father. Not so, however: ''It seems therefore, clear to me that, in the sense that I have used the words, all serious men, whatever their intellectual training, must pray, not perhaps for material help, not in expectation that the laws of the universe shall be changed at their request, not even primarily for strength to live rightly and justly, but as the supreme effort of the human soul to know God.'' The expression '' to know God '' is misleading. The author does not mean a purely intellectual knowledge, as will be seen in the sequel. ''And whether that which we call prayer be a direct communication with Him as our Heavenly Father, or whether it be a communion with our higher consciousness, which is in touch with Him, in either case the time can never come *when a human soul will not rise from such a communion purified and strengthened, with new hope and new patience, and with a more serene view of his own duty and his own future.*''[2] Whence this influx of power? He does not know and cares little as long as experience proclaims the effectiveness of the practise. Do you rise from your knees strengthened? Then pray! I waive the grave question of intellectual honesty to consider only the facts in themselves.

The religion of Humanity is another illustration of the possibility of

[1] See also Case I in *The Contents of Religious Consciousness*, Monist, XI, 1901, p. 539.

[2] *What is Religion*, Henry S. Pritchett, p. 93.

obtaining power by religious methods from an impersonal agent. The Founder intended, as we have seen, to provide an impersonal source of power, and his disciples have proved its effectiveness. The *Discourses on Positive Religion*, by J. H. Bridges, M. B., open with this eloquent exordium. "We meet here to-day to celebrate the festival of Humanity. By thought and by feeling we seek to enter into the presence of that assemblage of noble lives who, from the earliest ages until now, have labored for the benefit of men, and have left a store of material and of spiritual good from which all the blessings of our present life have issued. Before the resistless power of this unseen host we bow in thankful submission; *knowing well that of ourselves we are insufficient, either to see or to do what is right. Whatever wider thoughts or generous impulses prompt us to rise above ourselves, and to live unselfishly, come to us from the higher source. They are the free gift of humanity.*" [Italics are mine.] In the course of the first address, the speaker makes his point still clearer. "Each one of us has now to ask himself how far the faith which he professes is in any true sense a religion to him; how far it enables him to pray. I use that old word because there is absolutely no other that expresses the facts of the case so simply. After every wish that the laws of nature may be suspended for our individual benefit has been unflinchingly set aside, the final meaning of the word remains; rather, it appears for the first time in all its purity. To pray is to form the ideal of our life, by entering into communion with the Highest."

"With this loftier and purer conception of prayer, it is very evident that Positivists are in complete sympathy. Nay, it is clear that so far as such a conception is formed, it is not merely in sympathy with Positivism, but is itself wholly and entirely Positivist." The right in the claim of the Positivists that the "Service of Man" is a religion rests upon the undeniable fact that it accomplishes for them in essence, and by similar methods, precisely what the acknowledged religions secure to their disciples: "Our people here feel that life is a cold and hopeless thing in the absence of any religious emotion . . . and, as the hold upon an Omnipotent Providence in the universe has slipped from their souls, they feel firmly before them the reality of a Human Providence aiding the feeble steps of man on earth."[1]

[1] *Moral and Religious Socialism*, Frederick Harrison, New Year's Address, 1891.

We find, then, in our civilized Christian communities four groups of persons differentiated by their attitude towards the religious source of power. 1. Those who have a rational assurance of the existence of a personal God with whom communication can be maintained. 2. Those who under certain circumstances lapse into the belief of the first class, but who otherwise disbelieve in a personal God. When under emotional stress, the powers with which we think ourselves in relation assume a personal form as easily and irresistibly as at night the perturbed sleeper fashions inert objects into living beings. If due allowance be made for the natural illogism of the average person, and for the strength of the personifying tendency, the unconsciousness and naïvety with which hosts of people having no rational belief in a personal divinity nevertheless maintain personal relations with a power personified at the moment he is needed, will cease to be a matter for amazement. 3. Trained and self-conscious minds who deliberately set before themselves the task of dealing with the impersonal as if it were personal, without, however, cheating themselves into the conviction that they have a rational belief in a personal First Cause. To these persons all the world is a stage, and, as at the theatre the fictitious situation is for the time being admitted as real for the sake of enjoyment, so in life the personality of the Absolute is assumed in order to secure the benefits proceeding from such a being. This short-sighted form of pragmatic philosophy is easily enough defended by considerations such as the following. The first business of life is its maintenance and increase, and not logical thinking. Rational thinking is both a product and a tool of adaptive development, and so, when it stands in the way of growth, it is to be thrust aside as defeating the very end for which it has been evolved. After all, doing that which serves the end of life is eminently rational. Therefore a course of conduct in which reason is sacrificed to life may be said to be fundamentally true to the canons of the larger, the biological logic. This plausible argumentation is clearly superficial. Is it not discredited by the acknowledgment that in the long run conformity to the logically true leads to the greater result, to the relatively most perfect adaptation, to the ultimate good of the larger number? Is it not of the very essence of reason to save us from the necessity of acting with reference to the present moment alone, and to make it possible for us to conform our conduct to generalized experience? Would not the disregard of knowledge and of logical relations prevent, or at least retard, the discov-

ery of means of salvation more effective than those established ages ago by ignorant empiricism? But the sort of self-renunciation demanded by a far-sighted pragmatism is not the kind which finds favor in religious life, for the domination of the "will to live" leads to a disregard of critical judgment for the sake of immediate gratification. In religion, perhaps more than anywhere else, the lust of life compels reason to dance to very grotesque tunes. But, whatever may be thought of the wisdom of the short-sighted policy, the possibility for man—for some men—to get along in this manner is clearly established; that is an important fact. 4. Finally, those who, unable to admit a personal divinity, and also incapable of behaving as if they believed in one, make successful use of a non-personal source of psychic power. This attitude is made difficult by the personifying tendency of which we have spoken. Its possibility is, however, well attested, and it is not beyond belief that, with some training, man may come easily enough to adapt himself to a situation made by science and philosophy, squarely faced.

III. *The psychic power, in order to be available to man as a religious agent, must be superhuman in at least some of its qualities.* Omnipotent it need not be, nor omnipresent, nor infinite, nor supernatural. But *sufficient* to the limited expectation of man, it must be. Yet, if the wonderful attributes just named may be claimed for it, so much the better for the worshipper. It is well known that most historical gods had their particular places of abode and that their power was limited not only by other gods, but otherwise also. Even the God of the ordinary Christian is not usually thought of as omnipotent and infinite. Facts obvious to the ordinary mind—the existence of evil and of human beings—flatly contradict the opinion that the Christian God is either Omnipotent or Infinite. A Father in Heaven to whom the dominical prayer may be addressed is, generally speaking, abundantly adequate. "Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven, give us this day our daily bread," is not suggestive of the inconceivable Trinitarian Being whom theologians have vainly striven to define. The common sense meaning of this prayer implies a divinity limited in that it is personal and lives in Heaven and that, in addition, there are other beings in Heaven who do his will and still others on earth who do not. Metaphysical distinctions do not find a resting place in the ordinary person's mind, especially not during the intensely practical moments constituting religious life. Business is transacted with the divin-

ity in a direct, practical way, and is untrammeled by the subtle wrangles upon the nature of God and his relation to man and the Cosmos in which the few get entangled. These remarks are not to be construed as involving a denial of the influence exercised by knowledge and reflection upon the idea of God. The refinements undergone by this idea are the outcome of thought working upon experience. My contention is simply that in actual religious life, metaphysical distinctions are not regarded.

The foregoing description of the nature and constitution of religion will appear to some open to the objection of gross utilitarianism. Religion is not, they will say, so mean a scheme of self-gratification as I have made it out to be; on the contrary, in it are manifested the noblest impulses, the purest aspirations, the loftiest purposes stirring in the human breast; and they will point to resignation, self-surrender and self-sacrifice as being of the very essence of piety. In answer to this objection, it must be said that the phrase I have used with wearisome reiteration, *the gratification of needs*, does not necessitate the interpretation these critics put upon it. Why should any one understand by that phrase only the lowest wants and desires? I have tried to make clear that among the ends of religion are found ethical purposes and the social sentiments of friendship and love.

The self-aggrandizing impulse and intention alleged by me to be at the root of all religion, seems, it is true, to be replaced in the higher ethical religions by impulses of an opposite character. How could the assimilation of Power be of the essence of religious life when its culmination is the very opposite of self-increase? it will be asked. Does not Islam mean resignation? and is not self-sacrifice in self-surrender the highest achievement of the Christian? I do not contest the importance and significance of the self-surrender motive. I have on other occasions given it the attention it deserves. But let it be observed, in the first place, that self-sacrifice as an ideal is not antagonistic to aggrandizement. In religion these terms do not denote mutually exclusive ideals. They are, rather, one the positive, the other the negative, aspect of the same life-process, for where there are impulses and desires which are to prosper, others must be suppressed. The Buddhist wages war upon desire that he may be delivered from the miseries of rebirth, old age, disease, death, sorrow, and obtain the endless peace of Nirvana. The Christian is admonished to renounce the

flesh that the spirit may live. In his barbarous self-renunciations the ascetic manifests a greed unsurpassed in intensity by that of the most unrelenting moneylender. But the respective objects of their greed are of different orders: the one lusts after the things of this world, the other hungers after the things of the Spirit. Even those who, like Tiele, look upon adoration as the essence of all religion, have to recognize that it includes "a desire to possess the adored object, to call it entirely one's own, and conversely, a longing on the part of the adorer to feel that he belongs to the adored one forever, in joy and in sorrow, in life and in death." [1] One of the forms in which the goal of the Christian self-renunciation can be described is unification with one's fellow men and with one's God, or universation of the will. The struggle for preservation, increase and perfection may be partially described either in terms of self-sacrifice or in terms of self-increase. But, to be complete, it must be in terms of both.

> "... Men may rise on stepping-stones
> Of their dead selves to higher things."

It should be observed that even in its negative aspect, *i. e.*, when self-sacrifice is its aim, man makes use of a psychic power.

The persistency with which conflicting, even contradictory views of the nature of religion have been and still are offered by men apparently qualified to form authoritative opinions, is in itself a problem deserving of attention. One of the causes of these divergences lies in the difficulty experienced in separating the philosophical from the religious attitude. Nothing need be added in this place to what has been said above on this topic. Another cause resides in the fact, not sufficiently recognized, that among those who have written on the subject many have had little direct personal acquaintance with religion. Their religious experiences have been limited, it seems, to rare, accidental moments better characterized as adumbration of, than as fully developed, religious experiences. Still another cause is to be found in the natural tendency to define religion by means of its dominant characteristic or by its purpose. Most human activities can be identified by their end, why not religion? Unfortunately for those who have approached the problem in this manner different religious experiences may be dominated by different characteristics and

[1] *Ibid.*, II, 199.

every purpose of life may be a spring of religion, as we trust to have shown in the preceding pages.

A fourth cause of the confusion with regard to the nature of religion, and the last one we shall mention, is the appearance in religious practices of extraneous activities. The Navajo Indians perform, for instance, a notable ceremony called the *Mountain Chant*. It lasts nine days. Its ostensible purpose is the curing of disease, and, in so far as the performances are intended to secure the help of spirits in the curing of disease, it is a religious ceremony. But we are told that during a large part of it the primary purpose is forgotten and that the people give themselves up to the enjoyment of dance, song and even sexual indulgence for their own sake. In the Roman Catholic Church the connection of certain parts of the ceremonial to the strictly religious performance is often distant and at times possibly altogether wanting. Frederic Bastiat, speaking of the Church of Rome exclaims, "For the rest, it is a religion so beautiful that I understand very well that one may love it so as to be made happy by it in this very life."[1] Certain travellers have described the Protestant churches of the U. S. as *social clubs*. These churches are primarily, these observers think, centres of various social activities; they gratify first of all the ubiquitous social instincts and designs. The churches are no doubt right when they look upon Freemasonry as a rival, for it provides for the gratification of the social instincts and so far takes their place. Everywhere and always religious ceremonies have been a centre of attraction for a variety of activities desirable in themselves. In a New Year's address Frederick Harrison declares that the aim of the English Positivist Society has been threefold, "religious communion, systematic education, political and social activity. Thus, then, for 10 years, within the measure of our very modest resources, we have sought to make this place serve to us partly as chapel, partly and perhaps mainly as school and partly as political and social club."[2]

This gathering around a religious centre of activities of different orders has not made the task of the student of religion easier. But the phenomenon is not observable in religion alone, it expresses a human tendency working itself out in different directions and at times with most incongruous effects, as, for instance, in the case of the widely prevalent custom of feasting at a funeral. The keeping separate of purposes and

[1] *La Foi et ses Victoires*, Abbè Baunard. [2] New Year's Address, 1891.

of means is an achievement one need not expect to find realized in unscientific pursuits.

Not everything, however, can be incorporated into the public expression of religious life. Nothing obviously antagonistic to its purpose and to its method would be tolerated. But anything which either promotes a frame of mind advantageous to the success of the religious method, or which, because of its own value, will enhance that of religion, if allied to it, finds ready admittance. The law of the diffusion of feeling and emotion finds here a large field of application. The alliance of religion with art, looked upon with so marked a favor in many churches, owes its existence to the lustre it throws upon religion, and to the fact that æsthetic enjoyment puts the soul in an attitude which facilitates what is usually regarded as the operation of the Divine Spirit: it creates a state of mind analogous to the one distinctive of mystical ecstasy. A recent book on Æsthetics describes the beautiful object as possessing "those qualities which bring the personality into a state of unity, and self-completeness." [1] No wonder, then, that the beautiful has become an ally of religion.

The end of religion is excellently expressed by the words ascribed to Christ, "I came that they may have life and may have it abundantly," [2] while nothing could hit so wide of the mark as Spencer's affirmation, "Religion, under all its forms, is distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject matter is that which passes the sphere of experience." [3] That for which religion exists, is growth, which, of all things, falls within the sphere of experience. God, the Ultimate, to which Spencer applies the epithet, "subject matter," is, instead, the *means* by which more abundant and perfect life is produced. Religion is completely natural, the outcome, on the one hand, of impulses and desires, either coarse or refined, selfish or altruistic; and, on the other, of the belief, first naïve, and later at times reasoned, in the existence of superhuman agents holding practical relations with man. In its crudest forms, this belief is probably not beyond the mental capacity of the higher animals. If the terms superhuman and supernatural have any relevancy in religion, it is only when applied not to religion itself, but to its so-called object, God,

[1] *The Sense of Beauty*, Ethel Puffer, p. 49.
[2] John X, 10.
[3] *First Principles*, I, 17.

Spirit—an object which need not have any existence outside the mind of the believer. The description of religion as "a pathological manifestation of the protective function,"[1] is as illegitimate as the one which introduces the supernatural in its origin or in its nature. It is, on the contrary, a normal, commonplace exercise of the ordinary human powers of volition, observation, and inference. There are, of course, diseases of religion, but it would be as absurd to brand religion itself because of its anomalies as it would be to condemn the sexual life because of sexual perverts. Religion has also been labelled an instinct. No one who, in agreement with contemporary psychology understands by instinct a purposive action performed without foresight of the end, can for a moment regard religion as an instinct. The attempts to enter into helpful communication with a superhuman psychic power might be called an impulse, a tendency, but not an instinct.

Since the purpose of religion is to maintain and perfect life, the biological point of view should afford the larger and more fruitful outlook. From this point of vantage religion appears as a part of the struggle for life; the part involving relations with superhuman, psychic, powers. In its earlier stage, when the individual is still lost in the tribe or nation, the gods are national gods and the religious end is a national one. During that period the religious struggle aims at the preservation and increase of the community. At a later time, when the individual has gained a deeper sense of his personality, when he has become more fully self-conscious, religion becomes individual. Henceforth the struggle with which it is concerned is essentially subjective, internal. It strives toward the establishment of inward peace by the triumphs of the better, the superior impulses and tendencies. In persons keenly sensitive to ethical values this internal warfare claims a large share of attention. It may even, in particular circumstances, determine a momentous crisis. This work of intra-individual selection, of inner psychic adaptation, as I have called it elsewhere, is without any doubt of the utmost significance to the development of modern society.

The persistent effort towards more abundant and more perfect life, secured through the assistance of a religious source of power, has resulted in the establishment of peculiar attitudes and modes of consciousness favorable to the achievement of the religious end. Intoxi-

[1] Sergi, *Les Sentiments*, p.

cation, trance, ecstasy, meditation, contemplation, self-surrender, the Faith-state, are as many different states of consciousness empirically tried and incorporated into the body of religious practices because of their efficiency. These states of consciousness, and more generally the religious attitudes, rites and ceremonies, are empirical products: the selected residuum of a great number of more or less chance practices. It may be added, touching the distinctively *religious* attitudes, that they are all characterized by increased suggestibility and that this accounts for their peculiar effectiveness and therefore for their presence in religious life.

LITERATURE.

Christian Origins. By Otto Pfleiderer, D. D. Translated from the German by Daniel A. Huebsch, Ph. D. New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1906. pp. 295.

In this volume, a course of sixteen lectures given by Prof. Pfleiderer to students and non-collegiate visitors during the winter of 1905, at the University of Berlin, is made accessible to the English reading public. The point of view taken by the author is purely historical, and the subject matter is chiefly an adaptation and condensation from the material contained in his larger work. "Das Urchristenthum, seine Schriften und Lehren, in geschichtlichem Zusammenhang beschrieben' 2 Aufl., 1902, to which the reader is referred for the historical data and criticism if related literature. In the present book, those results of critical research which, on Prof. Pfleiderer's opinion, are most *probably* true, are used without further discussion to build up a consistent historical picture, and the book is avowedly written for those who are not satisfied with the traditional church-faith, but "are possessed by an urgent desire to learn what is to be thought, from the standpoint of modern science, concerning the origin of this faith and concerning the eternal and temporal in it." With this purpose and view-point, Prof. Pfleiderer discusses in the first part of the book the preparation and foundation of Christianity as found in Greek philosophy, in the Jewish-Greek philosophy of Philo and in Judaism; the historical Jesus and his psychology; and the historical and psychological development of the Messianic congregation.

The second part of the book treats of the evolution of Early Christianity into the Church. In this section are discussed the historical and psychological influences which moulded the thought and development of the Apostle Paul, and a critical review of his theology and teachings; the chronological order and criticism of the Gospels; the Gnostic movement and its influence on Christianity; and the growth and establishment of church authority.

Whether or not one agrees with the conclusions of Prof. Pfleiderer, his undoubted scholarship, clear thinking and scientific and religious purpose command thoughtful consideration and make the book an interesting and valuable contribution to modern thought on the problems discussed. Theodate L. Smith.

Jesus. By Wilhelm Bousset. Translated by J. P. Trevelyan; edited by Rev. W. D. Morrison. (Crown Theological Library.) Williams & Norgate, London, 1906. pp. 211.

Bousset thinks we must forego all attempts at a formal life or history of Jesus, for our knowledge of the real man is very vague and uncertain, and what we have is confined to a very brief period of his life. The real Jesus, to-day, is found not in the past, but in the hearts and lives of believers. His chief teaching was directly or indirectly about the kingdom. The form of his teaching on this subject was transitory and its husk is already shed. "If Jesus expected the eruption and appearance of an unknown world in the immediate future, we can no longer share his expectation; yet our own entry into the darkness of the beyond still remains a thing of the future, and with this in mind we can still pray in the spirit of Jesus,

though not in the direct and literal sense of his words, 'Thy kingdom come.'" Jesus' faith in the fatherhood of God was "an infinitely bold venture." God was a fact that to him surpassed all others in importance. He was a present reality. The idea of the kingdom was directly connected in the mind of Jesus with that of the last judgment, and his exhortation was to change the whole frame of mind. The majestic image of the judge as portrayed by Daniel was vividly before his mind. He looked for the resurrection of the dead and the final decision of heaven or hell passed upon the whole world and also upon Satan and his hosts. Still "the knowledge that all Jesus' moral demands were based upon and prompted by the idea of reward and punishment in the last judgment ought not to threaten us. It is true that we often hear it laid down from the standpoint of Kantian rigorism that the ethics of Jesus stands on a lower plane because of their prevailing idea of reward." They are, at any rate, removed from dangerous sensual eudemonism and the reward he promises is nearness to God, and the penalty, rejection from his presence. "Nevertheless we must learn to accept the fact that the Gospel knows nothing of the doctrine that man ought to do good for its own sake." The heart of the Gospel is not the bloodless moral law, but personal life culminating in God.

Jesus' teaching concentrated first of all upon the genuinely moral. He sought inner purity. the emancipation of the law from its accretions. He penetrated behind action to disposition. His fundamental feeling was a passion for truth and reality. The antagonism between Jesus and Phariseeism was far deeper than consciousness. Everything, for him, must be sacrificed in order not to lose one's self. He wanted heroism, enthusiasm. "In this respect," expectation of cosmic moral consummation, "we can no longer simply imitate and endorse the prayer of Jesus, We no longer live in imagination at the latter end of a decaying world." "The Gospel becomes the religion of ethical liberation, for in its very centre lies the belief in the release and unfettering of the will for good by the forgiveness of sins.'

The mystery of Jesus' person was that he considered himself the Messiah, although every one of the Messianic utterances in our Gospels is disputed on critical grounds, some with more, some with less plausibility. Jesus was in a very difficult position. So many of the Messianic hopes were so foreign to his inmost being that he was impelled to shun them, Yet, "the Messianic idea was the only possible form in which Jesus could clothe his inner consciousness, and yet an inadequate form; it was a necessity, but also a heavy burden which he bore in silence almost to the end of his life; it was a conviction which he could never enjoy with a whole heart." These hopes oscillated between purely earthly and supernatural conceptions. The "Son of Man" is simply one of the Messianic titles. The ideas it involved were "insufficient and even dangerous to the true being of Jesus. The expectation at which his broodings finally landed him, that he would return in the immediate future upon the clouds of heaven, surrounded by his angels—how foreign it sounds to us." History has followed a very different course. "The adoption of the idea of suffering and death side by side with his personal conviction which still remained unshaken . . . that he was called and sent by God was a truly immense achievement. There was something horrible and unheard of about the idea of a suffering and dying Messiah to the minds of Jesus' contemporaries. He was left to face the dark ways of God and an enormous task alone. He had so to ennoble and to transfigure suffering and failure, the abominations of Judaism, that they could become the crown of all that his followers believed of their Messiah. Therefore he rose above his fate and could wed the thought of death with the conviction that he was in a peculiar sense God's envoy."

His work tends to put man in direct relation with God, while he himself retired more completely into the background. Above all, he did not lay claim to judge the world and it is "inconceivable that Jesus, who stamped the fear of that almighty God, who had power to damn body and soul together, upon the hearts of his disciples with such marvellous energy, and who could speak of that fear because he shared it to the bottom of his soul, should have now arrogated to himself the judgeship of the world in the place of God.

"At the original supper Jesus did not mean to institute a sacrament in the Catholic, Lutheran or Calvinistic sense. It is also improbable on general grounds that Jesus should have asked himself the purpose of his suffering and death at all if, as we believe, his thoughts about his future destiny remained doubtful and perplexed until the hour of Gethsemane. It is certainly possible that he interpreted his death dimly and prophetically as a ransom for many." There is a deep truth in the faith in vicarious suffering of the righteous and the infinite value of martyrdom, but it is "certain that Jesus never conceived or expressed the thought that God's forgiveness of sins depended absolutely upon his own sacrificial death or by the vicarious atonement rendered by his death." He rendered the highest service by walking the path of sorrow in silence and simplicity, with unfaltering trust in the heavenly Father and in his own mission. Finally, what the disciples actually experienced in the days of the resurrection, Bousset declares belong not to the account of Jesus' life and personality, but to the history of the church. As we sink our souls in contemplating his figure, we are exalted and full of foundations of our own higher life.

Christianity and Sex Problems. By Hugh Northcote. F. A. Davis Co., Philadelphia, 1906. pp. 257.

We need, says Northcote, a new ethics of the sexes, and this is being slowly evolved, although a knowledge of this subject is exceedingly complex and involves a wide range in many fields, even the repulsive one of the darker side of sexuality, which are well calculated to try the nerve of even the expert. For the discretion of this topic, too, peculiar moral qualities, tact and caution are required. Some have suggested that for plainer, more medical books on this subject, a minimum price, and that a high one. should be fixed by law, and H. G. Wells would require special licenses for the sale of such literature. It is urged that the science of sex is positively necessary to understand certain fundamental matters in Christianity, and that the latter, at the heart of which is a passion for purity and righteousness, will be both cleared and strengthened by alliance with a true science of sex, although this will not involve any very radical change in present ideas of sexual morality, but will very greatly elucidate them and make them far more potent in life. The mighty idol of Moloch, Lord of the Baalim, before whom victims were plunged into the torture of flame, a sexual deity in phallic worship, was a lurid symbol of the dangers that beset the sexual relation. The sense of the inherent sinfulness of this relation has been explained in very different ways by Westermarck, Letourneau, Ellis, Crawley, Tennant, G. A. Smith and others. It is due to the fact of long-continued and calamitous errors and excesses in this part of our nature to which the dumb instinct of the race that always says one thing while meaning another, but is always inerrant when rightly interpreted, has reacted by developing the sense of shame. There is a marked trend in recent criticism both of the Old and New Testament to reveal sex meanings as often cardinal where they were formerly quite unsuspected, and even to judge of religions by the wisdom and

effectiveness with which they regulate this relation. No topic is so hard to treat without exaggeration, pruriency, high colors. Northcote deserves great credit for his sanity in treating perversions, sex in art, its spiritualization, marriage, divorce, disease, neomalthusianism, the battle for chastity in the child and the adult in a religious sense. Most current methods of coping with the evils of sex seem to him as effective as to try to suppress a volcano by carting off some of its scoria. Legislation has hitherto been usually baffled even in its efforts to protect children. Hypnotism is not effective. Medical warnings, moral counsel and penalties may and no doubt do help this evil that threatens civilization, but religion, which has been the chief agent in regulating it in the past, must be also looked to in the future.

The Solution of Religions: The logical and scientific analysis of the chief sacred doctrines of Buddhism, Hinduism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, by C. THAMO THARAM PILLAY. Strong & Asbury, Printers, Manippay, Joffna, Ceylon, 1906. pp. 400.

This work presents a composite and comprehensive picture of the various religious questions arising out of a minute and critical survey of the chief doctrines, rites and ceremonies of the four great religions in the world, viz.: Buddhism, Hinduism, Mohammedanism and Christianity, and proposes an entirely independent and a thoroughly impartial solution of them from a controversial point of view.

The author attempts to give a satisfactory explanation of the underlying assumptions of the so-called religions, viewed in the light of "modern logic, animal magnetism, and other sciences," which involves accurate and minute description of the subtler distinctions in matters of faith and revelation, considered with reference to the similarity and dissimilarity of interpretations obtaining between them. Since the objects of faith and the sources of revelation may immeasurably differ in two given religions, while both claim authoritative and infallible truth on their respective sides, it is difficult for an impartial mind to arrive at any definite conclusion, or to believe in the likelihood of any such "revealed management and will of God" to man. The aim of this volume is, therefore, to assist the reader in attaining a solution of such vexatious questions as may confront him in a serious study of this kind.

In Part I is given a general discussion of some important facts of the chief religions in the world, such as, for instance, the significance of worship, the nature and performance of miracles, the elastic and faulty explanations put forth by believers in a universal revelation given to man, at any particular time in the past, by some especial divine intervention or agency; also, the doctrine of transmigration or rebirth viewed in the light of what "modern science and the present state of intellectual advancement have done towards elucidating, improving and advancing the progress of the world in that direction," the teaching in the universal validity of the dictates of conscience, *disproved* on empirical grounds; and, in like manner, the idea of predetermination as a divine ordinance of God in the world; and lastly, the rational basis for believing in the existence of a Supreme Being, the soul and life beyond for man as well as for all other animals. Part II is devoted to a systematic treatment of the chief sacred doctrines of Buddhism and Hinduism, and similarly, Part III, to Mohammedanism and Christianity. But, in regard to the general discussion of each of these religions under consideration here, a word of comment may be given upon what seems to be of especial value in the manner of treatment adopted by the writer. In thus taking up each religion separately, and discussing

each of the foregoing points in a brief and ingenious way, so as to bring out the salient points of each doctrine, the author has enabled the reader to avoid the confusion which so often results from studies of this kind.

Now, inasmuch as the desire of the reviewer must limit itself to a merely general statement of appreciation of this work, a few of the main conclusions will here be briefly stated:

I. That the existence of God is a positive fact.

II. That as man cannot expect to comprehend or explain the ways of the unfathomable Supreme Being, he must follow some established religion, whether its details appear to him as false or true.

III. That the question as to the nature and truth of miraculous performances and discourses attributed to all reformers and founders of religions cannot be doubted.

IV. That we have no evidence of any dramatic beginnings of the soul in man as different from that in other lower animals.

V. That one and all of the human race should co-operate and form societies consisting of men of different faith and propagate the principle of universal brotherhood, or mutual love and assistance or mutual dependence throughout the whole world.

EUCLID HÉLIE.

Course of Study in Religious Education in the Höheren Töchterschule in München.

In the Girls' High School of Munich two periods a week are given to religious education. There are some five hundred and fifty pupils of whom about two hundred are Catholics, a slightly larger number Protestants, one hundred twenty-five Jews and a few "*konfessionlos*" or "frei." There are distinct courses given by representatives of the three religious bodies. A comparison of the announcements is very interesting, for each type has its own peculiar features. I have noted the topics stressed in each course and in the following sections have summarized them.

In the Catholic statement appear: (1) The apostles' creed, catechism, commandments, sacraments, grace, prayer, sin, virtue, perfection, Christian faith and requirements, nature and being of God, making and governing of the heart, revelation, Messiahship and Godhead of Christ; (2) Bible stories and geography of the holy land; (3) Church history, church feasts and calendar, organization and symbols of the church, the important saints, preparation for first commuuion and confirmation.

In the Protestant we find: (1) The Christian Creed, commandments, sacraments, Lord's prayer, confession, forgiveness; (2) A definite course partly in the Old Testament and partly in the New for each of the first four years (beginning about with our fifth grade in America), and during the fifth year a study of Matthew and the sixth year of Luke; (3) Founding of the Church, reformation, missions, preparation for church life; (4) Learning of six to a dozen hymns each year.

The Jewish course has the following items: (1) The commandments, prayers for various services in the original tongue, immortality, revelation; (2) Divisions of Bible, contents of groups as Pentateuch, Prophets, Writings; (3) History of the Jews to the present time, feasts, fasts and holidays; (4) Psalms; (5) Faith and duty lessons—relations to God, self, neighbor, family, elders, juniors, masters, servants, teachers, pupils, friends, the State; ethical teachings of the fathers.

The preponderance of theological terms in the Catholic course is noticeable. One is surprised to find immortality abstractly mentioned only in the Jewish outline. In the Protestant statement especial emphasis is placed on the *real nature*

of confession and forgiveness. In the Protestant course, too, appears the only suggestion of method, here, historically, as a matter of principle, appears instruction as to *learning*, *repeating* and *understanding*. I have found no reason why the Catholic course alone mentions the geography of the Holy Land. Perhaps the most interesting feature of all is the emphasis laid upon the ethical aspects of religion by the Jewish outline. While Bavaria is a Catholic country, the Protestant course seems most in accord with the other parts of the curriculum.

I have purposely confined myself to the printed statement for, where one attempts to discuss execution, the difficulties become great. The most serious limitation in the schools of which I have knowledge seems to come from the fact that the teachers of religion come from outside the school and have too little other contact with these children or, for that matter, with any children, and, consequently, do not understand child nature, with resulting waste and confusion. Then when a mechanism forms itself to which the children adjust themselves, the good priest, vicar or rabbi leaves well enough alone and does not use the freedom he might have. FRANK A. MAUNY, München.

Christus, ein Inder? Versuch einer Enstehungsgeschichte des Christentums unter Benutzung der Indischen Studien Louis Jacolliots. VON TH. J. PLANGE. 2 Auflage, Stuttgart. pp. 250.

This unique volume is dedicated to Ernest Haeckel and is largely based upon the oriental studies of Louis Jacolliot. In the first part, the writer discusses the gifts of the Orient to the world in the form of language, primeval legends, law, customs of various kinds, the rule of the priests, the age of the Vedas, etc. In the second part, we have an account of Moses and the Hebrews, while the third is devoted to Krishna and Buddha. The general purpose of the book is to show that primitive Christianity was nothing but a form of Buddhism early brought to Rome by Buddhist missionaries. The proof of this lies in the many similar traits in life touching the character of Jesus and Buddha. Krishna, who is placed 3000 years, and Buddha, 500 years before Christ, have, themselves, much in common. Whoever the founder of Christianity was, he must have lived under the immediate influence of the Buddhists. The Brahmans taught that the second person of their deity Krishna was incarnate, and the name Krishna is traced by many intermediate stages to the form Djisnu, Jisnu, Jesus, etc. Just so Christus is related to Krishna. Both came to save the world from evil because the first human pair had sinned and a redeemer was therefore needed. Both were born of virgins; both were persecuted by jealous kings soon after their birth, but escaped; an angel intervened to save both; both were teachers and collected a school of pupils about them; both used parables; were transfigured before their disciples; both contributed to the poor; wrought miracles; raised the dead; healed the blind, deaf, and cripples; drove out devils; both died as an offering to the revenge of the priests who were aroused against them; nature bemoaned the death of both and both went to heaven when their mission was over; before both came the world was in darkness, but they brought light.

The Psychology of Religious Belief. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1907. pp. 327.

The writer divides his work into three parts, psychological, historical and the present status. Under the first he discusses the elements of psychical life and the nature of belief; under the second, the beliefs of primitive people, of the ancient

beliefs in India, in Israel, and three phases of Christianity; under the third, the development of religious beliefs during childhood, and then types of belief in mature life, the value of God. One of these chapters has been already printed in the *American Journal of Religious Psychology*. The book ends with a select bibliography on the Psychology of Religion which he classifies under the head of religious works, conversion, mysticism, pathology, prayer and religion of childhood and religious feeling. We are glad to see that this writer does more justice than most to the as yet not well known or very accessible papers of Professor Leuba.

Scientific Basis of Sabbath and Sunday. A new investigation after the manner and methods of modern science, revealing the true origin and evolution of the Jewish Sabbath and the Lord's Day for the purpose of ascertaining their real significance and proper observance. By Rev. Robert John Floody. With an introduction by G. Stanley Hall. Herbert B. Turner & Co., Boston, 1906. pp. 358.

This is the second edition of this interesting work which is largely anthropological as well as religious in its character. While in scientific method it leaves much to be desired, it is a unique and valuable production and a pioneer one in its field. The Sabbath is a psychological institution which, although its basis has changed much in recent years, is doubtless on a permanent foundation. It not only antedated Christianity, but very probably Judaism itself, and it is plainly connected with ancient forms of moon worship.

Cosmos, the Soul and God. By Charles London Arnold. McClurg & Co., Chicago, 1907. pp. 296.

This work is a monistic interpretation of the facts and findings of science. It treats of physical processes, evolution, cosmos, histology and the beginning of intelligence, the human soul, the individualizing principle in the physical processes, immortality and God. It is written from what claims to be a scientific standpoint, but its position is not entirely unlike that of the late John Fisk.

Inneres Wachstum, sieben Aufsätze. Von E. G. O. Stuttgart. pp. 90.

This little book treats of consciousness, you and I, development, justice, harmony, the worth of life, the great teacher, death. It is aphoristic, undubitable and very tastefully bound. Its precepts are enforced occasionally by poetry and its style sometimes almost reaches eloquence.

Der Verbrecherische Aberglaube und Die Satansmessen im 17. Jahrhundert. Von Wilhelm Fischer, Mit drei Tafeln. Strecker und Schröder, Stuttgart. pp. 112.

The writer begins with a few considerations on the relations between superstition and cannibalism, and then passes to the discussion of the following topics very prominent in diabolic folk lore; thieves candles and torture powders, graves and burial and the forms and formulæ of mixing poisons, the function of the prophetess, of Hell Haufen in the Peasants' War, the so-called "burners" (Brenner), the erotic element in Satanism, the diabolical devotional services, Satanism and the magician of Logrono, the magic poisoning epidemic, the diabolical or black mass, duchess and Satanist, the relations between court and Satanism. The work appears to be written with a good deal of knowledge, but is almost entirely without literary references or allusions.

The Fourth General Convention of the Religious Education Association, in Rochester. February 5th-7th, 1907. pp. 18.

The programme of the Fourth General Convention of the Religious Education Association at Rochester, February 5th-7th, was of peculiar interest to those who have followed the history of this venture. Its policy has always been halting and uncertain in some respects, and has been more or less changed at every meeting. One year its session was omitted altogether and the plan seemed likely to lapse when the personal energy of the late President Harper was no longer felt in its conference. It has brought together many of the very best men in the religious life of this country and has listened to and printed many admirable addresses, There are those, however, who have been a little inclined to ask whether, after all, this was the best congress of the Christian religion which America could produce. Not half of the addresses have attempted to deal with scientific problems, and the leaders in the field of scientific religious studies have been generally conspicuously absent. The general meetings have been given up to Christian oratory. Of the special afternoon sections there appear to be sixteen, nine of which, this year, met simultaneously at different places in the afternoon. No doubt the best work was done here, but the sections were so numerous and the schematic division so fine and at the same time so arbitrary as to cause considerable criticism in some quarters; for instance, those interested in religious education in universities and colleges and those in theological seminaries could not attend each other's meetings and neither could attend that of those interested in Sunday School teaching, training, etc. To our mind, too, there was far too little discrimination in the selection of speakers who were of very different grades of knowledge, edifying power, experience, etc. Is it not possible either to place this organization upon a different and more solid and perhaps less forensic basis with less over-organization, or else organize another association on different lines that shall be more scientific?

Religious Education. The Journal of the Religious Education Association. Vol. I, No. 1, April, 1906. Vol. I, No. 2, June, 1906. Published by the Religious Education Association, Chicago.

Two numbers of this new journal are already before us. It seeks to be of use in making the purposes and the work of the Religious Education Association more widely known and in putting them into practice. Its fundamental problem is the training of boys and girls in the basis of religion and morality. No educational panacea or religious philosophy is advocated. It seeks to inspire the educational forces of the country with the religious ideal and to inspire the religious forces of the country with an educational ideal, and to keep before the public the need and value of religious training. Various guilds have been organized throughout the country and of these, too, their officers, members and the more important of their proceedings are printed here. Interesting topics discussed are annual conventions, the denominational college, Chautauqua, Sunday School, hymns, promotions, etc.

Religious Education. The Journal of the Religious Education Association, February, 1907. Published by the Religious Education Association, Chicago. pp. 201-240.

This number is almost entirely taken up with two articles; one, a mere note of two pages, on the Affiliated College, by Dr. Huntington, of Grand Forks, N. D.; the other on the College Chapel, by A. W. Harris. It also contains the report of a committee of six on the Religious and Moral Education in the Universities and Col-

leges of the United States, for this is a university and college number. This last paper is a conspectus based upon returns from many colleges. As a whole, the quality of this little journal hardly seems to the writer of this note to be improved.

Lex Orandi, or Prayer and Creed. By GEORGE TYRRELL. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1904. pp. 216.

This Catholic mystic is now having much influence, and here discusses in an intuitive way such topics as the sacramental principle; the two worlds; the life of religion and of prayer; the church and the means of grace; the two tables; love and belief; the truth of beliefs; lex orandi; the dark glass of mystery; belief in God; immortality; the blessed trinity; God's fatherhood, omnipotence, goodness and wisdom; God as creator; the incarnation; the facts of religious history; the value of other beliefs; ethical beliefs; morality and religion.

Holy Wisdom, or Directions for the Prayer of Contemplation. By the VEN. FATHER F. AUGUSTIN BAKER. Methodically digested by R. F. Serenus Cressy. Edited from the Douay Edition of 1657 by Right Reverend Abbot Sweeney, D. D. Burns & Oates, Ltd., London, 1905. pp. 667.

The author is an ancient worthy of the seventeenth century who has lately come into great prominence as a mystic, and has a group of choice and devout souls in the Catholic church who have made his writings glow with a new meaning for themselves. It is impossible to describe such a work. He first treats the contemplative life in general, how God is its inspirer and directer. He then discusses the educational value of contemplation and solitude. Mortification is necessary. To this belongs temperance, patience, scrupulosity, obedience, purity. Prayer is described under various divisions and degrees, beginning with meditation. The work ends with a treatise on contemplation, which is interpreted as unity with God.

Die Literatur des Alten Testaments, von G. WILDEBOER. Zweite wohlfeile Ausgabe. Vandenhoech & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1905. pp. 464.

The author begins with the fragments of the sojourn in the wilderness and the settlement in Canaan; then discusses the literary products of the time of the Judges, of the age of David and Solomon, the material of the oldest historians before they were placed in order, the popular narratives, the beginning of historiography in Israel, the remnants of its oldest product, the primitive codifications of Jewish law, the book of the Covenant, and other contemporary legal acts, the oldest of the prophetic writings (= Isaiah XV and XVI, Amos and Hosea), the pre-Deuteronomic elements in the Hexateuch and the other historical books, Micah and Isaiah, the second code, Zephaniah and Nahum, Jeremiah and Habakkuk, the Deuteronomic history and the re-editing of the books of the Judges, Samuels and Kings, Ezekiel, poetic remains of the pre-exilic age, the second Isaiah and other prophecies of his day, Haggai and Zachariah, Lamentations and Obadiah, the priestly Thorah and Hexateuch, Malachi, Jonah and Ruth, the eschatologists, Joel, Isaiah and Zachariah, Proverbs and Job, Psalms, the priestly historians, Ezra and Nehemiah, the Song of Solomon and Ecclesiastes, Daniel and Esther.

Das Fortleben des Heidentums in der altchristlichen Kirche, von WILHELM SOLTAU. George Reimer, Berlin, 1906. pp. 307.

It was high time for a concise and semi-popular summary of the indebtedness of early Christianity to the various heathen races by which it was surrounded in its infancy, and here we have such a work, which is comprehensive and thorough

in its scope, but extremely confused in the method of its presentation and lacking every kind of introduction.

Essay on the Creative Imagination. By TH. RIBOT. Translated from the French by Albert H. M. Baron. The Ben Greet Publishing Company, Chicago, 1906. pp. 370.

Mr. Baron's translation of this important work of Ribot is dedicated to the memory of his former teacher and friend, Dr. Arthur Allin, of the University of Colorado. The translator seems quite competent and the volume in English constitutes a distinct addition to the repertory of psychologists who read only English.

The Apostolic Age in the Light of Modern Criticism. By JAMES HARDY ROPES. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1906. pp. 327.

The author here republishes with little alteration a course of Lowell Lectures given in the spring of 1904. He discusses the earliest Christian missions; Jewish Christianity and its fate, Paul and his theology, early church life, the Apostles and Gospels, the preparations for Catholic Christianity, intelligent and modern study of the Apostolic Age. The style is clear and the view point, it need not be said to those who know the author, is liberal.

Christus Liberator, an Outline Study of Africa. By ELLEN C. PARSONS. With an introduction by Sir Harry H. Johnston. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1905. pp. 309.

This book is an admirable presentation of the present status of religious work in Africa. It is distinguished from other works by its broad view, its recognition of the significance of geographic, historic, and even geologic conditions and of the importance of studying the native African in his own habitat, and basing all salvage work upon his present condition.

LeReveil au Pays de Galles. Henri Bois, Fischbacker, Toulouse, 1906. pp. 613.

The writer has made a study upon the spot of the great Welsh revival of some two years ago. He describes religious life in that country and previous revivals, the conditions that led up to the present one, the Torrey mission. There are several chapters in which he describes the leaders in the great revival, Evan Roberts and Jones, and a final chapter on psychological aspects and the general results. This work is well worth publishing and appears to have been well done.

The Culture of the Soul among Western Nations. By P.RÁMANÁTHAN. The Knickerbocker Press, New York, 1906. pp. 262.

This Ceylon pundit, brought over by Myron H. Phelps, made a tour of this country last year, delivering five lectures giving the Brahminical view of vital problems of mind and life and comparing it with the Jewish and Christian view. This he did with great sagacity and in a way calculated to bring out the disparities between and the deficiencies of each. His own practical experience gave him power to speak with great effectiveness.

On Holy Ground. Bible Stories with Pictures of Bible Lands. By WM. L. WORCESTER. J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1904. pp. 492.

The author has brought together several score of stories from the Old and then from the New Testament, with copious illustrations (nearly one on every page) of Bible scenes, incidents, excavations, etc. All in all it is a book of high pedagogic quality and of interest even to adults.

Religionshygiene, von JOHANNES BRESLER. Marhold, Halle, 1907. pp. 55.

Jesus, ein vergleichende psychopathologische Studie, von EMIL RASMUSSEN, übertragen & herausgegeben, von A. ROTHENBERG ZEITLER. Leipzig, 1905. pp. 167.

Bresler can by no means accept the argument of E. Rasmussen that Jesus was the victim of an insane delusion in thinking himself to be the son of God. The case was as follows :—Jesus was convinced of and proclaimed the moral or anthropological pantheism that God is and in a more special sense the father of all men, who are therefore of course his sons. This grand affirmation over against the old idea that God was without and over against the world marked the great Christian epoch. But now, if all men are children of God, as he had so earnestly insisted, he cannot deny that he was God's son, for this was not only a logical conclusion from the major premise that all men were God's children and hence an ineluctable inference from his premise, but still further his life had been modelled into filial conformity and identity with God. His pantheism based on his own psychic experience gave his teachings their immediate success. Bresler states his own conception of religion to be that it is essentially based upon unconcatenated concepts (ungeschlosene Vorstellungen). When a psychic patient, *e. g.*, has persistent or imperative new and abnormal concepts that he cannot harmonize, he saves his mental unity and sanity and prevents disintegration by evolving general convictions that do bring rest and concord to his abstracted soul. These in the insane are often called delusions or fixed ideas, but they are remedial and save from further disintegration. Turning now to religion, man is unable to explain his partial and disconnected experiences without the supposition or postulate of some higher potency in himself or rather in the universe. This, and his relations to it, constitute religion, which is thus essentially therapeutic and hence in the highest degree sane and wholesome. It enables man to transcend opposition and hinderances if his nature, has sufficient inherent saving energy, and hence the advent of faith in the heart brings peace, joy and great relief. Hence, it is that Jesus is best conceived as a great physician of the soul specifically and because he showed that there was no opposition, as had long been thought, between God and the world. He thus brought reconciliation and atonement and this was essentially subjective, although conceived objectively, as are all deep psychic experiences. Thus Feurbach's identification of religion with illusion, due to the estrangement of man with himself, was only an extravagant statement of the truth and is really more correct than Sabatier's theory that religion is based upon pain and struggle. The trouble has always been in religion that many things have been thought to be central that were merely accessory. In our day, the great atonement needed and at hand, is between the physico-mechanical and the personal or anthropomorphic conception of the world. True religion is, at root, a most effective and comprehensive of all therapeutic tendencies.

Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, hrsg. von J. BRESLER & GUSTAV VORBRODT. Halle a/S, C. Marhold, 1907, Band I, Heft 1.

This *Journal* takes pleasure, just as it goes to press, in welcoming another of the same name in Germany, the first number of which has just come to hand, May, 1907. The sub-title denotes that its field is to be chiefly the wide borderland between theology and medicine. Its chief editors are a pastor, Gustav Vorbrodt, whose best known work in this country is his Psychologie des Glaubens (pp. 257,

Göttingen, 1895), and a practical physician, Dr. Johannes Bresler and thirty-one others, many of whom are eminent and well-known professors of psychology, psychiatry and theology. This combination is of great and cheering significance. The first article in this inaugural number is by Professor Freud, of Vienna, and discusses the relation between religious exercises and imperative actions, showing the kinship between ceremonies, formalities, rites, taboos, their symbolisms and similar relations found in sexual and other manifestations of abnormal life. Both are often dominated by conscious impulsion and there is anxious expectation and sense of sin or error, protective rules, renunciation and vicariousness. The next article, by Professor Vorbrodt, on the Religious Psychology of the Bible, gives an interesting discussion which we shall discuss more at length when it is completed. Dr. Bresler treats of the religious feeling of guilt which he associates with misfortune, but contrasts the antique conception that catastrophe was regarded as a divine judgment with the modern view. The old view destroys pity and makes the heart hard, for all suffering was supposed to be deserved. In the next article, Vorbrodt describes an ideal course in Religious Psychology, characterizing the chief recent works in this field and speaking at length of its possibilities, taking occasion to heartily commend our journal. Then follows a concise review of recent literature, and last comes a collection of accounts of contemporary religious phenomena in different lands of a predominantly abnormal nature. One of the interesting "referats" is on the recent work of Rank and Freud, who conceived religion as the unconscious psycho-therapeutics of the masses or of the folk-lore. If the sexuality of the race is so intense that art cannot abate it, then the figure of an ideal artist is evolved as its suppressor, who voluntarily assumes human sin and guilt and removes it out of the world that men may by this artistic expedient be restored to a state of nature and thus freed from temptation. Thus, passion is so far abated that its gratification can be deferred and referred to another world by faith in love and the cure it can effect. Thus, man has really his cure himself. Jesus found it, but only for those of similar psychic character and disposition.

The thesis of Dr. Moses, of Clark University, entitled "The Pathology of Religion" presents a rather exhaustive account of morbid religious manifestations, ancient and modern.

Religion und Geisteskultur: Zeitschrift für religiöse Vertiefung des modernes Geisteslebens Herausgegeben, von Th. Steinmann. Vol. I, No. 1. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1907. pp. 102.

Another German religious journal which begins its existence in 1907 is *Religion und Geisteskultur* (I). It is devoted to the "religious deepening of modern spiritual life" and is edited by a licentiate, Th. Steinmann, docent in psychology and systematic theology. Its purpose is to give anchorage and enlargement to cultured Christians in the present confused age. The truth of Christianity is the point about which controversy now rages. Although religion and culture have different roots, they are each essential for the welfare of the other. This is the theme of the first article by Eucken. The next defends epistemology from the charge of skeptical tendencies. To avoid these, however, it must be realistic and vindicate not only reality, but normality and worth in the world. More interesting is Höffding's autobiographical reply to the criticisms which have been made of his philosophy of religion. He was first a student of theology and philology intending to preach, but was awakened from dogmatism by Kerkegaard's writings, and then

passed through rather painful stages of development, which somewhat clouded his youth, although there was, in general, continuity and no distinct rupture in his development. Desiring in his doubt to find peace and rest, and fearing that he could not obtain a career which would be favorable to this inner vocation, he was quite distraught in the struggle between the inner and outer life. His theological studies, however, ended in 1865 and he turned to the English philosophy. Slowly he realized that the greatest and loftiest things in the world, even those that are spiritual, are subject to natural law. He sought to approach psychology and ethics independently of both religion and speculation. His religious philosophy stands midway between dogmatic theology and the complacent cheap and easy free thinkers. He admits belief in a personality at the root of the world, animism, and the conviction that the course of nature can be changed by man's wishes acting through some superior power he calls magic. Man feels his own limitations and needs and these are the centre of all religious philosophy. This need outlasts the various forms of its satisfaction. For such opinions Höffding has been pointed out in his own country as a "man no Christian should respect," but he candidly and without extravagance denies all such wooden theology. In another article, we have "Thoughts of the Temporal and Eternal" as suggested by a trip to Athens, and another writer discusses theism and the mechanical view of nature and tells us that we have no data for any valid inference concerning the relation between God, nature and man. "Monism and Monotheism;" "A Critique of Pantheism;" "The Irrational Nature of Our Worth Judgment," and What we can Learn from Herder, are the titles of other articles and, last, comes a report on modern religious philosophy in Russia which ends with the general statement that it is extremely concrete, pertaining chiefly to life and religious experience and in fact consists only of "documents and materials for a philosophy of religion," and that the latter in the West European sense is still to be developed. The number concludes with four reviews, perhaps the most interesting being that of a work which discusses whether the origin of conscience is in time or eternity.

On the whole, the first number of this journal seems somewhat slight and almost crude. Most of the themes are threadbare and most of the writers, save Höffding and Eucken are evidently young men trying their prentice hand. If we contrast these 100 large pages of fine type with the material in the Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, the latter is far more stimulating, instructive and promising. For the former, the best terms an honest, educated and well-wishing writer can apply to it are that it is a respectable and on the whole laudable effort.

Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart; drei Vorlesungen, von Rudolf Eucken. Reuther & Reichard, Berlin, 1907. pp. 120.

This indefatigable writer here prints three lectures, one upon the psychic foundations of religion. In this he rejects a religion of mere feeling, vindicates the independence of psychic life, describes the stages of its development, its conflicts, anthropomorphism, certainty and personal conviction as the ground of truth. The second lecture on religion and history describes antique modes of writing history, the destructive effects of modern criticism upon it, the vanity of mere evolution, the eternal in history and the significance of single periods, and presents a refutation of historism which is in the psychic, intellectual and emotional world. The third, on the essence of Christianity, describes various types of life, the affirmations and negations of Christianity, the exaltation of pain, the unity of God and man and

the atonement of oppositions, Christian heroic art, the limits of historical criticism, greatness in great persons and its significance in religion, the universality of Christianity, the overcoming of the opposition between Semitism and Indo-Germanism, the relations between Christianity and Germanism, the effects of the former at different ages, especially the present, the contrasts between the Christian and the modern mode of thought and the present general revival of religion.

Jesus Christ, Our Lord, an English Bibliography of Christology Comprising over Five Thousand Titles annotated and classified, by SAMUEL GARDINER AYRES. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York, 1906. pp. 502.

This work was begun in 1888. A part of it was printed in the Crooks and Hearst Methodology. The work is an English bibliography of Christology comprising over 5,000 titles annotated and classified. The work is done in the hope that in the future some one will attempt the same thing in other languages. The titles are included up to April 1, 1906. Classification is, of course, very difficult, but the author has in the main followed historical order. There is, of course, a subject and an author index. One can easily criticise such a work, and every student of the subject will find omissions, and also inclusions that he would be glad to eliminate, but these and other objections sink into insignificance compared with the great value of such a book. To our mind, it would have been a valuable addition to have had one section on scientific religious journals not only of the present, but of the past, and including quarterlies and monthlies, with a brief characterization of each.

Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu, von H. J. HOLTZMANN; ein Beitrag zur Leben-Jesu-Forschung. Mohr, Tübingen, 1907. pp. 100.

This is a contribution to the investigations in the life of Christ. Chief among these problems is the historicity of his messianity. The author's résumé of opinions and conclusions upon this subject is very thoroughgoing. He marshals a long array of authors who would exterminate messianity from the Gospels and describes the various modifications, such as the futuristic, the indirect, messianity, etc. Indeed, the definitions and subdivisions of the messianic as treated by modern Christologists are legion, those of Brandt, Steck, Wrades, Schweitzer, Dalman, Havet, Stärk, Harnach, Kaftan, Schrenck, Loisy, Merx, Kalthoff, etc., differing by various shades of meaning from each other. The question is vital, for if all these senses of messianity be denied, Jesus remains simply a teacher. There can be little doubt that he began at some much discussed period of his career to regard himself, at least more or less tentatively, as the Messiah, and according to Holtzmann, the ideal of the son of man was the consummation of the messianic consciousness. He argues that Jesus believed himself to be a Messiah in the sense of Daniel, but that this occurred about the time of his appearance before Cæsarea Philippi and was therefore relatively late in his career. The proclamation of messianity and the profession of Peter coincided and were the culmination of a long inner drama.

Christus, von OSCAR HOLTZMANN. Quelle & Meyer, Leipzig, 1907. pp. 148.

This is a comprehensive and well written little book which seeks to give a general outline for laymen of the results of Christological study, although it should be said that the point of view is extremely orthodox. The writer here treats of Christianity in history, of the race, home and sources for the life of Jesus, credulity of the first three evangelists, the history of Jesus, his Gospel, his salvation, the

facts of faith as related to Jesus' life, Jesus as redeemer, atoner and Messiah, with a final supplementary chapter directing those interested to further literary acquaintance with the life and character of Jesus.

Life of Christ from Bethlehem to Olivet, by Modern Painters. With Letterpress by J. R. Miller. Edited by W. Shaw Sparrow. Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1907. 30 plates.

In this folio the author has selected thirty modern pictures of Jesus from infancy to the ascension. He includes such modern painters as von Liphart, Aubert, Soord, Girardet, Bouguereau, Lefebvre, Bonnat, Ciseri, Munkacsy, Harrach, Bacon, Hofmann, Maddox-Brown, von Gebhardt, Gèrôme, Flandrin, Dietrich, Shields, Holman Hunt, Uhde, Roederstein, Jacomb-Hood, Dagnan-Bouveret, Leempoels, Merson, Burne-Jones, Lerolle.

Teachers' Book of Old Testament Heroes, a course of study beautifying and glorifying the moral and religious qualities of Old Testament Characters. By JOHN L. KEEDY. The Graded Sunday School Publishing Company, Boston, 1906. pp. 131.

Fifty characters are selected for description and study, each of whom is given a characteristic phrase; for instance the Maccabees were a family of patriots, Ezra was a second Moses, Esther a brave girl who saved her people, Daniel a man with character who reached the top, Josiah a young man who was serious, Manasseh a man of blood, Asa a Christian statesman, the Rechabites men who loved old customs, Micaiah one man in four hundred who would not lie, Solomon a wise man who made big mistakes, Absalom a promising boy who came to a bad end, Samson a strong man with a weak will, Baal a man who trifled with temptation, etc. This is essentially a guide-book with references to the literature of every subject and with allusions to art, similar incidents in later history, comparisons with modern life, suggestions for teaching and for studying the lesson.

Along with it, goes a pupil's handbook (pp. 88) of Old Testament heroes containing maps, references, suggestions, and above all questions.

89041
P Journal of Religious Psychology
Philos Vol. 2, Mar. 1906 - June 1907
J

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

Do not
remove
the card
from this
Pocket.

Acme Library Card Pocket
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File."
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU